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2Abstract
Municipal health commissions have been key elements in the reform of the Brazilian 
health system over the past thirteen years. The reform made publicly financed health care, in 
principle, universally accessible, while the system became better integrated as well as 
decentralised. Municipal health commissions have become a widespread institutional feature of 
the health system. They have gradually increased their planning and supervisory roles over 
health services located within their territorial jurisdiction.
The participatory schemes of municipal health commissions can achieve better results 
in areas where they have the support of strong social and trade union movements. This is the 
case in the southern region of Brazil and, in particular, in Porto Alegre. This study analyses the 
ways in which users were involved in the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre, 
between 1985 and 1991, verifying which institutional-political factors have most influenced 
their involvement.
The study develops a “methodology” for the assessment of user participation in 
statutory fora. The attendance lists and minutes of meetings, interviews with regular 
participants in the forum, and other sources of information, were used to build up indicators of 
user involvement and of the factors that could influence the participatory process. Two main 
sets of variables are identified. The first set of indicators is concerned with the ways in which 
users participated in the commission. Two indicator-variables were created to assess this 
participation: the attendance of users at weekly plenary meetings of the commission (the 
decision-making division of the forum) and the types of involvement of user representatives in 
the decision-making process. The second set of indicator-variables refers to institutional- 
political factors that could have most influenced the participation of users. Among these are: (a) 
major policy changes in the institutional framework of the Brazilian health system, (b) changes 
in the organisation of urban social movements in Porto Alegre (since trade unions had not 
regularly participated in the work of the commission), (c) changes in the relationship between 
public health professionals and leaders of urban social movements, (d) the types of interest 
which municipal, state and federal health authorities had in promoting the participation of user 
representatives in the decision-making process, and, finally, (e) the types of issues discussed in 
the majority of plenary meetings.
3Relationships were then established between both sets of variables to verify which 
factors most influence this involvement. The study concludes that, between 1985 and 1991, 
variations in the attendance of users at plenary meetings, as well as variations in the type of 
involvement user representatives had in the decision-making process of the forum, were 
strongly associated with important changes: (1) in the institutional framework of the Brazilian 
health system, (2) in the organisation of urban social movements in Porto Alegre and (3) in the 
relationship between public health professionals and leaders of urban social movements. The 
position of municipal health authorities on user participation has also influenced user 
involvement in the commission. The other factors, however, had apparently determined only 
short term changes in user involvement.
The study also highlights the role of Brazilian health system reformers as promoters or 
stimulators of these changes. This policy community had a central role in attracting urban social 
movement activists to become involved in these formalised fora. They can be regarded as policy 
formulators as well as as an active part of an alliance established between them and urban 
social movement activists.
In the case of Porto Alegre, it is possible to affirm that social organisations, particularly 
those representing shantytown populations, sustained consistent involvement of their 
representatives in the overt political spaces of the local and municipal health commissions. 
These commissions had limited power over health services in the city, mostly due to delays in 
placing these services under municipality control. However, the case examined indicates the 
gradual formation of an alternative type of political relationship in the health sector in Porto 
Alegre, in which the interests of the urban shantytown residents are represented formally and 
publicly. In this sense, the consolidation of participatory fora can assist in the democratisation 
of Brazilian institutions, giving voice to social sectors traditionally excluded from the political 
system. Through their involvement in the commission, these representatives were also 
increasing the responsiveness of publicly financed health services to the needs of users who, 
individually, lacked the political power to sustain their demands.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The reform of the Brazilian health system, during the eighties, can be understood within 
the context of reforms underway at that time, in both developed and developing countries. Since 
the thirties, in the view of policy makers and academics, the State would be the main promoter 
of economic growth and welfare (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 2). More precisely, central 
governments would be the principal promoters of progress. Particularly in developing countries, 
the size of the gap between the goals of development and the reality had justified central 
planning and implementation as the best way to deal with social and economic problems. 
During the eighties, however, international donors and development agencies recommended 
reforms based on neo-classical economic theories, challenging the idea of the State inducing 
economic growth and social welfare. The new approach advocated
"a shift ofpower away from central government to the market and to more local levels
o f government” (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 2).
Privatisation and devolution became key notions for many reform initiatives during this decade. 
This new approach on how to achieve development, combined with the idea of primary health 
care, had a strong influence on the reform of the Brazilian health system during the eighties.
The primary health care strategy redefined earlier views that were dominant in the 
health field. Criticism was directed in particular at the concentration of investment in a few 
complex health units, mostly hospitals, usually located in a few large cities (Walt 1994, 5,24). 
The idea was to make health care accessible to all, through a comprehensive network of basic 
health services, whose management would be decentralised and would count on community 
participation. The broad notion of participation, as it was initially conceived of by supporters of 
primary health care, would have distinct meanings according to the peculiarities of each 
country’s political and social organisation. Particularly in developing countries it has often 
resulted in the extension of health care coverage to rural regions and to poor urban areas (Walt 
1994, 5; Paim 1989,19; Cattani and others 1988,71-81).
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The grouping within the same classification of developing countries, whose societies 
and historical backgrounds are so different, is not the most straightforward way of explaining 
their current political organisation or their prospects for the future. Nevertheless, there are some 
common characteristics, well analysed by many studies, that permitted the use of this general 
concept (World Bank 1990; Grindle and Thomas 1991, 43-69). One of these characteristics is 
the lack or weakness of civil society organisation able to counterbalance the political power of 
economic and military elites in alliance with State officials. Particularly in Latin America, 
policy-making is traditionally conducted through informal channels, where business and 
military interests would be represented within the State bureaucracy (Cardoso 1975, 165-86). In 
Latin American countries, non-dominant interests - such as trade unions, rural workers, urban 
dealers - would be systematically excluded from autonomous representation of interest. Their 
demands would be filtered by the clientelistic relations established by politicians and officials 
with obliging leaders or individual clients.
This is a rather limited picture of political life in Brazil during the eighties. The 
prescriptions of international economic and health advisors for less central government, and 
some sort of community, participation in the health services hit a Brazilian society undergoing 
parallel processes of economic crisis, of unprecedented civil society organisation and of 
political liberalisation. Signalling the beginning of the so called “lost decade”, the economic 
crisis combined high inflation with negative or very low economic growth. The loss in 
government revenue due to reduced economic activity, as well as the draining of financial 
resources due to the payment of high interests on a huge external debt, virtually neutralised 
central government as the main agent of economic growth.
At the same time, there was a process of Brazilian civil society organisation taking 
place. Since the end of the seventies, the “new trade union movement” actively demanded pay 
rises and freedom of organisation, and openly opposed the military dictatorship (Keck 1989, 
252-96; Almeida 1984, 191-214). For the first time since the early sixties, rural worker trade 
unions and the landless movement organised public campaigns demanding land reform, and the 
extension of social security benefits to rural workers, among other claims (Hall 1990, 187-232; 
Grzybowski 1987). In the urban field residential associations promoted campaigns demanding 
better services or even, sometimes, the occupation of empty residences or public buildings 
(Baierle 1992; Martes 1990). At the same time, new organisations were created, such as 
environmental associations or feminist groups. The common ground of these organisations and 
movements was the rejection of the authoritarian political regime. They did not reverse 
centuries of authoritarian and elitist domination in the country (Schwartzman 1982), neither was
\19
the majority of the population involved in them. They potentially constituted, however, the 
embryo of a civil society organisation without precedent in the country.
The climax of political liberalisation during the eighties was the end of the military 
regime and the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1988. The new Constitution instituted a 
liberal regime of competitive oligarchies, in which all Brazilians were formally regarded as 
citizens (Weffort 1988, 16). The Constitution created new mechanisms of popular participation 
such as the referendum, plebiscite and popular initiative, and stated that there should be popular 
participation in the health sector (Moists 1990, 33; Brasil 1988, art. 194/VII). The actual 
implementation of such mechanisms remains, however, to be seen. As O’Donnel has affirmed 
(1988, 42), one of the most serious problems for the democratic transitions of South American 
countries was not only the incapacity of democrats to implement suitable strategies for the 
construction of democracy. There was also the difficulty of the new democratic regimes in 
opening up, widely and generously, their decision-making mechanisms to political and social 
sectors that, during the authoritarian period, had been kept outside the political process.
Grindle and Thomas (1991, 63) observed that in most developing countries large 
proportions of the population - peasants and urban shantytown residents, for instance - are not 
organised for sustained political activity. Societal interests are often likely to be represented 
through informal processes rather than through more public forms of lobbying. This was the 
case in Brazil, particularly during the sixties and seventies, when there was a combination of 
lack of political democracy with the exclusion of millions from the most basic services and 
goods made accessible to others through rapid industrialisation and modernisation. Can political 
democratisation stimulate the reversal of this perverse pattern of exclusion? Not necessarily but, 
as Moises pointed out (1990, 33), the construction of channels for effective participation, which 
could articulate the political institutions and the social demands of those recurrently excluded 
before, is a central element for any strategy of democratic consolidation in Brazil.
Setting up these channels of effective participation would require, firstly, the existence 
of organisations that could consistently represent those systematically excluded (Marmor 1983, 
92), such as urban shantytown residents. Secondly, it would help to have a “policy community” 
(Jordan and Richardson 1982, 83) interested in constructing these channels. In the case of the 
reform of the Brazilian health system, there were social movement activists eager to influence 
health policy formulation and implementation. There was also what Grindle and Thomas (1991, 
20) defined, when referring to developing countries in general, as a policy community of 
reformers seeking to mobilise these interest groups, which social movement activists
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represented, and trying to create alliances and coalitions to influence decision-making within 
the government.
Over the last decade, the reform of the Brazilian health system has made health services 
better integrated and decentralised. It is not yet clear whether the changes have improved the 
quality of health care, whether they have made it accessible to all Brazilians or whether they 
have helped to deepen the territorial and social inequalities that already existed (Collins 1989, 
170). There is no doubt, however, that this reform has created, at the municipal level of 
government, a participatory forum that has contributed to democratising the decision-making 
process in the health sector. Between 1984 and 1993, participatory fora were created in nearly 
all cities in the country and most of them have worked regularly since their creation (IBAM and 
others 1993, 33). Although, during the eighties, there was an increase in the organisation of 
civil society in Brazil, there is still a huge variation in the quality of this organisation among 
different Brazilian cities and between urban and rural areas. The strength of the political 
institutions and civil society within a large city could make feasible the participation of interest 
groups, determining the type of involvement users would have in these fora. Although some 
studies have looked at the distribution of such fora in the country or in states (IBAM and others 
1991, IBAM and others 1993, Carvalheiro and others 1992), very few have looked at the 
participatory process actually taking place there (L’Abbate 1990, Martes 1990).
As was mentioned before, the construction of channels for effective participation that 
could articulate political institutions and social demands from those traditionally kept outside 
the political process is essential for the consolidation of democracy in Brazil. It seemed to be 
relevant, thus, to analyse the participatory processes of these fora, especially in cities where 
there was a strong possibility of sustained and independent user participation. Moreover, the 
focus was placed on the participants representing users of public health services, who were 
mostly representatives of shantytown residents, usually placed outside the formal process of 
interest representation in Brazil.
The research, therefore, is concerned with the participatory process itself, aiming 
mainly at answering the following questions'. (1) how users were involved in a municipal health 
forum o f a Brazilian city, where they could be expected to participate; (2) what major factors 
could most affect their involvement. To answer them the research analysed the involvement of 
users in the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre, the capital of the state of Rio Grande 
do Sul, the Southern most Brazilian state, between 1985 and 1991. The chronological limits
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mark the year when the commission was created and the year before the research took place. 
The results of the analysis are presented in seven chapters.
Following chapter one (Introduction), the second and third chapters examine the 
concept of participation and its determinants. Chapter two analyses the concept of participation. 
Initially it stresses the idea of participation as a component of political change in liberal 
democracies and of development projects during recent decades. The analysis highlights the 
emergence and institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms in liberal democracies and the 
importance of the idea of participation in development projects. It goes on to discuss the 
different approaches to State theory and participation. This chapter also examines the social 
actors who are usually regarded as participants and what are the most used classifications of the 
modalities of participation. Taking into account these classifications and the nature of the case 
being studied, it defines the types of involvement of user representatives that were expected to 
be found by this research. Chapter three analyses the major influences that can reinforce or 
hinder user participation. Firstly it highlights the influence of the historical background of 
political organisations, considering their legal and institutional frameworks and their spatial 
organisation. The most influential actors were examined when discussing the concept of interest 
groups, of health authorities, of civil servants and of policy communities. Regarding users as an 
interest group, it discusses how different theories access the idea of interest groups. The chapter 
also discusses the other social actors inside and outside the State who could determine the 
quality of a given participatory process.
The following two chapters focus on the reform of the Brazilian health system, on the 
institutionalisation of the municipal health fora in Brazil, and on the main economic, social and 
health features of Porto Alegre. The first of these two chapters, the fourth of the dissertation, 
describes the evolution of the Brazilian health system, especially during the last decade. It 
allows us to understand how a system that was highly fragmented, centralised and offering 
socially unequal access to health care became better integrated and decentralised and, at least 
formally, universally accessible. Recent changes in the organisation of the health service also 
permitted the visualisation of the context within which municipal health fora became a 
widespread feature of the system. The fifth chapter examines, firstly, the distribution of 
participatory fora throughout the country, to verify whether the region and the size of Brazilian 
cities affects the participatory process. In this chapter, there is also a description of the 
demographic, social and health services of Porto Alegre.
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The last three chapters analyse the case of the municipal health commission of Porto 
Alegre. In the first one, the sixth of the dissertation, the involvement of users in this 
commission is described. Firstly, the organisation and working rules of the municipal 
commission are described. Two indicators of user involvement are analysed: the number and 
types o f users attending plenary meetings, which were the main decision-making division of the 
commission, and the types o f involvement o f user representatives in the decision-making 
process o f the commission. Given the statutory nature of the commission, it was possible to 
discover the number and types of users attending plenary meetings, which offers a very precise 
but limited account of user involvement in the forum. Analysis of documents and interviews 
allows us to examine the way in which user representatives were involved in the commission. 
This second indicator is not as objective as the first, but it offers a substantive account of how 
user representatives were actually involved in the activities of the forum. The analysis of both 
indicators stressed the evolution in number and in types of users attending plenary meetings, the 
involvement of user representatives in the decision-making divisions of the commission, and 
the relationship between the user representatives and the municipal health authorities, who were 
the co-ordinators of the forum.
The seventh chapter examines the variation throughout the period in the major factors 
that could have influenced user involvement. On the one hand, the selection of these factors 
takes into account the literature on the subject, discussed in chapter three. On the other hand, it 
considers the reality of the Brazilian health system and Porto Alegre’s political and social 
particularities, which are analysed in chapters four and five. As a result, the factors regarded as 
major influences on the involvement of users are: (1) recent changes in the institutional 
framework o f the Brazilian health system; (2,3,4) the position o f federal, state and municipal 
health authorities on user participation,; (5) the relationship between public health 
professionals, who worked at local health units, and urban social movement activists,; (6) the 
organisation o f urban social movements in the city; (7) the types o f agenda o f the commission. 
Although examining each actor or factor separately, it highlights the interdependence and the 
importance of the policy community of the Brazilian health system reformers in mediating 
relationships among them.
Finally, the eighth chapter examines the possible existence of an association between 
the involvement of users and the institutional-political factors that could have influenced this 
involvement in the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre. Firstly, the chapter verifies 
whether the number of users attending plenary meetings indicates the intensity of the 
involvement of user representatives in the decision-making process of the commission.
23
Following this, variations in the behaviour of actors or factors that could influence user 
involvement are summarised to establish categories to be linked to the two main indicator- 
variables of user involvement. The chapter also discusses how the relationship between user 
representatives and Brazilian health system reformers has influenced the participatory process.
In Appendix I, the research methodology is described. Although many studies have 
proposed classifications for the types of user involvement in participatory processes (Amstein 
1969, 216-24; Ham 1980, 223-4; Lee and Mills 1985, 129; Paul 1987, 33-4), very few have 
proposed methods for appraising the nature of a participatory process. Bjaras, Haglund and 
Rifkin (1991, 199-206) did so. They were concerned, nonetheless, with “community” 
participation in non-institutionalised fora situations, very different from the municipal health 
commissions in Brazil. Probably because they could not count on documents, attendance lists or 
even on the regularity of meetings, they based their proposal for the assessment of participation 
on the opinions of participants, which could be regarded as a valid but limited type of evidence 
when not cross-checked against other data. Another example of a study of a participatory 
process was the research by Klein and Lewis (1976) on Community Health Councils in Britain. 
In this case they used various types of data, particularly the attendance lists at regular meetings 
of the council. These councils were similar to the Brazilian municipal ones, they met regularly 
at local levels of management and had a well defined institutional role. Nevertheless, the 
authors were mainly concerned with the social profile of “consumer” representatives in order to 
compare them with the profile of those they represented.
The present research focus on the participatory process taking place in the municipal 
commission of health of Porto Alegre. Using various sources of evidence to cross-check 
information about this process, the research tried to develop a new approach to the assessment 
of the participatory process in institutionalised fora. This approach takes into account: the 
physical presence of the users at the commission’s plenary meetings and the type of 
involvement of the user representatives in the commission’s decision-making process. Users are 
regarded as those attending plenary meetings through local urban or trade union organisations, 
representing non-health sector workers. User representatives were considered to be those who 
were legitimately elected or nominated by organisations, such as trade unions or residential 
associations, to represent them in the commission. There is always room for dispute when 
assessing the nature of a participatory process. Regarding these two indicators, it was possible 
to compare the relative intensity of user involvement in an institutionalised forum, in different 
periods, with a reasonable degree of precision.
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Appendix II presents the transcription of the questionnaires from the interviews. Finally 
Appendix III displays the data upon which the Graphs, Tables and statistics presented 
throughout the dissertation are based.
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Chapter 2
Participation and Other Related Concepts
2.1. Introduction
Since the seventies, popular, community, citizen, consumer and user direct participation 
has become a policy issue as governments and International Agencies have created participatory 
mechanisms in many State organisations, programmes, plans and projects. An overview of these 
experiences and of their academic appraisal can give support to building up a group of concepts 
suitable for analysing the particular case of user participation in the municipal health 
commission of Porto Alegre. This overview can contribute to distinguishing who, as a social 
actor, can participate through such mechanisms. Moreover, it can help to define a concept of 
participation. This concept can be qualified in order to establish the range of possible variations 
in intensity and in quality of a participatory process. The literature on participation and the case 
studied will provide the basis for constructing a classification that would make possible the 
analysis of the variable participation in this particular case.
The first section of this chapter shows the historical context in which the idea of 
participation arose, discussing, firstly, the institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms in 
some western liberal democracies and, secondly, the idea of participation in development 
projects. The second part defines the concepts usually associated with the idea of participation, 
as well as the distinct theories on the State role in this field. The third section discusses the 
social actors usually regarded as participants in participatory processes. The fourth discusses 
existing typologies of participation modalities and levels, building up a classification relevant to 
the analysis of the case of the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre.
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2.2. Participation as a Component of Political Changes in Liberal 
Democracies and of Development Projects During Recent Decades
During the late seventies, the idea of participation emerged simultaneously as a new 
component of the political system in liberal democracies, and as an important aspect of 
development projects. Although there are some interfaces between these two processes, their 
paths were distinct.
2.2.1. The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Participatory Mechanisms in 
Western Liberal Democracies
During the late sixties and, in particular, throughout the seventies there was a tangible 
disillusionment with the political process in many western liberal democracies. Empirical 
studies carried out in the United States attested to declining voter participation in elections and 
political-party affiliation, and a growing mistrust of elected representatives. Moreover, they 
suggested decreasing confidence in the major American political institutions (Landsberger 
1980, 229; Langton 1978, 1). Although the American political system was probably the most 
studied, the critique that resulted in a pessimistic view of the political system was extended to 
other liberal democracies (Landsberger 1980, 229).
The climate of dissatisfaction with traditional methods of representing interests was 
accompanied by the political scientists' critique of political institutions in those societies. 
Thinkers from diverse political and theoretical backgrounds converged, highlighting business 
corporation control over party competition, interest group processes and political coverage by 
the mass media. These corporatist arrangements and technocratic government have substituted 
representative politics in determining public policies. Business control of economic resources 
constrains the agenda for political debate (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987,323-5).
The political institutions of liberal democracies, such as State bureaucracies, elected 
representatives and centralised modalities of planning and decision-making, appeared not to be 
so democratic. The voters could only remotely and sporadically supervise the political process, 
and it rather legitimated the inequalities of a political system than increased public control over 
it. Senior officials and politicians were responsive mainly to more powerful social and 
economic groups. Alford's (1975) classical demonstration of how dominant structural interests 
created barriers to reform New York's health services, exemplify such a view. He associated 
those barriers with corporatist characteristics of American society and its political system, and 
was quite pessimistic about the ability of repressed interests to participate or influence the 
decision-making process in the health field (Alford 1975,218-38).
27
A relationship can be identified between the debate about unequal opportunities for 
political involvement and lack of citizen control over State bureaucracies and elected 
representatives, and discussions about participation. Moreover, there should be a connection 
also between the former and the latter, and the growth of new social movements in the late 
sixties and throughout the seventies. As Langton (1978,1) affirms:
"As confidence in and respect for government have declined, a 'passivity- 
participation'syndrome has emerged
It was a two way impulse. The demand for more citizens’ participation came from government 
officials, as well as from citizens. This author affirms that, during the seventies in the United 
States, withdrawal and participation were the two predominant ways of expressing 
dissatisfaction with government and society (Langton, 1978, 1). The trend towards citizens’ 
activism has increased not only in American society; European countries, such as Britain, 
Germany and France (Landsberger 1980; Olives 1976; Pickvance 1975), have also witnessed 
the growth of extra parliamentary citizens' initiatives during the sixties and seventies.
The end of the sixties and the seventies was also regarded as a period when strong 
social movements arose, especially in the larger urban centres of the most industrialised 
countries. These movements were rather distinctive in terms of their origins, the way people 
were enrolled and their objectives (Dunleavy 1988, 32-48; Hannigan 1985, 435-7). They range 
from the "May Revolution" in Paris (1968) to the growth of grassroots neighbourhood, 
consumer and environmentalist organisations in the United States and in other developed 
countries throughout the seventies (Hannigan 1985,436; Langton 1978, 1-3).
Many studies have focused on these new social movements. Very influential in this 
stream of research were the frameworks built up by Touraine (1981) and Castells (1976). 
According to Hannigan (1985,436), the genesis of Touraine's and Castells' perspectives was the 
1968 "May Revolution" in Paris. They distinguished social movements on the basis of their 
anti-institutional orientation, and stressed their autonomy from organised institutions. For them, 
even alliances with political parties or trade unions, although regarded as important, should be 
circumstantial (Hannigan 1985,444). Their mistrust of institutional menaces to the autonomy of 
social movement has been influenced by, and, at the same time, has influenced, the position of 
some social movement activists who perceived participation in State fora as a new way of co­
optation by the establishment. Richardson (1979) has expressed very clearly this paradoxical 
attitude towards participation.
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"In some circles, participation is urged as a vital mean o f increasing the overall 
power o f the participants, while in others it is seen as a devious method o f  decreasing 
their power" (Richardson 1979, 228).
Participation could also be seen as a way of enhancing citizens' power over State 
institutions, or as a manner of legitimising and stabilising political regimes. Nonetheless, it is 
out of the question that the climate of disillusionment with liberal democracies' traditional 
participatory mechanisms, and the upsurge of new interest groups and their respective analysis, 
offered the justification and “created” the activists who would be involved in new participatory 
institutions.
Another element forcing the reshaping of political organisations was the economic 
crisis. During the second half of the seventies, it imposed limits upon government revenue. 
Welfare state agencies were placed under pressure to cut their financial expenditure. Behind the 
political and social unrest there were financial constraints which stimulated governments to 
promote reforms aimed at the rationalisation of State bureaucracy structures. These reforms, in 
many cases, implied the creation of participatory mechanisms.
Hirschman's work (1970) helps in the understanding of how governments with different 
political orientations developed diverse strategies of participation. According to him, there are 
two main ways for a consumer of a product, user of a service, or member of an organisation to 
manifest disapproval: (1) exit: giving up buying or using a given product or service or leaving 
the organisation; (2) voice: expressing opposition. The possibility of exercising the former or 
the latter alternative is directly related to a ''market" situation that could ideally range from total 
monopoly to perfect competition. Although it is a very complex idea with many subtle 
implications, two important strategies which developed from the seventies onwards for 
changing liberal democracies' State organisations can be observed in these concepts.
Conservative policies had mainly stimulated exit as an important element for increasing 
the responsiveness of public or private services to consumer demands. New right thinkers 
maintained that there should be private provision for nearly all services and products supplied 
by governments (Dunleavy 1991, 36-8). Privatisation would ensure that monopolies would be 
replaced by market competition and by a variety of producers, providers and/or organisations. 
At the same time, conservative policies allowed and even promoted consumer participation, 
preferably treating consumers as individuals, given their scepticism about the legitimacy of 
interest groups' internal organisation and leadership.
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Social Democratic policies tended to adopt a diverse perspective. Their emphasis was 
on reforming public organisation through non market based approaches. It focused on 
increasing consumers* or users* opportunities for expressing their opinions, increasing therefore 
their right to voice opposition in the sense defined by Hirschman. It aimed at preserving the 
notion of public provision and sought to reform the manner in which this provision was 
undertaken (Hogget and Hambleton 1987,14).
These approaches were contrasting political alternatives for coping with such complex 
issues as: State financial difficulties, governmental bureaucracies' lack of responsiveness and 
accountability, public dissatisfaction with and mistrust of political institutions, and reshaping 
relationships between new social movements and the State. The strategies were different and 
the political projects were conflicting. The first aimed at the promotion of privatisation, the 
second at public sector reform. The former proposed the end of the dependence culture that 
would create “lazy” individuals, while the latter aimed at maintaining the egalitarian ideals of 
equity and social justice. The social sectors that backed these policies were also totally diverse. 
While business interest groups supported the first, trade unions endorsed the second (Hogget 
and Hambleton 1987, 14). Nevertheless, both sought the creation of participatory mechanisms, 
tightening controls over bureaucracies and rationalising the State apparatus.
There are several cases of the institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms 
throughout many western countries during the seventies. It was the case in the United States 
(Alford 1975; Bates 1983; Gormley 1986; Landsberger 1980; Langton 1978; Marmor 1983), in 
Great Britain (Bates 1983; Klein and Lewis 1976; Klein 1989; Landsberger 1980; Lee and 
Mills 1985; Levit 1980; McEwen, Martini and Wilkins 1983; Wainwright 1992), in Canada 
(Godbout 1981; O'Neill 1992), in Germany (Landsberger 1980) and in Japan (Broadbent 1988). 
In these countries several examples can be found that vary in terms of area or type of 
participation allowed or stimulated by State managers or bureaucrats. Participatory schemes 
were implemented in areas such as air traffic, food and drug licensing, coastal management, 
environmental, educational, housing, energy, social work and health regulation, administration 
and/or policy formulation. The nature of this participation could vary from mere advocacy of 
consumer or user interests and forms of user or consumer consultation to active citizen, user or 
consumer involvement in committees, commissions or councils.
Specifically in the health sector, the more consistent experiences can be found in the 
United States, Britain and Canada. In the United States, during the late sixties and the seventies, 
there was citizens’ participation in the Boards of Neighbourhood Health Centres and
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Community Mental Health Centres, and long-term ombudsman health care programmes were 
established in most states (Langton 1978; Landsberger 1980; Gormley 1986). The most 
innovative change took place in 1974, when the National Health Planning and Resource 
Development Act established that there would be a consumer majority on the governing boards 
of the 210 new Health System Agencies (Landsberger 1980, 231). In Britain, in 1974, there 
were the Non-Executive Members of the Health Authorities and the Community Health 
Councils (CHC). The latter were created, during that year, in the lower administrative tiers of 
the National Health Service (hereafter NHS): Area Health Authority and District Management 
Team. They would represent the independent consumer's view on the services provided by the 
NHS (Wainwright 1992; Klein and Lewis 1976). In the Canadian health sector there was the 
case of Quebec where, from 1970 to 1972, laws were passed reforming the health sector. They 
established that citizens would participate in the boards of hospitals and nursing homes and in 
social work agencies. They also created the Local Community Health Centre (Centre Local de 
Services Communautaires - CLHC) that would be the entry point for all health and social work 
services throughout Quebec province (O'Neill 1992, 292). By law, citizens were represented on 
the boards of CLSCs. Until 1982 they had the majority of the voting seats.
The importance and recurrence of the institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms 
in the health field can be associated with the pressures discussed above for changing public 
institutions, and also to the stimulus of International Agencies to community or popular 
participation during the seventies.
2.2.2. Development Projects and Participation
In many developing countries during the fifties and the sixties there were development 
policies aimed at increasing income per capita and changing
"national economies from predominantly rural-agricultural to urban-industrial It 
required a continual incorporation o f productivity-raising technological innovations, 
and an increasing ability to exploit natural resources and transform the environment" 
(Wolfe 1982, 80).
Certain industrialised countries were identified as the model to be followed, while 
planning was seen as the main device for guiding and stimulating the development process. It 
was argued that, in the initial stages of this process, income had to be concentrated in the hands 
of entrepreneurs or of the State. In this phase, the participation of the population, as consumers 
or political actors struggling to participate in income sharing, was regarded as dangerous for 
dominant social sectors. People were seen mainly as producers who should improve their skills 
and internalise the work-ethic of industrial societies (Wolfe 1982, 80-1).
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In many developing countries the distribution of income remained highly unequal. 
Industrialisation and agricultural modernisation proved to be very disruptive. There were 
recurrent balance of payments crises and rising debt burdens. The enormous urban 
agglomerations that were forming suffered from many environmental problems. At the same 
time, the developed countries had lost their plausibility as models and planning strategies 
appeared incapable of promoting development or a more equal distribution of the national 
income.
In this context, two opposed conceptions of development have emerged (Wolfe 1982, 
83). One regarded State intervention through planning and regulation of social and economic 
affairs as a constraint on the development process. The role of the State should be limited to 
safeguarding the rules of the game, making markets function efficiently. The other was made up 
of distinct proposals based on the socially oriented criticisms of economic development. It 
consisted of projects that ranged from utopian blueprints for egalitarian new societies to 
relatively cautious projects looking at political and economic constraints, giving priority to the 
satisfaction of basic social needs. Despite their different political and ideological inspirations, 
the two conceptions had similarities. They conferred a large degree of relevance on the 
legitimacy of differing national styles of development, and on the values of equity, human 
solidarity and creativity. They considered popular participation as an element of the 
development process (Wolfe, 1982, p. 82-3). The idea was to create opportunities for political 
involvement and for
"the adoption o f  measures that would enable ordinary people to share fully in the 
development process" {Midgley 1986, 19).
During the seventies, some important international organisations promoted projects that 
took into account at some level the notion of community participation. Such was the case at the 
World Bank (IBRD), at the Inter American Development Bank (IDB), at the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO), at the Milbank Foundation, at the Rockfeller Foundation and 
at the Kellogg Foundation, among others (Ugalde 1985, 41; Paul 1987, 11-4). Nonetheless, few 
of these organisations have regarded popular participation as a central strategy for achieving 
social development. Exceptions were the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD), the United Nations Children's Fund (hereafter UNICEF) and the 
World Health Organisation (hereafter WHO) (Stiefel and Pearse 1982, 146-55; Midgley 1986, 
21-7; Wolfe 1982, 85).
Midgley observed (1986, 22) that the most significant contribution to consolidating 
policies concerned with popular or community participation came from the UNICEF/WHO
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Declaration on Primary Health Care at the Alma Ata Conference in 1977. It recommended the 
implementation of primary health care policies, which would stimulate community self-reliance 
(Hollnsteiner 1982, 37-8). Midgley affirms that
"above all, it called for mobilisation o f  local communities to take responsibility for 
their own health" (Midgley 1986, 22).
Although primary health care principles have also been very influential for the health 
policies of developed countries, in developing countries these principles became the major 
guideline for the formulation and implementation of health policies. It was seen by International 
Agencies and developing country policy makers as a powerful device for surmounting poverty. 
Some authors believed, however, that it could become a strategy for offering ’’poor" health 
services for the poorest groups in developing countries, while those not so poor would be able 
to buy better services in the market (Mendes 1987, 272-5; Navarro 1983, 150). Instead of 
helping to overcome poverty it would reinforce the social inequalities in developing countries.
The WHO and the Pan American Health Organisation (hereafter PAHO) promoted 
policies and advised Latin American governments to implement primary health care policies 
that could foster community participation. There were, nonetheless, different appraisals of Latin 
American experiences of community participation in the health field inspired by primary health 
care principles. According to Ugalde, the experience in Latin America, with the exception 
perhaps of Cuba and Nicaragua, showed that community participation failed to improve the 
quality of life of the majority of the population. He affirmed that:
"[o]n the contrary, the evidence suggests that community participation has produced 
additional exploitation o f the poor by extracting free labour, it has contributed to the 
cultural deprivation o f  the poor, and has contributed to political violence by the outing 
and suppression o f leaders and the destruction o f grassroots organisations" (Ugalde 
1985, 43).
In a similar way, Midgley (1986, 149) affirmed that, with few exceptions, the ideals of 
community participation had been lost due to administrative inefficiencies in government 
administration. In contrast, Stiefel and Pearse's (1982, 156) general assumption was that, in 
Latin America, despite widespread authoritarianism,
"the present stage o f  development offers favourable conditions for the promotion o f  
social movements as a form o f expression o f  popular demands and participation ” 
(Stiefel and Pearse 1982,156).
During the eighties, structural adjustment policies regarded popular or community 
participation as a secondary issue. The main international organisations took it into account 
only as a cost-reducing exercise for improving self-reliance, creating solutions without State 
help or direct intervention. The main interest of these agencies was in the adjustment of
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developing countries' economies through liberal policies that were intended to reduce the State's 
size. At the same time, for Latin American governments, the central issue became how to cope 
with their economic and financial problems.
Although community participation was one of the basic assumptions of the primary 
health care approach, another, and probably the most central, was the rational use of scarce 
resources. The emphasis would be on applying simple technology throughout a comprehensive 
health system that would reach every community, although targeting the poorest ones. In this 
sense primary health care policies did not contradict the International Agencies' new tone. It 
could be a way of rationalising State resource utilisation selectively reaching the poor and 
extending the "market" for allopathic medicine. At the same time, the rest of the population 
could get health services from the private market, where the State would not be responsible for 
its organisation or regulation.
Behind the structural adjustment policy recommendations of the International Agencies 
there was a general climate in political debates which criticised the State's role and the 
conventional way in which liberal democracies had dealt with representation of interests. The 
previous creation of participatory mechanisms in many developed countries, during the 
seventies, and the International Agencies’ concern with the role of popular or community 
participation in development projects during the late sixties and seventies, were thematically 
related but distinctive processes. The first process helped to reshape statutory political 
institutions, redefining the relationship between State and civil society. Its main directives were 
liberalisation through privatisation and deregulatory strategies or the reform of the public sector 
assuring the maintenance of the State's products and services provision. Usually it represents 
the institutionalisation of consumer or citizen involvement through the creation of participatory 
mechanisms or the opening of already existing statutory fora for their participation. The second 
process promoted projects or particular policies that, at low cost and maximum resources 
utilisation, would take advantage of cultural peculiarities and rely strongly on the community's 
own potentiality for self-help. The role of the community in primary health care projects, for 
example, could vary from temporary consultation, or help in terms of financing or labour, to 
taking part in the planning or implementation processes.
In the health field, primary health care strategy since the seventies has affected policy 
formulation in developed and developing countries. In the former it mostly meant establishing 
new directives to over-technological and hospital-centred policies. Community or popular 
participation was a contingent aspect of these projects or policies, although an important one.
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They did not usually propose the institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms. These 
mechanisms could, however, become a helpful outside control over reluctant bureaucracies 
resisting the acceptance of expenditure cuts and other rationalising measures. Although this 
rationalisation was justified by primary health care arguments and epidemiological evidence 
that most health problems could be solved through a comprehensive network of services 
providing very simple health care, the changes that took place in the United States, Britain and 
Canada, during the late sixties and the seventies, were certainly part of a more extensive 
process of reshaping political institutions.
In developing countries, primary health care represented an effort towards 
rationalisation of the health sector and towards increasing popular or community involvement 
in the politics of this sector. The institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms in the 
Brazilian health sector during the eighties was related to the emphasis placed by International 
Agencies, especially WHO and PAHO, on primary health care principles and their stimulus to 
popular or community participation. It was associated also with the impact that the discussion 
of changing political practices in western liberal democracies had on the Brazilian political 
system then in the process of liberalisation after many years of military dictatorship. It was also , \  j
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a result of the huge Brazilian institutional, political, social and economic crisis during the 
eighties. Nevertheless, the political and administrative dynamic of the Brazilian health sector 
itself was the most powerful driving force for its reform and for the creation of participatory 
mechanisms inside the health system. Primary health care policies stimulating community or 
popular participation, and the polemic about liberal democratic political systems, shaped the 
arguments for the political agents acting within the context of the political discussions and 
conflicts surrounding the process of reform.
2.3. Different Approaches to State Theory and Participation
Hitherto, the concept of participation has been used in association with different agents 
or possible participants. The way it can be used varies according to the historical period or to 
the political-ideological conditioning factors. Although some advocates of community 
participation are anti-statist (Midgley 1986, 16), almost every political or sociological approach 
to State theory is concerned with the issue. Sometimes the creation or existence of participatory 
mechanisms is not a major concern, but State theories always have some sort of explanation for 
the relationship between State and civil society. These explanations do not usually place 
participatory mechanisms as a central issue, but they always discuss them, normally relating the 
concepts of community, popular, citizen, consumer or user to the idea of participation.
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The analysis of popular participation in the public sector decision-making process 
implies focusing on the role and functions of the State in modem societies. According to 
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987), approaches to this theme can be grouped into five clusters. There 
are enormous variations among the authors' ideas placed under each label, but some key issues 
allowed the classification they have made. Their general conceptions of the western liberal 
States and the way they posit the issues of decentralisation, of local government and of citizen, 
consumer or user participation are very briefly presented below.
(1) Pluralism
Pluralists consider
"that the State mediates between sectional interests compromising between the 
demands o f  various associations and classes" (Midgley 1986, 6).
They conceive power in society as being dispersed among distinct interest groups that compete 
with each other in an open political system. Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987, 57-8) affirm that 
pluralists are advocates of decentralisation. Elected local governments, where specifically local 
decision-making processes can take place, in their understanding prevent the emergence of 
'democratic' despotism
"and multiple points o f access and sites for pressure groups activity enhance citizen 
participation and control over politicians" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, 57).
(2) New Right
The new right attacked the idea of State interventionism and welfarism. They are said 
to foster people's dependency on the State and to hinder economic growth (Midgley 1986, 8). 
They regard the democratic process as characterised by gross imperfections. According to 
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987, 95-108), some authors point out the defects of the interest 
group’s internal process - mainly criticising the restricted membership influence over leaders - 
and recommend improvements in democratic organisations. In general they assume that the 
leaders of civil society organisations, such as trade unions for instance, do not represent the 
interests of the majority of their members. Lobbies representing interest groups press for 
continuous enlargement of State control over society. The public choice approach assumes that 
citizens are rational actors concerned with maximising the ratio of benefits received from 
government, particularly from local authorities, which are assumed to be run by
"managers interested primarily in maximising the tax base o f their localities" 
(Dunleavy 1984,61).
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They usually advocate reducing the role of the State and restoring the role of 
individuals as consumers. They defend State administrative decentralisation where citizens or 
consumers can choose localities where services or goods are provided and can better meet their 
needs. The main way they conceive of citizen participation is as consumers. Public services or 
goods should be provided mostly by private organisations able to compete for potential 
consumers.
(3) Elite Theory
These theories suggest that the State will always exist and that oligarchies will always 
dominate political life.
"The overthrow o f arty elite merely results in its replacement by another elite" 
(Midgley 1986, 7).
Some elite theory sociologists have studied communities analysing
"political process as one aspect o f the social life o f the locality, and concluded that 
only a handful o f  people were influential in setting major decisions" (Dunleavy and 
O'Leary 1987, 144).
According to Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987, 145), radical elite theorists argue that 
existing political arrangements do not make feasible direct control by citizens over decisions 
affecting their lives. Decentralisation or local government, however, does not change the 
fundamental power structure, and does not allow any sort of authentic citizen participation. In a 
decentralised State organisation, instead of central elites, there will be local or regional elites,
"tied to national elites by networks o f patronage, clientelism, and control over public 
expenditure" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987,179).
(4) Marxism
Marxists usually analyse the State as an instrument for managing the common affairs of 
the bourgeoisie. At the same time, its main function is to maintain the capitalist system. Only at 
very specific historical moments can it assume an arbiter's role (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, 
208-11). Neo-marxists recognise that state-economy and state-society relationships are much 
more complicated than classical Marxism suggests (Midgley 1986,6).
According to Dunleavy (1984, 63), there are basically two main Marxist perspectives 
on central-local government relationships. The first stresses the potential utility of local 
government as a defence of working-class interests against central government attempts to 
reintroduce 'market disciplines' into areas of social life previously dominated by 'welfarism'. In 
contrast, the second assumes that the continued decentralisation of functions to local authorities
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serves mainly to break up working-class power over the central government to the benefit of 
dominant class interests (Dunleavy 1984,64).
Many Marxists regard popular participation at local level as a means of organising the 
working-class for revolutionary change of the whole system. Nevertheless, neo-marxists, 
particularly eurocommunists, have accepted the liberal democratic way of achieving political 
power. In this sense, the idea of participation can become a political principle to be pursued and 
not only a means to prepare revolutionary change. Conventional Marxism, however, considers 
local government as an extension of the dominant class political network for working-class 
submission. User participation in any State organisation is seen mostly as a manipulative 
strategy to legitimise the capitalist system and to exert patronage over the working-class.
(5) Neo-Pluralists
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987, 271-3) affirm that neo-pluralism is a derivation of the 
pluralist stream of thought. Neo-pluralists
suggest a much more sophisticated liberal analysis, centring on the operations o f  
large corporations and the modem extended State, sensitive to the problems and 
deficiencies o f current social arrangements, but coldly realistic about the limited 
scope o f reform" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, 272).
The traditional arrangements, emphasising direct control by representative political 
institutions over bureaucracy, have become less efficacious. Instead western States
"have shifted towards progressively more professionalised policy systems [.] (...) 
Governmental fragmentation remains important in such systems, however, as a means 
o f building in controls and forcing different professional groups to balance out 
different aspects o f public interest concerns" (Dunleavy 1984, 59).
Pluralists posit that one of the fundamental causes of problems in western democracies 
is too little citizen control over the State decision-making process. Instead of centralised, statist 
strategies supported in different forms by western Communists and Social Democratic parties, 
most neo-pluralists
"advocate a mixture o f  market socialism, industrial democracy inside firms, a limited 
use o f  public enterprises and other forms o f social ownership, and o f course an 
extensive program o f government decentralisation" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, 
70).
Otherwise, other neo-pluralists clearly write off any possibility of reinforcing existing 
channels for public participation via representative institutions. The main issue for these writers 
is not how to increase power for the common people, but how to promote equal benefits. In this 
sense, popular rule means the fulfilment of popular needs (Sartori 1987,150).
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Although these five approaches treat the question of participation in very distinct ways, 
they are all concerned, some more than others, with the question of local participation in public 
sector decision-making processes. Nevertheless, the definition of who may participate can vary 
according to different authors and also according to the focus of each study. The concepts most 
often utilised are popular, community, citizen, consumer or user participation.
2.4. Who Participates
Popular participation has mostly been used by social scientists in a Marxist tradition 
to designate the participation of those who do not belong to the dominant class of a society. The 
expression "popular" is usually applied to people who take no part or little part in enjoying the 
wealth generated by society. It can be regarded as more accurate in sociological terms than the 
notion of "community", as it takes into account social class differences. Nevertheless, the 
concept of popular participation is very broad and diffuse. To use this concept, it is necessary to 
qualify the territory it encompasses and to establish who can be thought of as being able to 
participate under this label.
Many authors have criticised the concept of community participation (Glassberg 
1981, 6-12; Hollnsteiner 1982, 39-40; Midgley 1986, 23-5; Tumwine 1989, 157-8; among 
others). "Community" is usually employed to refer to some local population as a whole. In this 
sense, the concept is precise in terms of spatial boundaries. Nevertheless, it does not express 
social cleavages. Thus, its utilisation becomes difficult, unless one employs qualifications that 
specify who is regarded as being able to participate, who is considered as belonging to the 
community or what the social differences within the community are.
The concept of citizen participation has its origins in classical pluralist theory 
(Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, 293). Marshall (1963) developed the concept of citizens’ rights, 
extending its range from political and civil rights to the notion of social rights. Mishra (1977, 
34-8) criticises Marshall, arguing that the notion of political and civil rights differs from the 
notion of social rights. Even considering that critique, it is undeniable that Marshall's thought 
has been very influential in the diffusion of the idea that citizens' participation in the political 
process is as much a right as citizens' participation in the wealth produced in societies. 
Nevertheless, the concept of "citizen" designates every country's inhabitant. In this sense, one 
can call "citizens" individuals of any social origin. It also becomes difficult to utilise the 
concept to designate who participates in a particular process, which can take place in a specific 
territorial area and/or field of social policy.
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The concept of consumer participation is currently related mainly to new right theory. 
Nevertheless, the notion is used largely by authors identified with other approaches. The notion 
of '’consumer" comes from the economy. It refers to individuals buying, in the market, goods or 
services that are offered by different sellers or providers. The concept is closely associated with 
the notion of competition among sellers and providers for attracting consumers, and to 
individual choice in the consumption of some service or good. Hambleton (1988, 129) points 
out the difficulties of using these notions for some social services. Particularly in the health 
field in developing countries, it is rather unrealistic to suggest that the worse off have a free 
choice to opt for one type of service or another, or for choosing one region or another in which 
to live according to the public services they can find (Abel-Smith 1976, 155-7). They are 
actually 'compulsory' consumers of the cheapest and more accessible services.
Finally, the concept of user participation usually refers to a particular group of people 
that uses some specific service. It is the concept that this research mainly uses, associated with 
the idea of participation. It has some similarities to the concept of consumer participation, but 
the seller/buyer relationship is not its main characteristic. It combines notions of citizenship and 
citizens’ rights that originated in the concept of citizen participation, but refers specifically to 
users of particular services provided in a single territorial area. In this sense, it retains the 
political dimension of the citizens’ universal democratic right to participate, but refers to the 
participation of a given population segment that uses particular services.
2.4.1. User Representatives and the Concept of Representation
This research analyses the involvement of the users of health services in a statutory 
forum, highlighting the participation of their representatives. Whether it is possible to treat 
these representatives as legitimate, and what is the nature of their representation in this forum, 
is questionable.
According to Pitkin's classical study (1969) there are four main approaches or views on 
representation. The first presents a rather formalistic view, regarding the representative as a 
person
"who acts in the name o f another, who has been given authority to act by that another, 
so whatever the representative does is considered the act o f the represented" (Pitkin 
1969, 8).
Such a view portrays the representative as a free person who acts as s/he chooses. It does not 
matter whether s/he is a monarch, aristocrat or elected representative, s/he is the sovereign. In
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that sense it does not matter whether people's wishes are considered or their interests protected 
(Pitkin 1969, 8).
The second view sees representation as descriptive. The representative stands in for 
someone who is absent, substituting the latter. They, representative and represented, should be 
sufficiently alike, resembling each other. The body of representatives must be an accurate map 
of the whole population,
"a portrait o f the people, a faithful echo o f their voice, a mirror which reflects 
accurately the various parts o f the public " (Pitkin 1969, 10).
In this case, the emphasis is on achieving the correct composition of representatives, as though 
they were a sample of the population represented. What the representatives should do, once they 
are chosen, is not discussed because they resemble the population and should act like it.
The symbolic view conceives of the representative as a symbol who, although standing 
in for someone, does not resemble that person. In this case, it does not matter how the 
representative is chosen or what he substantively does. The connection between representative 
and represented is not based on anything objective. It is mediated by irrational relations that 
make people believe in a symbol, a certain man. This usually means working on the minds of 
the represented. Irrational appeals that enhance belief in a charismatic leader became the focus 
instead of the representation itself. In this sense, representation becomes a power relation of the 
leader over those he supposedly represents (Pitkin 1969, 12-3).
The fourth approach perceives representation as a substantive political action. It relies 
on the idea of acting for another, not in the
"merely formal sense that one has been authorised or will be held to account, but the 
real substance behind that formality: the activity o f representing" (Pitkin 1969, 14).
Such a view allows us to distinguish between a person's formal, legal position and those s/he 
actually represents, in terms of actions. Thus, for instance, it is possible to say that some 
legislator or representative represents the interests of users of health services. More important 
than formal authorisation or accounting, or whether s/he symbolises or resembles the 
represented, is the substance of her/his activity which is identified with those interests (Pitkin 
1969,14).
In the health field these paradigms have influenced the way in which user 
representation was conceived when participatory fora were created. The discussion around the 
validity of the descriptive model of user representation that had been applied in the United
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States to the Health System Agencies (hereafter HSA), can illustrate this model’s pitfalls and 
points to alternative forms of dealing with the problem of user representation in the health 
sector. The user dominated HSAs were established in 1974. They were statutory and obliged to 
descriptively represent all the social and demographic groups in the community. There were 
some problems with this way of selecting representatives. Firstly, mirroring an entire population 
is impossible, as the potential range of interest groups is infinite (Wainwright 1992, 13). 
Secondly, rather than mirroring a given population's interests and opinions, it just reflects its 
demographic characteristics (Marmor 1983, 81). The third difficulty is that not all
characteristics ought to be represented; racist or sexist discriminatory feelings, although
present, should not be accepted (Marmor 1983, 82). The fourth problem is that it makes 
recourse to constituencies unnecessary, as it emphasises broad representation paying little 
attention to accountability (Marmor 1983,82).
Moreover, representation would be more successful if the focus was displaced from 
demographic resemblance, which supposedly assures similar political views, to the pursuit of 
user interests. In this sense the
"effectiveness o f  representatives is crucial for substantive representation. An eloquent 
speaker or a skilful political operator can be said to provide better substantive 
representation than another -with an equal understanding o f  constituent interests but 
without the same skills ” (Marmor 1983,82).
Even if representatives have better social conditions than the average constituent, their 
representative capacity, or even leadership, will be legitimated through the idea of
constituencies. Substantive representation introduces the idea of constituencies that should
choose their representatives, who have to be accountable and easily substituted if not pursuing 
properly what users perceive as their interest.
Examining who can take part in participatory fora helps to define the participants 
involved in these fora. It does not clarify, however, the quality and intensity of their 
involvement. The next section discusses how this issue was tackled in the literature on 
participation.
2.5. Modalities and Levels of Participation
Many authors have elaborated different classifications for categorising (a) types o f 
"involvement" in the decision-making process, (b) distinct agency attitudes or proposals fo r  
involving users in this process and (c) diverse degrees of user participation.
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Lee and Mills' (1985) typology establishes four types o f "involvement" of various 
bodies in the planning process. It is concerned especially with how different interests and 
organisations are articulated in the decision-making process. The authors define the following 
types:
(1) Collaboration when
"the organisation or groups in question have equal rights to be involved in the 
formulation o f each other's goals and in their achievement where these are matters o f 
mutual responsibility, concern and interests" (Lee and Mills 1985, 129).
(2) Participation when
"representatives o f interest groups actively take part in the decision-making process, 
and have equal power to affect the outcome" (Lee and Mills 1985, 129).
(3) Consultation when advice, information or opinions are sought by a consulting body which 
has no commitment to follow views received and is alone responsible for the final decision.
(4) Negotiation when
"one body cannot get what it wants without seeking an accommodation with another 
party" (Lee and Mills 1985, 129).
This classification establishes a conceptual distinction in the notion of participation itself. It 
considers as generic the term "involvement" rather than "participation". More than one of these 
types of involvement can be found in the same decision-making process according to its 
different moments or phases.
Two alternative classifications were formulated by Ham (1980, 223-4) and Paul (1987). 
Ham’s typology is related mainly to different sorts of public officers' attitudes towards users. 
There is (1) negotiation, when public officers seek a group's view on a decision and it is 
contingent upon group approval. There is (2) consultation, when a group view is actively 
sought by decision makers but may or may not be taken into account. (3) Public relations exist 
when a group's views are sought but do not exert any influence over the decision-making 
process. Finally, there is (4) articulation, when a group's views are presented without having 
been sought by decision makers (Ham 1980, 223). Although this typology can be used for 
classifying government or public officers' intentions in promoting user participation, it is less 
useful than the first one for examining the actual relationships that can be established between 
users and different interest groups.
Another aspect discussed in the literature is government or agency objectives in 
supporting community participation. Paul (1987, 3-4) developed a classification for analysing
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development projects. Nevertheless, it can be also applied to policy implementation analysis. 
Although the author’s major concern was with the objectives of given projects, it can be used in 
the appraisal of participatory processes, promoted either by development institutions or by 
statutory agencies. According to the author, a project or policy can aim to achieve one or more 
of the following objectives.
(1) Empowerment
"should lead to an equitable sharing o f  power and to a higher level o f  people's, in 
particular the weaker groups', political awareness and strengths" (Paul 1987, 3).
The empowerment of people through project or development activity is a means of making 
them able to initiate actions on their own and thus influence the process and outcomes of 
development. In this sense, political participation does not have value per se. It should also 
favour the sharing of the benefits of development by weaker groups.
(2) Building Beneficiary Capacity means promoting the beneficiaries' capacity for sharing in 
the management tasks of the project. They may take operational responsibility for a segment of 
the project or policy.
(3) Enhancing the Effectiveness of a project or policy may promote the beneficiaries' 
involvement in improving its design and implementation, and for improved matching of 
services with beneficiaries' needs.
(4) One objective also could be Cost-sharing, in terms of money, labour or maintenance of the 
project with the people it serves.
(5) User participation may improve Efficiency, promoting agreement, co-operation and 
interaction among beneficiaries, as well as between them and the implementing agency.
The classification elaborated by Amstein (1969) established different degrees of 
citizens' participation through defining governments’ or public officers’ formal or hidden ways 
of and intentions in promoting it. However, this typology can be easily applied to the analysis of 
community, popular or user participation in the decision-making process. Working with the 
analogy of a ladder, she considers that at its bottom rungs lie (1) Manipulation and (2) 
Therapy, that is "non-participation".
"Their real objective is not to enable people to participate in planning or conducting 
programs, but to enable power holders to 'educate' or 'cure' the participants" 
(Amstein 1969,217).
Rungs (3) Informing and (4) Consultation progress to levels of "tokenism" that allow the 
participants to have "hearing" and "voice". Rung (5) Placation is a higher level of "tokenism"
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because, although the power holders allow the participants to advise, the right to decide remains 
in the hands of the former. The final three levels of participation signify real user involvement 
in the decision-making process. (6) Partnership enables them to negotiate and engage in trade­
offs with power holders.
"At the topmost rungs, (7) Delegate Power and (8) Citizen Control have-not 
citizens obtain the majority o f decision-making seats, or full managerial power" 
(Amstein 1969,217).
The Amstein typology is concerned mainly with levels of user empowerment in the decision­
making process. Her analysis highlights the actual level of sharing in decisions and the degree 
of power holders' utilisation of participatory strategies for keeping political power even if 
apparently they are sharing it.
The mere existence of participatory mechanisms does not ensure actual sharing of 
power. There can be citizen control over a given political forum but the issues decided there can 
be secondary or irrelevant. Behind the formal process of making decisions there is a previous 
selection of what should or should not be placed on the agenda to be decided by the actors who 
participate in this formal process. The real decision-making process is much broader than the 
formal or legal one. Decision-making can be analysed as a process where political actors have 
to decide some clear issues. It is established through political relationships in which social 
actors exchange empirically observable power relations.
Bachrach and Baratz (1962 and 1963) affirm that many studies looked only at formal 
decision-making situations. They alert investigators to the fact that there is an equal or even 
more important area to be researched which might be called "non decision-making". The 
decision-making process that is opened to citizens' participation is made up of only safe issues. 
The process of establishing the political agenda remains a very closed one (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1963, 632).
Lee and Mills (1985, 128), quoting Lukes, argue that the process of establishing open 
or hidden agendas is a very complex one. The exclusion may result from unconscious and non­
individual choice. The socially structured behaviour pattern of groups and practices of 
institutions have a strong influence over the way power is exercised. Thus, decision-making 
processes are made up of a complex cluster of observable and non-observable conflicts and 
accommodations. In this context, power is exercised through coercion or consensus. The latter 
means a power relation where the powerful party might manipulate the other socio-political 
forces and/or exert authority or influence. It may also mean a situation where decisions are 
made with different socio-political forces participating often through negotiation.
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Considering the objectives of this research, its focus on user participation, the empirical 
reality of a municipal forum in the Brazilian health sector and the literature discussion on the 
subject, it will mainly use the following typology for defining types o f user representatives* 
involvement:
(1) Non-participation - This means that, although users have the right to participate in the 
decision-making process, representatives of user organisations do not take part in it. The issues 
to be placed on the commission's agenda are selected and decided mainly by health authorities.
(2) Manipulation - This means that, although users have the right to take part in the decision­
making process, they do not participate autonomously. Users can be involved in the 
commission’s activities, but they only exert their legal discretionary power to reinforce health 
authorities’ positions. In this situation, health authorities select most of the issues to be placed 
on the agenda and decisions are made almost only by these authorities.
(3) Delegation - As in the previous type, users have the right to participate in the decision­
making process, but do not usually do so. Health authorities can allow and stimulate user 
participation, but users exercise very little of their discretionary power. Nevertheless, they are 
not relinquishing their political power but are just giving a sort of "confidence vote” to those 
authorities. In this situation, health authorities select most of the issues to be placed on the 
agenda with user representatives' agreement and the decisions are made mostly by these 
authorities with user representatives' acceptance.
(4) Negotiation - This means that "one body cannot get what it wants without seeking an 
accommodation with another party" (Lee and Mills 1985, 129). This situation can occur when 
health authorities try to hinder user participation but the users insist upon it. It creates a conflict 
situation that could be solved through "negotiation". The main issues are placed on the agenda 
by health authorities but some can be excluded and new ones can be added due to user 
representatives' political pressure. The decisions are the result of negotiations between health 
authorities and user representatives.
(5) Participation - There is participation when user representatives "actively take part in the 
decision-making process, and have equal power to affect the outcome" (Lee and Mills 1985, 
121). In this situation, the agenda will be made up of issues selected by the health authority but 
also by user representatives. The decisions are made both by health authorities and user 
representatives.
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2.6. Summing Up
During the last three decades the idea of participation has emerged in both developed 
and developing countries. This process took place in the context of a critique of traditional 
forms of political representation and discussions about their transformation. One innovative 
modality of political relationship between State and civil society arose in this context. It was the 
institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms, allowing or stimulating involvement of new 
social actors, such as the residential urban movement. Particularly in the health sectors of 
developing countries, since the late seventies and eighties, there has been a strong influence by 
International Agencies' primary health care policies which have stimulated popular or 
community participation in different phases of project planning and implementation. These two 
elements, liberal democracies’ reshaping of their modalities of political representation and 
International Agencies' promotion of community or popular involvement in health actions, 
reached Brazil during a period of economic crisis and of political democratisation, thus 
influencing the nature of the health system reform in the country. One element of this reform 
was allowing and establishing that there should be popular participation in the health sector.
The literature about participation, in the health sector or in other areas, utilises normally 
the concepts of popular, community, consumer, citizen and user participation. The focus of this 
research is on user participation, users being defined as a particular group of people who use 
some specific services. Users normally participate on a regular basis through their 
representatives. Although the literature presents different approaches to this subject, substantive 
representation can be seen as a more effective way of representing users' interests.
The participation of users and their representatives can be more or less intense and its 
quality can vary. Studying different realities and highlighting distinct aspects, many authors 
have analysed participatory processes and built up typologies for classifying the degree and 
quality of its variation. They have focused on types o f "involvement" in the decision-making 
process, distinct agency attitudes or proposals for involving users in this process and diverse 
degrees of user participation. Taking these models into account, considering that decision­
making processes open to citizens' participation can be made up of only politically non-decisive 
issues, and regarding the empirical reality to be analysed, this research will mainly discuss the 
notions of non-participation, manipulation, negotiation, delegation and participation for 
defining different levels and types of involvement.
The quality and intensity of a participatory process are the result of a cluster of 
institutional rules, structures and practices which establish its possibilities and limits. Social
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actors inside, around or behind this process also determine its shape and dynamic. This chapter 
has aimed to display the recent historical context in which the idea of direct participation has 
arisen, defining who can participate and how the level and quality of this social actor 
participation can vary. The next chapter will analyse the factors that can influence and explain 
why, even when the law allows and establishes that there should be user participation, it can or 
cannot occur and, when it occurs, its level can vary.
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Chapter 3
Reinforcing or Hindering User Participation
3.1. Introduction
The last chapter analysed the various conceptual dimensions of participation, and this 
chapter will assess the major influences affecting participation. The political behaviour of 
interest groups and State bureaucracy can be seen as the main determinants of social policy 
formulation or implementation (Teixeira 1989,45). It seems to be relevant to study both sets of 
behaviour, especially in the Brazilian context of transition from authoritarian rule to political 
democracy. Interest groups and State bureaucracy are, however, very complex concepts 
frequently used to designate distinct social actors. In the first place, the notion of interest 
groups is very broad, since these can come from totally distinct social classes representing 
opposite interests. In the second place, the concept of State bureaucracy is used to designate 
different sets of actors such as partisan administrators, senior officials and civil servants. The 
latter can also be referred to as professionals, as professional communities or as policy 
communities inside the State apparatus. Moreover, it is not only social actors who determine 
policy implementation or change, the institutional framework also can play a strong role in this 
process. This framework delimits the feasibility of implementing policies or transforming 
organisations. Nevertheless, only social actors can cany out such policies, can exert pressure 
for, or can resist, organisational changes.
This chapter presents a discussion of the main aspects associated with the increase or 
the decrease of user representatives' participation and with its qualitative change in a statutory 
forum. The initial section, which discusses the influence of institutional aspects on determining 
policy formulation and implementation, firstly assesses the role played by legal and 
organisational frameworks and, secondly, focuses on a key element in studying participatory 
mechanisms at local government level, the possible existence of a trend towards
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decentralisation. The second section highlights the role of some social actors in influencing the 
level and quality of user participation in a municipal statutory forum in the health sector. 
Initially, it presents an overview of the different approaches of interest groups, stressing the role 
of user representatives in implementing policies, particularly when these policies implicate the 
possibility of their own empowerment. Secondly, it examines civil servants’ possible influence 
in promoting user representatives' participation in statutory municipal health fora. Thirdly, it 
discusses the municipal health authorities’ role in reinforcing or hindering user representatives' 
participation in these fora. The fourth part assesses policy communities in the health sector as 
decisive actors for policy change and implementation.
3.2. Historical Background and Institutional Framework
A State organisation’s historical background and its legal and institutional framework 
are important elements both for understanding how, and explaining why, it has a given 
organisational structure and way of working. The transformation of its administrative or 
political structures and especially of its decision-making process - opening participatory 
channels for instance - will be bounded and shaped by a particular historical process. The 
analysis of its endogenous mechanisms, as well as its role as an active part of a more general 
social process, can help to elucidate why particular policy changes can or cannot take place. 
There are key institutional elements that can determine the successes or failures of statutory 
participatory mechanisms, and, moreover, delimit the shape these can take. They are, basically, 
the legal and institutional framework made up of laws, bills, policies, programmes, projects; the 
actual institutional practices; and the institution’s spatial organisation, focusing on strategies 
leading to its centralisation or decentralisation. These crucial factors and the way social actors 
act, within institutional limits or forcing their modification, can strengthen or undermine 
proposed policy changes.
3.2.1. Legal and Institutional Framework
In democratic societies legal structure sets the major limits and establishes the main 
directives for political and social actions. Although the legal apparatus is not easily changed, 
especially in very stable democracies, social and political actors can modify or redefine it. 
Even if legislation is clearly worded, it can be modified during implementation. As Marmor 
(1983, 39) affirms, legislation is not the end of the policy-making process. General or sector 
policies can redefine priorities and targets, changing the quality and quantity of the provision of 
services and goods within a stable legal framework. Officials, administrators and professionals, 
when implementing laws and policies, are not just ''executing'1 but making policy. Interest
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groups, such as organisations representing users, can also affect policy formation and 
implementation when they refuse to use some services, express dissatisfaction with some 
services, demand new ones or actively propose modifications.
In societies with weak democratic political tradition, policy communities inside each 
policy sector would play a strong role, not only in proposing alternative solutions to problems, 
but also in placing issues on the political agenda. Authoritarian regimes in developing 
countries, such as the Brazilian regime between 1964 and 1985, actively discourage 
representation of societal interests through formally constituted interest groups (Grindle and 
Thomas 1991, 63). Grindle and Thomas argued that, as a consequence, societal interests were 
often represented through informal processes rather than through more public forms of 
lobbying. These informal processes took place inside policy networks that systematically 
excluded some social sectors, particularly peasants and urban shantytown residents. In this 
context, policy communities often would initiate reforms by placing issues on the agenda of 
government decision-making (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 32-3). The Brazilian political system, 
however, went through a deep process of democratisation during the eighties. Then, on the one 
hand, the role of policy communities was still central in policy formation and implementation. 
On the other hand, organised social groups, depending on their interests, effectively influenced 
decision-making processes either by supporting or by opposing proposed policies and their 
implementation. Moreover, the success or failure of policies would be often linked to the ability 
of policy makers to find societal allies and to identify opposition inside and outside the 
governmental political arena.
Planning strategies, that since the fifties have been seen as a means of reforming State 
organisations and policy implementation, paid little attention at first to political processes. 
Their failure in promoting the changes they planned was more intense in countries and sectors 
where there were private and public providers, and where consumers or users could choose 
among diverse provisions or products. Planning and policy implementation, in a sector of State 
apparatus, depends both on the particular political process there taking place and on the sectors’ 
organisational characteristics. It is necessary to take into account how the sector organises its 
finances, who decides what matters, how decisions are made, what agencies execute what 
actions, whether actions are directly carried out by State or by private providers, and what is the 
spatial distribution of functions and political power. This last aspect is especially relevant in a 
country such as Brazil with large territorial dimensions, whose political organisation relies on 
municipal, state and federal tiers of government. Nevertheless, analysing the role of national 
and sub-national levels of government in diverse State sectors serves as an indicator both of
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decentralisation or centralisation tendencies and of the distribution of political power along 
territorial and social lines.
3.2.2. Spatial Organisation: Trend towards Decentralisation
Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of political authority to plan, to make 
decisions and to manage public functions from a central level to sub-national governmental or 
non-governmental levels (Mills 1990, 11; Rondinelli 1981, 137). Decentralisation involves, at 
the same time, the delegation of power in a territorial hierarchy (Smith 1986, 455-6). Most 
authors, when describing or analysing decentralisation processes, have used Rondinelli's 
classification (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983; Rondinelli, 1983). According to this author, the 
first distinction can be made between functional and aerial decentralisation. The former means 
the transfer of authority to perform specific tasks or activities to specialised organisations. In 
this case, they operate nationally or at least across local jurisdictions. Aerial decentralisation 
aims at transferring responsibility for public functions to organisations within well-defined sub­
national territorial boundaries (Rondinelli 1981, 137). In addition, he and Cheema (Rondinelli 
1983; Cheema and Rondinelli 1983), affirm that a second distinction can be made among 
different degrees of decentralisation. These degrees are defined as follows:
(1) Deconcentration
This implies the distribution of responsibilities within the central government. Actually, it 
involves shifting attributions from the central level of government to regional or local tiers, 
within the same administrative structure. The staff of these tiers may or may not be given the 
authority to decide upon how these functions must be performed. Regional or local 
administration may be integrated, wherein the ministry field staff and the local officials work 
under the supervision of the local executive; or unintegrated, wherein the ministry officials
"and administrative staff o f  local jurisdiction work independently o f each other and 
are supervised by different sets o f executives" (Rondinelli 1981, 137-8).
(2) Delegation
Delegation is the transfer of decision-making and management authority for specifically defined 
functions to organisations that are not directly controlled by the central government. It involves 
the creation or transfer of authority to plan and implement actions, relating to specific functions 
and duties, to semi-autonomous or parastatal organisations. These units have semi-independent 
authority to perform their responsibilities within well-defined spatial boundaries.
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(3) Devolution
Devolution is the creation or strengthening of sub-national units of government. The central 
government relinquishes certain functions to regional or local levels or creates new units of 
government. Sub-national units are legally separated from central government, which exercises, 
at the most, supervisory control over such units.
(4) Privatisation
This means the transfer of some planning and implementing decisions, responsibilities, or 
public functions from government to voluntary, private or non-governmental institutions. The 
responsibility for licensing and regulating some actions or functions, and supervising 
government members, can be given to "parallel organisations" (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983, 
24). The government may also shift the responsibility for producing goods or services that were 
hitherto offered by public or parastatal organisations to profit-making or non-profit-making 
enterprises.
This classification seems to be helpful for analysing important organisational aspects of 
different decentralisation processes, especially taking into account that, during the eighties, 
governments and International Agencies were promoting policies aiming to decentralise 
traditionally over-centralised bureaucratic organisations (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983, 9-10; 
Conyers 1983, 97-8; Oberst 1986, 163-4; Rondinelli 1981, 133). According to Rondinelli 
(1981, 133), development strategies at that time aimed at the promotion of equitable economic 
growth in order to reach the poorest groups. In this context, decentralisation was regarded as a 
means of stimulating the development process.
There were differences, however, between decentralisation processes that took place in 
distinct regional contexts. According to Mills (1990, 12), in some cases, mainly in Africa and 
Asia, there was an attempt to implement decentralisation policies in the new context of 
decolonization. Former initiatives during the fifties and sixties were implemented in a 
thoroughly different situation, as they aimed to reinforce colonial rule (Conyers 1983, 98-101; 
Mills 1990, 12). During the seventies and eighties, particularly in Africa, governments on the 
one hand felt secure enough to renounce part of their power to local organisations while on the 
other hand this became feasible because skilled administrators became available. In these cases, 
decentralisation was pushed by the central government rather than demanded by local or 
regional authorities and interest groups (Mills 1990,12).
In West European and North American countries, the last two decades of debate on 
centralisation and decentralisation would have taken place in a distinct context. Many of these
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countries had previous strong local governments, taking into account both their revenue and 
their functions. The identifiable trend was rather towards centralisation than the opposite. 
Nonetheless, decentralisation remained as a constant demand of local politicians from 
opposition parties and interest groups directly concerned with maintaining or increasing local 
autonomy (Mills 1990, 13). This trend did not seem to have been unique and uniform. A 
tendency toward less local government reliance on central grants can be identified in Denmark, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and France. It came together with increasing 
central government control of policy implementation, income-raising and spending in Denmark 
and in the United Kingdom (Pickvance and Preteceille 1991, 205-6). In France, there was a 
clear tendency towards decentralisation, with local governments increasing their autonomy over 
income-raising, spending and policy implementation. Nevertheless, unlike the first three 
countries mentioned above, the previous State organisation in France was very centralised 
(Pickvance and Preteceille 1991,206).
Hence, among the decentralisation processes which took place in the seventies and 
eighties, there were inter-regional and inter-countries distinctions. Moreover, although the most 
apparent aim of these processes was to help development, behind the manifest objectives it is 
important
"to acknowledge that decentralisation policies are concerned with changing power
relationships between levels o f  government" (Mills 1990,11-2).
Decentralisation often produced conflicting situations due to the transfer of political power they 
could provoke. As Collins observed (1989, 170), decentralisation may be viewed as both a 
product and determinant of political conflict. In the first place, decentralisation involves 
changes in administrative structures that induce conflicts, particularly among bureaucratic staff 
whose interests are affected (Oberst 1986, 164). Most of the time, these interests are connected 
with social class requirements to maintain privileges and political or economic power. In the 
second place, intra-governmental power shifts favour some bureaucratic and societal interest 
groups and undermine others (Collins 1989, 170). If it can formally bring decision-making 
arenas closer to citizens, it can also, in practice, reinforce the domination of local oligarchies 
over weakly organised social groups. This could be the case particularly in rural areas and in 
small cities in Brazil (Carvalheiro and others 1992, 118-9). In the third place, in the African, 
Asian and Latin American experiences of decentralisation, during the seventies, institutions for 
local control had been created, but significant powers were not often devolved to them (Smith 
1985,189).
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In authoritarian regimes, there was a stronger probability that attempts at promoting 
devolution or deconcentration would not result in actual political and administrative 
decentralisation. Even if they did, it did not mean lesser oligarchic power at the local level. In 
democratic environments, however, organised societal interests can exert pressure to make 
formal decentralisation more effective. This can result in an uneven pattern of decentralisation, 
where more organised social groups and more powerful economic regions can enforce transfer 
of discretion to their political sphere or spatial area, while lesser powerful groups and regions 
obtain less benefit from the decentralisation process. This seems to have been the case in the 
process of decentralisation of the Brazilian health system during the eighties, analysed in the 
next chapter.
That chapter will also show that the Brazilian health sector process of decentralisation 
seems to be a particular aspect of an overall tendency towards the devolution of power from 
central to local government. Though erratically, political power, administrative functions and 
financial resources have been transferred from federal government to municipalities. Unlike in 
the African cases, although in some periods and sectors there was a central government 
deliberation to do so, state and municipal governments were the most influential actors and had 
exercised strong pressures since 1985 in order to enhance their political powers and revenue 
(Souza 1994, 588-609).
Hence, given the complexity of the matter, it is not an easy task to make extensive 
generalisations about the existence of a possible trend towards decentralisation. Nevertheless, 
as Hambleton (1988, 130) observed, decentralisation should not be regarded as a passing fad. 
New information technology has fostered the shaping of decentralised forms of organisation. 
This author suggests focusing on three variable aspects when analysing a particular case: (1) the 
degree to which power is being decentralised from the centre to the periphery of the 
organisation, (2) the amounts of different services that are being brought together at a local 
level, and (3) at what level it combines managerial with political change (Hambleton 1988, 
130). As a result, one can find that there can be, for example, a huge devolution of power from 
central to local government, with integrated management of several services at this 
decentralised level, combined with empowerment of officials only or with the intense 
involvement of interest or user groups.
3.3. The Most Influential Actors
There are three sets of actors that can exert most influence upon a statutory 
participatory forum’s workings: (1) interest groups, (2) officials or civil servants, and (3) policy
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communities. The first set is made up of civil society organisations, which in the health field 
represent the interests of health professions or health workers, private providers of health care, 
trade unions excluding those representing health professionals, users of specific or territorially 
defined health services, and other non-governmental organisations whose activities have an 
impact on, or are affected by, the health sector. The second set of actors is made up of officials 
or civil servants responsible for policy formulation and, in the case of officials, for managing 
and executing health policies. The third set refers to very influential social actors, who are 
professionals working in the health sector in connection with interest groups. Policy 
communities act politically in a co-ordinated manner being guided by a common proposal for a 
given government sector.
The degree to and way in which users would participate in statutory municipal health 
fora will be determined by the behaviour of some key interest groups and by the type of support 
or opposition senior officials and health sector’s policy communities will give to this 
participation. Firstly this section will present an overview of the different approaches of interest 
groups. Next it will analyse the role of civil servants, senior officials and policy communities in 
policy formation and implementation regarding the case being studied.
Interest Groups
Dunleavy (1991, 1-78) affirms that there are four major political science accounts of 
interest groups: pluralism, corporatism, the logic of collective action model and the new right 
view. As this author’s appraisal of the subject is very complete and systematic, it was the main 
source for the classification presented below.
(1) Pluralists
Pluralists consider interest groups as one of the largest, longest-lasting and most active 
forms of political participation in liberal democracies. Interest groups have four distinctive 
features. They are multi-member organisations that bring together different types of actors, such 
as individuals, firms or other organisations. Membership is voluntary and joining or leaving 
cannot be enforced. They depend on member involvement. They have a narrow focus of 
concern, usually single issues or restricted areas of social life and public policy (Dunleavy 
1991,14-5).
Pluralists consider that most interest groups act internally in a basically democratic 
fashion. Internal democracy legitimates group representation and it
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"is critical for achieving a successful public stance for a group, as well as
demonstrating that group interests are in line with a broader public interest"
(Dunleavy 1991,14-5).
They believe that imbalances in the influence of interest groups create systems of 
countervailing power. Any group that acquires privileged political power and economic benefits 
provokes rival groups to seek similar benefits or their reduction. The general pluralistic 
assumption is that any interest group has relatively equal political strength. According to 
pluralists, interest groups are related to government through a one-way flow and there is no 
significant tendency towards rising corporatist relations between government and dominant 
interest blocs (Dunleavy 1991,24-9).
(2) Corporatist
Corporatists perceive strategic relationships between government and major interest 
organisations as different from the conventional pluralist process (Dunleavy 1991, 27-30). They 
regard much of the policy-making in liberal democracies as functioning in a pluralistic way. 
Nevertheless, trade unions, big business trade associations and professions play a privileged 
role in decision-making processes over key issues for economic and social development. Their 
special position in a political process can be explained by (1) their class basis, as they express
the interest of larger social classes or class sections; (2) their control of resources, as they
control resources that are vital for economic activity - labour, capital and investments, 
knowledge; (3) their ideological distinctiveness, as they generate and maintain widespread 
supported ideologies which condition how members interpret social issues; (4) their solidaristic 
group loyalties, as people’s identities are partly constituted by their identification with these 
groups.
Leaders act to sustain organisational resources and to maintain a group's ideology. 
Group leaders do not respond to detailed control from their members, but both are tied by 
dependency power relations. Members have considerable resources, some groups depending 
heavily on mass participation, but they also rely on groups' leaders for information about 
national issues and feasible policy options. So, leaders try to limit or make members' exit 
options costly.
Decision-making for strategic political issues is set by
"conflicts and co-operation between functional interest groups themselves, and with 
government, relegating conventional representative politics to the side lines" 
(Dunleavy 1991,27-30).
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Corporatists see arrangements between interest groups and government as a two way 
representation/control relationship. On the one hand, leaders control their members' behaviour 
on behalf of the government, on the other, the government makes concessions on issues that can 
benefit the former leadership.
(3) Logic of collective action
The logic of collective action model is mainly based on Olson's work (1978). It regards 
individuals and organisations as joining interest groups to achieve collective benefits which 
may be extended to everyone else in a particular social category (Dunleavy 1991, 30-6). The 
interest groups' main challenge is to persuade people to join, when they can get the benefits - 
non-excludable public goods - without incurring the participation costs. The larger the group 
the lesser will be the likelihood that an individual's contribution will be decisive or noticeable.
In such a context, group leaders are pictured as political entrepreneurs acting in a non- 
market environment of public goods production of which the central task is setting up strategies 
to reward those who join the group and to provide negative incentives against non-members. 
These selective incentives are vital in overcoming free-rider problems and they are also the 
main reason why interest groups are internally non-democratic, since leaders want centralised 
organisations capable of increasing their autonomy from members' control.
They contradict the pluralist view on the role of these groups in governmental decision­
making using three arguments:
"First, patterns o f interest group activity reveal very little about underlying preference 
intensities in society. (...) Second, groups acquire sharply unequal levels o f influence 
over policy-making which once established persist for long periods. (...) Third, 
governments, legislators and public bureaucrats are all aware that the pattern o f 
interest group activities gives little or no worthwhile or reliable information about the 
social distribution o f preference intensities" (Dunleavy 1991, 35-6).
Hence, as leaders represent non-democratic internal group political practices, governments tend 
to see them as illegitimate representatives of interest group members who are not able to 
represent public opinion. Governmental policy-makers can act freely, fostering or hindering 
distinct interest group pleas according to their political and ideological preferences.
(4) New right
According to Dunleavy (1991, 36-42), new right authors retain Olson’s rational actor 
model. Nevertheless, they consider that most public goods sought by interest groups are 
divisible and excludable. These goods could be supplied through normal market mechanisms.
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They stress, more strongly than Olson, the entrepreneurial character of leaders and their 
isolation and lack of control from the members of interest groups. Group leaders can affect the 
flow of benefits influencing the governmental agency
"by 'colonising' the agency providing the funding or regulation, winning over the 
agency's personnel by perks (such as lucrative post retirement jobs for senior agency 
officials) or political and legislative support for the agency" (Dunleavy 1991, 37).
Closed and corporatist arrangements take place as groups1 leaders are pushing at an 
open door since senior bureaucrats are seeking bigger budgets. Hence, leaders are not legitimate 
representatives of the members of interest groups and do not reflect public opinion. Bureaucrats 
are budget maximizers whose agencies are symbiotically linked to key interest groups. From 
this picture came their defence for private provision of nearly all products and services.
These four distinctive approaches evaluate differently the relationship between interest 
groups and governments. It can be seen as a one way flow from groups to governmental policy 
makers or as a two way flow with mutual influence. Governments can be perceived as having 
autonomy for deciding about which groups can get more benefits, or as bureaucrats seeking an 
agency's budget maximisation tied through corporatist arrangements to key interest groups.
However it is conceived, the relationship between interest groups and the State is 
doubtless one of the most decisive mechanisms of the governmental decision-making process. 
Participatory fora created during the last decades in most liberal democracies can be seen as a 
way of formalising this relationship. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the decision-making 
process has been transferred to these fora. The conventional pluralists' image of interest groups, 
with basically equal political opportunities for pressuring governmental bureaucracies, can only 
explain the apparent process that may take place. These fora can also have a hidden agenda, can 
hold covert political alliances and confrontations that occur inside and around them, and the 
main actors involved can be other than the leaders of interest groups and officials acting inside 
or around these fora. Moreover, even if a forum became central in the decision-making process 
of a government sector, the sector itself cannot be central in government political strategy, as 
the health sector is usually not (Walt 1994, 86-8). Underlying corporatist arrangements that 
would often guarantee openness to participatory mechanisms in governmental sectors regarded 
as non strategic, such as those dealing with social policies, can help to better explain how the 
decision-making processes take place. It can also help to understand how representatives of 
interest groups, such as users, can participate in such processes.
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In the health sector, for instance, the absence of the medical profession and private 
providers of health services, or their lack of influence over participatory fora, does not mean 
that they exercise little power over this sector's decision-making process. It could mean, on the 
contrary, that they exercise their influence over policy formulation and implementation through 
concealed privileged channels. In this case, even if they do not directly affect the degree of user 
participation in these fora, they influence their agenda formation and contribute to setting the 
role of these fora in the health sector’s decision-making process as a whole.
Another controversial point on these four approaches is the legitimacy of the leaders of 
interest groups. The first two, although to different degrees and with thoroughly diverse 
conceptions of the format and role of the groups, attribute a reasonable amount of membership 
control over interest group leaders. The last two mainly explain their lack of legitimacy by 
considering non-democratic internal group practices and members' weak control over these 
leaders. The view of the internal functioning of interest groups as quasi-commercial 
organisations, run in a very hierarchical manner by entrepreneurial leaders, is closer to an ideal 
image than to a real portrait. As Dunleavy (1991, 71) affirms, most interest groups are much 
less hierarchical than private firms.
"Indeed', their commonest formal structure is some type o f imperfect democracy, a type 
o f arrangement used in few other social organisations. Leaders are often directly 
elected (and re-elected) by grassroots members, who also vote on key policy decisions, 
often accompanied by decentralisation down to local level not just in organising 
activities but also in policy-making" (Dunleavy 1991, 71).
So, leaders can be, and usually are, regarded as legitimate representatives of the membership of 
interest groups, once their organisations follow democratic, if imperfect, procedures. Although 
there are many interest groups influencing policy formulation and implementation in the health 
sector, users are often the most influential when the policy issue is whether or not to promote or 
not their own representatives' participation in a statutory municipal health forum.
Users
As has been seen when discussing representation, elected representatives of urban 
residents’ associations or trade unions can be regarded as legitimate leaders of health services 
users' interest groups. Although the legitimacy of their representation can be contested 
sometimes, they are usually seen as rightful representatives, because they are normally elected, 
consult grassroots’ members before taking the most important decisions, and the membership 
can organise their substitution. The last chapter treats users as an interest group of participants.
60
Here they are seen as organised into interest groups that can enhance or hinder the participation 
of their own representatives.
Some authors are sceptical about the possibility of users influencing policy formulation 
or implementation (Alford 1975, 218-38). Others discuss what can make it possible. Lee and 
Mills (1985, 131), for instance, present three major factors that will influence each interest 
group having more or less power. The first two are related to institutional aspects: the 
prevailing political, and the organisational, characteristics of the body inviting involvement. 
The third factor is the organisational characteristics of the groups themselves. These 
characteristics will involve: resources, such as money, skills and advice; prestige; legitimacy in 
terms of their status in law and statutory powers; organisational cohesiveness; and political 
skills.
Marmor (1983, 92) remarks on the importance of organisational features behind an 
interest group when specifically discussing the consumer influence on the health sector. For 
him, the potential for user participation lies in organisations that already exist within the 
consumer population. The previous existence of organised groups, according to him, 
demonstrates a commitment to enhancing the life circumstances of this population. As they are 
already organised, they can: (1) devote attention to issues in a relatively sustained manner, (2) 
often overcome low levels of expertise by re-deploying their staff.
“Representatives from these groups will have clearly defined constituencies, 
experience in organisational politics, and resources at their disposal” (Marmor 
1983,92).
So, it is not the individual, selected or elected to represent a given population, who is 
the potential actor for influencing policy formulation or implementation, but pre-existing 
organised interest groups. These groups may commit themselves to pressure for their 
representatives to participate in a formal forum once they have the legal right to do so. They 
may opt for public protest if the established forms of representation of interest, including new 
participatory mechanisms, are regarded as inefficient. In the Brazilian case, they can choose, 
among the growing number of participatory fora open during the last decades, which are those 
to be considered as a priority. In any case, their interest will be decisive in whether or not to 
enlarge participatory channels.
Among user organisations trade unions have these characteristics. Urban social 
movements, although not as structured as the labour movement, have been building up, since 
the seventies, in many countries, an organisational pattern that can also support relatively 
constant interventions in statutory fora. Nevertheless, these groups' interests in pressuring for
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increasing their representatives’ influence in a given fora, will be related to the degree to which 
decisions made there will have an effect on the services provided for their membership. For 
example, in Brazil, many categories of regular urban workers, particularly those whose unions 
are the most active, have special arrangements - health-maintenance organisations, special 
services directly provided by firms, special private insurance schemes - for health care 
provision. Hence, their interest in promoting user participation in a forum that could decide 
upon services that their membership do not normally use will be only marginal. People living in 
shanty towns in Brazil, sometimes not formally employed, with no alternative but to use 
publicly financed health services, will be the same people who gather around residents’ 
associations and would like their leaders or representatives to influence the decision-making 
process of these services, searching for some improvement.
In countries with a unified national health system, like in Britain, it is possible to define 
‘‘users” as representing together "community” interests and "workers’” interests, since they have 
access to similar care (Lee and Mills 1985,132-43). In countries where the health care provided 
for the formal economic sector’s workers, particularly for qualified workers, is clearly distinct 
from the health care provided for the informal economic sector’s workers, both types of 
workers may be also regarded as users but with distinct interests. As the difference in the 
quality and accessibility of care favours the formal economic sector’s workers, it will often 
limit the interest of trade union members in pressuring for their representatives' participation in 
fora concerned with the provision of care by publicly financed health services. They will 
concentrate their demands on expanding the special insurance arrangements or in improving the 
exclusive health care they already have. On the contrary, as members of urban social movement 
organisations have no option but to use the standard health care provided by public financed 
health services, they will pressure their leaders to demand improvement in these services. 
Taking part in participatory fora may be seen as a means of so doing.
3.3.2. Civil Servants and Health Authorities
State officials and civil servants have direct influence over user involvement in 
participatory fora. Even when there are laws or policies establishing that there should be user 
participation in a given State forum, the way they implement this legal or policy provision can 
be very distinct.
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Civil Servants
As Lee and Mills (1985, 67-8) observed, the picture of a faceless civil servant, 
executing but not making policy choices, appears to be unrealistic. They can be policy makers 
who hold the information and key means of policy implementation. Many authors have 
discussed their role in State bureaucratic organisations (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1978; Mills 
1956; Lee and Mills 1985; Dunleavy 1991). The concept of bureaucracy is used sometimes as 
referring to senior officials, to civil servants, or to any organisation's administrative employees. 
Although the monolithic bureau does not exist (Downs 1967, 133), within broad limits,
"officials' influence on bureau policy is always extensively rank-structured, with those 
near the top being the most influential" (Dunleavy 1991, 174).
Even considering the discretion that "street level" public workers or administrative low 
rank officials can have when executing their functions and choosing whether or not hold 
exclusive information, bureaucracies are fundamentally hierarchical organisations and the 
degree of political power tends to grow together with officials' rank. Hence, it is more precise to 
distinguish between (1) ordinary and low rank civil servants; (2) senior officials; (3) partisan 
directors. Their role in policy formulation and implementation and the way they are selected can 
vary from one country to another. For instance, in Britain, in the health sector, the first two 
groups are responsible for policy implementation and the Minister and a group of partisan aides 
for policy formulation. Although this division is not actually so clear, it is very distinct from the 
situation in the United States and in most Latin American countries, where
“top civil servants change with changes in government. Civil servants in these systems 
are not seen as 'neutral ’ but supportive ’ o f one party or ideology " (Walt 1994, 80).
In Brazil, in most governmental organisations, at federal, state and municipal levels of 
government, only the first type of civil servants were not chosen according to partisan lines. As 
in other countries, corporate networks link privileged economic groups, politicians and officials 
influencing both policy formulation and implementation. Nevertheless, in Brazil, State 
organisation is thought to have peculiar characteristics (Schwartzman 1982, 51-7). Public 
services posts sometimes would be viewed as property to be used in the holder's favour or to 
favour the political "godfather" that temporarily owns it. This generalisation, although valid, 
cannot be applied to many of Brazil's public or semi-public organisations. Public institutions 
vary according to regional, political and institutional traditions, according to the type of good or 
services they deliver, or according to their economic importance, along with other factors. 
During the eighties, political democratisation in Brazil has increased public controls on, and 
media exposure of, irregular civil servants' activities. Nevertheless, it has not affected the
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institutional tradition in the Brazilian public services of changing nearly all managerial posts as 
soon as a new government takes office. Non partisan civil servants usually deal only with non 
politically sensitive and routine issues, having little influence over the decision-making process 
in the public sector. Delicate political matters, such as dealing with activists representing health 
service users, are not among their duties. Paradoxically, they can have very strong discretion 
over policy implementation functions, since formal supervisory mechanisms are very loose if 
they exist at all.
Health Authorities
Health services* directors in charge of participatory processes are acknowledged as 
powerful actors whose behaviour can influence the character of participation. As managers of 
public health services (Lee and Mills 1985, 130), they can be conceived of as supporters of 
particular interests - aiming at the maximisation of their agency budget in public choice and 
new right accounts for instance - or as arbiters of a planning or decision-making process, since 
they hold strong power over the health services under their management. Their role in the 
municipal participatory fora in Brazil is also multiple, because their position within the health 
services organisation attributes to them the "post" of municipal health authorities and their 
personal careers qualify them as professionals or as members of a policy community. They are 
"politicians" in the sense that they should belong to, or be strongly identified with, political 
parties or groups running the Ministiy of Health, when they represent federal government; the 
state health secretariat, when they represent state government; the city hall government when 
they represent the municipal health secretariat.
Marmor discussing the American Health System Agencies (HSA) affirms
(...) the imbalanced political features o f  health planning will be tempered by two 
mechanisms - one internal to the HSA (staff assigned to the consumer representatives), 
the other external (selection o f the representatives by groups) " (Marmor 1983,92).
The argument can be transferred to the Brazilian case. User representatives should be legitimate 
for representing users. The staff assigned to deal with user representation will be, in this case, 
municipal health authorities directly, who were the municipal secretary of health and the 
directors of the municipal health secretariat with partisan identification with the party or parties 
in office at the City Hall.
Federal and state health authorities may also have had an influence over municipal 
participatory fora in the health sector in Brazil, as they were responsible for transferring 
financial resources to municipal levels of management and for controlling directly most of the
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publicly financed health services in the city, as will be seen in chapter five. Nonetheless, they 
were not exclusively responsible for the administration of health services in the area of Porto 
Alegre and they represent governments that are only partially concerned with the health care 
provided in a particular city.
Health authorities - municipal, state and federal - were partisan managers and also 
"professionals”. They were normally medical doctors or health professionals, usually with a 
personal history of political activity in the health sector. Whether or not they identify with 
policy communities in the health sector, sometimes along partisan distinctions, can help us to 
understand their role in stimulating or not stimulating user participation.
3.33 . Policy Community
It is central for thinking about how political decisions actually happen in the public 
sector, to ask about the implications of a professionalised State apparatus (Dunleavy 1981, 4) 
which formulates substantive sector policies. Quoting Larsons (1977), Dunleavy (1981, 7) used 
the concept of "ideological corporatism" for explaining the role of professional communities in 
modem complex State organisations. This community's central characteristic is
"the effective integration o f different organisations or institutions at the level o f 
substantive policy making, by the acceptance or dominance o f an effectively unified 
view o f  the world across different sectors and institutions ” (Dunleavy 1981,6).
This cohesion could mean a perverse integration of professional ideologies with capital 
interests or with party competition (Dunleavy 1981, 6). Following this stream of analysis, the 
profession becomes an important focus of study.
In the health field, for instance, the role of the medical profession is a major one. 
Nevertheless, the segmentation of the medical act, as well as the creation of complex health 
systems, has given rise to a new collective entity that could be defined as an administrative and 
technical team of health workers where the physician remains as the main element but not as the 
only one. In this context, its role has remained very influential, but other professionals in the 
health sector also became influential. Walt observed that by the eighties,
"there was a significant challenge to the medical profession’s privileged status based 
on its technological knowledge and expertise, and to the ‘medical model' which 
explained ill health and diseases largely in terms o f biological factors. The primary 
health care approach was part o f a revolution in health policy which put more 
emphasis on the value o f lay care, and control o f factors outside the medicine, to 
improve peoples ’ health ” (Walt 1994, 102).
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During the early eighties, as costs for providing health care rose, many governments tried to 
find ways of decreasing the power of the medical profession in order to have control over the 
use of resources (Walt 1994, 81). The Brazilian government was not an exception to this 
pattern, as will be seen in the next chapter.
The multiplication of professional and political actors, however, is not particular to the 
health sector. The concept of policy networks (Heclo 1978, 87-124) attempts to categorise the 
increasing complexity and specificity of policy sectors, which demanded that specific policies 
should be dealt with by those possessing specialist expertise (Marshall 1988, 68). The policy 
networks are a means of defining the relationship between groups and the government/ 
government departments (Smith 1991,235). They comprise
“a wide range o f actors moving in and out o f the policy arenas with different views o f  
policy outcomes and a wide range o f decision-making centres ” (Smith 1991,235).
The concept of policy community, in contrast, refers to a limited number of relatively 
stable members who share the same values on policy outcomes. The decisions are taken within 
the communities and the process is commonly closed to other communities and to the general 
public (Rodes 1986, 23). Policy communities take part in the political process within policy 
networks. As policy-making becomes segmented, policies are made by a myriad of 
interconnecting, interpenetrating organisations (Jordan and Richardson 1979, 53-74). Policy 
communities are replacing the disintegrating centre - the Parliament or the Cabinet of Ministers 
- as the source for substantial decisions.
In the health sector policy networks and policy communities comprise individuals from 
various institutions, disciplines, or professions. They may be health practitioners, researchers or 
commentators. Policy networks would be made up of overlapping policy communities both 
within and outside government (Walt 1994, 110-1). The policy network in the health field at a 
given historical period will comprise the complex relationships between pharmaceutical 
companies, professionals, private providers of hospital care, any interest groups, and policy 
communities, which would have members within and outside government. The policy 
community would participate in this network trying to influence policy formulation and 
outcomes. There may be differences within the community, especially those related to more 
"administrative" issues (Dunleavy 1981, 9), which usually give rise to partisan cleavages, 
particularly in political systems, such as the Brazilian, where there were many parties 
competing without the clear predominance of any one. Nevertheless, the policy community has 
a common ground of consensus over basic political and ideological propositions.
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In the health field in Brazil, during the last two decades, there could be identified two 
policy communities which had a strong influence over federal government policy-making (Paim 
1989, 22-3; Teixeira 1989, 47-8). In the seventies, the most influential policy community was 
made up of senior officials in federal health organisations, who had strong connections with the 
pharmaceutical companies, as well as with organisations representing private providers of 
hospital care, representing health maintenance organisations and representing some health 
professionals, which were mostly unions of medical doctors from some Brazilian states. This 
articulation of policy makers had determined the consolidation and expansion of a model of 
health care provision whose central feature was the private provider - hospital, health 
maintenance organisation or the individual physician - placed in urban centres, financed by the 
social security system, and controlled by very weak regulatory mechanisms.
During the eighties, the dominance of that policy community was challenged by a new 
community proposing the reform of this model of health care. This new policy community was 
made up of academics, researchers and unions of health professionals and health workers. Its 
criticisms of the organisation of the health system and its new proposals were inspired by the 
primary health care approach. Its growing influence reflected the climate of democratisation in 
the country. It can be seen also as an expression of the complexity of Brazilian society which 
favoured the proliferation of interest groups pressuring the government to attend to their 
demands. The growing influence of this community over federal government was related also to 
the deep economic crisis the country was undergoing, which imposed constraints on 
government spending capacity, making welcome rationalisation policies, such as those the 
reformers defended. As will be seen in the next chapter, the Brazilian health system reformers 
proposed that users should be involved in the health sector. The idea of user participation in the 
health sector was inspired by primary health care defence of community involvement and by the 
ideal of democratising Brazilian political life. It can also be seen, however, as a way of 
obtaining more social support for the reform they were proposing, reinforcing their position 
against the resistance of the former policy community.
3.4. Summing Up
There are organisational factors that can determine the degree and quality of user 
participation in a statutory municipal health forum. These factors are mainly the legal and 
institutional framework of the health sector organisation and the actual policies and practices 
there implemented. As the focus of this research is on the municipal level, it is important to 
verify the nature of its relationship with the national, state and local administrative levels,
t
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within the health sector. Power and functions can be distributed among these tiers of 
government, throughout the sector, in a centralised or decentralised fashion. Some policy 
aspects are easier to decentralise, such as the execution of functions and activities, and others 
are more difficult, such as decisions about the distribution of financial resources. Moreover, 
there would be a relation between the decentralisation of functions and political power and the 
level and quality of user participation in a statutory municipal health forum. This influence 
would be positive or negative depending on whether or not decentralised actions reached the 
local administrative level, near to where the users live and where their autonomous political 
organisations are placed.
The degree to, and the way in, which users will participate in statutory municipal health 
fora would also be determined by the political action of some key interest groups, such as health 
professionals, private providers of health care, labour movements, non-governmental 
organisations whose activities have an impact on, or are affected by, the health sector, and users 
themselves. Users, when organised as interest groups, are among the most important actors 
influencing the participatory processes open to them, as they can or cannot pressure for their 
own representatives' participation. The existence of a previous organisation can establish the 
conditions for the participation of user representatives on a relatively permanent basis. Trade 
unions and, to a lesser degree, urban social organisations can offer such a background. They can 
or cannot effectively support the demand for increasing user representative participation in 
these fora according to (1) what "sector" or arena the organisation regard as a priority at a given 
moment and (2) the degree to which decisions made there would have an effect over the 
services provided for their membership.
Other influential actors are those inside the State apparatus who co-ordinate these fora 
and are responsible for implementing decisions made there. Usually, in Brazil, low rank civil 
servants do not deal directly with politically sensitive issues such as running participatory 
mechanisms. More decisive are the attitudes of health authorities, which can be for or against 
participation. Health authorities can promote different types of participation depending on their 
political preferences. Municipal health authorities directly responsible for the co-ordination of 
the municipal health commissions created during the eighties in Brazil could have a strong 
influence over the way the forum would work. Health authorities from federal, state and 
municipal level exercise multiple roles, as their position within the health services organisation 
attributes to them the "post" of health authority, their personal careers qualify them as 
professionals and as members of policy communities trying to influence governmental decision­
making processes.
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Professionals in modem State organisations are central actors in explaining how 
political decisions actually happen. They can be seen as loose interest groups organised along 
corporate lines that can influence the formulation and implementation of substantive policies in 
specific areas of government. The traditional power of the medical profession over the health 
sector's decision-making processes has been weakened due to the segmentation of the medical 
act, and the creation of complex health systems that demanded a range of other professionals. 
The medical profession also lost prestige due to the difficulties for governments in maintaining 
the huge costs of models of health care which place on the medical professionals most of the 
discretion about treatments and the organisation of health systems. Although the physician 
remained the main element of the team of professionals working in the health sector, the 
decisions were more often made by policy communities. The members of these communities, 
who shared similar objectives for policy outcomes, are academics, professionals and interests 
groups which, in connection with governmental officials, influenced the policy-making in 
specific areas of government. An example of a policy community is the Brazilian health system 
reformers who defended, during the eighties, changes in this system in order to make it better 
integrated and decentralised. The next chapter will describe the evolution of this system during 
this century, aiming at explaining how in the last decade these reformers stimulated changes in 
the system that would promote also the involvement of users in municipal health commissions.
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Chapter 4
The Brazilian Health System: Towards 
Decentralisation and Institutionalisation of User 
Participation
4.1. Introduction
This chapter aims at examining the evolution of the Brazilian health system in order to 
establish which was the system to be reformed during the eighties and how this reform created 
and consolidated municipal participatory fora. Firstly, this chapter shows the historical 
evolution of the Brazilian health system until the early eighties, taking into account the 
following aspects: (1) the type of actions and care offered, (2) the populations covered, (3) the 
way the system was financed, (4) the organisational characteristics and (5) the existence or not 
of user participation. During this period there were two sub-sectors of health care: the social 
security and the public health. The lack of co-ordination between the two sub-sectors, their 
ineffectiveness and high costs have attracted many criticisms particularly since the late 
seventies. Secondly, the chapter describes the recent reform of the Brazilian health system 
which attempted to tackle these problems at the same time that it created participatory fora at 
the municipal level of the system. The Figure 4.1 is intended to help the comprehension of the 
organisational evolution of this system, highlighting its main institutions, showing whether its 
organisation was mainly centralised or decentralised, the type of population it covered and 
whether there were participatory mechanisms.
70
Figure 4.1 - Evolution of the Brazilian Health System During this Century
Social Security Sub-sector of Health Care Public Health Sub-sector of Health Care
1900-1929
1923
CAPs
-decentralised organisation: organised by firm
-covering few categories o f urban workers
-participatory mechanisms: user representatives 
directly elected participating In each CAP highest 
decision-making body
-decentralised organisation: state health secretariats 
stronger than national health department
-formally covering all population, in fact taking care 
o f the sanitation o f main urban centres
-no participatory mechanisms
1904
DGPS
1923
DNSP
1930-1963
1933
IAPs
-centralised organisation: national institutes 
organised by functional categories o f workers
-covering nationally some categories o f urban 
workers
-until 1945 centralised organisation: national health 
department imposed pattern o f organisation over state 
health secretariats
-deconcentration: 1945 to 1964 state and municipal 
health secretariats gained more autonomy
1930
DNSAM
1941
DNS
-participatory mechanisms: user representatives 
nominated by federal government - since 1945, 
nominations influenced by trade unions - 
participating in each IAP decision-making body
- formally covering all population, actually mostly 
reaching populations in most important economic 
areas
-no participatory mechanisms
1953
MS
1964-1983
-centralised organisation: single national institute
1967
INps -covering all urban workers working in the formed 
economic sector
-in the seventies coverage extended to rural,
1974 self-employed ami domestic workers 
PPA MPAS
1978 -no participatory mechanisms
INAMPS
1982
CONASP
- centralised organisation: Ministry o f Health 
establishing the health policy nationally to be followed 
by state and municipal health secretariats
- formally covering all population, actually mostly
reaching populations in poorest urban areas j 974
PECS
-no participatory mechanism 1979
PREVSAUDE
Unified Health System
1984-1990
1984 -transfer offinancial resources from  social security system to state and municipal health secretariats
AIS -helping state and municipal health secretariats to extend coverage o f their services
-created health commissions at federal, state, regional, municipal and local levels o f management,
- municipal and local commissions should have user participation
-municipal commissions should monitor the expenditure of social security financial resources 
transferred to municipalities
1987 -transfer the whole sub-sector o f health care to state and municipal health secretariats 
SUDS -extended coverage o f health care to all Brazilian population
-state, municipal and local health commissions should have user participation
-if municipal government signed municipalisation covenant: municipal health commissions monitor
expenditure of previous state and federal health services
1988 -create a universal, comprehensive, integrated and decentralised health system
Constitution . ,  , ,
1990 -created federal, state, municipal health councils
. _ -most municipal councils created from  the transformation ofprevious municipal health
Health Laws commissions
-as health care provision became a municipal government obligation municipal councils 
would have control over public or contracted health services within each city area
CAPs - Caixas de Aposentadorias e Pensdes
IAPs - Institutes de Aposentadorias e Pensdes
INPS - Institute Nacional de Previdencia Social
PPA - Plano de Pronta A$ao
MPAS - Ministdrio da Previdencia e Assistdncia Social
IN AMPS - Institute Nacional de Assistdncia Mddica da
Previddncia Social
CONASP - Plano de Reorganiza^So da Assistdncia & 
Saude no Ambito da Previddncia Social
DGPS - Diretoria Geral de Saude Publica 
DNSP - Departamento Nacional de Saude Publica 
DNSAM - Departamento Nacional de Saude e Assistdncia 
Mddico-Social
DNS - Departamento Nacional de Saude
MS - Ministdrio da Saude
PECS - Pianos de E x te n d  de Cobertura
PREVSAUDE -Programa Nacional de Serviyos B&sicos de
Saude
AIS - Programa das Affes Integradas de Satide
SUDS - Programa dos Sistemas Unificados e Decentraiisados de Satide
71
4.2. Brazilian Health Policies before 1930
Before 1930, the central government derived its political strength from very 
autonomous state and local oligarchies which supported a weak federal political power that 
promoted liberal policies, except when subsidising coffee production and exports. Political 
institutions were very decentralised, each state was autonomous in implementing its own 
policies in many areas, including health policies. Regarding the lack of central command (Braga 
and Paula 1981, 41-50), at the beginning of the twentieth century can be found the origins of 
the division in the Brazilian health system into two distinct, and often non-articulated, sub­
sectors of health care that would characterise the country's health system organisation until the 
eighties. They were the social security and the public health sub-sectors of health care.
4.2.1. The Public Health Sub-Sector of Health Care before 1930
The public health sub-sector was mainly responsible for preventive public health 
measures and urban sanitation. It formally covered all the Brazilian population but, in fact, it 
reached only those living in economically important urban centres. It was created to deal with 
the crucial problem of the sanitation of ports and urban centres. Cities like S3o Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro and Santos were strategic centres of commerce and finance for the export complex and 
nascent industries. Minimal sanitary conditions were required not only for maintaining trade 
relations but also for attracting migrants to build up a labour market (Braga and Paula 1981, 
42).
The end of the last and beginning of the current century witnessed the setting up of 
departments of health in some Brazilian states, such as S3o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco 
and Rio Grande do Sul. Aiming to control diseases like cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, 
malaria, tuberculosis, typhoid and leprosy, these state organisations promoted preventive 
measures such as vaccination, and the cleaning and reorganising of urban spaces, sometimes 
forcing poor populations to change habits or removing them to other areas. State departments of 
health also ran special hospitals network treating tuberculosis, leprosy and mental illness.
At the federal level, in 1904 the Diretoria Geral de Saude Publica was created to co­
ordinate public health actions in the country. Nevertheless, an important constraint on more 
effective central government action was the very decentralised political structure of the 
Brazilian State. Even the regulations of this Diretoria, issued in 1914, stated that any federal 
intervention should be exceptional and a response to public disaster.
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Although state governments retained responsibility for public health policies, the Carlos 
Chagas reform in 1923 created the Departamento Nacional de Saude Publica to be responsible 
for urban and rural sanitation health education child, industrial and professional hygiene. These 
responsibilities, however, never became actual policies and local solutions were the 
overwhelming reality (Braga and Paula 1981,46).
The sub-sector was financed by federal and state budgets and had a decentralised 
organisation, in which each state had its own very autonomous secretariat of health. It had no 
participatory mechanism other than being accountable to the Congress or state Legislative 
Assemblies.
4.2.2. The Social Security Sub-Sector of Health Care before 1930
In 1923, the Eloi Chaves Law was passed by the Congress, providing the obligatory 
creation in each railway company of a fund for retirement and survivors’ pensions that should 
offer insurance benefits and health care for employees. The fund was called Caixa de 
Aposentadorias e Pensfles (hereafter CAP). In 1926, this system was extended to dock and 
ship workers. Through this insurance scheme the employee and his/her family - people living 
under the same roof and "economy” - were entitled to out-patient medical care, reduced priced 
medicine, retirement and invalidity pensions and, in the case of death, a pension for his/her 
heirs. From 1926, CAPs were allowed to have their own medical services and medical care 
included, as well the right to hospitalisation in case of surgery. By 1930, there were more than 
40 CAPs covering more than 140,000 workers and their respective families (Oliveira and 
Teixeira 1986, 22), that is, only 0.4 per cent of the Brazilian population (140,000 people 
insured out of 37,625,436 inhabitants) (IBGE 1941, 3). People who were not covered by the 
services of CAPs had to pay for health care or rely on charity, since private insurance 
companies, then, did not cover health care.
While the public health sub-sector was financed directly by federal or state budgets, the 
social security system was maintained by deductions of three per cent of an employee’s wages, 
one per cent of the firm's gross income and 1.5 per cent of the price of the services, such as 
railway tickets (Oliveira and Teixeira 1986, 32-3). By its very nature the system was 
decentralised, since the CAPs were organised by firms.
The system had participatory mechanisms, since the major administrative body of each 
CAP was made up of three employer’s representatives and two directly elected employees' 
representatives.
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4.3. Brazilian Health Policies from 1930 to 1964
The Revolution of 1930 provoked a strong shift in the country's political organisation. 
Placed in the world's economic and financial crisis, coffee imports fell, weakening the main 
economic basis of the power of regional oligarchies. The new government fostered 
industrialisation and shaped corporatist relations between employers and employees through 
State mediation. Federal government implemented social policies that, for the first time, sought 
to reach the entire population, but only actually benefited economically strategic categories of 
urban workers. The new economic and social policies were promoted through centralised 
institutions and mechanisms. Before 1930, federal government was weak, after this year it 
gradually became the political centre of a national State.
4.3.1. Public Health Sub-Sector of Health Care from 1930 to 1964
Between 1930 and 1945, when the Vargas dictatorship was in power, in the public 
health sub-sector there was a clear tendency towards centralisation. In 1930, the Ministry of 
Education and Health was created. It was made up of two national departments, one for 
education and another for health (Departamento Nacional de Saude e Assistencia Medico- 
Social - DNSAM). In 1941, the Ministry of Education and Health was reorganised, the former 
national department was renamed Departamento Nacional de Saude. The department 
encompassed special services against diseases such as malaria and yellow fever and was 
responsible for health campaigns as well as for training public health specialists. The promotion 
of health campaigns and technical assistance were the two main devices used in imposing the 
Ministry’s influence over state and municipal health secretariats. Health campaigns, during the 
thirties, were organised in a "military" way with centralised decision-making processes, aimed 
at reaching the Brazilian population as uniformly as possible (Garcia 1989, 205-6). According 
to Braga and Paula (1981, 54), they were an important element in political centralisation in the 
health field as well as in making health policies national in spatial terms. From 1930 to 1945, 
the national department of health’s supervisors visited all states of the country, imposing 
uniform patterns of health care provision and similar institutional organisations on state 
departments or secretariats of health.
Between 1945 and 1964, when the political regime was democratic, the autonomy of 
state and municipal secretaries of health seemed to have increased, at the same time that the 
main policy goal was to promote economic growth (Braga and Paula 1981, 61). This period is 
known by Brazilian historians as the "developmentalist" years. It means that all policies were 
subordinated to a major aim: rapid industrialisation with transnational capital participation. In
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1953, the Ministry of Health was created from the organisational structure of the previous 
Departamento Nacional de Saude. The public health sub-sector's financial resources were 
channelled to health actions that would favour Brazilian economic development. For instance, 
the Departamento Nacional de Endemias Rurais was created in 1956 with the declared objective 
of acting in areas of clear social and economic importance for the nation’s development 
(Ribeiro 1976, 5). According to Rivera (1982, 45), the main aim was to increase Brazil’s 
economic productivity, preventing deaths without spending much. As the major policy concern 
was with economic growth, most federal government expenditure would go to policy areas 
directly related to economic production. In this context the Ministry of Health's participation in 
the federal budget declined between 1961 and 1964 from 4.6 to 3.6 per cent (Braga and Paula 
1981,62).
The sub-sector, which was financed through federal, state and municipal budgets, was 
made up of federal, state and municipal health units which promoted traditional public health 
measures, such as immunisations and health education, and also provided individual health care 
for those not covered by the social security scheme. This non integrated out-patient network of 
health care should implement campaigns and programmes against the most common infectious 
diseases that ought to reach all the country's population. In fact, it was made up of few complex 
units, usually called health centres, situated in urban areas targeting the poor or targeting 
special populations such as, since 1950, those living in strategic areas for economic 
development. These services remained isolated and only helped to improve health standards in 
small areas reaching insignificant populations. Moreover, they were not suitable for dealing 
with infectious diseases, which were then the most common illnesses in Brazil.
The sub-sector did not present, in this period, any type of participatory mechanism.
4.3.2. Social Security Sub-Sector of Health Care from 1930 to 1964
Similar to the other sub-sector, during this period, the social security sub-sector of 
health care underwent a process of centralisation. In the early thirties the social security system 
expanded its coverage through the creation of Institutos de Aposentadorias e Pensdes 
(hereafter IAP). From 1933, rather than creating CAPs, new pension institutes were created 
which aimed at protecting national functional categories of workers such as dock and ship 
workers, bank workers or industrial workers (Malloy 1977, 46-7). By 1938, federal civil 
servants, commercial workers, dock and ship workers and industrial workers had been 
encompassed by the new IAP s’ scheme or by the remaining CAPs, while rural workers and 
other categories of urban workers still were not encompassed by the system. In the whole period
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workers whose categories did not have institutes or CAPs - those self-employed, domestic 
workers and rural workers - had to use public health sub-sector services, pay for care or rely on 
charity.
CAPs and IAPs had very different features. (1) The CAPs were organised by individual 
firms while the IAPs were organised by national functional categories of workers. (2) The first 
were civil societies totally independent of the State, and the second were quasi-govemmental 
organisations under strict State control. (3) The CAPs encompassed bigger firms' workers while 
the IAPs were intended to reach all workers in the country of a given functional category. (4) 
The first were financed by workers, firms and consumers, while the second were financed by 
workers, firms and the State.
IAPs did not offer a uniform set of benefits and workers and firms did not pay similar 
contributions. Particular features of each occupational category, such as work conditions and 
strength of trade unions, could determine differences that had been accentuated throughout the 
years (Donnangelo 1975, 16). For instance, industrial workers, subjected to very bad work 
conditions that frequently caused invalidity or premature death, pressured for more illness, 
invalidity or death monetary benefits, while bank workers, whose work conditions were better, 
pressured for more health care.
The system as a whole restricted the supply of benefits and services if compared to 
those the CAPs had offered before 1930. The provision of health care, for example, became a 
secondary issue in all institutes, since their directors considered the provision of pensions and 
benefits as the primary, if not exclusive, obligation of their organisations. The bank workers' 
institute and the dock and ship workers' institute established that expenditure on health could 
not exceed limits of twelve per cent and eight per cent respectively of their annual revenue. 
Other IAPs would offer health care only to those who paid an extra premium (Donnangelo 
1975, 25-30). According to Donnangelo (1975, 30), in 1945, the social security system insured 
nine million Brazilians, but offered health care to only 100 thousand people. That is, in 1945 
circa nineteen per cent of the Brazilian population (nine millions out of 46,592,978 inhabitants) 
was covered by the social security system, while it offered health care to only 0.2 per cent of 
this population (IBGE 1951,1).
Reducing benefits and regarding the provision of health services as optional and not as 
an obligation, were very adequate to the industrialisation project dominant in Brazil during the 
thirties. One third of the total revenue of institutes should be paid by employees, one third by 
the employers and one third by central government. As Oliveira and Teixeira (1986, 140)
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observe, instead of paying its third federal government used the saving generated by employees* 
and employers* contributions for destinations other than guaranteeing benefits for urban 
workers and their dependants. Several decrees and laws demonstrated how the Brazilian central 
government, from 1930 to the early fifties, had been "allowing" - in fact forcing - IAPs to buy 
shares and bonuses in governmental or semi-governmental enterprises and to "invest" in 
programs for industrial development (Oliveira and Teixeira 1986,141-8).
By 1950, political democratisation reinforced the trade union movement, and as a 
consequence its leaders could influence the choice of directors and, particularly, the nomination 
of employees* representatives to take part in the consultative bodies of the institutes. Moreover, 
during the fifties, the social security system became more amenable to interest group pressures 
for more assistance. Gradually IAPs had lifted restrictions on benefit concessions and limits on 
health care expenditure. Pressures for enlarging Institutes' provision of health care came from 
inside the social insurance system. Institute officials argued that, to reduce the concession of 
invalidity and illness benefits, more medical care should be provided to the insured population. 
Political democratisation and the growth of the urban-industrial sector made it easier for 
workers to express their demands for more and better health care (Donnangelo 1975, 28-30). 
An additional pressure was the increase in medical costs, due to the introduction of new 
medicines and technology. As a result, the late fifties and early sixties witnessed the growth of 
the expenditure of the social security system on medical care. In 1947, the social security 
system had spent 6.5 per cent of its revenue on medical assistance, while in 1964 it spent 17.3 
per cent, surpassing therefore the limits established before (Possas 1981,235).
At the same time, there were initiatives aimed at system unification. Although during 
the forties and fifties there had been much discussion on the theme, only in 1960 was the social 
security law passed by Congress. It equalised benefits, establishing that the social security 
system would encompass all urban workers in the formal sector, excluding therefore those who 
were self-employed, domestic workers and rural workers. However, this law was never applied, 
because there was strong resistance to the idea of unifying the system. The resistance came 
from social sectors interested in maintaining the old system: (1) private companies that used to 
insure accidents at work; (2) some work categories, such as bank and railway workers, whose 
institutes provided better benefits and who were afraid of losing them through unification; (3) 
workers from CAPs and IAPs afraid of losing their jobs; (4) political leaders reluctant to lose 
the political influence IAPs gave to them (Malloy 1977, 51-56). Another opposition group was 
formed by the senior officials of the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce (Ministdrio do 
Trabalho, Indtistria e Comfrcio), since they saw the possibility of creating a new giant rival
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Ministry for Social Security as a threat. Trade union leaders, since the democratisation in 1945, 
had considerable influence over benefit distribution and over the choice of people to fill 
institute posts. Therefore, they also resisted losing this mighty source of political power.
4.4. The Late Sixties and the Seventies: Reshaping the Health System
The military regime that took office after the 1964 military coup promoted the 
centralisation of Brazilian political institutions and stimulated the growth of private provision 
of goods and services. The tax reform, the Institutional Acts, the 1967 Constitution written by 
the military government and the 1969 constitutional amendments, concentrated all discretionary 
power in the hands of central government. It became responsible for nearly all matters. Other 
levels of government could almost only execute the central directives. As a result of this 
concentration process, state participation in the total federal revenue distribution declined from 
10.6 per cent, in 1968, to 8.8 per cent, in 1980, and the municipal participation from 7.3 per 
cent to 4.3 per cent (Mddice 1987, 188). These general features of financial resources and 
power distribution throughout the levels of government also affected the health sector.
4.4.1. Public Health Sub-sector During the Late Sixties and the Seventies
The public health sub-sector did not change its organisational structure during the 
seventies and the early eighties. It still remained without participatory mechanisms, whose 
creation, in this period, would be very improbable due to the authoritarian political regime. The 
sub-sector, however, became less important in the Brazilian health system. In 1967, this sub­
sector received 56 per cent, and the social security sub-sector 44 per cent, of the total federal 
expenditure on health and sanitation while in 1972, the public health sub-sector got 45 per cent, 
and the social security sub-sector 52 per cent of this total (Braga and Paula 1981, 93). The 
reduction in expenditure affected all the Ministry's programmes and services (Braga and Paula 
1981,91-9).
This did not happen because the health conditions of the Brazilian population had 
improved. On the contrary, the reduction of preventive and sanitary actions and of health care 
offered to those excluded from social security coverage could have had a bad impact on the 
poorest. This happened when the economy was growing very fast, during the so called Brazilian 
economic "miracle", and wealth concentration was worsening social inequalities. Between 1968 
and 1974, the Brazilian GNP grew on average more than ten per cent a year. Industry alone, 
which was the economic sector leading the growth, grew sixteen per cent in 1973 (Luz 1979, 
255-6). In this period, however, social inequalities increased. In 1960, the five per cent of the
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population with the highest income earned 27 per cent of the national income, and the 50 per 
cent of the population with the lowest income earned seventeen per cent of the national income. 
In 1970, the richest five per cent earned 36 per cent and the poorest 50 per cent earned thirteen 
per cent of the national income (Cardoso 1975, 75). In 1973 and 1974, diseases seen before 
only among rural populations appeared in urban centres. Tuberculosis and meningitis returned 
as a cause for concern of public health professionals (Braga and Paula 1981, 93). In some 
regions of the country, infant mortality, a very sensitive indicator of poor social conditions, 
achieved its highest levels, after years of constant decline. It was the case in the state of S3o 
Paulo, where in 1966, in one thousand live births, 66 children had died at less than one year old, 
while in 1970, in one thousand live births, 89 children died (Luz 1979,276).
In 1974 the economic growth slowed down and the military regime suffered its first big 
electoral defeat. The new military government took office, in 1974, proposing gradual political 
liberalisation. One important expression of this political shift was the development plan called 
II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento, which embodied the new military President "social 
discourse" (Paim 1989, 19). It established new strategies of social planning and proposed 
policies, aiming at health system rationalisation. From 1975, new health programmes were 
created. They were planned and executed vertically and subsequently imposed on states and 
municipalities. The most innovative programmes aimed to extend coverage to reach populations 
until then excluded from medical coverage. They reached mostly areas where there were almost 
no health services, such as the country’s Northeast region, or destitute groups more easily 
affected by adverse conditions of life. Concomitantly, the Ministry of Health increased its 
participation in the federal budget from 0.9 per cent, in 1974, to 1.4 per cent, in 1979 (Mddice 
1987, 214). Although organisational rationalisation and better uses of financial resources were 
one of the II PND proposals, these programmes did not imply any attempt to integrate both sub­
sectors.
Another set of initiatives which attempted to modify public health services came from 
some municipal health secretariats. Towards the end of the decade, in small or medium sized 
cities, most of them ruled by political parties in opposition to the military regime, municipal 
health secretariats implemented policies inspired by primary health care principles. Besides 
offering basic care to deprived populations, one of their goals was to involve health service 
users in some decisions over health service management. The degree of user participation was 
very different from one case to another, but for the first time the idea of user participation was 
introduced in public health services. Many health professionals were deeply involved in these 
experiences.
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The Programa Nacional de Servi^s B&sicos de Saude (hereafter PREVSAUDE) was 
the first attempt to integrate both sub-sectors through a unified health system encompassing the 
whole Brazilian population. In 1979, during the seventieth national health conference, Ministry 
of Health officials presented this programme whose main objectives were: (a) the extension of 
primary health care coverage to all Brazilians; (b) the reorganisation of the public health sector, 
linking institutions and reviewing the amount and type of services supplied, aiming at 
productivity increases; (c) the promotion of better environmental conditions, mostly through 
expanding drinking water provision and improving public health and sanitation. In order to 
achieve such goals: (1) the public sector would provide basic care and control the health system 
as a whole; (2) public institutions would integrate their management; (3) there would be 
decision-making and operational decentralisation; (4) there would be integration among the 
activities related to promotion, recuperation and rehabilitation of health; (5) simplified 
technology would be used; (6) there would be administrative efficacy; (7) community 
participation would be promoted (Paim, 1989,20).
The discussion surrounding the possibility of the implementation of PREVSAUDE 
showed the different interests involved in the Brazilian health field (Paim 1989, 22-3). On the 
one hand, social security and Ministry of Health directors, private providers' associations 
representing hospitals and health maintenance organisations (Federa^o Brasileira de Hospitais 
- FBH, Associa^o Brasileira de Medicina de Grupo - ABRAMGE), and the Brazilian Medical 
Association (Associa^o Medica do Brasil - AMB) accused PREVSAUDE of being statist and 
of having communist inspiration. In contrast, many associations of health professionals and the 
trade unions' Institute of Studies on Health and Safety at Work (Departamento Intersindical de 
Estudos e Pesquisas de Saude e dos Ambientes de Trabalho - DIES AT) supported the most 
important aspects of the programme. After one year of intense discussion, the programme was 
finally abandoned. Although it was never implemented, its ideas were the basis for the reform 
of the Brazilian health system that took place during eighties.
4.4.2. The Social Security Sub-Sector of Health Care During the Late Sixties and 
the Seventies
During this period, the social security system became the actual co-ordinator of national 
health policies as well as the main purchaser of health care provided by private suppliers 
throughout the country. The system offered health care free of direct charge to an increasing 
proportion of Brazilians: 22 per cent in 1964, 39 per cent in 1969 (Donnangelo 1975, 37). In 
1979, it covered around 57 per cent of the total, and 90 per cent of the urban, population 
(Possas 1981, 249, FIBGE 1983a, 74). In the middle seventies, around 90 per cent of all
80
individual health care in Brazil was financed by the social security system (Donnangelo 1975, 
34).
As has been seen, many interest groups were against the unification of IAPs. 
Nevertheless, after 1964, the repressive government neutralised that resistance. During this 
year, in all IAPs, central government substituted former institute managers with intervention 
boards. The new boards excluded any worker representation. The managers who controlled the 
system defended and imposed new policies "free of political pressures”. This meant that trade 
unions would not have political influence on the decision-making process of the institutes. In 
fact, during the seventies, workers would only participate in the system by paying social 
security premiums.
In 1966, after studies carried out by an inter-ministerial commission, social security 
communities were created to unify routines and programmes among institutes at municipal and 
regional levels. In 1967, the Instituto Nacional de Previdencia Social (hereafter INPS) was 
created, unifying the IAPs (Possas 1981, 218-27). The INPS lost some responsibilities, such as 
those related to food and housing assistance that were transferred to other institutions, but 
remained responsible for a complex range of financial benefits and for medical care. At the 
same time, it expanded its coverage which became nearly universal. In 1971 and 1972, some 
insurance benefits were extended respectively to rural workers and domestic workers. In 1973, 
autonomous workers were covered by the social security system. In 1974, a new plan (Plano de 
Pronta - PPA) established that anyone needing emergency medical assistance could have 
it, on a non-contribution basis.
As was seen above, during the mid seventies, slower economic growth and electoral 
defeat induced central government to promote policies that could restore its legitimacy. Due to 
its national dimensions and revenue independence from the federal budget, INPS was seen as 
the most appropriate State institution for promoting policies of poverty alleviation. In fact, since 
the sixties, the social security budget had relied increasingly on employers’ and employees’ 
compulsory contributions. Between 1961 and 1981, the compulsory contributions paid by 
employees and employers rose from three per cent to 8.5 or ten per cent (lowest to highest 
salaries) of each employee's wage (Teixeira and others 1988, 51). According to M6dice (1987, 
188), from 1972 to 1982, compulsory contributions represented, on average, 89 per cent of the 
total revenue of the social security system. Hence, workers insured by the system financially 
supported the main governmental instrument of health policy implementation. They did it
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directly when they paid premiums and indirectly when consuming goods and services whose 
prices included the costs of enterprises' compulsory contributions (M^dice 1987,188).
The importance of the social security system to the government’s social policies was 
demonstrated by the creation, in 1974, of the Ministry of Social Security, the Ministlrio da 
Previdencia e Assistencia Social (MPAS). In 1975, the national health system (Sistema 
Nacional de Saude - SNS) was created to co-ordinate all health activities inside what was 
intended to be a harmonious network of health services. The co-ordinator of this system would 
be the Conselho de Desenvolvimento Social, which had been created a year before. The 
creation of the national health system was an unsuccessful attempt at reorganising the health 
sector while avoiding political conflict. The military government was not strong enough at this 
moment to face the opposition that would come from a real organisational integration of the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Security sector responsible for health care, and the 
state and municipal health secretariats. Senior officials in both Ministries were against such 
integration, if it implied expansion of public sector health care provision and increasing 
controls over private providers of health care. The proposal of creating a harmonious network 
of health services did not become a reality, but it placed the idea of health sector integration on 
the political agenda.
In 1978, the national system of social security (Sistema Nacional de Previdencia e 
Assistencia Social hereafter SINPAS) was created under the co-ordination of the Ministry of 
Social Security. One of the institutions this system comprised was the Instituto Nacional de 
Assistencia Mldica da Previdencia Social (hereafter INAMPS) responsible for medical care. 
The creation of the INAMPS can be seen as a step towards the separation of health care from 
the social security system. It also expressed an institutional acknowledgement of the specificity 
of health care provision and the importance it had acquired within the social security complex, 
which can be illustrated by the dimensions of social security expenditure on health care. In 
1978, when the INAMPS was created, its participation in total SINPAS expenditure was 30 per 
cent. Using Mddice's (1987, 214) estimate for the years before 1978, it is possible to observe 
that this institute’s participation in total SINPAS expenditure, from 1970 until 1982, was on 
average 27 per cent.
Between 1969 and 1976, the expenditure of the social security system on hospital care 
grew by 185 per cent and on out-patient care 400 per cent (Braga and Paula 1981, 115-6). 
Although, in 1976, most of the social security expenditure on health went to hospital services - 
56 per cent of the total - the expenditure on out-patient care grew faster probably due to the
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Plano de Pronta A9&) (Braga and Paula 1981, 116). Concomitantly with the expansion of out­
patient care, a private network of hospital services was built up to become the main provider of 
hospital care, during the late seventies and eighties. The Fundo de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento 
Social (hereafter FAS) was an important instrument in this process. The fund, which was 
created in 1984, received financial resources from the federal budget, federal lotteries and 
federal banks among other sources. It offered highly subsided loans to private entrepreneurs and 
governmental agencies for building social facilities. By August 1977, 80 per cent of FAS loans 
in the health area had gone to private hospitals (Braga and Paula 1981,128).
During the seventies, the social security sub-sector of health care had two different 
types of services: its own and contracted services. Social security had its own network of out­
patient units and hospitals, but both out-patient and hospital care were mostly provided through 
contracted services. In 1976, 32 per cent of the total social security expenditure on health care 
was on its own services and 6 8  per cent was on non-owned services (Braga e Paula 1981, 120). 
Nevertheless, the INAMPS’ own hospitals provided highly specialised and complex care, 
leaving to contracted ones the provision of simpler and less expansive care (Possas, 1981,254).
There were two main types of contracts: contract and covenant. Through the first type, 
private hospitals received fees-for-services (Unidade de Servi9o - US) payments for hospital 
care or out-patient attendances in hospital based out-patient units. Covenants were usually 
established with industrial and commercial enterprises contracting health maintenance 
organisations. In this case, part of the social security compulsory contribution went directly to 
the health maintenance organisation. Other types of covenant were those established with state 
and municipal health secretariats, universities and trade unions. In these cases financial 
resources were transferred according to specific criteria depending on the type of institutions 
involved (Possas 1981, 247-70). Covenants with states and municipalities would increase in 
importance during the next decade when the idea of health system integration and 
rationalisation became politically relevant due to social security financial problems and 
"ideological crisis” (Oliveira and Teixeira 1986, 270-5). During the seventies, the authoritarian 
regime tried to increase its legitimacy offering more health care, mostly through private 
providers, to larger population sectors. The enduring economic crisis in the late seventies and 
early eighties, however, would force decision-makers to seek solutions not only for reducing the 
costs of contracted services, but also for making public health sub-sector out-patient units able 
to contain the demand for health care before it reached social security services. The social 
security crisis would make it feasible for Brazilian health system reformers to implement 
policies aimed at health sector integration and decentralisation, at increased control over private
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providers and at the promotion of user involvement in the health sector decision-making 
process.
4.5. Changing the Brazilian Health System: The Eighties and the Shift 
towards Integration and Decentralisation
During the eighties, Brazilian society underwent a deep economic crisis and a process 
of political democratisation. Political life became freer although the "liberalisation” process was 
firmly controlled by military forces. New political parties were created. Many strikes occurred, 
although, at first, they were illegal. Press freedom was re-established. In 1982, state governors 
were directly elected. In 1985, all mayors were directly elected, but the President of the 
Republic was directly elected only in 1989.
In 1985, the first non-military President since 1964 was indirectly elected by an 
electoral college made up of members of Congress. It used to be a political mechanism used by 
the military regime for formalising their previously chosen candidates. This time, however, the 
climate of growing political liberty, the lack of military government legitimacy, the economic 
crisis and the unprecedented popular mobilisation that brought millions of Brazilians to public 
demonstrations asking for direct elections for the Presidency, had shaped the political basis for 
the complex political alliance supporting a civilian government. This political alliance was 
made up of very distinct political forces, such as ex-leaders of the military regime and left wing 
factions of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), the biggest political party 
of this alliance. These left wing groups would have a strong influence over the reform of the 
Brazilian health system.
4.5.1. Towards Brazilian Health System Integration and Decentralisation: The 
CONASP Plan
As was mentioned before, PREVSAUDE launched the idea of a unified, universal and 
comprehensive health system. Although the Ministry of Health officials who proposed the 
programme had no political power to make it work (Paim 1989, 21), they were successful in 
starting what Oliveira and Teixeira (1986, 270-5) called the social security system's ideological 
crisis.
Behind the ideological crisis, however, there was the social security system's financial 
crisis (Oliveira and Teixeira 1986, 276-91). The latter was due, firstly, to the economic 
recession which, since 1973, reduced social security revenue from compulsory contributions 
from wages. Since then, there had been more unemployment and less increase in wage levels.
84
The recession also affected federal revenue, since less economic activity implied fewer taxes 
paid to the government. Central government decided to allocate its scarce financial resources to 
other areas lacking their own revenue or regarded as more important in economic terms. 
Between 1970 and 1973, the federal budget transfer to the social security system was on 
average ten per cent of the total social security system revenue, declining to 3.4 per cent in 
1980 (Oliveira and Teixeira 1986, 277). The financial crisis was due, also, to the expansion of 
the population covered by social security without the enlargement of its revenue basis. During 
the seventies and early eighties, the system insured nearly all Brazilians but its main source of 
revenue still remained restricted to compulsory contributions from each regular worker’s wage.
*  jThe mismanagement of financial resources helped as well jexacerbatep existing 
problems. The social security system had the biggest budget at federal level, only surpassed by 
the whole federal budget itself (Oliveira and Teixeira 1986, 279). Its financial operations 
involved huge amounts of money, so that losses from this amount of financial resources could 
be substantial. An example of mismanagement was the existence of two social security bank 
accounts in financial institutions, one receiving contributions and the other paying benefits or 
services, in the case of health care. The payment accounts always went “red” during part of the 
month, while the resources in the receiving accounts could not be transfered to the former. In an 
economic context of high inflation and high interest rates this mechanism resulted in large 
monthly transfers of financial resources from social security to the banking system. Although 
the social security’s two accounts had been debated since the late seventies, the situation was 
only modified in 1986.
Trying to reduce social security expenditure on health care, the federal government 
adopted measures to rationalise this sub-sector at the same time that it laid the foundations of a 
broad health system reform. In 1982, federal government issued a plan for the reorganisation of 
social security’s health care system (Plano de Reorganizafilo da Assistencia a Saude no Ambito 
da Previdencia Social hereafter CONASP). The plan created new control mechanisms over 
private sector accounts, particularly over contracted hospitals. Social security had paid private 
hospitals until then through fees-for-services mechanisms but, after the plan, they were paid per 
average cost of disease treated (Autoriza^So de Interna^o Hospitalar - AIH). This measure 
should have allowed more control, since hospitals could not add indiscriminate procedures to 
each patient’s account. Although private hospitals had created new mechanisms to defraud 
social security controls (Respondent/15, 1992), the percentage of INAMPS expenditure on 
private services seems to have decreased. In 1985, for the first time in many years, private
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sector services received less than 50 per cent of social security financial resources (Mddice 
1987, 192).
The CONASP plan recommended the creation of a comprehensive, integrated and 
decentralised health system, where primary health care could be stimulated and public out­
patient and hospital networks should work according to their maximum capacity. It also 
proposed the creation in each Brazilian state of a trilateral covenant which would have the 
participation of the Ministries of Social Security, of Health and the state health secretariat. 
These ideas revived some PREVSAUDE propositions which aimed at creating a comprehensive 
and integrated health system. They would become actual policy when central government 
launched the Programa das A^fies Integradas de Saude (hereafter A1S).
4.5.2. Programa das A^des Integradas de Saude: The First Step towards the 
Reform of the Brazilian Health System
This programme represented a significant step towards inter-institutional integration. It 
established that covenants would be signed between state governments and the Ministries of 
Social Security, of Health and of Education in each state of the country. After the state 
government had signed the AIS covenant, municipal governments could "adhere” to it. It would 
entitle state and municipal governments to receive social security financial resources to be used 
by their secretariats of health. These financial resources were paid through a fee-for-services 
scheme.
The programme also opened statutory mechanisms for user participation in the 
Brazilian health field. It created inter-institutional commissions, responsible for planning and 
co-ordinating health policy implementation, at federal, state and regional levels of government. 
These commissions were respectively the Comissao Interministerial de Planejamento e 
Coordena53o (CIPLAN), the Comissao Interinstitucional de Saude (CIS) and the Comissao 
Regional Interinstitucional de Saude (CRIS). They had to have the participation of covenant 
institutions and other health care providers. At the municipal level - a city or a group of cities - 
and local level - city district - the Comissao Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude (hereafter 
CIMS) and the Comissao Local Interinstitucional de Saude (hereafter CLIS) should be 
created. Very few regional health commissions were created in the country, but municipal and 
local commissions became part of Brazilian health sector institutional life since that time. These 
last two fora had to have the participation of
"covenant institutions' representatives, municipal health secretariat or City Hall’s
representatives as well as community associations, trade unions, associations
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representing local population" (Brasil. Ministdrio da Previdencia e Assistencia 
Social and others 1984, 8).
Ideally, planning and decision-making for the health sector at each level of government 
should take place in these fora. Nevertheless, it was still a frail health service integration, most 
decisions taken being related to the transfer of financial resources from social security to 
municipal health secretariats. Moreover, the programme established that municipal and local 
commissions had to have popular participation, but it did not define the nature of this 
participation or how to select popular representatives. Usually, municipal and state health 
secretariats established who had to be invited, but it could vary, depending on the political 
power and organisational capacity of the local popular or trade union movements. Even 
considering these limitations, for the first time, there was a decentralised network of 
participatory fora at the local level of government aiming at the integration of the management 
of health services. Some of them had only a formal existence, but others became the scenario of 
important political disputes within the health sector.
The AIS programme recommended that providers should integrate their plans and 
activities, but the only actual step taken towards that integration was the creation of inter- 
institutional commissions. The policy recommendation was that planning and decision-making 
for municipal health services should take place in the municipal fora. Nevertheless, the 
exclusive legal power of these commissions was over the expenditure and respective accounts 
related to the social security system financial resources transferred to municipalities. Health 
care provided directly or contracted by the social security system, health care provided by the 
Ministry of Health, state health secretariats and health care financed through municipal budgets, 
were excluded from any public scrutiny and could remain as disintegrated as ever. It made the 
creation of such municipal fora very attractive to municipal health authorities because they 
could obtain financial resources from federal government without sharing power or increasing 
their responsibilities. The enlargement of municipal commissions’ decision-making powers on 
other issues would depend very much on health authorities’ good will or on irresistible political 
pressure.
In 1985 the civilian federal government took office. Although right wing politicians, 
military and business interest dominated the so called New Republic (Nova Republica) 
government, there was also participation by some left wing politicians and professionals. In the 
health field, political co-ordination was given, in both INAMPS and the Ministry of Health, to 
Brazilian health system reformers who had links with left wing parties or left wing political 
factions. These reformers defended strategies aimed at health system decentralisation and at
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strengthening public control over the system. They transformed AIS from just a programme into 
the central policy of the health sector. Although, in 1985, AIS represented only ten per cent of 
the social security's expenditure on health care, in 1986, the 2,500 Brazilian municipalities had 
''adhered” to AIS' covenants (Neto 1991,61).
Defending the idea of decentralisation and more public control over health care 
provision, brought to them support from municipal secretaries of health (Neto 1991, 60) and 
opposition from both sides of the political spectrum. From the left, there were those, such as 
some health professional associations, some left wing political parties, parts of trade union and 
urban social movements, defending the claim that all health services should be immediately 
under State ownership. From the right, there were associations representing private providers of 
hospital care, health maintenance organisations, some trade unions of health professionals, 
especially medical doctors and dentists, afraid of increasing government controls over their 
practices. They argued that the market was the best health sector regulator, so governments 
should not intervene more than they already did. A third group against change was made up of 
health service civil servants at all levels of government, afraid of losing their jobs and 
privileges. INAMPS’ employees were the most resistant group since they worked in the most 
powerful public organisation in the health sector.
In 1986, the eighth national health conference (VIII Conferencia Nacional de Saude) 
produced strong political mobilisation and its final report supported health system 
decentralisation and integration. There were approximately four thousand participants 
representing public and private health institutions, the main universities, student unions, the 
main trade union confederations, many health worker unions, urban and rural trade unions, 
urban residential associations, political parties, Catholic and Protestant churches and many 
other organisations. Its final report placed the very idea of health in a broad context, stating that
"health results from conditions o f nutrition, housing, education, income, environment, 
work, transportation, leisure, freedom, access to land and health services" (Relatdrio 
Final da VIII Conferencia Nacional de Saude 1987, 382).
This concept implied that only structural changes in society could actually improve the health 
situation of the Brazilian population. Nevertheless, some policy goals were proposed: (1) to 
improve the situation of the poorest, (2) to create a universal and comprehensive unified health 
system, (3) to decentralise health services, (4) to establish rules that could guarantee that public 
and private services would provide good quality health care.
Since this conference, although divergent positions have remained, those defending the 
Brazilian health system reform have agreed upon some basic objectives: creating a
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comprehensive and universal health system, integrating and decentralising health services, 
defending State ownership of health services, or at least, strengthening public control over 
private providers and promoting user participation in the system.
4.5.3. Sistemas Unificados e Decentralisados de Satide: The Second Step towards 
the Reform of the Brazilian Health System
In 1987, the central government created the programme of Sistemas Unificados e 
Decentralisados de Saude (hereafter SUDS) aiming at the consolidation and qualitative 
development of AIS. The programme established that all citizens should have the right to use 
SUDS public or contracted services. Since then, any Brazilian citizen is, at least formally, 
entitled to receive health care, independently of paying social security contributions. Federal 
government would manage, co-ordinate, control and evaluate the national health system but it 
would only provide direct or indirect health services that reached the whole Brazilian 
population. It transferred nearly all INAMPS and Ministry of Health functions and services to 
state health secretariats. INAMPS would gradually reduce personnel and installations since it 
would gradually stop providing health services. State secretariats would become responsible for 
the direct or contracted health care provided within each state territory. The programme also 
stimulated the further transfer of functions and services from the state level to the municipal 
level of government. Municipalities would present a plan, sign a covenant and then receive 
financial resources from the state health secretariats which were becoming responsible for state 
and federal health units and hospitals within municipal territory. The transfer of financial 
resources would be made through new mechanisms of integrated budgets management.
SUDS reinforced the role of users in inter-institutional health commissions, since it 
recommended that state commissions would be open to civil society participation. Before then, 
only municipal and local commissions were open to user participation. Moreover, it also 
stimulated the enlargement of the role of the municipal commissions. If a municipality and the 
state government agreed on a municipalisation covenant, state, federal and municipal health 
units and hospitals, that were not referrals for state population, would be transferred to 
municipal responsibility. Municipal commissions would control the expenditure and the 
accounts related to health services transferred to the responsibility of municipal health 
secretariats. Municipalisation covenants were signed by many municipalities throughout the 
country. In 1989, in the state of SSo Paulo, 98 per cent of cities, 565 out of 572, had their health 
services municipalised (Carvalheiro and others 1992, 39-40). In 1990, in the state of Rio
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Grande do Sul, 38 per cent of the cities, 125 out of 333, had their health services integrated 
(Respondent/32 1992).
SUDS's main strategy for speeding the pace of the Brazilian health system reform was 
implementing decentralisation through devolution. Nevertheless, the municipalisation process 
was not as easy as AIS implementation, because it was not just a way of receiving more 
financial resources. In the case of the largest cities, it also implied taking under municipal 
responsibility a large network of health services with immense financial and administrative 
problems. An example is the case of Porto Alegre. Since 1989, municipal health authorities had 
been asking for the municipalisation of state and federal health services, by then under the state 
health secretariat management due to the SUDS programme implementation. Municipal health 
authorities could not agree, however, with the state health secretariat proposal for transferring 
services without guaranteeing the concomitant transfer of financial resources to enable not only 
the services to function but to recuperate buildings and equipment, to qualify and contract 
personnel, among other improvements (Respondent/5 1992). The case of Porto Alegre does not 
seem to be an exception, since by 1991 no Brazilian state capital had its services integrated and 
decentralised, including the capital of the state of SSo Paulo, which by 1990 had more than 98 
per cent of cities with health services municipalised.
Critics pointed out that the SUDS programme did not really change the relationship 
between the social security system and the private sector. In fact, it did not affect the way the 
public sector contracted and paid private providers. What the programme actually did was to 
transfer to states the former social security system’s responsibility of dealing with contracted 
services, to transfer social security’s own health units and hospitals to state and municipal 
administrations and to end the historical division between social security and public health sub­
sectors of health care in Brazil. As a result the SUDS programme has pushed into the health 
sector political arena mayors and state governors pressing for the devolution process in the 
health field to be deeper and faster (Arouca 1988, 53).
The SUDS programme could be seen as a reaffirmation of the commitment of INAMPS 
and Ministry of Health directors to the reform of the Brazilian health system and as an attempt 
to push it further, before the alliance politically guaranteeing their posts was totally dissolved. 
In 1988, the tendency of central government to seek right-wing political party support, pressure 
from groups of health professionals, from private providers as well as from the INAMPS 
conservative bureaucracy, resulted in the replacement of the main INAMPS and Ministry of 
Health directors.
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4.5.4. Constitution and Health Laws: The Third Step towards the Reform of the 
Brazilian Health System
Since 1987, pressure groups against or in support of the reform of the Brazilian health 
system have been mobilised and connected with members of Congress. On one side, opposing 
the increase in State control over the system and/or against devolution of functions to state and 
municipal governments, there were interest groups representing private providers, some 
medical professional associations and some factions of INAMPS and the Ministry of Health 
bureaucracy. On the other side, supporting the extension of state control over the health system, 
particularly over private providers, and the devolution of functions and financial resources to 
state and municipal governments, were some health professional associations, some trade 
unions, the main trade union confederations, urban residential associations and most state and 
municipal governments.
In 1988, the latter group created a national plenary that rapidly acquired political 
prestige, due to its capacity to formulate a clear and consistent project of constitutional text on 
health issues, to its constant pressure on the members of the constituent assembly and to its 
broad social representation (Teixeira 1989, 51). In the same year, municipal secretaries of 
health created the National Council of Municipal Secretaries of Health (Conselho Nacional de 
Secretdrios Municipals de Saude hereafter CONASEMS) whose main priority at that moment 
was pressing the constituent assembly to approve items that would establish health system 
decentralisation and empower the municipal levels of government.
In 1988, in some way reconciling diverging political interests, not only in the health 
field but in all in areas of social life, the new Brazilian Constitution came into force. This 
Constitution buried for good the concept of social security as a system whose benefits and 
services would reach only those who paid premiums. It was substituted by the notion of social 
security as a universal social right. The new social security system was made up of a 
comprehensive health sub-system, a social insurance sub-system and a social assistance sub­
system. In the health field the Constitution set up the legal basis for strengthening health system 
changes and created the Sistema tJnico de Saude (hereafter SUS). The SUS had to be 
decentralised through the delegation and devolution of functions and discretionary powers to 
state and municipal governments. It had to integrate all the services in a territorial area under a 
unified command. The public sector would have overall control and would regulate the system.
After months of intense political dispute, in September of 1990 the health law (Brasil. 
Congresso 1990, Lei 8.080) was passed by the Brazilian Congress, to make operative
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constitutional principles and to establish the legal parameters that could make the SUS feasible. 
Nevertheless, some articles that were present in the original Bill were vetoed by the President of 
the Republic. In fact, the Brazilian political situation had changed in 1990. Before then, as state 
and municipal governments had been directly elected, they had stronger political legitimacy 
than the federal government. In 1990, Fernando Collor, the first directly elected president since 
1961, took office in Brasilia. His political legitimacy reinforced the central government's role in 
the political scene. It was a right wing government supporting privatisation, but resistant both to 
devolution of political power from central to state and municipal levels of government, and to 
institutional democratisation. In the health field, it tried to regain power through slowing down 
the decentralisation process and restricting the influence of participatory channels. Therefore, 
the President of the Republic vetoed articles in the original Bill which: (1) established that there 
should be Health Councils and Conferences of Health with large civil society representation in 
the three governmental spheres (federal, state and municipal) as the main formulators of 
strategies and directives, controlling policy implementation; (2) established automatic and 
regular transfer of financial resources from the social security fund to states and municipalities; 
(3) established the proportion of financial resources to be automatically transferred to states and 
municipalities. In December 1990, the federal government lifted the vetoes after intense 
political mobilisation lead by the municipal secretaries of health, who were particularly 
concerned with the veto on the automatic transfer of financial resources.
The Law 8.080/90, together with the Constitution, created a health sub-system that was 
part of the social security system. The main functions of this sub-system (SUS) were: promotion 
of preventive and curative care; production of equipment, medicines and other substances of 
health interest; control of food and environmental quality; promotion of basic sanitation; human 
resources development; epidemiological and sanitary monitoring; control of health and safety at 
work. The SUS would be publicly financed, would have a unique direction in each 
governmental sphere (federal, state and municipal), guaranteeing the private sector freedom to 
realise its activities according to the law (Carvalho e Santos 1992, 36-7). The legal provisions 
regarded the municipalisation of health services as a priority for consolidating the new system 
(Carvalho and Santos 1992, 45). They placed on municipalities the obligation to plan, execute 
and control a variety of health related activities. Since that time, it has not been optional for 
municipal governments to establish covenants with the social security system, becoming 
responsible for the management of federal and state health units in exchange for financial 
resources. It has become obligatory, since their health secretariats were a decentralised sphere 
of the SUS.
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Although financial and tax reforms are still to come in Brazil, the Constitution and the 
health law established the general parameters that would make it feasible for municipalities to 
bear their enlarged responsibilities in the health field. They stated that federal, state and 
municipal budgets, employers’ and employees' compulsory contributions, as well as the federal 
and state lotteries, would provide financial resources for the social security budget. 
Organisations responsible for health, social insurance and assistance should prepare this budget 
in accordance with the directives of the annual budget law. Financial resources from the federal 
budget, the social security budget and other sources would be allocated to a national health fund 
managed by the Ministry of Health. Half the amount of the financial resources to be distributed 
to state and municipal health secretariats would be allocated taking into account the relation of 
the population size of the state or municipality to the country's total population. Municipalities 
should receive at least 70 per cent of this total. To receive such financial resources, municipal 
and state health secretariats had to have: (1) a health fund, (2) a health council, (3) a health 
plan, (4) a management report, (5) considerable participation of health in the municipal or state 
budgets, (6) plan of career for personnel. The other half would be distributed according to a 
combination of criteria which would take into account the epidemiological profile of the 
population and the efficiency of the health services. The SUS financial resources for each 
governmental sphere would be credited to special bank accounts whose transactions would be 
monitored by the health councils.
The reorganisation of the system after the implementation of the SUDS programme, 
therefore, resulted in transferring to states and municipalities functions, buildings, personnel, 
that is, the whole management of INAMPS’ own and contracted services. As a consequence the 
social security system reduced its expenditure on health. Taking into account the resources 
allocated to INAMPS and to the Ministry of Health, in 1987, when the SUDS programme was 
introduced, the social security system spent on health 34.7 per cent of its total expenditure 
while, in 1991, it spent 23.6 per cent (Carvalho 1991, 12). Health laws have imposed the 
automatic transfer of, at least, part of the social security's financial resources to states and 
municipalities. Nevertheless, in 1991, while the private sector were paid integrally for the care 
they had provided, the state and municipal secretariats’ own services had to share the "rest” 
(Respondent/5 1992). It seems that political affinities among governors, mayors and federal 
government, as well as the capacity of municipal health authorities for mobilising public 
support had more influence on the decision about whether each state or municipality would 
receive more financial resources than the technical criteria established by law (Respondent/5 
1992; Respondent/15 1992). There are not yet any studies assessing whether the 
decentralisation and integration of the system resulted in better care or in the increased
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effectiveness of health services, but there is no doubt that the federal government cut its costs 
on health since the reform came into effect, by transferring responsibilities to lower levels of 
government.
In terms of user participation, the Law 8.142/90 (Brasil. Congresso 1990, Lei 8.142) 
passed by Congress in December of 1990, went further than previous programmes in stating 
that the health councils in the three governmental spheres would be permanent and would have 
representatives of government, health service providers, health professionals and users of health 
services. Half of the council should be made up of user representatives and the other half of 
other representatives. These fora would participate in establishing strategies, deciding financial 
resource allocation and in monitoring policy implementation. Moreover, since health care 
provision had become a municipal government obligation, these councils would have control 
over all the services provided within each city area. Once these six prerequisites were fulfilled, 
the municipality would automatically become responsible for health services located there and, 
therefore, the councils would be entitled to make decisions concerning these services.
Nevertheless, the difficulties that were verified on the implementation of the SUDS 
programme in large cities, remained after the health laws had been issued. As was mentioned 
above, by 1991, no state capital had their health services municipalised. In the particular case of 
Porto Alegre, all the prerequisites had been fulfilled, but it was not possible to reach an 
agreement between state and municipal health authorities on what services would be 
transferred, at what pace each type of service would go under municipal management, and 
about the financial resources to be automatically transferred (Respondent/5 1992). As state and 
municipal governments were ruled by different political parties, the difficulties were made 
worse (Respondent/27 1992). While health services in a city did not go under municipal control 
it would be more difficult for a municipal health commission to monitor health care provision 
and to influence the decision-making process in the sector. This was so, firstly, because the 
commission would have to influence the state health secretariat, which legally was outside its 
jurisdiction. Secondly, because, as the health system was undergoing a process of 
reorganisation, it was often difficult to identify, particularly in large cities, which organisation 
could be held responsible for which type of activities. Even taking into account these problems, 
the perspective of municipalisation, which is ‘an inevitable process’, according to a user 
participant in the Porto Alegre’s municipal health commission (Respondent/13 1992), and the 
institutionalisation of participatory fora through the law, seemed to have stimulated the
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involvement of users in the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre, as will be seen in 
following chapters.
4.6. Summing Up
Until the early eighties, the Brazilian health system was divided into public health and 
social security sub-sectors of health care, both acting without co-ordination and with 
overlapping functions. The social security sub-sector had most of the financial resources, had 
the largest public out-patient and hospital network, and financed individual health care for the 
majority of the Brazilian population. By then, both hospital and out-patient health care were 
provided mostly by private services contracted by the social security sub-sector of health care. 
The economic crisis and the growing cost of health care provision for the social security system 
reinforced the idea among the policy makers, within and outside the health sector, that the 
health system needed to be reorganised for its better integration and decentralisation. The 
reorganisation implied the transfer of discretionary powers and financial resources from the 
social security to the public health sub-sector of health care, and from central government to 
state and municipal governments. Since the early eighties, following the country's general 
climate of democratisation and the recommendations of International Agencies, the policies and 
legal dispositions that aimed chiefly at integrating and decentralising the Brazilian public health 
system also stimulated user participation at the municipal level.
In order to liberalise the political regime, since the economic crisis had reduced the 
political legitimacy of the military government, the regime became less oppressive and took 
initiatives in building new channels of political representation. It sought to legitimise the 
authoritarian regime and broaden its social basis of support by implementing policies for 
poverty alleviation and expansion of social security coverage. Simultaneously, the former 
coiporatist relationship between business interests and public sector technocracy (Cardoso, 
1975, 181-6) were criticised even by some bourgeois sectors, which were dissatisfied with the 
slowing down of economic activities. Democratic forms of political representation were 
gradually restored or created, such as elections for executive posts, press freedom, freedom of 
association and of political parties to organise. New modalities of political representation inside 
the State apparatus were created. Government projects and programmes established boards and 
commissions that were supposed to have civil society interest group representation. One 
important element of the Brazilian health system reform, that took place during the eighties, 
was the establishment of participatory mechanisms.
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During the eighties there were two federal government programmes and one set of legal 
provisions that could be regarded as the main landmarks of health sector reform. They were the 
programme of A(5es Integradas de Saude (AIS), the programme for the development of 
Sistemas Unificados e Decentralisados de Saude (SUDS) and the 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution together with the health laws.
The AIS programme, created in 1984, was part of the military regime’s strategy of 
reducing social security system costs, which had increased during the seventies. It established 
that the social security system would transfer its financial resources to the state governments 
and municipalities that opted to take part in the programme. The main goal was to improve the 
public health network of services spread through the three governmental levels, retaining the 
demand for specialised and hospital care financed or directly provided by the social security 
system. To facilitate the integration of public providers the programme created inter- 
institutional commissions at the federal, state, regional, municipal and local administrative 
levels. The first three types of commission did not have to have the involvement of civil society 
organisations but those at the municipal and local levels did. The municipal commissions would 
decide on the allocation of social security financial resources to be transferred to municipalities 
as well as monitoring their expenditure. The health care provided directly by federal, state and 
municipal spheres of government and the health care provided by private services did not have 
to be included on the agenda of these fora. Besides aiding inter-institutional integration, the 
municipal and local fora were also new channels of political representation inside the State 
organisation. They could become places where interest groups could present their demands to 
the government, taking part in the decision-making processes in the health sector.
From 1985, when the first civil government took office, the programme became a 
central element of the federal health policy. The municipal and local fora, placed in a rather 
centralised health system, could have little influence over the system, but they could absorb and 
alleviate interest group pressure on the government. Gradually, interest groups, such as user 
organisations, trade unions, health professionals and health workers' unions, organisations 
previously excluded from the sector's decision-making process, saw the empowerment of these 
fora as an opportunity to influence decisions. Particularly in large cities where social 
movements were better organised, these interest groups pressed for the enlargement of the fora's 
agenda in order to share power in the sector (Carvalheiro and others 1992,116-27).
The SUDS programme was inaugurated in August of 1987 due to the initiative of the 
federal health authorities, who defended the health system reform. The main strategy of this
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new programme was to universalise access to health care and, at the same time, to rationalise 
costs and resources, unifying the management of public health and social security health 
services. It would be done by taking advantage of the decentralised public health network of 
services. States and municipalities would sign covenants enabling the transfer of social security 
financial resources and of social security hospitals and out-patient units to state health 
secretariats. The programme also established that there should be a further transfer of services, 
as well as of states’ own units, hospitals and public health services, to municipalities. The 
programme proposed real integration, virtually extinguishing the direct involvement of social 
security in the provision of health care and in the purchasing of private care. When there was 
municipalisation, municipal health secretariats would become the actual managers of the health 
services in their respective territorial areas, except for the services that acted as referrals for the 
state or country populations, that is those complex services that were used by the whole state 
and the whole Brazilian population.
The Brazilian health system reformers regarded it as a matter of principle that civil 
society should have control over the system, but they also needed to expand political support for 
their policies, which could be helped by interest groups being mobilised in participatory fora. 
The programme opened state commissions to civil society participation and reinforced the role 
of civil society representatives in municipal and local health commissions. The SUDS enabled 
municipal commissions to participate in decisions concerning all public or contracted health 
services in the city, since health services were municipalised.
The Brazilian Constitution, promulgated in 1988, and the health laws passed by the 
Brazilian Congress in 1990, were influenced by the lobby made up of reformers of the Brazilian 
health system in alliance with user interest groups. The general strategy was to create a 
universal unified health system (SUS) financed basically by social security funds and federal, 
state and municipal budgets, transferring most health care provision to the municipal level, 
leaving to the federal and state levels the monitoring and evaluation of the system. The legal 
provisions stated that the health system should have a unified and decentralised management. 
Municipal health authorities would be responsible for health care provided within the municipal 
territory, excluding the services which were referral centres for state or national populations. 
Although the responsibility for health services became by law a municipal duty, it was difficult 
to reach an agreement between municipal and state health authorities on how and when services 
would be devolved to municipal health secretariats in large cities, particularly in the state 
capitals.
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Even considering the difficulties, and the resistance in turning policies and legal 
requirements into reality, a growing number of municipalities were taking control of health 
services in their territories. The growing number of municipalisations favoured the idea that 
there would be municipalisation even in the state capitals. User organisations and other interest 
groups, aware of the inevitability of the devolution process, tended to renew efforts to increase 
their influence on municipal councils. They acknowledged the centrality of the municipal 
sphere of government within the SUS and the possibility of opening these councils to playing 
an active part in the decision-making processes of the health sector.
The health laws also created health councils at federal, state and municipal levels of 
management of the system. Most municipal councils created since that time, were formed from 
previous municipal health commissions. In legal and institutional terms municipal commissions 
had been modifying their character inside a health system that had also been changing. 
Nevertheless, from 1985, when the federal health authorities gave priority to AIS, the municipal 
commissions, besides facilitating inter-institutional integration, could become places where 
providers, different levels of government, and organisations representing users, health workers 
and health professionals could channel their demands and expectations and could conciliate 
their differences.
Mediating interests in the sector, however, depended on the forum having discretionary 
powers over the system and on the capacity of the actors to participate autonomously and on a 
regular basis in a given forum (Marmor, 1983, 92). The first prerequisite was determined 
mainly by health policies, laws and institutional practices; nevertheless interest group pressures 
and the political views of health authorities could enlarge a forum’s agenda. The second would 
depend on the strength of the organisations behind the representatives participating there. Trade 
unions, residential and community associations were the organisations that usually offered 
support for substantive user representation in Brazil. Without such pre-existing organised 
structures supporting user representatives, their involvement in State participatory channels may 
become manipulative, giving legitimacy to policies actually decided only by government 
officials and other powerful social actors, such as medical professionals or private providers. In 
small cities in Brazil clientelism and favouritism could hamper the political autonomy of user 
organisations (Carvalheiro and others 1992, 116-8, 135-43). In large cities, particularly in state 
capitals where there was a concentration of political organisations, it could be possible for user 
involvement in State participatory mechanisms to go beyond manipulation. On the one hand, 
these cities have a large network of out-patient units, hospitals and specialised complex services 
making the reconciliation of interests surrounding the municipalisation of health services more
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difficult. On the other hand, in this situation there was more urgency in establishing channels 
for mediating conflicts.
99
Chapter 5
The Brazilian Municipal Health Fora and the Social 
and Political Scenario of Porto Alegre's Health Forum
5.1. Introduction
This chapter aims, firstly, at placing the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre 
in the broader country context and at justifying why users’ involvement in this commission is an 
interesting case for analysis. The first section examines the existing information about the 
distribution of different types of municipal health commissions or councils by large territorial 
regions and by types of city, with regard to population size and city income. The types of fora 
were defined according to the regularity of their meetings and according to their internal 
regulations regarding the role of the fora in establishing municipal health policy and the role of 
users in the commission. Taking into account population and city income, when defining the 
size of the city, it has been possible to explore the relationship between city size and distinct 
patterns of political life, of urban social movement organisations, of public health professionals* 
role in the health sector, and of user involvement in municipal health fora activities.
The second section aims to show that this research focused on the case of the Porto 
Alegre municipal health commission because of the city's position in the Brazilian context and 
the city's own peculiarities. Firstly, Porto Alegre's demographic, social and epidemiological 
characteristics are described in the Brazilian context, verifying whether social inequalities could 
have favoured the emergence of the concern with health issues of the urban social movements. 
Secondly, Porto Alegre's health services are described, examining their capacity in principle to 
cover the needs of the population, but also highlighting the limited real access of poor sectors 
of the population to these services, which could also have produced demands for better care 
from urban social movement organisations. Nevertheless, the existence of social inequalities in
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the distribution of goods and services alone neither creates political mobilisation nor defines 
who should be the social actors motivated to represent, and capable of representing, the 
interests of deprived social sectors. In Brazil, these actors have consisted mainly of urban social 
movements. Moreover, spatially-based organisations rather than class defined ones have been 
more interested in taking part in participatory health fora. As their members were the main 
participants in the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre, the origins of the urban social 
movements in the city are described, stressing the analytical difference between "traditionar 
and "new" organisations and highlighting the regions whose organisations, even before the 
creation of the municipal health commission in 1985, had included health issues on their 
political agendas.
5.2. Distribution of Municipal Health Fora in Brazilian Regions and by 
Type of City
The first municipal health commissions (Comiss3o Interinstitucional Municipal de 
Saude) were created in 1984, when the A95es Integradas de Saude (AIS) established the first 
covenants between federal and state governments. Although there are no systematic studies of 
the commissions created during the first years of AIS implementation, there is some 
information on particular periods and regions. By 1986, 2,500 Brazilian municipalities had 
"adhered" to AIS covenants (Neto 1991, 61), representing 59 per cent of the 4,212 cities in the 
country (FIBGE 1987, 45). All of them should have had a municipal health commission, but 
this does not mean that they were active, had civil society participation, or were even successful 
at integrating the activities of public and private providers of health care. In 1987 in the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul, whose capital is Porto Alegre, there were 192 municipal health 
commissions (Respondent/22 1992) representing 77 per cent of the 248 cities of this state 
(FIBGE 1989, 65).
After the creation of the Sistemas Unificados e Decentralisados de Saude (SUDS), in 
1987, municipalisation covenants were signed by many municipalities throughout the country. 
Any municipalised city was to have a municipal health commission, although those not yet 
municipalised could have one as well. In 1989, in the state of S£o Paulo, at least 98 per cent of 
cities had health commissions, since 565 out of 572 cities had had their health services 
municipalised by this year. In 1990, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, at least 38 per cent of the 
cities had commissions, since 125 out of 333 had had their health services integrated 
(Respondent/32 1992; FIBGE 1991,31).
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From 1990, health laws dictated that the establishment of municipal health councils was 
a condition for municipalising the health services of a city. During 1991 and 1992, many 
municipal health commissions were transformed into municipal health councils, even if  health 
services in the city had not yet been municipalised. The data available refer exclusively to 
municipal health councils, excluding the remaining commissions, and they also refer to only 68 
per cent of Brazilian municipalities. The data, therefore, probably underestimate the actual 
figure of municipal health fora in Brazil in 1991 (IBAM and others 1993, 335). Even taking 
into account both limitations - dealing only with councils and the actual scope of cities reached 
- it is possible to draw some interesting conclusions concerning the distribution of the 
municipal health councils among Brazilian regions, attesting to the widespread 
institutionalisation of these fora throughout the countiy. Table 5.1 demonstrates that, by the end 
of 1991, just one year after the health laws had opened up the possibility of creating municipal 
health councils, at least 25 per cent of Brazilian municipalities had them. They were distributed 
over all Brazilian states. Rio Grande do Sul, the state whose capital is Porto Alegre, was the 
Southern state with the highest percentage of cities with a municipal health council. This state’s 
percentage of 40 per cent of cities with councils was well above the national figure of 25 per 
cent.
Although beyond the temporal limits of the present study, it is interesting to observe 
that, between 1991 and 1993, there was an increase in the percentage of Southern state cities 
with municipal health councils. Between 1991 and 1993, the percentage of cities with 
municipal health councils in Southern states grew by 209 per cent - 188 to 582 - above the 
national average of 84 per cent - 1,143 to 2,108 - and the percentage growth of other regions. 
As a result, in 1993, this region had the highest proportion of cities with municipal health 
councils, 65 per cent - 582 for 1,058 cities - compared to the national average of 47 per cent - 
2,108 for 4,973 cities (FIBGE 1991,33; IBAM and others 1993,35).
There are indications that, in the Southern region, not only has there been rapid 
proliferation of municipal health fora, but also the fora could have had more control over the 
formulation of municipal health policy and stronger user involvement. According to the 
Institute Brasileiro de Administraf&o Municipal and others (IBAM and others 1991, 1), who 
surveyed 11 per cent of the Brazilian municipalities in 1991, the internal regulations of most 
health councils stated that they should be places where decisions on municipal health policy 
were taken. As can be seen in Graph 5.1, the South had the highest percentage of councils’ 
internal regulations (88 per cent) stating that decisions on health policy should be made there. 
Nevertheless, formal participation in the decision-making process does not imply actual
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empowerment of the fora. Apparently, most of the researched councils were mainly fora where 
users made complaints and obtained further information about the health system (IBAM and 
others 1991, 4-5). Even with this consideration, the high proportion in the Southern region of 
councils’ internal regulations stating that they should have discretionary powers over municipal 
health policy, coincides with the fast growth of the percentage of Southern cities with councils, 
between 1991 and 1993.
Table 5.1 - Cities with Municipal Health Council by Brazilian States -1991
Brazilian States Regions Cities Cities with 
Council *
Percentage of Cities 
with Council
Brazil 4,491 1,143 25
Mato Grosso do Sul - MS Central-west 72 62 86
Mato Grosso - MT Central-west 95 55 58
Ceari-CE Northeast 178 89 50
Espfrito Santo - ES Southeast 67 32 48
Piauf - PI Northeast 118 53 45
Rio Grande do Sul - RS South 333 134 40
Rio de Janeiro - RJ Southeast 70 26 37
Parafba - PB Northeast 171 61 36
Minas Gerais - MG Southeast 723 216 30
Pernambuco - PE Northeast 168 50 30
Rio Grande do Norte - RN Northeast 152 45 30
Maranhio - MA Northeast 136 36 26
Ronddnia - RO Northeast 23 6 26
Alagoas - AL Northeast 97 24 25
Santa Catarina - SC South 217 50 23
Sio Paulo - SP Southeast 572 131 23
Acre -AC North 12 2 17
Pari-PA North 105 15 14
Tocantins - TO North 79 10 13
Rorafma - RR North 8 1 13
Amapi - AP North 9 1 11
Sergipe - SE Northeast 74 6 8
Bahia - BA Northeast 415 32 8
Amazonas - AM North 62 1 2
Parani - PR South 323 4 . 1
Goiis - GO Central-west 211 1 0
Distrito Federal - DF Central-west 1 0 0
*  Sample of 68 per cent of Brazilian cities reached by the research "Avalia^o do Funcionamento dos Conselhos 
Estaduais e Municipais de Saude - Relat6rio Nacional/Versio Final" (Institute Brasileiro de Administrated Municipal 
and others 1993, 335).
SOURCES: Funda^o Institute Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, Anuario Estatistico do 
Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1991), 33.
Institute Brasileiro de Administrate Municipal and others, "Avaliato do Funcionamento dos 
Conselhos Estaduais e Municipais de Saude - Relatorio Executivo" (Ministerio da Saude, 
Conselho Nacional de Saude, 1993), 35, photocopied.
As can be seen in Graph 5.1, it also coincides with the fact that, in 1991, the Southern 
region had the highest percentage - 59 per cent - of surveyed councils with regulations 
establishing that they should have discretionary powers over health policy, and also establishing
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that there should be parity between user representatives and all other groups of representatives 
together. Although Law 8.142/90 stated that half of council participants should be user 
representatives, internal regulations indicated that councils were not fulfilling this legal 
requirement (Brasil. Congresso 1990, Lei 8.142). As will be seen in the next chapter, when 
Porto Alegre’s Municipal Law 277/92 transformed the municipal health commission into a 
council, it also did not follow this legal provision (Porto Alegre. Camara Municipal 1992, Lei 
Complementar 277).
Graph 5.1 - Percentage of Deliberative Municipal Health Councils with Parity of User 
Representation, by Brazilian Region -1991 *
□  Deliberative fora tZ Deliberative fora with parity o f  user representation
90 -r
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* Research surveyed 11 per cent o f the Brazilian cities (Instituto Brasileiro de A dm in istra te  Municipal and others 
1991, 1).
SOURCE: Instituto Brasileiro de Administrate Municipal and others, "Perfil dos Municipios 
na Area de Saude - Sintese" (Ministerio da Saude, Fundaito Nacional de Saude, IBAM, 1991), 
25, photocopied.
Hence, Brazilian literature indicates that, in the Southern region, municipal health fora, 
given their characteristics, could have strong user involvement in their activities, although it 
neither guarantees that these fora had actual power over municipal health policies nor that users 
necessary participated in their decision-making processes. Nevertheless, it points to a 
possibility that there is the potential for this to occur, particularly in large cities where civil 
society organisations could support the consistent involvement of user representatives in these 
fora.
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In 1991, more than 56 per cent of cities with over five hundred thousand inhabitants - 
fourteen out of 25 - had municipal health councils, well above the average of 25 per cent for all 
cities (IBAM and others 1993, 33; FIBGE, 1991, 36). By 1993, the highest proportion of 
councils working regularly - their last meetings were in the three months before the survey took 
place - were those situated in cities with more than five hundred thousand inhabitants. Among 
21 cities with more than five hundred thousand inhabitants, 57 per cent (twelve) had councils 
working on a regular basis, also above the national average of 46 per cent (IBAM and others 
1993,38).
The population size of cities is often related to the level of complexity of their political 
life. Carvalheiro and others (1992, 39-62) used combined indicators of population size and of 
city income to analyse differences in political organisations, health services and health 
indicators among cities in the state of S2o Paulo. The authors defined “city size” according to a 
range of population size combined with a range of income size. A city with a small population 
but a large income could be regarded as “medium-sized”, while a city with a large population 
and a small income could be considered “small”. Using this type of classification, when 
population size or income size was considered alone there could be overlaps. For example, a 
city with 80 thousand inhabitants could be regarded as a “small”, a “medium-sized” or as a 
“large” city. Only the combination of the two criteria will define what they regarded as the 
actual “city size”.
Using this methodology, they (Carvalheiro and others 1992, 41-52, 95-133) 
demonstrated that, in the state of S3o Paulo, the larger the city, by population size and city 
income, the more complex was its civil society organisation and its political life, and the more 
active was its municipal health commission. In small cities - with a population of between five 
and one hundred thousand inhabitants, and a municipal income of up to one hundred million 
cruzados (1987 prices) - personal relationships were stronger than political ones. Political 
parties were seen as an inessential part of the political arrangements, being personally identified 
with some local elite individuals. There was no clear distinction between public and private 
spheres, or room for autonomous civil society organisation. In these cities, not surprisingly, the 
municipal health commission’s existence was only formal. The commissions did not have 
internal regulations and the meetings were very irregular. Neither user representatives nor other 
interest group representatives were involved in these forum activities.
In medium-sized cities - with a population of between fifteen and two hundred 
thousand inhabitants, and a municipal income of between ten and one hundred and fifty
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thousand million cruzados (1987 prices) - political relations were reasonably institutionalised. 
Traditional clientelistic relations coexisted with the actions of emerging political parties, such 
as the left wing Workers Party (PT) and the centre-left Party of the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement (PMDB). There were organised interest groups such as residential associations, 
trade unions, popular health councils and professional associations. Most of the political actions 
of these organisations, however, did not involve even their membership, usually being 
promoted by individual leaders alone. In these cities, municipal health commissions were 
reasonably active and institutionalised. They had formalised internal regulations and meetings 
were held regularly. Among the representatives of the civil society organisations participating 
in their activities, there were some users. Nevertheless, some of them were mere individuals 
assigned by municipal authorities, who were confused about their role and were unable to 
distinguish whether they should represent the interest of municipal authorities or that of users.
Unlike the others, large cities - more than forty thousand inhabitants and more than fifty 
million cruzados of municipal income (1987 prices) - had highly institutionalised political 
relations. Not only did political parties have distinct policy agendas, but some politicians, who 
belonged to the mayor's party, even had independent positions and used to criticise aspects of 
municipal policy. Although clientelistic relations endured, political parties were the main 
vehicle for expressing political relations. Several civil society organisations could be found, 
such as trade unions, residential or professional associations. In large cities, the activities of 
municipal health commissions were very institutionalised. The fora worked according to 
formalised internal regulations and the time and place of meetings were announced publicly in 
advance. Civil society representatives were chosen and indicated by their organisations as clear 
representatives of these organisations' interests.
In these cities, public health professionals co-ordinated the implementation of health 
policy. Their multifaceted political positions mirrored the complex political life and society of 
these cities. In small cities, there were hardly any public health professionals and they were 
strictly under the mayor’s influence. In medium sized cities, there were more than one, and 
sometimes public health professionals opposed the mayors’ policies. In large cities, there were 
several public health professionals and they were identified with partisan cleavages or with 
some civil society interest groups. They were political actors, who could basically be divided 
between those identified with some factions of the popular or trade union movements or with 
more traditional social sectors.
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The size of Brazilian cities seems to influence whether there is a municipal health 
council working regularly. Large cities tended to have an institutionalised political life, and 
urban social movements were able to propose alternative policies articulating broad inter-sector 
projects. In these cities, public health professionals could have different types of relationship 
with social movements, depending on whether the organisation represented the trade union or 
the urban social movements. Brazilian trade unions were highly State-regulated organisations, 
whose enduring corporatist structures had been created during the thirties and forties 
(Rodrigues 1990, 61-70). Urban social movement organisations had their main period of 
emergence during the seventies. Members of the strongest trade unions usually had agreements 
with employers that guaranteed access to special health care. In contrast, most urban social 
movement members had precarious access only to publicly financed health care. 
Representatives of residential associations had more incentive, thus, to participate in municipal 
health fora than trade unions, even if trade unions had a better institutional structure to sustain 
their representatives’ participation.
Health issues were not a priority for most trade unions, but they were for trade unions 
of health professionals or health workers. The latter have often shaped the discussions on health 
issues within trade union confederations, and have often represented the views of 
confederations in institutional health fora. In Porto Alegre, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
since issues related to publicly financed health care did not mobilise members and leaders of the 
most powerful trade unions, health professionals or health workers could represent the views of 
their particular trade unions or professional community rather than those of the trade union 
confederations they were supposed to represent (Respondent/23 1992). There are indications 
that, in Campinas, which is the second most populous city in the state of S3o Paulo, health 
professionals played a similar role within the United Confederation of Workers (Central Unica 
dos Trabalhadores hereafter CUT) (L'Abbate 1990,435-6).
Residential associations, even in big cities, did not have a large staff that would enable 
them to have representatives with some degree of expertise in different areas. Nevertheless, 
they could build up connections with professionals identified with the claims of residential 
associations for better public services and for the empowerment of health service users. During 
the eighties, especially in large cities in the state of S3o Paulo, public health professionals 
working in poor neighbourhoods, together with urban social movements, defended 
improvements in public health care provision and in sanitation (Carvalheiro and others 1992, 
106-8). In Campinas the popular health movement started in poor regions of the city during the 
late seventies. It was promoted by urban social movement activists concerned with health
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problems in association with public health professionals working in health units in these regions 
(L'Abbate 1990, 448). During the eighties, in the city of S3o Paulo, the popular health 
movement, especially in the East Zone, has in its origins two main social actors besides urban 
social movements themselves: Catholic church grassroots organisations called "Comunidades 
Eclesiais de Base” (Grassroots Ecclesiastic Communities - CEBS), and public health 
professionals committed to the reform of the Brazilian health system (Fantin 1989, 37-78; 
Martes 1990,99-109).
Large cities, with their complex political life, active civil society organisations and 
policy communities of public health professionals, could apparently provide better conditions 
for user involvement in municipal health commissions. Although recent research has mostly 
focused on the municipal health fora in the large cities of S3o Paulo state, the Southern region’s 
health fora in large cities seem to be interesting subjects for study, given the strong role their 
internal regulations confer to user representatives. In 1991, Porto Alegre was the second largest 
city in the Southern region and had an active civil society and political life, which could help to 
explain the vitality of its municipal health commission and, in particular, the enduring 
involvement of user representatives in its activities after 1986, as will be seen in the following 
chapters.
5.3. Porto Alegre: The Scenario of the Municipal Health Commission
Porto Alegre is the capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, in the extreme south of 
Brazil. This research focuses on the involvement of user representatives in the municipal health 
commission of this particular city of the Southern region for four main reasons. First, because 
the commission has functioned regularly since its creation in 1985. There have been weekly 
plenary meetings and, from 1987, they were held each fortnight, allowing the dynamic of the 
forum to be followed during a period when the Brazilian health system had undergone 
remarkable changes and when the fora had been institutionalised throughout the countiy. 
Second, Porto Alegre is not only Rio Grande do Sul’s largest city and its capital, but it has also 
developed a strong tradition of political mobilisation, where many political organisations 
representing many different interest groups are concentrated. These organisations supported the 
regular involvement of user representatives in the commission. User representatives, as political 
actors, have enough political autonomy to choose whether to participate in the commission or to 
participate with variable intensity at different periods of time. Third, the political parties that 
have been ruling Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul and Brazil have varied. So, during the period 
being studied - 1985 to 1991 - there have been distinct health authorities with different
108
positions on user participation, ranging from total opposition to enthusiastic support. It makes it 
possible to verify the influence which health authorities can have in hindering or stimulating 
user participation in the commission. Fourth, in Porto Alegre there were very active members of 
both the medical profession and the Brazilian health system reformers, facilitating analysis of 
the relationship between them and user representatives.
Before analysing the case of Porto Alegre's municipal health commission, the city itself 
will be examined. The aspects highlighted are those that would help to explain the reasons for 
users becoming involved in the commission. They are the demographic, social and 
epidemiological characteristics of Porto Alegre's resident population, the city's health services 
and urban social movements.
5.3.1. Demographic, Social and Epidemiological Characteristics of Porto Alegre's 
Population
Porto Alegre is the economic and political centre of the Greater Porto Alegre region, 
which is made up of 22 municipalities. In economic terms, Porto Alegre is the capital of the 
state of Rio Grande do Sul, whose GNP in 1992 was US $ 38.6 billions, representing around 
eight per cent of total Brazilian GNP (Contri and others 1994, 9). In 1992, the GNP per capita 
of the state of Rio Grande do Sul was US $ 3,890 while the Brazilian average was US $ 2,995 
(Contri and others 1994, 9). In 1980, in Porto Alegre, 60 per cent of the economically active 
population were occupied in service activities, eighteen per cent being employed by commercial 
firms and 21 per cent by industries (Giacomoni 1993, 104). According to Alonso and Bandeira 
(1988, 3-28), during the last decades, Porto Alegre's industrial production decreased in relative 
importance, while there was a growth of tertiary economic functions such as commercial, 
financial and governmental activities.
According to Giacomoni (1993, 104-5), due to the state's model of agrarian production 
and to the insufficient generation of urban jobs in the medium-sized cities of Rio Grande do 
Sul's hinterland, there has been a strong migration towards Greater Porto Alegre. During the 
seventies the growth of Greater Porto Alegre's population was 46 per cent, while in the eighties 
the population growth was only 36 per cent. Nevertheless, these percentages of growth were 
much higher than the rest of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, which were respectively eight and 
ten per cent (Giacomoni 1993, 106). Porto Alegre itself had a smaller population growth than 
other cities of Greater Porto Alegre. During the seventies and the eighties, Porto Alegre's 
population grew respectively by 27 and twelve per cent, and the other 21 cities of Greater Porto 
Alegre, without Porto Alegre, grew by 71 and 59 per cent (Giacomoni 1993, 106). This
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demonstrates that migrants went mostly to other Greater Porto Alegre cities and not to Porto 
Alegre itself. Although the best job opportunities, in the formal or informal sector, were in 
Porto Alegre, high residential costs induced people to settle in other cities of the region. 
Additionally, during the last two decades, at the same time as the economic importance of 
services and commerce in Porto Alegre increased, Greater Porto Alegre's cities became 
important industrial centres, attracting enterprises and labour force. Those who stayed in Porto 
Alegre increasingly dwelled in houses they built themselves in suburban or slum areas less 
valued in the urban housing market (Giacomoni 1993, 106; Carrion 1989, 233-47).
Graph 5.2 - Percentage of Porto Alegre’s Population Living in Illegally Occupied Areas
1981/1991
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SOURCES: Giacomoni, James, A Comunidade como Instancia Executora do Planejamento: o 
Caso do "Orgamento Participativo" de Porto Alegre (PPGA - Departamento de Ciencias 
Administrativas da Faculdade de Ciencias Economicas - UFRGS, Porto Alegre, 1993), 107, 
photocopied.
Funda^o Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, Anuario Estatlstico do Brasil (Rio de 
Janeiro, IBGE, 1993), 208.
In 1991, the population of Porto Alegre was 1,263,239 (FIBGE 1993, 208). In 1980, it 
was the fifth biggest state capital in Brazil; in 1991, it became the ninth. Flence, during the last 
decade, the rate of growth of Porto Alegre's population was inferior not only to other cities of 
Greater Porto Alegre but also to other state capitals. Nevertheless, if during the period 1981 to 
1991 Porto Alegre’s urban population as a whole grew by eleven per cent, the population living 
in illegally occupied areas grew by 114 per cent. In these areas, residents do not have legal
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ownership of the land or domicile and normally, but not necessarily, have a very precarious 
urban infrastructure (Giacomoni 1993, 106-7). They are usually located in slum areas. Each 
slum area is called a vila in Porto Alegre, in the same sense as other Brazilian regions employ 
the word favela. In 1981, as can be seen in Graph 5.2, there were 182,480 inhabitants living in 
illegally occupied areas, representing sixteen per cent of Porto Alegre's total population. In 
1991, there were 391,501 inhabitants living in these areas, representing 31 per cent of Porto 
Alegre's total population. At the same time, in 1981, there were 163 vilas in Porto Alegre, 
increasing to 263 in 1991 (Giacomoni 1993,106).
Data on urban infrastructure, and social and health indicators often refer to averages 
and it was difficult to obtain information about the population living in illegally occupied areas 
in Porto Alegre. Even so, it was possible to gather some information. For example, 95 per cent 
of the population had access to drinking water, above the Brazilian average of 81 per cent 
(Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi5o Social 1991, 2; Comiss3o Interministerial para a 
Prepara53o da Conferencia das Na95es Unidas sobre Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento 1991, 
21). Nevertheless, in some slum areas of the city this access was restricted to public water taps 
or even to mobile tanks distributing water some days a week. In 1990, sewage facilities reached 
around 45 per cent of the population, slightly above the national average of 36 per cent 
(Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9 0  Social 1991, 2; Comiss3o Interministerial para a 
Prepara9<io da Conferencia das Na95es Unidas sobre Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento 1991, 
21). It is reasonable to suppose that, among the regions without sewage facilities, were the 
illegally occupied areas. There was daily refuse collection in central areas, but in other areas it 
was on alternate days only. In some slum areas, nevertheless, very narrow and irregular streets 
did not allow access to lorries. In these cases, the litter was collected by small tractors and 
placed in containers for disposal later (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social 1991,2).
Social indicators also point to strong social inequalities. Life expectancy at birth - the 
average number of years a new-born baby can be expected to live if current trends of mortality 
continue (Last 1988, 45) - is usually regarded as an accurate indicator of a given population's 
quality of life. In 1980, life expectancy at birth in Brazil was 60 years while in Porto Alegre, 
considering the triennium 1979-1981, it was 70 years, men being expected to live, on average, 
64 years and women 74 years (FIBGE 1993, 228, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o 
Social 1991, 3). In the same year, in Greater Porto Alegre, people living with or without 
adequate access to drinking water and sanitation, showed no significant difference in their life 
expectancy at birth, since the indicator reduced from 71 to 67 years. Nevertheless, those bom in 
Porto Alegre, in 1980, in families without access to these facilities, and whose mothers had no
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formal education, could expect to live only 63 years (Leite and others n.d., 9-20). So, if the 
education of poor mothers is added to living without access to drinking water and sanitation, as 
was often the case for families living in illegally occupied areas, the life expectancy at birth 
would decrease significantly in comparison with the rest of the population.
The rate of infant mortality - number of deaths among children less than one year old 
per 1,000 live births (Last 1988, 65) - is a very sensitive indicator of social conditions and of 
the quality of health services. Both types of infant mortality, neonatal mortality - deaths during 
the first 28 days of life - and late infant mortality - deaths during the first year of life except the 
first 28 days - are associated with the socio-economic conditions of life and the quality of health 
care available to mother and child. Nevertheless, the former is more strongly associated with 
the quality of health care during pregnancy and birth and the latter with socio-economic living 
conditions. In 1980, the Brazilian rate of infant mortality was 87 deaths per 1,000 live births, 
while Porto Alegre’s was 37 deaths per 1,000 live births. In this city, 70 per cent of deaths 
occurred in families living in illegally occupied areas, and 30 per cent in families living in 
regular housing areas (Barcelos and others 1986, 56-61). So, although the infant mortality rate 
was low in Porto Alegre if compared to other Brazilian areas, social inequalities affected the 
distribution of infant deaths in the city.
During the eighties, Porto Alegre's infant mortality rates underwent a significant 
reduction. In 1989, the rate was 14 deaths per 1,000 live births (Ceccim and others 1990, 48). 
The reduction in Porto Alegre's rate of infant mortality occurred in both neonatal and late 
infant mortality. This was due possibly to the immunisation and re-hydration campaigns 
promoted by public health services. It is also probably associated with the extension of refuse 
collection and drinking water services to slum areas (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi^o 
Social 1991, 3). There could also have been improvements in women's education in the region. 
Future studies can explore these possibilities, since these data have not yet been systematically 
analysed. Nevertheless, it is certain that, in the first six months of 1990, the majority of deaths 
(55 per cent) occurred during the first 28 days of life and the main group of causes of infant 
mortality were perinatal conditions (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi^o Social 1991, 3). It 
indicates that lack of adequate care for mother and child during pregnancy and birth could be 
associated with these deaths.
In general terms, Porto Alegre has better social indicators than the national average. 
However, social inequalities seem to have reduced life expectancy for the one-third of the 
population living in illegally occupied areas and to have brought about limited access to health
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care. The population living in these areas usually had their interests represented by urban social 
movements, and from these movements came most of the user representatives taking part in the 
municipal health commission between 1985 and 1991. It is thus reasonable to suppose that 
these inequalities motivated the involvement of their representatives in the commission.
5.3.2. Porto Alegre's Health Services
The municipal health commissions could in theory exercise power over Porto Alegre’s 
health services, whose general features and evolution were presented in the last chapter. As in 
the rest of the country, by 1990, there were in Porto Alegre municipal, state and federal 
networks of out-patient and hospital services that, according to legal provisions, should be 
unified and comprehensive. These services were much more integrated than before 1985, when 
the AIS covenant was signed, but complete integration through a genuine municipalisation 
process was, until late 1993, only a proposal. As seen before, until 1993, no health services in 
Brazilian state capitals were municipalised. Nevertheless, since 1988, after the SUDS 
programme was issued, nearly all federal services went under the direct management of the 
state health secretariat. By 1990, there were also private services in Porto Alegre, encompassing 
autonomous physicians and dentists, hospitals, clinics, health maintenance organisations and 
services for the support of diagnoses and health recuperation. The lack of governmental control 
or regulation of private and liberal practices makes it difficult to paint a complete picture of the 
health services in Porto Alegre during the late eighties and early nineties. Even so, it is possible 
to identify the main private organisations providing health care in the city, as well as to have an 
idea about these organisations’ relations with the public sector.
As can be observed in Table 5.2, the biggest out-patient network in the city was made 
up of government-owned units. In 1990, there were in the city 30 small and 43 medium-sized 
out-patient health units, offering primary health care and general clinics. Some medium-sized 
units also provided specialised care in paediatrics and gynaecology-obstetrics as well as 
promoting public health actions. Nearly all of them were located in impoverished areas of the 
city, mainly near illegally occupied areas. The small ones were all under the management of the 
state health secretariat, while the medium ones were under federal, state or municipal 
management. They would be open between eight and ten hours a day from Monday to Friday. It 
is well known, however, that physicians and dentists worked fewer hours than their job 
contracts established, allowing them to have alternative jobs or activities. Poorly qualified
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nurses kept the units open the rest of the time, offering a reduced range of health services, such 
as immunisations and information about the unit or other health services (Rosa 1989, 76-93).
Table 5.2 - Types of Government-Owned Out-Patient Health Units in Porto Alegre -1990
Type and 
Number of Units
Statistical
Function
Area 
in ms Physicians Dentists Nurses
Other
Profess.
Assistant
Nurses
Daily Open 
Hours
30 SmaU PHC average 49 2 0 0 0 2 9
Primary h. care, general median 40 1 0 0 0 1 8
clinics mode 40 1 0 0 0 1 8
43 Medium PHC average 192 6 1 1 1 7 10
Primary h. care, general clinics, median 150 6 1 1 1 6 10
Some: specialities and pub. mode 140 7 0 1 1 7 10
8 Medium Specialised average 1151 16 3 2 3 21 10
Specialities, Some: primary h. median 890 14 3 2 3 16 10
care and public health mode - 15 4 1 0 14 12
3 Large Specialised average 1159 118 16 8 16 73 12
Specialities, Some: primary h. median 1215 107 15 7 17 83 12
care and public health mode - - - - - - 12
3 1 or 2 Specialisms average 1250 27 0 3 8 17 12
Specialities median 1419 21 0 3 7 16 12
mode - - 0 - 7 - 12
1 Emergency - 43 10 6 1 48 24
SOURCE: Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi50  Social, Plano Municipal de Saude de 
Porto Alegre (Porto Alegre, Prefeitura Municipal de Porto Alegre, 1991), 19-46, photocopied.
In Porto Alegre there were also eight medium-sized and three large specialised out­
patient health units and there were three out-patient health units offering one or two specialisms 
(Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social 1991, 19-46). Most of them also offered 
primary health care, but they mainly, and in some cases exclusively, provided specialised care. 
Although some of these units were located in poor areas of the city, most of them were not. 
Considering the total of fourteen units, seven were located in the central area of the city and 
most of the others were located at a distance from illegally occupied housing areas. Most of 
them, nine out of fourteen, were previously social security system units, which by 1990, were 
already under the management of the state secretariat of heath. Out of the five remaining, four 
were under the administration of the state health secretariat and one under the command of the 
municipal health secretariat. Most of them were open from ten to twelve hours a day from 
Monday to Friday. Similarly, as in non specialised units, physicians and dentists in specialised 
units did not work the hours their contracts stipulated. The number of professionals in 
specialised units thus did not represent actual availability for users.
There was in the city one municipal out-patient unit providing emergency care. It was 
located in district four, inside a slum area, called Vila Cruzeiro, in the same building as the 
second biggest specialised out-patient unit in the city. The service was open 24 hours a day. The
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installation of this unit in 1988 was due to the strong pressure of the users in the region, whose 
urban social movements were the most mobilised by health issues in Porto Alegre.
Apart from these federal, state and municipal services, there were in the city out-patient 
units, most of them providing emergency care, located in federal or state hospitals and in the 
main non-profit making and profit making hospitals. The latter hospital units had been 
previously contracted to the social security system and, in 1990, were contracted by the state 
health secretariat on behalf of the United Health System (SUS). In the same year, the SUS 
contracted around 600 private services in Porto Alegre, which provided health care in clinics, 
dental care and diagnosis and therapeutic services (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o 
Social 1991, 5-6).
Although there was no information on the total number of out-patient attendances 
provided in Porto Alegre, it is possible to use the Brazilian Ministry of Health ideal parameter 
to appraise the relative importance of the provision of governmental units. This parameter 
established that there should be two attendances-per inhabitant-per year, these being 65 per cent 
of the total number of attendances at the basic specialities, which are general clinics, obstetrics, 
gynaecology, paediatrics and surgery (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social 1991, 5). 
Considering the population of Porto Alegre in 1990 - 1,263,239 inhabitants - there was a 
theoretical demand for 2,526,478 attendances, with 1,642,209 in basic specialisms. There was 
no reliable information on the type of the attendances, whether in clinics or specialities. The 
information available referred to government-owned out-patient units without specification on 
the type of attendance. These units, in 1989, catered for 933,667 attendances, representing 36 
per cent of the total of those theoretically needed by Porto Alegre's population in the basic 
specialist services. Although the area and personnel of non hospital out-patient units were 
considerable, they seemed to be offering much less care than they should (Secretaria Municipal 
de Saude e Servi9 0  Social 1991, 5). The capacity of these units to effectively solve health 
problems were hindered by lack of equipment, medicine and by recurrent problems related to 
the absence of physicians and dentists. This has generated a demand for health care from the 
emergency units of the main Porto Alegre hospitals, jeopardising the capacity of these services 
to attend urgent cases. In 1989, two important hospitals, the Hospital de Clinicas, the most 
complex Porto Alegre hospital, and the Santa Casa de Misericdrdia, an important non-profit 
making group of six hospitals, affirmed that respectively 75 and 62 per cent of the cases their 
emergency services attended were ordinary health problems (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e 
Servi9o Social 1991, 5).
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By 1990, there were eleven government hospitals in the city (Secretaria Municipal de 
Saude e Servi9 0  Social 1991, 4-5). There was one federal hospital, the Hospital de Clinicas de 
Porto Alegre, which was administratively linked to the main federal university in the state and 
was a referral point for complex health care for the Southern region population. There was one 
municipal highly specialised hospital, treating trauma cases in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul 
and other Southern region states. It is regarded as "the" city's hospital for emergency cases, 
caused by accidents or violence. There were also nine hospitals under state government 
management, five of them previous social security system hospitals (Secretaria Municipal de 
Saude e Servi9o Social 1991,4-5). Among the hospitals managed by the state health secretariat, 
seven were specialised hospitals, one general and one a large hospital attending complex cases 
from Porto Alegre and from the rest of the state.
There were also 53 private hospitals in the city. A non-profit making Catholic 
organisation, the Santa Casa de Misericdrdia group owned six general and specialised hospitals. 
This organisation was closely linked to the federal university and to the state health secretariat. 
Among the other 47 private hospitals, there were sixteen contracted by the SUS, and the others 
were purely private. Most of them were small clinics attending the elderly (Secretaria 
Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social 1991, 5-6).
In 1990, taking into account all government owned and privately contracted hospitals, 
there were in the city 7,455 hospital beds, 68 per cent (5,088) for clinics, paediatrics, obstetrics 
and surgery (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social 1991, 6). Therefore, excluding the 
"pure" private hospital beds, Porto Alegre had, in 1990, six hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, 
exceeding by 50 per cent the ideal parameter of four beds per 1,000 inhabitants recommended 
by the World Health Organisation (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi90  Social 1990, 13). 
Nevertheless, there were constant complaints about difficulties of access to hospital beds in the 
city.
There are three main reasons for this apparent paradox. Firstly, many of Porto Alegre's 
hospitals, the complex or specialised ones, were referral points for the state or even for the 
entire Southern region population. The way the process of the municipalisation of health 
services has been carried out in many of Rio Grande do Sul's cities enabled many city halls to 
invest in ambulances and not in improving the quality of their services. This "transport-therapy" 
(Respondent/5 1992) seems to have increased the overload on Porto Alegre's hospitals. In fact, 
in 1990, around 48 per cent of Porto Alegre's public beds were occupied by residents of other 
Rio Grande do Sul's cities, reducing the actual availability of beds to three per 1,000 inhabitants
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(Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9 0  Social 1991, 6). Secondly, patients paying privately 
or through private insurance contracts had priority. Hospitals or professionals would ask 
patients to pay additional charges to obtain beds and treatment. In this sense, the lack of beds 
could mean financial barriers for having access to services that by law should have been 
universal and free of charge. Thirdly, although for basic specialities there seemed to be enough 
beds, there was a lack of beds for some specialisms such as heart disease, malign neoplasm, 
respectively the first and second causes of death in the city, and AIDS (Secretaria Municipal de 
Saude e Servi5o Social 1991,6).
As was seen in the last chapter, the new constitution and health laws transferred to 
municipalities the responsibility for all public health functions, retaining at the national level 
the functions of overall planning, regulation and control. Even considering that by 1990 Porto 
Alegre's health services had not yet been municipalised, some public health activities, which 
had been the responsibility of the state health secretariat, had been transferred to the municipal 
health secretariat. This was so, for example, in the case of the service for prevention and control 
of zoonoses. Nevertheless, the majority of epidemiological and sanitary activities related to 
regulation, notification, prevention and control of diseases have remained in the hands of the 
state health secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social 1991,4-5).
Hence, to inequalities in housing, sanitation and household income were added 
differences in access to health care. On the one hand, enduring deficiencies in the public out­
patient network made people seek care in the emergency services of hospitals, undermining the 
capacity of these services for dealing with very urgent and complex cases. On the other hand, 
there was the process of health service municipalisation. The recurrent delay in Porto Alegre's 
health services municipalisation has hindered attempts at their reorganisation because, since 
1987, it has been said to be on the verge of happening. The municipalisation of other cities' 
health services in the state, without consistent guidelines and supervision of the process, has 
resulted in an additional burden on already overloaded Porto Alegre hospitals, since cases that 
could have been treated locally were sent to the capital. The process of universalising access to 
publicly financed health services, during the last two decades, has created, in fact, a disguised 
two tier system: one offering easy access and better care for middle class and qualified workers 
who were able to finance it directly through private insurance companies, entitled to use health 
maintenance organisations' services or other special services; and another, providing precarious 
and sometimes inaccessible health care for those unable to pay for it. Most people who rely 
only on the second type of health care live in low income families, in illegally occupied urban 
areas, lacking urban infrastructure, with the worst social indicators in the city.
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As in other large Brazilian urban centres, during the last two decades, people living in 
Porto Alegre's deprived areas have created associations to organise and represent their interests 
when facing other interest groups and governmental agencies. Improvement of health care has 
been on their agenda together with other issues. When, in 1985, participatory channels were 
opened in the health sector, these organisations supported their representatives' involvement. 
Since most of the people they represented only used public health services, they were very 
interested in making real the formal right to have access to universal, comprehensive and 
decentralised health services.
5.3.3. Porto Alegre's Urban Social Movements
As has been seen, an important pre-condition for effective user representatives' 
involvement in an institutional participatory process is the existence of user organisations which 
can: (1) discuss previously polemical issues, preparing representatives to face decisions to be 
taken in the forum; (2) help to overcome lack of expertise, re-deploying the organisation's staff 
or developing connections with non governmental organisations specialised in supporting social 
or trade union movements; (3) give legitimacy to these representatives since they supposedly 
represent the membership of their organisations. Porto Alegre was home to professional 
associations, the biggest trades unions in the state, the state's federations of trade unions and 
trade unions national confederations, such as the CUT and Central Geral dos Trabalhadores 
(hereafter CGT). Moreover, there were urban social organisations that would support the most 
prominent and enduring user representatives in Porto Alegre's municipal health commission.
Since the thirties there had been residential associations (associa9Ses de moradores) 
and neighbourhood associations (sociedades de amigos de bairros) in Porto Alegre (Baierle 
1992, 97). Nevertheless, most of them were created during the fifties, not only in Porto Alegre 
but throughout the biggest cities of the country. These associations adopted clientelistic 
practices; they did not mobilise or try to extend their membership, neither did they confront 
governmental policies. Rather, they sought informal ways of influencing public officials or 
governmental agencies, trying to obtain advantages especially for dwellers supporting their 
policies (Baierle 1992, 97-105). They were created during the populist Vargas government, 
when the pension institutes had built many working class housing complexes. Associations 
were created to represent residents’ interests, but mainly to mediate in the relationship between 
the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) and residents, helping the party to select those who would 
have preference in the allocation of the low price, long-term financed houses of the complexes. 
The central criterion for selection was the degree of loyalty to or good connections with party
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leaders or activists (Baierle 1992, 97-105). During the seventies and eighties, due to the high 
standard of urban facilities in these complexes, such as sanitation, transport and electricity, 
most working class residents had gradually sold their homes and left the region, going to 
illegally occupied areas or to regions outside Porto Alegre’s territorial limits. During the 
eighties, residential associations, created in these circumstances, could still be found in middle 
class and in poor residential areas. They remained connected to populist politicians, especially 
those of the Democratic Labour Party (PDT), the party that inherited the Brazilian Labour Party 
(PTB) populist tradition.
In the late seventies new urban social organisations could be found in Porto Alegre. 
Their line of action prioritised confrontation with government. They distinguished themselves 
from clientelistic associations that used to agree with government policies (Baierle 1992, 118). 
The mobilisation of residents to obtain land, better urban infrastructure and services was seen 
by their leaders and influential advisors as a tool for transforming the capitalist structure of 
society (Baierle 1992, 120). In the late sixties, the authoritarian regime had separated housing 
policy from the social security system, creating a national bank responsible for housing policies, 
the National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional da Habita^o). Housing policies promoted by this 
bank, during the seventies, mostly benefited middle class social sectors. Municipal and state 
agencies involved in housing issues had to promote policies determined by the federal 
government. The main actions of Porto Alegre's department of housing aimed at removing the 
poor population from central areas, relocating them in the periphery of the city. Initial 
perplexity in the face of compulsory relocation was replaced by defensive action resisting 
removal, organising the occupation of new areas, searching for political solutions and 
denouncing violence to the press. These actions gave birth to new residential associations, 
community associations, mothers’ clubs and other similar organisations that have proliferated in 
the slum areas of Porto Alegre since the late seventies (Baierle 1992, 113). During the early 
eighties, the liberalisation of the Brazilian political system allowed them to represent the 
interest of those living in these areas, also opening up opportunities to defy the military regime, 
together with the trade union movement and other social forces seeking to extend the process of 
political democratisation in Brazil.
In the early eighties, organisations such as mothers’ clubs, youth groups and community 
nurseries, which became central for the new urban social movement in Porto Alegre, were 
usually created with the help of government agencies. Often officials, promoting policies in 
areas such as health or housing, were personally critical of the dictatorship and stimulated 
activities which challenged the regime. As in other large cities in Brazil, in Porto Alegre, there
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were groups of professionals, religious and political activists, which had links with and 
influence over urban social organisations. There were also Catholic activists, priests and nuns, 
as well as left wing militants of opposition political parties. There were Democratic Labour 
Party (PDT) militants, whose left wing sectors extended the party’s influence beyond the 
traditional clientelistic forms of interest group organisation, there were activists from 
communist parties, from left wing factions of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
(PMDB), from the recently created Workers Party (PT), and there were representatives of non­
governmental organisations such as FASE, CAMP and CIDADE (Baierle 1992, 123-4). The 
actions of these "external" actors, together with the growing dissatisfaction with governmental 
policies, created what Baierle called a culture o f rights (1992, 125). During the eighties, a 
growing number of leaders, representing those living in the slum areas of Porto Alegre, 
demanded from politicians and governments what they gradually started to regard as their 
legitimate right.
In the early eighties, leaders and activists of these new types of association contested 
the control of organisations that unified the urban social movements of Porto Alegre and of the 
state. They disputed and obtained representation in the directorate of the Rio Grande do Sul 
Federation of Community and Neighbourhood Associations (Federa^o Riograndense de 
Associa5des Comunitdrias e Amigos de Bairro hereafter FRACAB). In 1983, they l^ d  the 
creation and the first directorate of the Porto Alegre Union of Residential Associations (Uniao 
das Associa9des de Moradores de Porto Alegre hereafter UAMPA), an organisation which 
brought together residential, community and neighbourhood associations as well as other 
associations of Porto Alegre's urban social movements (Baierle 1992, 118, 157-97).
Considering the social indicators of those living in illegally occupied areas and their 
difficulties of access to health services, it is not surprising that the urban social movement 
leaders representing them were the most active user representatives in the municipal health 
commission of Porto Alegre. Nevertheless, until 1985, apart from isolated campaigns among 
the ten health districts in the city, only in health district four had the urban social organisations 
placed health issues as priorities on their political agenda. There were mobilisations for better 
health services in district four before and after 1985. In 1980, residential movement leaders, 
together with Catholic activists, health professionals supporting the Brazilian health system 
reform and militants of left wing political parties, created a health commission in the area (Rosa 
1989, 94; Respondent/7 1992; Respondent/8 1992; Respondent/23 1992). The commission 
created in 1980 in district four area at first had no institutional links. It promoted protests and 
pressured for better and new services in the region (Rosa 1989, 94-7; Respondent/7 1992). In
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1981 and 1982, the state secretary of health, who was running for governor of the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul, opened 26 new small or medium primary health care units in Porto Alegre, 
nearly doubling the number of state government units. Not surprisingly, 30 per cent of these 
were opened inside the most populated slum area of district four (Cattani and others 1988, 71- 
81). After 1985, the commission was transformed into a local health commission institutionally 
linked to the municipal health commission, which was created in the same year. User 
representatives of this district were the most active and regular participants in the municipal 
health commission, as will be seen in the following chapters. During the late eighties, some 
health professionals, who had participated in the commission since its creation, integrated the 
department of health of the trade union confederation CUT and declared their support for the 
Workers Party (PT). They would become CUT representatives in the municipal commission in 
1987 and 1988 and, from 1989, when the Workers Party (PT) took office in the municipal 
government, some of them became directors of the municipal health secretariat.
During the second half of the eighties, other local health commissions would became 
active, as will be seen in the following chapters. The municipal health commission created in 
1985 gradually became the central locus of political articulation and interest representation for 
popular organisations aiming at improvements in the quality of the health service or at 
mobilising people for broader social changes, through the politicisation of health issues. Other 
interest groups in the health sector also regarded the municipal commission as the main arena 
for establishing political alliances, opposing or supporting policies and exercising influence 
over health policies. Nevertheless, the possibility of constructing a forum where users could 
influence policy in the health sector was the real novelty. During the second part of the decade, 
user representatives of nearly all regions of Porto Alegre participated in the commission, mainly 
through a network of local commissions active to varying degrees depending on the regions and 
period.
5.4. Summing Up
In the early nineties, Southern region cities had the highest percentage of municipal 
health councils in comparison with other regions of the country. They also had the highest 
proportion of councils with internal regulations establishing that they should have deliberative 
power over municipal health policies, and that these formally deliberative councils should have 
parity of representation between user representatives and all other groups of representatives 
together. Although it does not guarantee that there was authentic user participation in these 
fora, it does indicate the potential for such power being experienced.
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The data also indicate that cities with over five hundred thousand inhabitants had more 
municipal health fora than smaller towns. There was also a tendency for the percentage of 
municipal health fora working regularly to increase when the urban population was larger. 
When the concept of "size” of city takes into account population and city income, it appears that 
large cities tended to have an institutionalised political life; public health professionals used to 
be articulated both with political parties and social movements; and urban social movements 
were organised enough to propose alternative policies to governments. The complexity of the 
social and political life of large cities offered the potential to make user representative 
participation feasible in municipal health commissions.
When user organisations already exist within a user population, as in the case of large 
Brazilian cities, user representatives can take part in statutory participatory fora in a relatively 
sustained manner. User organisations were mainly residential associations and trade unions, 
which were not created to deal exclusively or even centrally with health issues. Nevertheless, 
residential associations tended to participate more than trade unions in municipal health fora.
Trade union representatives, when taking part in municipal health fora, were mostly 
concerned with issues related to health and safety at work. Members of the most powerful trade 
unions usually have access to health services through special insurance arrangements. Since 
issues related to publicly financed health care did not mobilise the members and leaders of 
powerful trade unions, health professionals could exercise strong influence on the views about 
health policy of trade union confederations. Residential associations, even in big cities, did not 
have staff large enough to enable them to have representatives with some degree of expertise in 
many subjects. Nevertheless, they could build up connections with professionals identified with 
residential associations’ claims for better public services and for the empowerment of health 
service users.
In the late eighties, the municipal health commissions gradually became the centre of 
political articulation between the popular health movement and other political and social actors. 
During the same period, especially in large cities, political parties became more influential in 
Brazilian political life, creating cleavages within trade union and residential movements and 
among professionals aiming at the reform of the Brazilian health system. It affected the way 
user representatives - coming from urban social movements - participated in municipal health 
fora as well as the way professionals - as health professional representatives, or health 
authorities - positioned themselves for or against the participation of user representatives in 
these fora.
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Although in the Southern region there were more municipal health councils per city 
than in other regions of the country, and most of these fora had internal regulations favouring 
user participation, there have been no studies focusing on these regional fora or user 
representatives' participation in them. The case of the municipal health commission of Porto 
Alegre was selected because it is a large city, having social and political characteristics that can 
make user representatives' participation feasible, and because: (1) The commission has worked 
regularly for seven years, making it possible to follow the dynamic of the commission’s 
activities during a period when the Brazilian health system underwent remarkable changes. (2) 
The concentration of civil society organisation in cities can enable user representatives to obtain 
sustained support from their organisations and can facilitate follow-up alliances or 
confrontations between these representatives and other social actors. (3) The variety of political 
parties that has taken office in municipal, state and federal governments, during the period 1985 
to 1991, makes it possible to distinguish health authorities with different positions on user 
participation, ranging from opposition to support. It makes it possible to verify the influence 
health authorities can have in hindering or stimulating user participation in the forum. (4) The 
concentration of very active members of both the medical profession and the Brazilian health 
system reformers, could facilitate the analysis of the relationship between them and user 
representatives.
During the seventies and the eighties, housing standards and sanitation in Porto Alegre 
were above the Brazilian average. Social indicators, such as life expectancy at birth, infant 
mortality and access to formal education for men and women, were better than the Brazilian 
average. Nevertheless, social inequalities increased the risk of premature death among those 
low income families living in areas with the worst urban infrastructure in the city. Between 
1981 and 1991, the population of these areas grew by 114 per cent, compared with the city 
average of eleven per cent. These growing populations not only were affected by poor standards 
of housing, sanitation and low household income, but had limited access to deficient public 
health services.
Reform has created a two-tier health system: one offering easy access to, and better 
care for, middle class and qualified workers who were able to pay for care directly or through 
private insurance companies, or had the right to use special services; and another providing 
precarious, and sometimes inaccessible, health care for those unable to pay for it. People living 
in illegally occupied areas, with the worst social indicators in the city, were those able to rely 
only on the second type of health care.
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During the last two decades, people living in Porto Alegre's most deprived areas have 
created new types of associations to organise and represent their interests. These organisations, 
instead of adopting traditional clientelistic practices, have promoted membership mobilisation 
and confronted governmental agencies and politicians not identified with their movement. 
Improvements in the quality of health care were on their political agenda together with other 
issues, but were promoted to varying degrees depending on the regions of the city or the period. 
During the late eighties, when participatory channels opened in the health sector, many of these 
organisations supported the involvement of their representatives.
124
Chapter 6
User Involvement in the Municipal Health Commission 
of Porto Alegre -1985/1991
6.1. Introduction
This chapter will describe the dependent variable of this research, that is, user 
involvement in the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre. Two main indicators of users' 
involvement were considered in this description. One is the number and types o f  users 
attending meetings o f  the plenary, which is the deliberative forum of the commission. The 
physical presence of users at these meetings did not explain how they were really involved in 
the activities of the commission. The ways in which they take part can be appraised by 
analysing the second indicator of their involvement: the types o f  involvement o f  user 
representatives in the decision-making process o f  the commission. Before looking at these two 
indicators, it was necessary to understand the environment in which they could develop. Hence, 
the set of rules that regulated the work of the commission and its fora were examined.
Following this is an analysis of the first of the two indicators of the modes of 
participation and the intensity of the involvement of users within the commission: the number 
and types o f  users attending plenary meetings. Everyone attending plenary meetings had to sign 
an attendance list as well as stating the name of the institution or organisation s/he came from. 
This latter piece of information made it possible to classify the vast majority (95 per cent) of 
those present at these meetings into four major categories: (1) providers: were those coming 
from health institutions, independently of being health professionals, health workers or senior 
managers; (2) health professionals or health workers: were those coming from associations
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or trade unions of health professionals or of health workers; (3) users: were those coming from 
organisations such as residential, community or neighbourhood associations, trade unions 
representing non-health sector workers, confederations of trade unions or confederations of 
organisations of urban social movements; (4) others: were those who could not be classified 
within the previous three categories.
To identify whether user participants came from centralised or decentralised 
organisations they were further classified into four major categories according to the type of 
organisation: (1) large organisations, such as confederations of trade unions or of urban social 
movement organisations; (2) local urban organisations, such as residential, community and 
neighbourhood associations; (3) trade unions, excluding those representing health sector 
professionals and workers; (4) others, such as associations of sufferers of particular diseases - 
AIDS, diabetics or haemophiliacs - or associations concerned with environmental issues.
Local organisations were situated in particular areas of the city. By 1991, Porto Alegre 
was divided into eleven health districts, each one corresponding to one local health 
commission. Users attending plenary meetings were usually participants in the local health 
commission or in some urban organisation in the area. Since the location of grassroots 
organisations was identified, it was possible to distribute users of these organisations according 
to each health district. This further classification helped to verify whether users from different 
regions of the city were uniformly involved with the activities of the municipal health 
commission.
Following this, the second indicator of the involvement of users was analysed: types o f  
involvement o f  user representatives in the decision-making process o f  the commission. This 
analysis stresses the participation of users in the processes of agenda formation and of decision­
making. Strong indications of their participation in both processes can be drawn from an 
examination of the commission's regulations, as well as from the verification of whether users 
participated in, or had control over, the executive and technical divisions of the commission. 
The results of such analyses were used to distinguish the types of involvement which user 
representatives enjoyed in the decision-making process. The types of involvement that were 
mainly taken into account were those presented in chapter two: (1) non-participation, (2) 
manipulation, (3) delegation, (4) negotiation, (5) participation. Each sub-period was defined 
by the existence of particular patterns of user representative involvement in the decision­
making process of the commission. Table 6.1 summarises the main elements of the description,
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given in this chapter, of the two indicator-variables of the involvement of users within the 
municipal health commission of Porto Alegre by each sub-period.
Table 6.1 - Attendance of Users at Plenary Meetings and Involvement of User 
Representatives in the Decision-Making Process by Sub-Periods - Porto Alegre - CIMS -
1985/1991
Periods A ttendance o f  U sers at 
P len ary  M eetings
Involvem ent o f U ser R epresentatives in the  Decision-M aking Process
Sep 1985 .mostly weak .Non-participation
to
11 May 1987 82 meetings: .no formal internal regulations
69 (56) per cent 0-2 users .no co-ordinating committee
18 (15) per cent 3-7 users .decisions/agenda formation:
14 (11) per cent 8 or more users health institutions, mostly municipal health authorities
12 May 1987 .mostly strong .Negotiation
to
Dec 1988 46 meetings:
.internal regulations
61 (28) per cent 8 or more users .co-ordinating committee:
35 (16) per cent 3-7 users -with participation o f  user representatives
4 (2) per cent 0-2 users .decisions/agenda formation:
-mostly negotiated among municipal health authorities, other health 
institutions, representatives o f  users and representatives o f  health 
professionals or health workers
Jan 1989 .mostly moderate .Participation and Delegation
to
Nov 1990 49 meetings: .internal regulations
55 (27) per cent 3-7 users .co-ordinating committee:
35 (17) per cent 8 or more users -1989: working with participation o f  user representatives
10 (5) per cent 0-2 users -1990: inactive 
.decisions/agenda formation:
-during 1989 mostly agreement among municipal health authorities, 
other health institutions and representatives o f  users and 
representatives o f  non medical health professionals or health workers 
-during 1990 mostly municipal health authorities and other health 
institutions, some user representatives withdrew from the commission 
delegating to municipal health authorities power over decisions 
-during both years representatives o f  private providers and o f  the 
medical profession were almost excluded from the process o f  agenda 
formation and had minimal participation in decisions
Dec 1990 .mostly strong .Participation
to
Dec 1991 29 meetings: .internal regulations
93 (27) per cent 8 or more users .co-ordinating committee:
7 (2) per cent 3-7 users -with participation o f  user representatives 
.decisions/agenda formation:
-mostly agreement among municipal health authorities, other health 
institutions and representatives o f  users and representatives o f  non 
medical health professionals or health workers 
-private providers and members o f  the medical profession were almost 
excluded from the process o f  agenda formation and had minimal 
participation in decisions
6.2. Organisation and Rules of Work
The municipal health commission of Porto Alegre was created in September of 1985, 
when the municipal government signed an agreement with the state AIS covenant (CIMS 1985,
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2/9). The agreement allowed the transfer of financial resources from the social security system 
to the municipal health secretariat. Following AIS guidelines, participants in the first plenary 
meeting of the commission had established that the plenary should have representatives of the 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, of the INAMPS, and representatives of the state and 
municipal health secretariats. They also agreed that the co-ordinator of the commission should 
be the municipal secretary of health (CIMS 1985, 2/9). It was established that the forum could 
invite other organisations to participate, depending on the agenda of the commission (CIMS 
1985,9/9).
The AIS covenant stimulated the creation of local health commissions (CLIS). In 1980, 
a covenant between IN AMPS and the state health secretariat had proposed the division of the 
territorial area of Porto Alegre into ten health districts. Since then, in each district, health 
institutions with services there had been meetings, aiming at the integration of planning and 
management. By 1986, districts two, three, ten, and four were the most integrated 
(Respondent/CLIS2 1993; Respondent/CLIS3 1993; Respondent/CLIS4 1993; 
Respondent/CLISIO 1993; Respondent/15 1992). Nevertheless, users were only occasionally 
involved in the meetings of the first three districts. The exception was district four. In 1980, in 
this area, an initial working party for institutional integration ended up joining the independent 
health commission created by the union of residential and community associations of the 
region: the Uniao de Vilas Zona Sul. Since then, in this region, there has been a close 
relationship between urban social movement activists and public health professionals working 
there in out-patient units of the state health secretariat.
Between September 1985 and August 1987, there were no internal regulations guiding 
the work of the commission. The commission followed vague guidelines proposed by the 
federal health authorities and occasional rules established by the representatives of health 
institutions taking part in plenary meetings. The plenary had to discuss municipal health 
policies, but its main role was to decide about spending the financial resources transferred from 
the social security system to the municipal health secretariat. It also had to supervise the 
accounts relating to the expenditure of these financial resources. The other divisions of the 
commission were the technical secretariat (Secretaria Tdcnica) and the inspection 
commission (ComissSo de Fiscaliza$3o). The technical secretariat was responsible for 
technical issues, especially for the preparation of proposals for spending the transferred 
financial resources. It would also analyse the accounts of the expenditure of these resources. 
Both the proposals and the analysis of expenditure should subsequently be appraised by the 
plenary. The secretariat was made up of representatives of the health institutions participating
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in the plenary meetings (Secretaria Tecnica/CIMS 1985). A provisional inspection commission 
was created in September 1986 (CIMS 1986, 9/9) but there is no register indicating that it had 
met during this year. In March 1987 it was reactivated, having its internal regulations approved 
by the plenary in April 1987. The commission was made up of representatives of the Rio 
Grande do Sul Medical Association (Associa^o Medica do Rio Grande do Sul), of Rio Grande 
do Sul Private Hospital Association (Associa^o de Hospitais do Rio Grande do Sul hereafter 
AHRGS), of the Porto Alegre Union of Residential Associations (Uniefo das A ssociates de 
Moradores de Porto Alegre hereafter UAMPA), of the INAMPS and of the municipal health 
secretariat (CIMS 1987, 24/3). Its main objective was to verify whether the providers of health 
care contracted by the INAMPS were following their contract provisions (CIMS 1987, 24/3). 
The commission would act in response to complaints. The restriction on inspecting only 
'’contractual” matters seems to have created difficulties for the commission, since there were 
recurrent complaints about the quality of care. The minutes of the commission’s meetings 
demonstrated that it worked more like a bureaucratic formality than as an inspecting 
commission. Its main task seems to have been to send, when asked, enquires or files to hospital 
directors or senior government officials (ComissSo de Fiscalizafflo/CIMS 1987).
On 12 May 1987, user representatives, especially those from large organisations, led 
the initiative for the constitution of a working party to draft a proposal of internal regulations 
(CIMS 1987, 12/5). The party had a majority of four user representatives from large 
organisations over three institutional representatives. There were two users representing the 
confederations of urban organisations, UAMPA and FRACAB; two users representing the trade 
union confederations, CUT and CGT; one representative of the IN AMPS, one representative of 
the state health secretariat and one of the municipal health secretariat (CIMS 1987, 12/5). In 
July, the plenary established that, during the process of decision-making about internal 
regulations, fifteen representatives of institutions and organisations should vote. User 
representatives had eight votes while representatives of health authorities, providers and health 
professionals had only seven (CIMS 1987, 14/7). On 4 August 1987, after months of intense 
discussions, the internal regulations were approved (CIMS 1987,4/8).
The internal regulations (CIMS 1987, 4/8) stated that the municipal health commission 
would plan, decide and supervise health actions taking place in urban and rural areas of the city. 
The commission would promote inter-institutional integration as well as the decentralisation of 
management of health services. It would guarantee universal access to health care aiming at the 
institution of a comprehensive network of health services. It would have three divisions:
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(1) The plenary, which would have ultimate power to take decisions. It would evaluate plans 
for expenditure and accounts related to the financial resources transferred from social security 
to municipality. The plenary would appraise applications for plenary membership and reports of 
the inspection commission. It would elect the co-ordinating committee and nominate members 
for the technical secretariat and for the inspection commission. It had four groups of voting 
participants. (1) The first should be made up of representatives of the Ministries of Social 
Security, Education, Health and Labour, as well as representatives of the state and municipal 
health secretariats. (2) The second group should have two user representatives and one health 
professional nominated by each local health commission. (3) The third should have 
representatives of organisations of health sector professionals and workers. (4) The fourth 
group should have representatives of the trade union confederations, CUT and CGT, and of the 
confederation of urban social organisations of Porto Alegre, UAMPA. It should also have 
representatives of the state association of private providers of hospital care, AHRGS, of the 
state association of non-profit making hospitals, of the municipal legislative chamber’s health 
commission and of the union of rural workers of Porto Alegre (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores 
Rurais de Porto Alegre).
(2) The co-ordinating committee would be responsible for the organisation and co-ordination 
of the overall work of the municipal commission, establishing the agenda of plenary meetings 
and representing the forum. It should have seven members, elected by voting members of the 
plenary. Although it was not required by the internal regulations, the municipal secretary of 
health was always the co-ordinator of the committee.
(3) The technical secretariat would prepare appraisals, plans, projects, proposals, inquiries and 
reports to help the plenary to make decisions. The members of the technical secretariat should 
be representatives of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, INAMPS, municipal and 
state health secretariats, whose nomination was approved by the plenary. The plenary should 
also indicate one to five other members to take part in the secretariat.
The regulations also established that local health commissions would participate in the 
decision-making process, would help to supervise the health care provided and to define health 
priorities in their respective territorial areas.
During 1987 and 1988, municipal health authorities had reinforced the organisation of 
local health commissions (Respondent/4 1992). Commissions six, seven, eight and nine were 
created then. During these years, however, only commissions six and nine worked regularly and 
had some user involvement (Respondent/15 1992; Respondent/27 1992; Respondent/CLIS9 
1993). Others, created before, had weak involvement of users in their activities. This was the
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case, for instance, in commissions one and three (Respondent/CLIS3 1993; Respondent/27 
1992). Only commissions two, five, four and ten, out of the ten local health commissions 
formally constituted in the city, met regularly and had constant user involvement in their 
activities. All of them had their activities supported by public health professionals working in 
the region, and by urban social movement activists. In health district two, public health 
professionals, mainly those from the out-patient units linked to the programme of family 
medicine of the hospital Nossa Senhora da Concei^o, stimulated leaders of local urban 
associations to participate in the commission as a means of improving the provision of health 
care (Respondent/CLIS2 1993). Local commission five, created in 1987, came under the 
influence of the same group of public health professionals. From the beginning, urban social 
movement activists from the region were involved in its activities (Respondent/27 1992; 
Respondent/13 1992). Local commission four had enjoyed the constant mobilisation of public 
health professionals and of activists of urban social movements since the beginning of the 
decade. During 1987 and 1988, local issues, such as the opening of a 24 hour emergency 
service in the region, motivated users to participate in the local commission as well as 
stimulating them to participate in the municipal health commission (Respondent/CLIS4 1993, 
Respondent/28 1992). Local commission ten, created in 1986, would have strong user 
involvement, especially in 1988. Again, this came about due to the combined initiative of public 
health professionals, particularly those working in out-patient units, and activists of local urban 
social movements (Respondent/CLISIO 1993).
In 1989, there were two changes in the organisation of the municipal health 
commission. One was the withdrawal from the commission of the direct representation of 
INAMPS (CIMS 1989, 19/10). As a result of the implementation of the SUDS programme, 
during 1988 and 1989 the management of this institute in Rio Grande do Sul was transferred to 
the state health secretariat, deepening the process of integration and decentralisation of the 
health system in the state. There were also changes in the inspection commission. In June 
1988, a new commission made up only of users was nominated by the plenary. Nevertheless, 
there were always health professionals present when the inspections took place (Respondent/15 
1992; Respondent/27 1992). The internal regulations of the commission were modified during 
1989 (Comiss3o de Fiscaliza5§o/CIMS 1989). New regulations extended the "jurisdiction" of 
the commission to all health care provided by any health service in Porto Alegre. The 
irregularities to be verified could be of any type. It also established that the commission should 
regularly visit hospitals or out-patient health services. Later it should write a report to be 
discussed by the plenary, which should seek solutions to irregularities detected by the 
inspection commission. The new type of commission ended the policy of "hospitals inspecting
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themselves”, according to a user representative (Respondent/7 1992). During 1988, 1989 and 
1990 the commission was very active. Many hospitals contracted by INAMPS as well as other 
health services had inspection visits (CIMS 1988, 7/1, 6/6, 7/7, 18/8, 27/10, 1/12; CIMS 1989, 
5/1, 16/2, 2/3, 4/5, 3/8, 5/10, 19/10, 30/11; CIMS 1990, 18/1, 17/5, 5/7, 19/7, 8/11, 22/11). The 
INAMPS accepted negative reports of the inspection commission as evidence for cancelling 
contracts or, at least, for exerting pressure on hospitals to improve their services. The reports of 
the commission resulted in the suspension of some contracts, which were only revalidated when 
the reforms had been carried out (Respondent/7 1992; Respondent/11 1992; Respondent/13 
1992; Respondent/15 1992).
During 1989 and 1990, local health commissions did not work uniformly. 
Commissions one, seven and eight, which had had problems with their consolidation in 
previous years, still had difficulties. They had occasional meetings and did not sustain the 
permanent involvement of users or professionals (Respondent/15 1992; Respondent/27 1992). 
In local commission six there was a deterioration in the relationship between public health 
professionals working in the area and urban social movement leaders. The main problem was 
the difficult relationship between these leaders and the director of the main group of out-patient 
units in the region, the S3o Josd do Murialdo complex of the state health secretariat. The 
director, who took office at the end of 1989, was also the co-ordinator of the local health 
commission. The works of the local commission relied very much on the facilities and 
resources provided by these units. The commission relied as well as on the constant support 
offered by the health professionals of these units and, most of all, by their director 
(Respondent/10 1992). In commission five, during 1990, the public health professionals of out­
patient units, linked to the programme of family medicine of the hospital Nossa Senhora da 
Concei^o, reduced their involvement in the commission (Respondent/15 1992). Additionally, 
the leader of the urban social organisation most involved in the local commission became ill 
and was forced to withdraw from local and municipal health commissions (Respondent/13 
1992).
Two local health commissions worked regularly during 1989 and 1990. One was local 
commission four, which had strong involvement of leaders from the major urban organisations 
in the region and of many public health professionals working in the area. Some of these 
professionals, especially those who worked in units of the state health secretariat, became 
directors of the municipal health secretariat when, in 1989, the Workers’ Party (PT) took office 
in the municipal government. Commission two maintained regular meetings, but it developed a 
"pragmatic" pattern of work. This local commission seemed to be more interested in solving
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practical problems in the region than in taking part in broader discussions about the 
organisation of the health services in the city or about the reform of the system (Respondent/15 
1992). Local commissions three, nine and ten consolidated their organisation during 1990. This 
consolidation was apparently due to the establishment of a solid relationship between the public 
health professionals working in these regions and the main local leaders of urban social 
movements (Respondent/15 1992; Respondent/CLIS3 1993).
During 1991, there was no important change in the way the municipal health 
commission worked. The novelty was the discussion surrounding the bill that, once passed by 
the legislative chamber of Porto Alegre, would transform the commission into an 
institutionalised municipal health council. There were many discussions in plenary meetings 
related to amendments or modifications to the bill proposed by the co-ordinating committee 
(CIMS 1991, 2/5, 16/5, 21/11). There were also pressures from different interest groups that 
would have liked to be officially included in the future council. These groups were residential 
and community associations, trade unions of health professionals and health workers, trade 
unions confederations, associations of specific disease sufferers, and environmental groups, 
among others.
During this year nearly all the local health commissions were working regularly with 
user involvement. The exceptions were commission one, which has never consolidated its 
organisation, and eleven, which was new and did not have time to firm up its organisation 
(Respondent/15 1992). Commissions seven and eight, which had traditionally been weakly 
organised, worked regularly in this period. Local commission seven had intense mobilisation 
during the period immediately before the first municipal health conference, due to the intense 
participation of activists of the Workers’ Party (PT) (Respondent/15 1992). The involvement of 
users in commission eight was due to the action of public health professionals and urban social 
movement leaders of the region Menino Deus (Respondent/15 1992). Local health commission 
two maintained its pragmatic method of working. It did not establish a strong relationship with 
the regional popular council, but its meetings were regular and had intense user involvement 
(Respondent/15 1992). In local health commissions four, three, nine and ten there was intense 
user involvement. Regular user participants in these local health commissions helped to 
consolidate the popular councils in their respective regions (Respondent/28 1992, 
Respondent/CLIS3 1993, Respondent/CLIS9 1993, Respondent/CLISIO 1993). At the same 
time, urban social movement activists in these regions participated in or supported the activities 
of these local health commissions. Both organisations, together with others, would also 
articulate the demands and propositions to be presented during the assemblies of the
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Participatory Budget, which had been created by the Workers’ Party (PT) municipal 
administration, as will be seen later in this chapter (Respondent/15 1992).
Two local health commissions experienced a revival during 1991. One was local 
commission five , whose main leader, who had been ill, resumed participation at the same time 
that new participants became involved. One example of these new participants were 
representatives of the strong trade union of metal workers of Porto Alegre. Another was health 
professionals and workers from the biggest specialised health unit of the region, the PAM four 
(Respondent/15 1992). Local commission six was also revived during this period. By the end of 
1990, some health professionals and activists of urban social movements in the region proposed 
that a user should be the co-ordinator of the local health commission. It aimed at undermining 
the influence of the director of the health unit S2o Josd do Murialdo within the health 
commission. As the proposal was accepted, the election of a user representative to co-ordinate 
the forum made it easier to establish connections between the commission and the regional 
popular council of the area, especially because urban social movements in this region had 
traditionally been very concerned with health issues (Respondent/8 1992; Respondent/10 1992; 
Respondent/27 1992).
6.3. User Attendance at Plenary Meetings
The number and types o f  users attending plenary meetings does not indicate, on its 
own, whether users had any political influence over the forum. Nevertheless, it is a very 
objective means of indicating whether users were involved at all in the activities of the forum, 
since it is used in combination with other types of evidence. Graph 6.1 demonstrates that the 
most frequent types of participant in plenary meetings were providers. Users came in second 
place. Graph 6.2 shows that in most meetings there was no user present. This graph, however, 
does not show the evolution of user attendance throughout the whole period. Table 6.2 
demonstrates that most meetings without the presence of users were held in the first years of the 
commission. During the later years, the number of users attending plenary meetings increased. 
In fact, while in the whole period, that is between 1985 and 1991, there were 61 meetings 
without the presence of users, between September 1985 and 11 May 1987, there were 60 
plenary meetings in which users were not present. In contrast, between December of 1990 and 
December of 1991, the minimum number of users present at a meeting was five.
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Graph 6.1 - Attendance at Plenary Meetings: Mean by Type of Participant - Porto Alegre 
- CIMS - September 1985 to December 1991
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SOURCE: ComissSo Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre, "Atas de Reunides 
Plenarias - Listas de Presen9 a" (Porto Alegre, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi^o Social, 
CIMS, Sep/1985 to Dec/1991), typewritten.
Graph 6.2 - Users’ Attendance at Plenary Meetings: Histogram and Normal Curve - Porto 
Alegre - CIMS - September 1985 to December 1991
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Table 6.2 - Attendance at Plenary Meetings and Evolution of User Atiendance by Sub- 
Period - Porto Alegre - CIMS - September 1985 to December 1991
Period Number
of
Participants Evolution of
Meetings Total Providers Users User Attendance *
Sep 1985 
to
11 May 1987
82 1198 929 
(78 %)
80
(7% )
Mean = 1.00
Most Meetings (Mode) = .00 
60 meetings *  .00 
Range 0 to 10
Linear Regression 
b = .035 
Rsq = .165 
Sigf= .000
12 M ay 1987 
to
Dec 1988
46 1859 816
(44 %)
442 
(24 %)
Mean = 9.609
Most Meetings (Mode) = 5.00 
1 meeting ■ .00 
Range 0 to 24
Linear Regression 
b = .172 
Rsq = .180 
Sigf = .003
Jan  1989 
to
Nov 1990
49 1763 941
(53% )
330
(18 %)
Mean = 6.735
Most Meetings (Mode) = 5.00 
2 meetings ■ .00 
Range 0 to 24
Linear Regression 
b = .017 
Rsq = .003 
Sigf = .705
Dec 1990 
to
Dec 1991
29 1663 856
(51%)
399 
(24 %)
Mean = 13.759
Most Meetings (Mode) = 9.00
Range 5 to 27
Linear Regression 
b = .329 
Rsq = .214 
Sigf =.011
* The scarce number o f  cases and the irregularity o f  values remove the predictive power o f  the regression, but it does 
give an idea o f  past tendency.
SOURCE: Comiss2o Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre, "Atas de Reunides 
Plenarias - Listas de Presen9a" (Porto Alegre, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9 0  Social, 
CIMS, Sep/1985 to Dec/1991), typewritten.
As can be seen in Table 6.2, during the first sub-period users were present at only 22 
meetings out of 82. Towards the end of this sub-period, however, the number of users coming 
to plenary meetings increased. During 1985, they did not come to one single meeting. On 13 
May 1986, users attended plenary meetings for the first time (CIMS 1986, 13/5). During the 
rest of 1986 they came erratically to meetings. Nevertheless, from the beginning of 1987, the 
number of user participants increased. In the second sub-period there was a significant (Sig. = 
.00) although gradual increase in the number of users attending plenary meetings (r2 = 18). The 
small number of cases and the high variation in values weakened the predictive power of the 
regression. Nevertheless, it indicates that there was a tendency towards growth in the number of 
users at meetings. In the third sub-period, users regularly attended plenary meetings, but in
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slightly lower numbers than in the period immediately before. As these numbers refer to a total 
and not to a sample, even this small difference could be taken into account. In the fourth sub­
period, users had regularly attended plenary meetings, and they had the highest attendance 
average of the four sub-periods. In this sub-period, there was a significant but weak tendency 
(Sig. = .01, r2 = .21) towards the increase of users attendance at plenary meetings. In this case 
also, the regression only indicates a past trend. Graph 6.3 demonstrates that the attendance of 
users at the 207 plenary meetings, taking into account the whole period between September 
1985 and December 1991, saw a significant growth (Sigf = .00, r2 = .44). Nevertheless, this 
growth was not very regular. Even considering that again the regression did not have predictive 
power, it is possible to observe the long term tendency in the increase in user attendance at 
plenary meetings. The line in Graph 6.3 indicating the values actually observed also shows that, 
between January 1989 and December 1990 (meetings 129 to 178), user presence at plenary 
meetings did not increase.
Graph 6.3 - Evolution of Users’ Attendance at Plenary Meetings - Porto Alegre - 
CIMS - September 1985 to December 1991
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User participants in plenary meetings could be classified into three major groups: (1) 
those from associations concerned with environmental issues or specific diseases, (2) those 
from the trade union movement, and (3) those from urban social movement organisations. The 
first group had no significant presence either as user representatives involved in the decision­
making of the commission or as participants in plenary meetings. During 1987 and 1988, trade 
union representatives had been involved in the decision-making process of the commission, 
particularly those representing the Federation of Rural Workers (Federa^o dos Trabalhadores 
da Agriculture hereafter FETAG), the CUT and the CGT and the union of rural workers of 
Porto Alegre. Nevertheless, they were never a large group. Proportionally, only ten per cent 
(122 out of 1,251) of the users attending plenary meetings came from trade unions. On the 
contrary, user representatives from urban social movement organisations had been constantly 
involved in the decision-making process of the commission and 86 per cent (1,077 out of 1,251) 
of the users attending plenary meetings came from this type of organisation.
Until 1988, there was a tendency towards centralisation of the organisation of these 
movements. An expression of this tendency was the creation, in 1983, of the confederation of 
urban associations of Porto Alegre, UAMPA (Baierle 1992, 54). In July 1988, after successive 
political crises related to partisan disputes, a divisive electoral battle took place for the 
directorate of the organisation. After this election, the UAMPA lost influence among urban 
social movements. The weakened UAMPA illustrates, and possibly influenced, the reversal of 
the trend reflected in the type of users attending plenary meetings.
Regarding the size of the organisation they came from, there were two types of user 
participants: (1) those coming from large organisations, whose members were themselves 
organisations, such as confederations of trade unions (FETAG, CUT, CGT) or confederations 
of associations of urban social movements (UAMPA, FRACAB); (2) those coming from local 
organisations, whose members were individuals usually living in the same neighbourhood, such 
as residential associations or local health commissions. As can be observed in Graph 6.4, during 
1988, the absolute and the proportional number of users from "large” organisations attending 
plenary meetings decreased.
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Graph 6.4 - Attendance of Users at Plenary Meetings by Type of Member Organisation:
Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
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During the first half of the eighties, the authoritarian features that still dominated the 
political system helped to make large organisations partial substitutes for political parties. 
During the last years of the eighties, due to the growing liberalisation of the regime, political 
parties increased in importance. In the new context, these large organisations gradually lost 
political weight, becoming, at the same time, more "specialised" in their particular area of 
concern and more subject to constant and divisive partisan disputes for their control (Baierle 
1992, 156-98). The tendency towards the relative increase in users from local organisations 
attending plenary meetings reflected a shift in the dynamic of the urban social movement in 
Porto Alegre, towards a more decentralised pattern of organisation (Respondent/5 1992; 
Respondent/8 1992). During 1988, the profile of users attending plenary meetings changed. In 
the words of a participant, users representing large organisations, which had been involved in 
the commission before, were "professionals", almost a bureaucracy, unable to perceive the 
reality of the shanty towns. In contrast, those representing local organisations were more 
aggressive, more difficult to deal with, but more authentic, focusing their attention on problems 
and matters with which they were very familiar (Respondent/34 1992).
The tendency of urban social movements to rely less on central organisations was 
further stimulated by the policy of a Participatory Budget, implemented by the municipal
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government after 1989, when the Workers’ Party took office. From then on, all capital 
expenditure from the municipal budget in Porto Alegre was discussed in meetings in nine 
regions of the city, comprising social movement activists, individual residents, institutional 
representatives and politicians, among others. They aimed at establishing priorities and at 
electing the "councillors of the budget". The councillors, from all regions, would decide 
priorities together with councillors from other regions and, afterwards, would check whether 
what was agreed had been implemented. The Participatory Budget had stimulated the 
consolidation of regional popular councils (Conselhos Populares Regionais), which united 
urban social organisations in each region, and which had the legitimacy to speak on behalf of 
the region during the budget process (Giacomoni 1993, 130-6). The previous existence of the 
local health commissions in each region had, on the one hand, helped to strengthen the regional 
popular councils (Baierle 1992, 210-1). On the other hand, it had made those speaking on 
behalf of the local health commission respected and supported by the activists of the regional 
councils. The constant interrelation between the two participatory fora seems to have helped 
their mutual growth.
From May 1990, besides the dynamic of urban social movements and the influence of 
the Participatory Budget, there was a municipal policy of reinforcing local health commissions 
as participatory fora entitled to decide upon local issues. Public health professionals working at 
the local level had an important role in stimulating the involvement of urban social movement 
leaders in both local and municipal health commissions. Until 1986, only in health district four 
did some public health professionals, most of them working at the out-patient units of the state 
health secretariat, establish a close relationship with local urban social movement organisations. 
Between January 1987 and April 1990, in districts two and five also, the relationship between 
these two actors became strong. From May 1990, municipal health authorities had stimulated 
public health professionals, who worked at the municipal health secretariat, to become involved 
in the local and municipal health commissions (CIMS 1990, 3/5). Looking at Graph 6.5, it is 
possible to observe that, before municipal health authorities developed this policy, most of the 
users attending plenary meetings came from local organisations located in districts four, two 
and five. After May 1990, they came mostly from districts four, nine and ten. District four has 
been always the most concerned with health issues (Respondent/7 1992; Respondent/8 1992; 
Respondent/15 1992; Rosa 1989, 94-6). The constant attendance of users from organisations of 
this region reflects this. The attendance of users from other regions, however, could have been 
due to the encouragement of the municipal health secretariat. Graph 6.5 also demonstrates that, 
before May 1990 when this policy of encouragement was implemented, there was more 
concentration of users coming from a few regions. After then, the distribution became more
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even (IQV until April 1990 = .93, IQV after April 1990 = .97). The municipal policies - the 
Participatory Budget and the incentive for public health professionals to become involved in the 
local and municipal health commissions - could have helped to widen the involvement of users 
in local health commissions throughout the city.
Graph 6.5 - Attendance of Users from Local Organisations at Plenary Meetings: Number 
by Health District - Porto Alegre - CIMS - September 1985 to April 1990 / May 1990 to
December 1991
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6.4. Involvement of User Representatives in the Decision-Making 
Process
The sub-periods that form this section were established taking into account the 
existence of particular patterns of user representative involvement in the decision-making 
process of the commission. In the first sub-period, between September 1985 and 11 May 1987, 
there was mainly “non-participation”. The second sub-period began when the plenary named a 
working party, with a majority of user representatives, responsible for writing up a proposal for 
internal regulations. From then until the end of 1988, “negotiation” is the best classification for 
the type of involvement which user representatives had in the commission. The best 
classification for the third sub-period, between January 1989 and November 1990, is a 
combination of “participation” and “delegation”. The revival of the co-ordinating committee, in
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December 1990, would mark the beginning of the last period, when user representatives 
actually participated in the decision-making process of the commission.
6.4.1. A Participatory Forum Lacking User Participation: September 1985 to 11 
May 1987
As mentioned before, during this period the commission did not have formal internal 
regulations. The co-ordinating committee would be created only in 1987. The agenda of 
plenary meetings was established by the municipal health authorities together with the 
representatives of the other main health institutions that were participating in the activities of 
the commission by then. The technical secretariat was made up of representatives of these 
institutions (CIMS 1985, 9/9). As was observed before, the inspection commission existed 
only on paper, since it did not actually meet or work.
There were some peculiarities in the way user representatives were involved in the 
activities of the municipal commission in this period. Firstly, their direct involvement was 
minimal. Users’ demands were presented to the divisions of the commission - plenary and 
technical secretariat - mostly through health professionals working in the federal, state and 
municipal out-patient units (Respondent/23 1992). Secondly, when user representatives came to 
plenary meetings, they wanted to discuss the inffa-structural problems of the region where they 
lived, such as access to drinking water or the construction of a sewage system. They also came 
to demand the creation of specific health services, to require improvements in a particular 
health unit or to complain about the quality or quantity of health care provided by certain 
services or professionals (Respondent/2 1992; Respondent/23 1992; Respondent/24 1992). 
Thirdly, they came to ask for solutions to some particular problems in the same way they could 
have done if they had directly asked the federal, state or municipal health authorities. These 
user representatives had no intention of forcing the forum to accept their regular participation in 
the decision-making process. They did not demand "deciding with". Depending on the political 
profile of the organisation they represented, they could wait for solutions from health 
institutions, as though waiting for a benefit since a favour had been asked, or they could wait 
impatiently for these institutions to provide the services they regarded as their right to have 
(Respondent/2 1992; Respondent/22 1992; Respondent/27 1992).
Participants in the commission have pointed out that, in 1985, the forum routine 
gravitated around issues related to the municipal emergency hospital (Hospital de Pronto 
Socorro de Porto Alegre). In 1986 and the beginning of 1987, the agenda was broader, 
including "environmental" matters, such as access to drinking water or sewage disposal
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(Respondent/21 1992; Respondent/23 1992). During 1985, representatives of INAMPS had a 
strong influence over the forum. During 1986, co-ordination was clearly in the hands of the 
municipal health authorities (Respondent/24 1992). These differences can be related to the 
distinct political identifications and professional backgrounds of the municipal health 
authorities. The municipal secretary of health in 1985, Pedro Rushel, was mainly a "hospital 
doctor", representing an authoritarian government (Respondent/1 1992; Respondent/27 1992). 
In 1986, the municipal secretary, Claudio Silveira, was a public health professional, supporting 
the Democratic Labour Party (PDT), by then newly elected for Porto Alegre’s municipal 
government (Respondent/2 1992; Respondent/27 1992).
6.4.2. User Representatives Imposing Their Participation: 12 May 1987 to 
December 1988
The changes the municipal health commission underwent during 1987 and 1988 were 
due mostly to the pressures of user representatives to increase their influence in the forum. At 
the end of 1987, once internal regulations had been passed by the plenary, users could enjoy a 
majority in all divisions of the commission. They controlled the electoral process of the co­
ordinating committee as well as the reshaping of the inspection commission. Nevertheless, in 
the same way that users did not become the major participants at plenary meetings, user 
representatives did not have an actual majority within the crucial divisions of the commission.
Until August 1987, when the internal regulations were passed by the plenary (CIMS 
1987,4/8), the forum had three sub-divisions: the plenary itself, the technical secretariat and the 
inspection commission. Following the provisions of the internal regulations, a co-ordinating 
committee was to be created. In September 1987, an electoral commission was created, in 
which users had a majority (CIMS 1987, 3/9). During the electoral process there were two 
conflicting propositions. One, supported mostly by user representatives, maintained that the co­
ordinating committee should be made up of three representatives of public health institutions 
and four user representatives. The other, supported mostly by medical representatives, insisted 
that it should have three representatives of public health institutions, three user representatives 
and one representative of health professionals. Although there is no evidence attesting to who 
voted for each one, the minutes of the meeting registered that the first proposition won, with 30 
votes against six. In November 1987, the first co-ordinating committee was elected (CIMS 
1987, 1/11). The co-ordinator of the committee was the municipal secretary of health and the 
deputy co-ordinator was a representative of the INAMPS. The other health institution 
represented on the committee was the state health secretariat. Four users took part in the
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committee, they represented two local health commissions, the UAMPA, and the CGT (CIMS 
1987, 1/11).
Although user representatives should have had a majority of four out of seven on the 
committee, in practice they did not have. In the 46 meetings of the committee taking place in 
1987 and 1988 there were on average two user representatives and four institutional 
representatives (Nucleo de Coordena^o/CIMS 1987; Nucleo de Coordena^o/CIMS 1988). 
Following the same pattern of plenary meetings, after July 1988, the majority of users present at 
these meetings represented local organisations and, after October 1988, users representing large 
organisations stopped attending.
According to the internal regulations, the technical secretariat did not need to have 
user representatives as members. Even so, during 1987 and 1988, user representatives were 
present at 44 per cent (31) of the 71 meetings held by the secretariat. In 30 meetings there were 
users representing local urban organisations, while in only one was there a user representing 
large organisations (Secretaria T6cnica/CIMS 1987; Secretaria Tecnica/CIMS 1988).
The inspection commission started work in March 1987. As was mentioned before, the 
commission had one user representative, from the UAMPA, and four from other interest groups 
and health institutions (CIMS 1987, 24/3). Nevertheless, no user attended the ten meetings the 
commission held in 1987. A new commission, nominated by the plenary in June 1988, had only 
user representatives, but health professionals were usually invited to take part in inspections 
(CIMS 1988, 9/6; Respondent/15 1992; Respondent/27 1992). In 1988, there was just one direct 
record of a meeting held in January. Nevertheless, during this year the commission was very 
active and many inspection visits to health services were recorded (CIMS 1988, 7/1, 9/6, 7/7, 
18/8, 27/10,1/12).
Apart from participation in the divisions of the forum, the relationship between the user 
representatives and the municipal health authorities was another element in determining the 
type of involvement users would have. During 1987 and 1988, the Democratic Labour Party 
(PDT) was still in the municipal government of Porto Alegre. Nevertheless, there was a new 
secretary of health. Ollmpio Albrecht was a professional politician from a party with a strong 
populist tradition. He would not be expected, therefore, to favour user representatives taking 
part in decisions. Nevertheless, the deputy secretary, Mdrio Dantas, who became secretary in 
the last eight months of 1988, could be regarded as a Brazilian health system reformer 
(Respondent/4 1992).
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A participant in the commission affirmed that the best illustration of the position of the 
municipal health authorities on user participation was the physical distribution of chairs during 
the plenary meetings. It was like a school class, where the municipal health authorities sat 
behind a table in a line a step higher than the representatives of interest groups and of other 
health institutions, who sat in the lower part of the room. This strongly suggests that the 
municipal health authorities did not intend sharing decisions (Respondent/28 1992). Another 
participant observed that user representatives were struggling to obtain more space within the 
decision-making divisions of the forum, but municipal health authorities still kept many 
political issues off the agenda (Respondent/27 1992). Even if the user representatives had 
increased their influence over agenda formation, some matters came to plenary meeting already 
agreed, with solutions and alternatives previously prepared before plenary appraisal 
(Respondent/20 1992).
There seem to have been two parallel reactions of user representatives to the 
restrictions placed on the scope of the agenda. The first was the revival, during 1988, of the 
practice of bringing to plenary meetings very local or personal problems related to health care 
(Respondent/16 1992; Respondent/18 1992; Respondent/21 1992; Respondent/23 1992; 
Respondent/27 1992). The second, highlighted by user participants, was the aggressive attitude 
of the user representatives towards the co-ordinator of the commission.
The second type of reaction was mentioned by a representative of the municipal health 
authorities, who observed that the user representatives had such an interest in increasing their 
participation that they tried unfairly to dominate the forum (Respondent/3 1993). The climate of 
tension, which some describe as a constant fight (Respondent/9 1992; Respondent/22 1922; 
Respondent/27 1992), resulted in changes in the dynamic of the forum, well documented above. 
These changes were brought about through constant negotiation between user representatives 
and resistant representatives of health institutions and of the medical profession. As an 
institutional representative affirmed:
"Some will say There was an incentive from such or such manager', but there was not 
that. In fact, they became more aware, they started to demand that their decisions be 
followed. Before they just asked i f  they could get this, asked i f  they could get that, 
asked, asked, asked Then they began to demand what they saw as their right " 
(Respondent/22 1992).
Three major changes were regarded by user representatives as signs of their increased 
influence: (1) the discussion and final approval of the internal regulations, (2) the creation of 
the co-ordinating committee and their actual participation in it, (3) the reshaping of the 
inspection commission (Respondent/11 1992; Respondent/12 1992; Respondent/13 1992;
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Respondent/15 1992). If in practice they were not able to sustain a level of involvement that 
would guarantee their majority in all divisions of the forum, with the internal regulations, they 
increased their control over them. Even if user participants acknowledged that many problems 
discussed in the forum were not solved, there was a firm awareness that those participating in 
the co-ordinating committee had access to more information. They also felt that they had a 
higher status within the forum and could influence decisions and agenda formation 
(Respondent/11 1992; Respondent/12 1992). As one user representative, who participated in the 
co-ordinating committee during 1987 and 1988, observed:
"The co-ordinating committee... We co-ordinated the agenda. Sometimes they came 
with an agenda and we, users, told them 'No it will not be this one' we suggested 
additional items or the suppression o f something we had already discussed. The 
agenda was the one we really thought would be suitable" (Respondent/11 1992).
The activities of the inspection commission were a point of tension between user 
representatives and municipal health authorities. The directors of the municipal health 
secretariat in 1988 did not agree with the practice of the inspection commission of visiting 
hospitals without warning, accompanied by the press.
"He [the municipal secretary of health] had to explain to hospitals, and he felt very 
uncomfortable. He apologised because the inspection had been so tough. He felt 
uneasy, he did not seem to like what the inspection commission was doing, he did not 
support it" (Respondent/15 1992).
The visits of inspection commissions to hospitals, the process leading to the approval of 
the internal regulations and the election of the co-ordinating committee have all caused tension 
between user representatives and municipal health authorities. Municipal health authorities, 
during 1987 and 1988, held the view that user representatives should become more involved in 
the municipal health commission, but that they should not have decision-making power. Even 
municipal health authorities in office during the eight final months of 1988, who were 
supporters of the idea of user participation, acknowledged that for them user representatives 
should offer and obtain information. The commission should be a consultative body for the 
municipal secretariat of heath (Respondent/4 1992). User representatives, however, had a 
conflicting view. They wanted to increase their power over municipal health policies, over 
agenda formation and over the decision-making process taking place within the commission. 
The result was not an overt or constant conflict, but a process of negotiation where user 
representatives partially obtained what they wanted while municipal health authorities kept 
trying to restrict their influence.
This process of negotiation was apparent even in small decisions relating to the ways 
the forum worked. During 1987, the meetings of the plenary and of the co-ordinating committee
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took place in the working hours of the day. Plenary meetings had until October 1987 taken 
place in the mornings but, from 1 November 1987, meetings took place at 7 o'clock in the 
evenings. The co-ordinating committee had its first meetings in the afternoon, but user 
representatives protested, asking for their transfer to the evenings, because they had to work 
during the day. The negotiation about this transfer illustrates how disputes between user 
representatives and institutional representatives were solved then. One user representative 
described the negotiation:
"We won the transfer o f  plenary meetings to the evenings, but the meetings o f the co­
ordinating committee were at two o’clock in the afternoon. We proposed then to 
transfer them to 6 o'clock in the afternoon. We were divided, users wanting them at 6 
and Dr. Mario [deputy municipal secretary of health] thinking it would be too late. Dr 
Olimpio [municipal secretary of health and co-ordinator of the commission] asked me 
and Mario to come and said 'Let’s agree. How about 5 o'clock?' We both agreed. It 
was much better" (Respondent/13 1992).
The changes in the commission’s dynamic of work took place at the beginning of the 
process of decentralisation of the Brazilian health system. Since health services in Porto Alegre 
had not by then been municipalised, the real scope of influence of the commission was limited 
to health services financed through resources transferred from social security to municipality. 
Extension of the agenda beyond this limit would depend on the political commitment of health 
authorities to do so or they being forced to do so, due to intense political pressure. Even 
regarding these limitations, participants in the commission, particularly those representing 
users, considered that user representatives had a very active role in the commission during 1987 
and 1988. The forum was open to some sort of user involvement, but user representatives were 
interested in extending the scope of decisions placed under the commission’s discretion, as well 
as in increasing their own influence in the decision-making process taking place in the 
commission. Their activism did not always result in the actual numerical superiority in meetings 
of the co-ordinating committee, for instance. Nevertheless, user representatives could strongly 
influence the decision-making process of the forum in this period. Influence they have 
"conquered" (Respondent/13 1992) through a constant process of negotiation between them and 
municipal health authorities.
6.4J. User Representatives Limit Their Involvement: January 1989 to December 
1990
During 1989 and 1990, the municipal health commission worked regularly, but user 
representatives seemed to have lost the impetus they had shown during the former period. There 
was almost a consensus, however, among participants in the commission that municipal health
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authorities had a strong interest in the participation of user representatives in the decision­
making process of the commission.
The co-ordinating committee in office during most of 1989 was elected in September 
1988 (CIMS 1988, 1/9). In this election again there were two proposals. Supported mainly by 
user representatives, there was a proposal for a committee made up of three representatives 
from the health institutions and four user representatives, one from a large organisation and 
three from local ones. The other proposal, supported mainly by representatives of the medical 
profession, called for the substitution of one user representative by one representative of health 
professionals. The first proposal won, by fifteen votes to eight.
The co-ordinating committee in office during the end of 1989 and most of 1990 was 
elected in September 1989 (CIMS 1989, 28/9). There was again a proposal to include a health 
professionals’ representative on the committee. This time the representative of private hospitals 
voiced the idea specifying that it should be a representative of the medical profession. His 
proposal did not obtain support from the other participants and it was not even voted on. The 
co-ordinating committee elected then had one representative of the municipal health secretariat, 
one of the state health secretariat, and five user representatives, one from a large organisation 
and four from local organisations. This committee, nonetheless, did not meet or work during the 
first eleven months of 1990. Only in December 1990 would a newly elected committee meet 
again regularly, signalling the beginning of the new sub-period (Nucleo de Coordena^o/CIMS 
1990, 20/12).
The inactivity of the committee during most of 1990 demonstrates that the involvement 
of user representatives in the decision-making process of the commission decreased during this 
year. Considering together the committees elected in September 1988 (CIMS 1988, 1/9) and in 
September 1989 (CIMS 1989, 28/9), there were 24 meetings, all of them during 1989 (Nucleo 
de Coordena9{Jo/CIMS 1989). In 1987 and 1988, there were on average two user 
representatives and four representatives of health institutions present at meetings. In 1989, there 
were on average two user representatives and two representatives of health institutions, and in 
only one meeting, was a representative of a large organisation present. Hence, the co-ordinating 
committee only worked in 1989, but the meetings taking place then had proportionally more 
user representatives on average than in the previous period. This proportional increase, 
however, was not due to a growth in the average of user representatives attending these 
meetings but to a decrease in the average of institutional representatives present at them 
(Nucleo de Coordena?ao/CIMS 1989).
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As was mentioned before, in June 1988 the plenary decided that the inspection 
commission would only be made up of user representatives (CIMS 1988, 9/6). In January 1989, 
the plenary decided to reshape it again. From then on, it should have had five user 
representatives: two from local health commissions, two from the large organisations (CUT, 
UAMPA) and one from the Porto Alegre Union of Rural Workers. It should also have two other 
representatives: one representing the council of nurses of Rio Grande do Sul and another 
representing the inspection department of the state health secretariat (CIMS 1989, 5/1). 
Although there was no register of the inspection commission meetings, many plenary meetings 
in this period discussed reports presented and inspections carried out by the inspection 
commission (CIMS 1989, 5/1, 16/2, 2/3, 4/5, 3/8, 5/10, 19/10, 30/11; CIMS 1990, 18/1, 17/5, 
5/7, 19/7, 8/11, 22/11). There were also respondents of interviews, who have spontaneously 
highlighted the intensity of the activities of this commission in the period (Respondent/12 1992; 
Respondent/13 1992; Respondent/14 1992).
At the plenary meeting of 19 October 1989, a proposal was approved that the technical 
secretariat should enjoy the participation of representatives of health institutions, of non­
medical health professionals and of users from local health commissions (CIMS 1989, 19/10). 
Nevertheless, in only four of the 88 meetings of this secretariat, during 1989 and the first eleven 
months of 1990, was there one user representative present (Secretaria Tecnica/CIMS 1989, 
Secretaria T6cnica/CIMS 1990). The technical secretariat did not necessarily have to have user 
representatives involved in its activities, since it was concerned mostly with preparing analyses 
and appraisals to guide decisions to be taken by the plenary. Nevertheless, the absence of user 
representatives who had previously promised to be there, can be considered a further indication 
that, in this period, user representatives had decreased their involvement in the decision-making 
process of the commission.
Between 1989 and 1991, the Workers’ Party (PT) was in the municipal government in 
Porto Alegre. The sociologist Maria Luiza Jaeger, who was the first woman and the first non­
medical doctor to be municipal secretary of health, was an active participant in the "policy 
community" of Brazilian health system reformers (Respondent/5 1992). She was a leading 
member of the department of health of CUT, in Rio Grande do Sul, which was made up of 
health professionals representing trade unions of health workers and health professionals. When 
the Workers’ Party (PT) took office in Porto Alegre’s city hall, most members of the 
department of health of the confederation would hold the highest managerial posts in the 
municipal health secretariat (CIMS 1989). The Workers’ Party (PT), to which they were
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affiliated, supported the reform of the Brazilian health system, defending the participation of 
user representatives in the decision-making process of municipal health commissions.
Respondents agreed unanimously that, during this period, the co-ordination of work 
was more democratic. They affirmed that it was easier, compared with former periods, for user 
representatives to participate. During plenary meetings, the chairs were arranged in a circle, 
everybody at the same level (Respondent/28 1992). New issues, related to the organisation of 
health services in Porto Alegre, appeared on the agenda. The forum began to discuss whether 
new health services should be opened, which services should be closed or where services 
should be placed (Respondent/27 1992). A user participant in the commission affirmed that by 
then
"Our role was no longer to claim for improvements. We could go beyond that and 
create things together, make proposals, develop a better work, a serious work" 
(Respondent/7 1992).
There were some participants, however, who did not like the change. A representative 
of the medical profession affirmed that user participation had become more organised but also 
more radical. In his view, the growing influence of user representatives over the decision­
making process of the forum would result in the medical professions' withdrawal 
(Respondent/16 1992). A representative of the private hospitals of Rio Grande do Sul was more 
emphatic. He affirmed that, during 1989, the intense participation of users made the work of the 
forum chaotic (Respondent/21 1992). However, only representatives of the medical profession 
and of private hospitals made this type of appraisal. Their criticism was probably related to the 
reduction in their influence over the decision-making process of the forum and to the actions of 
the inspection commission.
There was, on the other hand, another type of criticism from those who saw the efforts 
of the municipal health authorities to encourage the involvement of users in the commission. 
This was related to the inexperience of these authorities as managers. Respondents pointed out 
that their exclusive experience was as critics of governmental policies, when representing 
sectoral trade unions and the trade union confederation (CUT) on the health commission 
(Respondent/5 1992; Respondent/12 1992). Their inexperience was evident when, for instance, 
they placed problems on the agenda whose solution was beyond the sphere of influence of the 
commission or of the health institutions there represented. The discussion of such issues created 
expectations for a solution among user representatives. Since this did not materialise, it gave 
origin to a sense of frustration (Respondent/12 1992; Respondent/14 1992; Respondent/21 
1992; Respondent/25 1992; Respondent/26 1992).
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Another criticism was the frequency and extension of discussions related to financial 
matters (Respondent/ll 1992; Respondent/26 1992). An institutional participant explained it 
very clearly.
"At some point, during 1989 - later we evolved from that - user representatives were 
very worried about the role o f "administrative-inspectors", and I  think their 
withdrawal from the forum was because o f  that. We discussed the pans and cutlery to 
be bought for the emergency hospital. I  think people felt, even without knowing clearly 
why, that they would not lose two Thursdays per month to discuss the SUDS 
expenditure plans: 'We will buy that and that and that...'. I  mean, the municipal 
managers went into such detail that it resulted in emptying the commission. The 
commission should decide over macro-issues. You cannot use the commission to 
discuss i f  you will buy a pan size 24 or 25" (Respondent/26 1992).
In fact, in the second half of 1989 and the first half of 1990 for the first time, financial matters 
were the most frequently discussed issues in plenary meetings (CIMS 1989; CIMS 1990).
Some user representatives, however, seemed to have deliberately reduced their 
involvement in the commission (Respondent/5 1992; Respondent/7 1992; Respondent/15 1992; 
Respondent/17 1992; Respondent/28 1992). These municipal health authorities had participated 
in the commission before as allies of user representatives. It was not surprising that some of 
these users had thought they could delegate to them power to take decisions (Respondent/28 
1992). This was so, particularly for users representing organisations located in district four, 
where many directors of the municipal health secretariat had worked before. As a very active 
user representative in this region explained:
"We thought they were people we could rely on. People who knew our needs. So, the 
community did not need to sacrifice itself participating there. Because, for the 
community participation is a sacrifice. We thought they would naturally speak the 
same language, they, as government, would take the decisions they have to take. But it 
was not what happened We realised we would have to make things happen... do it 
together. It was not difficult work together with them, but we had to do it together, 
they would not do things on our behalf. Then the community began to participate 
again" (Respondent/7 1992).
Hence, it was not only the disorganisation of the confederation of urban social 
movements, nor problems in carrying out the commission’s work, that negatively affected user 
involvement in the forum. Some user representatives, especially those from the very active 
district of health number four, thought that the municipal health authorities were so close to 
them politically that they could delegate the decisions to them. Until they realised that this 
would not work.
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6.4.4. The perspective of institutionalisation: December 1990 to December 1991
During this period, user representatives seem to have been intensely involved in the 
decision-making process of the municipal health commission. The co-ordinating committee 
elected on 6 December 1990, to be in office during 1991, was made up of two user 
representatives and one health professional from local health commissions, two institutional 
representatives from municipal and state health secretariats, a representative of the trade union 
of nurses of Rio Grande do Sul and another from the association of civil servants of the 
municipal health secretariat (CIMS 1990, 6/12). Unlike in previous periods, the official 
composition of this co-ordinating committee would have two user representatives for five 
representatives of other interest groups or institutions. Between December 1990 and December 
1991, the average attendance of user representatives at meetings compared with other 
representatives’ average was respectively two and four, which was the same as for 1987 and 
1988 (Nucleo de Coordenaf&o/CIMS 1990; Nucleo de Coordena^o/CIMS 1991). As in 1989, 
nearly all user representatives attending the meetings of the co-ordinating committee came from 
local organisations. Hence, the formal reduction in the number of user representatives elected to 
take part in the co-ordinating committee did not signify a real decline in the number of user 
representatives actually participating in the committee meetings. This composition established a 
proportion in accordance with the actual number of user representatives who had been attending 
these meetings.
In this period, as in the previous one, user representatives did not participate directly in 
the activities of the technical secretariat. Nevertheless, the secretariat’s official composition 
nominated by the plenary established that it should have the participation of a user 
representative from a local health commission (CIMS 1989, 19/10). In June 1991, however, the 
plenary substituted the user representative, who was constantly absent from meetings, with a 
representative of the physiotherapists’ union (CIMS 1991, 6/6). In the previous period, the 
withdrawal of user representatives from the secretariat seemed to provide further evidence of 
the decline in users' involvement within the municipal commission. In this period, it seems to 
suggest that user representatives voluntarily withdrew their participation from this technical 
body.
Although there could be found no direct record of the work of the inspection 
commission in this period, many minutes of plenary meetings mentioned its activities (CIMS 
1991, 24/1, 21/2, 2/5, 18/7, 7/11, 21/11). The incisive, but more "constructive”, attitude of this 
commission in 1990 could be an indication that the municipal health commission was initiating 
a period of institutional consolidation, in which its divisions worked more efficiently
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(Respondent/26 1992). The inspection commission still denounced irregularities to public 
opinion, inviting journalists to come on their surprise visits to health services. Nevertheless, 
towards the end of 1990 and during 1991, the commission seems to have taken a more practical 
approach, seeking commitments that could lead to improvements. As a result some hospitals 
signed agreements with the inspection commission agreeing to make reforms (Respondent/26 
1992).
This shift in the strategy of the inspection commission possibly came together with a 
general change in the way that the municipal commission worked. By May 1990, the co­
ordinators of the commission had realised that there were fewer users attending plenary 
meetings and user representatives were decreasing their participation in the decision-making 
divisions of the forum (Respondent/5 1992; Respondent/26 1992; CIMS 1990, 3/5). The best 
example of this decrease was the inactivity of the co-ordinating committee since the beginning 
of 1990. Although the co-ordinating committee would work again only in December 1990, 
during May and June of that year, there were discussions in plenary meetings about the weak 
involvement of users in the commission (CIMS 1990, 3/5, 7/6). These discussions resulted in 
the adoption of two main strategies aimed at increasing involvement.
Firstly, they changed the way financial matters were discussed. Instead of discussing an 
expenditure plan, for example, item by item, there was a presentation of the general aspects, 
making available the detailed plan for the scrutiny of any representative. The time saved by this 
new mode of discussion was used to debate more important issues, such as the plan for 
municipalisation of the health services, mechanisms of referral and counter-referral, quality of 
hospital care or quality of care provided by public out-patient services (Respondent/26 1992). 
This was also used, for the first time, to systematically discuss environmental problems, such as 
the quality of food and of drinking water, environmental pollution and sewage disposal 
(Respondent/19 1992).
The second strategy was aimed at strengthening the organisation of local health 
commissions. Local issues that could be solved by local health commissions, whose interest 
was limited to single health units or a few users, were returned to these commissions. The 
stimulus to make local commission claims more organised helped to "clean" the agenda of very 
specific issues. It forced local commissions to analyse and prepare issues before presenting 
them to the plenary (Respondent/27 1992). From the end of 1990, most issues placed on the 
agenda should have been of interest at least to a whole "vila", that is a whole shanty town area 
(Respondent/23 1992). At the same time, municipal health authorities stimulated the civil 
servants of the municipal health secretariat to participate in local commissions or, if relevant, to
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help in the creation or in the organisation of local commissions (Respondent/17 1992; 
Respondent/27 1992; Respondent/28 1992). The directors of the municipal health secretariat 
themselves went to the meetings of local health commissions or promoted meetings where they 
were not organised (Respondent/7 1992; Respondent/9 1992; Respondent/10 1992; 
Respondent/12 1992). Also from 1990, the Participatory Budget further stimulated users' 
participation at the local level. An indication of the success of the strategy of strengthening the 
organisation of local fora was that, in 1991, users attending plenary meetings came from all 
regions of the city. Another indication was the occurrence, in the same year, of political 
disputes within some local health commissions, where there were different groups of activists 
competing to represent the local commission on the municipal health commission 
(Respondent/27 1992). For the first time, the municipal health authorities promoted a consistent 
policy of systematic organisation and strengthening of the local commissions. In 1987 and 1988 
there were initiatives aimed at stimulating the organisation of local commissions, but it did not 
seem to have been a central aspect of municipal health policies then, as it was in 1990 and 
1991.
The growing interest of user representatives in the health commission was also related 
to the health law passed by the Brazilian Congress in December 1990 (Brasil. Congresso 1990, 
Lei 8.142). This law institutionalised the involvement of user representatives in the 
organisational structure of the Brazilian health system. It stated that there should be health 
conferences every four years, when institutions and organisations of civil society should 
establish the guidelines that would direct policy implementation for the next four years. In 
September 1990, the municipal health commission organised and co-ordinated the first 
municipal health conference in Porto Alegre (I Conferencia Municipal de Saude/Porto Alegre). 
A few hundred people, representing many institutions and popular organisations, participated in 
the conference. Some urban social movement activists were deeply involved in its organisation 
(Respondent/5 1992; Respondent/15 1992, Respondent/27 1992). The law also established that 
each of the three levels of government should have health councils, with at least half of their 
members being user representatives.
The transformation of the commission into a council took place in May 1992, when it 
was instituted by municipal law (Porto Alegre. Camara Municipal 1992, Lei Complementar 
277). The date of the creation of the council put it outside the chronological limits of this 
research. Nonetheless, the debate surrounding it did not, which focused mostly on which 
organisations would be members of the council. The structure of the council would be similar to 
that of the commission, but the law should state which members would have the right to
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participate in the council. After intense debate during which many organisations lobbied to 
guarantee their inclusion in the council, the law was passed by the municipal legislative 
chamber. It established that 76 representatives of institutions and organisations would take part 
in the council. Those represented included local health commissions, public and private health 
institutions, unions of health professionals and of health workers, unions of private hospitals 
and of private laboratories, environmental organisations, trade union and urban organisations, 
confederations and associations of sufferers of diseases, among others. Contradicting the health 
law, however, user representatives did not have half of the seats on the council. In reality, they 
had 31 seats while other representatives together had 45. Despite this, however, the number of 
organisations enrolled to participate in the council is impressive, demonstrating that there was 
widespread motivation among organised interest groups in participating. The motivation to 
ensure a place on the new council probably contributed to the increased involvement of users in 
the commission during this period.
The growing involvement of users in the commission in this period corresponded, in 
contrast, to a deliberate withdrawal of representatives of the medical profession and of private 
providers of hospital care. They had failed in successive attempts to include a medical 
profession representative on the co-ordinating committee and they could not maintain their 
representation within the inspection commission (CIMS 1987, 1/11; CIMS 1988, 1/9; CIMS 
1989, 28/9). Not surprisingly, medical profession organisations ceased their involvement in the 
commission at the end of 1991. A medical profession representative on the commission 
justified the withdrawal on the grounds that, firstly, the internal regulations "politically" 
restricted the vote of health professionals to one per category. Secondly, they were 
systematically excluded from any decision-making division of the forum. This particular 
situation and the reality of the Brazilian health system reform, with which they could not agree, 
led to their formal withdrawal from this forum by the end of 1991 (Respondent/16 1992). A 
representative of the private hospitals of Rio Grande do Sul used similar arguments to justify 
their absence from 1991 (Respondent/21 1992). In fact, the attendance lists of plenary meetings 
confirmed that the last plenary meeting they attended was respectively in October and in April 
1991 (CIMS 1991, 18/4,10/10).
Hence, in this period, user representatives had participated intensely in the decision­
making process of the municipal health commission. The co-ordinating committee resumed its 
work. User representatives did not have a majority of seats on the committee, but they 
participated constantly. The inspection commission was very active and the role of local health 
commissions as local channels for planning and decision-making was stimulated. This was been
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achieved through the growing involvement of the directors and civil servants of the municipal 
health secretariat. There was also the mutual stimulus of the local health commission and the 
regional assemblies of the Participatory Budget. The reinforcement of decentralised health fora 
consolidated the decentralised basis for the involvement of users in the municipal commission. 
At the same time, the agenda of the forum became more concerned with issues of collective 
interest
As the process of the municipalisation of health services did not start in Porto Alegre, 
the power of the commission over the organisation of health services remained limited. 
Nevertheless, the holding of the first municipal health conference, as well as the debate 
surrounding the creation of the municipal health council, seemed to have given to urban social 
movement activists the perspective that, sooner or later, municipalisation would also happen in 
Porto Alegre. When it did happen, the council would have strong powers over the organisation 
of health services in the city. Therefore, it was important to reinforce the consolidation of the 
forum as well as to guarantee a place there.
6.5. Summing Up
Considering the two indicator-variables of the involvement of users, the number and 
types o f  users attending plenary meetings and the types o f  involvement o f  user representatives 
in the decision-making process o f  the commission, it is possible to affirm that, between 1985 
and 1991, the involvement of users increased significantly. Gradually, more users attended 
plenary meetings and user representatives intensified their involvement in the decision-making 
process. Users from local organisations made up the majority of users attending plenary 
meetings and the majority of user representatives participated in the decision-making divisions 
of the commission.
Between September 1985 and December 1991, taking into account which type of user 
representatives’ involvement was predominant, it was possible to identify four sub-periods. In 
the first period, between September 1985 and 11 May 1987, there was non-participation. In 
this sub-period the commission had been recently created. The commission did not have formal 
internal regulations or a co-ordinating committee and its agenda was decided mostly by 
municipal health authorities. Users rarely attended plenary meetings.
Between 12 May 1987 and December 1988, the involvement of user representatives in 
the decision-making process of the commission can be classified as negotiation. On the first 
date, a working party was set up, with a majority of user representatives, to write the internal
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regulations of the forum. The regulations, passed by the plenary in August 1987, guaranteed the 
majority of the co-ordinating committee’s seats for users. In this sub-period, most decisions 
taken by the commission, as well as its agenda, were the result of a negotiation process among 
health authorities, user representatives and representatives of health professionals or health 
workers. Users had attended plenary meetings regularly and the majority of meetings had eight 
or more users present.
Between January 1989 and November 1990 the involvement of user representatives in 
the commission can be classified as participation/delegation. In this sub-period municipal 
health authorities had the clear intention of promoting user participation in the commission. 
Nevertheless, especially during 1990, leading user representatives had delegated power over 
decisions to municipal health authorities, because these representatives saw them as political 
allies. During 1989, most decisions and the agenda of the commission were agreed among 
health authorities, representatives of users and representatives of non medical health 
professionals or health workers. In 1990, however, the co-ordinating committee did not work 
and most user representatives withdrew from the commission’s activities. As a result, the 
decisions and the agenda were decided mostly by health authorities and non medical health 
professionals or health workers. In both years, representatives of private providers and of the 
medical profession were almost totally excluded from the process of agenda formation and had 
minimal participation in decisions. In this sub-period, users had regularly attended plenary 
meetings, but in reduced numbers. In most meetings there were between three and seven users 
present.
Between December 1990 and December 1991, the involvement of user representatives 
in the decision-making process can be classified as participation. The co-ordinating committee 
resumed its meetings and worked regularly with the constant presence of user representatives. 
The decisions and the agenda of the commission were agreed mainly among health authorities, 
representatives of users and representatives of non medical health professionals or health 
workers. Representatives of private providers and of the medical profession still did not 
participate in the process of agenda formation and decision-making. It motivated their 
withdrawal from the forum by the end of 1991. In this period, users regularly attended plenary 
meetings and in nearly all meetings (27 out of 29) there were eight or more users present.
The most common type of user attending the first plenary meetings differs from the 
most common type attending the last. Throughout the whole period, there was a tendency to 
reduce the number and the proportion of users coming from large organisations representing 
trade unions or organisations of urban social movements. On the contrary, there was a tendency
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to increase the number and the proportion of those coming from local organisations. These 
users from local organisations came increasingly from more regions of the city. During the last 
sub-period, the distribution of users from local organisations among the eleven health districts 
of the city was nearly homogeneous. It indicates, firstly, that there was a change in the profile 
of the user attending meetings. The more articulate representative of large organisations was 
gradually substituted by a representative who, although more aggressive, was more aware of the 
needs of the population s/he represented. It indicates as well that there was a double process of 
decentralisation. On the one hand, the organisation of the urban social movement tended to 
become more regionalised. On the other hand, the local health commissions tended to become 
increasingly important within the municipal health commission.
The growth in the influence of user representatives on the forum was a key element in 
the political tensions surrounding the reform of the Brazilian health system. The influence of 
users grew alongside decreases in the importance within the forum of representatives of the 
medical profession and of the private providers of hospital care. The Brazilian health system 
reformers supported the consolidation of this participatory forum because they defended the 
idea of "social control" and, in particular, of user control over the health system. Nevertheless, 
the political forces articulated in this forum had the potential to strengthen the reforms. The 
alliance between reformers and user representatives, cemented in this commission, could have 
reinforced their converging claims for more financial resources and more services, against the 
reluctance of mayors, state governors or federal government. This alliance could have helped in 
the confrontation with interest groups opposing the increase in public control over the health 
sector as well as sectors of the federal bureaucracy that were resistant to decentralisation. These 
reformers formed a loose policy community, whose members were united by a reform goal with 
a broad common ground. At the municipal level, in Porto Alegre, these reformers had, at 
diverse moments, acted as representatives of a confederation of trade unions, as representatives 
of federal, state or municipal authorities, as representatives of trade unions of health 
professionals or as public health professionals promoting the participation of users in local 
health commissions. In the next chapter, when analysing the actors and factors that could have 
influenced the involvement of users in the commission, the different personifications of these 
reformers will become clearer.
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Chapter 7
Major Influences on the Involvement of Users in the 
Municipal Health Commission of Porto Alegre
7.1. Introduction
The previous chapter examined the involvement of users in the municipal health 
commission. This chapter analyses the major factors that could have influenced this 
involvement. Taking into account the literature on participation, the literature on the recent 
history of the Brazilian health system, and the specific case of the municipal health commission 
of Porto Alegre, it was possible to distinguish seven major factors that had possibly influenced 
this involvement: (1) recent changes in the institutional framework of the Brazilian health 
system; (2,3,4) the positions of the federal, of the state and of the municipal health authorities 
on user involvement in the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre; (5) changes in the 
relationship between public health professionals, who worked at local health units, and activists 
of urban social movements in Porto Alegre; (6) the organisation of urban social movements in 
Porto Alegre, regarding their centralisation or decentralisation; (7) the issues most frequently 
discussed at the plenary meetings of the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre. The 
analysis of each of these actors and factors, between 1985 and 1991, corresponds to each 
section of this chapter.
Although considered independently, these factors are closely interrelated. For example, 
the institutional framework influenced the behaviour of political actors such as health 
authorities. Conversely, this institutional framework is the result of an interplay of political 
actions in which health authorities certainly played important roles. Taking into account their 
mutual interdependence, they are not treated as if they were isolated, but they are examined 
separately to better analyse them. Looking at them separately permits an assessment of whether 
they had any impact on the involvement of users in the commission. Table 7.1 summarises the
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description given in this chapter on how, throughout the period, these factors have changed. 
The changes were classified into three ordinal categories, corresponding to a specific period of 
time. This Table can help the understanding of this chapter, and of the next chapter, when the 
strength of the possible associations between each of these variables and the involvement of 
users will be considered.
Table 7.1 - Factors and Actors that Could Affect Users’ Involvement in the Municipal 
Health Commission: Categories and Periods - Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
Actors and Factors That 
Coaid Have Affected
Types of Variation
Users’ Involvement 1 2 3
Institutional Framework of the 
Brazilian Health System
Period
A?6es Integradas 
de Saude (AIS)
Sep/85 to 9/Jul/87
Sistemas Unificados 
Descentralizados de Saude 
(SUDS)
10/Jul/87 to Dec/1990
Leis do Sistema Unico de Saude 
Jan/91 to Dec/91
Position of Federal Health 
Authorities on Users 
Involvement in Municipal 
Health Commission Activities
Resistant to users’ 
involvement
Indifferent to users’ 
involvement
Interest in user representatives’ 
participation in decision­
making process
Period Jan/90 to Dec/91 May/88 to Dec/89 Sep/85 to Mar/88
Position of State Health 
Authorities on Users* 
Involvement in Municipal 
Health Commission Activities
Non interest in 
users’
involvement
Interest in user involvement, 
but not at CIMS or in Porto 
Alegre’s CIMS
Interest in user representatives’ 
participation in decision-making 
process
Period Oct/91 to Dec/91 Sep/85 to Dec/90 Jan/91 to Sep/91
Position of Municipal Health 
Authorities on Users’ 
Involvement in Municipal 
Health Commission Activities
Non interest in 
users’
involvement
Interest in consultative 
participation
Interest in user representatives’ 
participation in decision-making 
process
Period Sep/85 to Dec/85 Jan/86 to Dec/88 Jan//89 to Dec/91
Relationship Between Public 
Health Professionals, Working 
at Local Level, and Activists of 
Urban Social Movements
Close in few 
regions of the city
Close in many regions of the 
city
Close in many regions of the 
city combined with municipal 
policy of support
Period Sep/85 to Dec/86 Jan/87 to Apr/90 May/90 to Dec/91
Urban Social Movement 
Organisation
Tending towards 
centralisation
Tending towards 
decentralisation
Tending towards 
decentralisation with 
Participatory Budget
Period Sep/85 to Jul/88 Aug/88 to 26/Sep/90 27/Sep/90 to Dec/91
Issues Discussed in a Higher 
Proportion of Plenary 
Meetings
Financial Similar proportion financial 
and organisation of health 
services in Porto Alegre
Organisation of health services 
in Porto Alegre
Period Sep/85 to Dec/ 85 Jan/86 to Jun/86 Jul/86 to Jun/89
Jul/89 to Dec/89 Jul/90 to Jun/91 Jul/91 to Dec/91
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7.2. Institutional Framework of the Brazilian Health System and the 
Municipal Health Commissions
In chapter four the Brazilian health system was discussed at length. Here only the main 
turning points that could have had a direct influence on the municipal health commission will 
be highlighted. They were:
(1) The programme A£8es Integradas de Satide (AIS) of 1984, which created the first 
municipal health forum. This programme also transferred financial resources from the INAMPS 
to state and municipal health secretariats and stimulated the integration of governmental 
agencies responsible for public health and health care provision.
(2) The programme Sistemas Unificados Descentralisados de Saude (SUDS) of 10 July 1987, 
which transferred health units, personnel and financial resources from INAMPS to state health 
secretariats. The programme universalised access to health care and established that there 
should be further transfer of state and federal services to municipalities. It also stated that 
municipal health commissions should monitor the planning and management of the new system 
at the municipal level.
(3) The health laws - Leis do Sistema Unico de Saude - of December 1990, which would 
regulate the health system created by the Brazilian Constitution in 1988. These laws reinforced 
the principles of integration, decentralisation and the universal right to health care. They also 
established that institutionalised municipal health councils would have planning and 
supervisory powers over municipal health services. These councils would become an 
institutionalised part of the structure of the municipal government as well as of the organisation 
of the national health system.
7.3. Position of Federal Health Authorities on the Involvement of Users 
in the Municipal Health Commission
Between 1985 and March 1988, the main managerial posts in the Brazilian health 
system were occupied by professionals concerned with reforming the system. At first, this 
group of reformers saw the AIS programme as a useful means of gradually universalising, 
decentralising and integrating the system (Possas 1987, 246-51). At the beginning of 1986, the 
programme was transformed into policy, in which user participation became a central issue. 
Since the seventies, these professionals had been criticising the authoritarian regime and 
defending the involvement of users in decision-making processes in the sector. Beyond the 
objective of democratising the health sector, there was the goal of establishing alliances with 
leaders of trade unions and of urban social movements, since these leaders could support a
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reform which universalised access and proposed to offer better quality care. In 1987, these 
professionals realised that the political alliance backing the federal government was 
increasingly relying on right wing politicians. As a consequence, they were losing support 
(Cordeiro 1988, 37). The SUDS programme, launched in July 1987, made the reform 
irreversible, speeding the process of decentralisation before they lost their posts. It reinforced 
the principle of the participation of user representatives in the sector, extending user 
representation - restricted before to local, municipal and regional levels of management - to 
state and federal health commissions. It is possible to affirm thus that, in this period, federal 
health authorities supported both the empowerment of municipal health commissions and the 
involvement of user representatives in these fora.
As can be seen in Graph 7.1, the majority of the respondents, who were participants in 
the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre during this period, agreed with the literature. 
Most of them thought that these authorities favoured the participation of user representatives in 
the decision-making process of the commission. One institutional representative has pointed out 
that the federal health authorities wanted user participation, but they did not know how to 
promote it (Respondent/23 1992), even if they seemed to "live for" promoting user participation 
(Respondent/2 1992).
Graph 7.1 - Opinion of Participants in the Municipal Health Commission about the 
Position of Federal Health Authorities on User Participation: Number of Answers by 
Period - Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
resistant
indifferent
in favour
missing
1986/1988 1988/1989 1990/1991
Period
SOURCE: Interviews with Participants in Porto Alegre's CIMS. Interviewed by Soraya M. V. 
Cortes, September to December of 1992, transcript, Interviewer Files, London.
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There was, however, a difference of opinion between non-user and user respondents. 
As Graph 7.2 demonstrates, most non-user respondents considered federal health authorities 
resistant to the participation of user representatives in the decision-making process of the 
commission. Five of those who thought they were resistant to it (Respondent/4 1992; 
Respondent/18 1992; Respondent/20 1992; Respondent/25 1992; Respondent/28 1992) 
observed that federal health authorities only talked about user participation, being in practice 
indifferent to it. These answers, however, should be placed in the context of the politics of the 
Brazilian health system. These respondents were health professionals supporting a more radical 
reform of the system. They seemed to be criticising the non democratic way federal health 
policies had been decided, without prior discussion with civil society, rather than the specific 
attitude of federal health authorities towards user involvement in the municipal health 
commission of Porto Alegre.
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"They opened the door. They called us to do it, at the end they taught us how to do it, 
like in a school class. You go there because you were curious to see what they were 
discussing. You became a student in the house. At the end you stay in the house" 
(Respondent/9 1992).
Another user respondent acknowledged the fact that the federal government had an 
ambiguous attitude towards the participation of user representatives. He explained, however, 
that if there was resistance, it was not among the representatives of the Ministry of Health and 
of the INAMPS in Rio Grande do Sul. He considered that these representatives had an 
"excellent” relationship with the user representatives in the municipal health commission of 
Porto Alegre (Respondent/13 1992). In fact, five respondents, both users and non-users, 
highlighted the role of the INAMPS’ regional managers in promoting user representatives' 
participation in municipal fora (Respondent/5 1992; Respondent/6 1992; Respondent/12 1992; 
Respondent/13 1992; Respondent/22 1992).
The favourable view of user respondents about the position of federal health authorities 
on the issue is more relevant if it is borne in mind that the political parties of these federal 
managers did not have strong connections with the urban social movements in Porto Alegre, of 
which these respondents were activists. The faction of the Brazilian health system reformers 
running federal health policies, during this period, was identified with the central-left Party of 
the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) and with the Brasilian Communist Party (PCB) 
(Gallo and Nascimento 1989, 107). The urban social movement in Porto Alegre, then, was 
mostly influenced by the central left Democratic Labour Party (PDT) and increasingly 
influenced by the Workers’ Party (PT) (Baierle 1992,123-5).
On the one hand, it was mostly non-user respondents who, at the same time, criticised 
the federal health authorities' strategy of reform and were suspicious about the federal 
government’s supposed support for user participation. On the other hand, it was mostly user 
respondents, without partisan connections with these authorities, who considered that they 
favoured the participation of user representatives in the decision-making process of the 
commission. Considering both respondents together, there was a slight majority who thought 
that federal health authorities favoured participation, as can be seen in Graph 7.1. Considering 
the fact that users were less affected by political disputes among the factions of reformers, and 
that they were the ones who were supposed to participate, it is reasonable to accept their view 
that these authorities favoured participation.
By then the municipal health services were not municipalised in Porto Alegre, and thus 
the municipal health commission had the right only to monitor the health care provision 
financed through social security resources transferred to the municipal health secretariat. As
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further evidence that the federal health managers in Rio Grande do Sul, especially those in the 
INAMPS’ regional administration, supported the involvement of users in Porto Alegre’s 
commission, they had backed the work of the inspection commission, suspending contracts with 
private hospitals when this commission recommended it. It seems that federal policies could not 
have been very successful in stimulating user representatives' participation in the decision­
making process of municipal health commissions throughout the country, but the regional 
managers representing the federal health authorities in Rio Grande do Sul had been particularly 
committed to the issue (Respondent/5 1992; Respondent/22 1992).
The group of health professionals in the main posts of the Brazilian health system, 
between April 1988 and December 1989, was not regarded as reformers (Diretoria Nacional 
do CEBES 1988, 5). They did not have a clear political commitment to the decentralisation of 
the system or to the promotion of user representatives' participation in it. Nonetheless, during 
this period, the federal government as a whole did not have the political strength to impose any 
dramatic change in policies that could have gone against the interest of directly elected 
governors and mayors. So, during this period, considering their political weakness, federal 
health authorities could be regarded as indifferent to the issue.
The views of the regular participants in the commission coincided with the assumptions 
of the literature. Nevertheless, the respondents seemed to be more interested in the process of 
decentralisation of the Brazilian health system that was under way than with the stance on user 
participation of these increasingly remote federal health authorities.
The majority of the respondents thought that the federal health authorities, in this 
period, were indifferent to the issue of users' involvement in the commission. When explaining 
their answers, the respondents usually focused on the difficulties of the process of 
decentralisation of the health system. Federal health authorities apparently were mainly 
concerned with transferring as many functions as possible to state and municipal spheres of 
government, although INAMPS’ civil servants were resistant to it (Respondent/23 1992; 
Respondent/26 1992). Other respondents have focused their explanations on the difficulties of 
incorporating INAMPS into the state health secretariat (Respondent/5 1992; Respondent/25 
1992; Respondent/27 1992).
There was no big difference between the answers of users and non-user, as can be seen 
in Graph 7.2. Nevertheless, this Graph also shows a particular characteristic especially in user 
respondents’ responses: many of them did not answer the question. Out of ten users, four did 
not know what position the federal government had on the issue. It could be due to the
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weakness of the federal health authority in office during that period. Even the representatives of 
health institutions could not recall who was the Minister of Health then (Respondent/5 1992). 
This "ignorance” or "lack of memory" could be both an indication of federal health authority 
indifference towards the issue or of the political weakness of federal health authorities in this 
specific period. It could also be due to the withdrawal, in 1989, of the direct representation of 
INAMPS from the commission. This institute was incorporated into the state health secretariat 
because of the implementation of the SUDS. Especially for user representatives, it was difficult 
to identify which were those authorities without direct representation in the forum and what was 
their position on user participation (Respondent/11 1992).
At the beginning of 1990, the first directly elected president since 1961 took office in 
Brasilia. The legitimacy of the polls reinforced the role of central government on the political 
scene. It was a right wing government supporting privatisation policies, but resistant both to the 
devolution of political power from the central level to state and municipal levels of government 
and opposing institutional democratisation. In the health field, the Minister of Health affirmed 
that the main ministerial policy would be to consolidate the health system created by the new 
Constitution (Guerra 1990: 6). Nevertheless, when the health laws were passed by the 
Brazilian Congress in September 1990, the federal health authorities induced the President to 
veto articles that reaffirmed the constitutional principles of decentralisation of the health system 
and user participation. Although federal health authorities affirm to favour decentralisation and 
user participation, they in practice acted politically against them. Hence, the literature usually 
suggested that federal health authorities, in 1990 and 1991, were against the involvement of 
user representatives in municipal health fora (Paim 1990, 7; Arouca 1990, 9; Escorel and 
Pavuna 1990,16-7).
The perception of the regular participants concerning the position of the federal health 
authorities, broadly confirms the supposition in the literature that they were resistant or 
indifferent to the issue. As can be seen in Graph 7.1, the majority of respondents believed that 
these authorities were indifferent to the issue. Graph 7.2 demonstrates that user and non-user 
respondents have a similar pattern of distribution of answers. Looking at Graphs 7.1 and 7.2, it 
is possible to observe that the answers referring to the periods 1988/1989 and 1990/1991 were 
similar. When referring to 1990/1991 there were also many respondents who did not answer the 
question and most of them were users. There were respondents (six) who answered without 
further comments even when asked to explain their opinions. The "non-answers" could again be 
attributed to the withdrawal of the federal health authorities from the municipal political scene. 
Among the seven respondents who explained their answers, four - one user and three non-user
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representatives - pointed out that, in 1990 and 1991, federal health authorities just talked about 
user participation, but that they were in reality resistant or indifferent to it (Respondent/5 1992; 
Respondent/12 1992; Respondent/18 1992; Respondent/28 1992). User respondents observed 
that if before federal health authorities had had any good will towards user representatives, in 
this period they had none (Respondent/7 1992; Respondent/10 1992). An institutional 
representative pointed out that, in contrast to former periods, in 1990 and 1991, federal health 
authorities in Rio Grande do Sul did not even acknowledge that there were user representatives 
participating in a municipal health forum (Respondent/26 1992).
7.4. Position of State Health Authorities on the Involvement of Users in 
the Municipal Health Commission
During 1985 and 1986, the right wing Democratic Social Party (PDS), which had 
supported the military regime, was in charge of the state government in Rio Grande do Sul. The 
state health authorities were, therefore, identified with this party, and were not regarded as 
Brazilian health system reformers. The governor of Rio Grande do Sul at that time, who had 
chosen them to direct the state health secretariat, was Jair Soares, state secretary of health and 
Minister of Social Security during the military dictatorship. When he was Minister of Social 
Security he did not allow the PREVSAUDE programme to be implemented. As was seen in 
chapter four, this programme was the first comprehensive attempt at integrating the system and 
of promoting user participation. Because of this political background, state health authorities 
were not expected to favour the involvement of users in the municipal health commission of 
Porto Alegre.
However, state health authorities seem to have had a more complex relationship with 
user representatives than their partisan affinities would lead us to suppose. As can be seen in 
Graph 7.3, the majority of respondents considered that the state health authorities were 
indifferent to or favoured the participation of user representatives in the decision-making 
process of the commission. A non-user respondent explained that the state health authorities did 
not seem to have any conviction about promoting the participation of user representatives. He 
acknowledged, however, that representatives of the state health secretariat, in this period, had 
always participated in the activities of the municipal health commission, even if they often 
ignored the decisions taken there (Respondent/27 1992).
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Graph 7.3 - Opinion of Participants in the Municipal Health Commission about the 
Position of State Health Authorities on User Participation: Number of Answers by Period
- Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
resi start
9  indifferent
in favour
1985/1986 1987/1990 1991
P e r io d
SOURCE: Interviews with Participants in Porto Alegre's CIMS. Interviewed by Soraya M. V. 
Cortes, September to December of 1992, transcript, Interviewer Files, London.
Nevertheless, user respondents believed that the state health authorities favoured the 
participation of user representatives in the decision-making process of the commission. A user 
respondent, who was a very aggressive activist from the urban social movement in district four, 
identified with left wing parties, affirmed that the state secretary of health, Germano Bonow, 
had the best ever relationship with the community (Respondent/7 1992). She affirmed that he 
was attacked by the community during his first years as secretary, when it was very hard to 
work with him. During the last three years of his administration, however, he became very close 
to the community, listening to and respecting their decisions (Respondent/7 1992). Another user 
respondent, from the same region, said that this secretary had tried to deal with the claims of the 
community objectively and respectfully, but he criticised his choice of political party 
(Respondent/8 1992).
The only respondent who thought that the state health authorities were against the 
involvement of user representatives in the municipal health commission was a representative of 
the federal health authorities (Respondent/22 1992). During 1985 and 1986, she maintained that 
the state health secretariat directors, and its representatives in the municipal commission, 
intended to hinder user participation and to undermine the forum itself. On the one hand, her 
view could be biased, because she supported the reform of the system promoted by the federal
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health authorities. When considering the idea that the state health authorities were against user 
participation, she could be extending the state health authorities’ criticism of the type of health 
system reform under way to a supposed opposition they would have towards the empowerment 
of user representatives. On the other hand, the state health authorities could have been 
supporting a type of user involvement in the health sector that was essentially different from the 
type of participation Brazilian health system reformers, like herself, defended.
State health authorities, during 1985 and 1986, seemed to favour incremental changes 
towards a better integration of the health system. They did not consider central to their project 
the administrative integration of the sub-sectors of public health and of social security health 
care, which, in contrast, were essential to the plan of the Brazilian health system reformers. A 
representative of the state health secretariat, in 1985 and 1986, illustrates their position.
"The Law, I  knew the number by heart, 8,229 or 6,229, that one that in the early 
seventies divided the health between INAMPS and Ministry o f Health. The Ministry 
was responsible for immunisations, sanitation and all these things, INAMPS for  
providing medical attendance. That dichotomy, that wonderful thing [sarcastic]... 
Everybody used to swear against it. Nowadays we do not have it any more. What is the 
result? Nothing! It is a catastrophe. There is no sanitation anymore, there is no 
immunisation, there is no medical attendance. There is neither one nor the other" 
(Respondent/24 1992).
These authorities promoted the organisation of public health services into districts, and 
highlighted the disadvantages of centralised planning because of its distance from the 
communities. According to them local populations should participate in the system, presenting 
their needs and helping to increase the efficiency and efficacy of health services (Grupo de 
Apoio e Dinamizaf^o Setorial 1980, 2). Nevertheless, they did not consider that user 
representatives should participate in decision-making. The institutionalised and overt 
representation of interests in the municipal health commission was regarded by them as the 
pointless struggles of one community against another for scarce resources (Respondent/24 
1992). Instead of helping to find more effective methods of running the forum, these health 
authorities reinforced direct individual links with social movement leaders. They promoted 
traditional forms of representation of users’ interests, in which politicians or State bureaucracy 
would establish direct and informal relations with individuals, who were leaders of the urban 
social movements. Not surprisingly, when user respondents provided examples of the support 
that the state health authorities had given to community participation, they reported events 
where they interacted directly with social movement activists and never their actions in the 
municipal health commission itself.
169
Between 1987 and 1990, the central-left Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
(PMDB) ran the government of Rio Grande do Sul and, consequently, the state health 
secretariat. The main managerial posts of this secretariat were held by health professionals 
closely identified with the reformers’ faction in office at the Ministry of Health and IN AMPS 
between 1985 and March 1988. So, it is reasonable to suppose that they would have promoted 
the decentralisation of the state health services and, at the same time, stimulated the 
empowerment of the municipal health fora as well as the participation of user representatives in 
the decision-making process of the commission.
This expected support for user involvement in the commission’s decision-making was 
not confirmed by the views of the regular participants in the commission. As can be seen in 
Graph 7.3, among these participants, there was no predominance of a type of response about the 
views of the state health authorities on participation.
It is curious that the only user respondent who was a militant of the Party of the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), the political party running the state government in 
this period, affirmed that the state health authorities did not favour user participation. This 
urban social movement leader observed that state health authorities had only "talked" about 
participation. He recalled that only once did the state secretary of health receive community 
leaders, although they had tried many times to present their demands to him (Respondent/10 
1992). Another respondent, who was a Brazilian health system reformer and a representative of 
the federal government, affirmed that the state health authorities favoured user participation, 
but only slightly. According to her, they neither helped to promote it nor worked to hinder it 
(Respondent/22 1992). The opinion of these two respondents is intriguing since they were both 
affiliated to parties supporting the state government and the reforms under way in the Brazilian 
health system. It is one among several indications that managers of the state health secretariat 
had an ambiguous attitude towards the issue.
There were further indications of this apparent ambiguity. Firstly, there was the already 
mentioned similar number of respondents affirming that the state health authorities favoured, 
were indifferent or resistant to the participation of user representatives in the decision-making 
process of the commission. Another indication of this ambiguity is that some respondents (three 
non-users and two users) distinguished between the position of the state secretary of health and 
the position of representatives of the state health secretariat in the commission. Apparently two 
different political strategies were in dispute within the state health secretariat. Some directors 
defended a similar strategy of widespread support to the consolidation of municipal 
participatory fora independently of partisan differences. Others defended more selective
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support. For the latter strategy the empowerment of the municipal health commission of Porto 
Alegre was a non-priority. This was so because the municipal health secretariat, whose 
secretary was the co-ordinator of the commission, had been run by two political parties seen as 
rivals by the state health authorities: the central-left Democratic Labour Party (PDT) during 
1987 and 1988, and the leftist Workers* Party (PT) during 1989 and 1990. Furthermore, the 
majority of user representatives on the commission came from organisations that had political 
connections with the two parties.
The directors of the state health secretariat were resistant to the empowerment of the 
commission, while a group of important managers of the secretariat favoured it (Respondent/4 
1992). Representatives of the state health secretariat at the commission had clearly supported 
user participation in the decision-making process of the commission. These representatives 
participated regularly in the activities of the commission, trying to find a way of attending to the 
demands of users and of implementing decisions taken by the commission. A respondent 
observed that the representative of the state health secretariat at the commission during 1987 
and 1988 tried to empower the forum. Her effort, nevertheless,
"had no consequence, because the state secretary o f  health did not 'embrace' the 
decisions, undermining the image o f  this representative inside the forum. (...) What 
does it mean? It means that she did not have power to represent the state health 
secretariat inside the forum. She came only because she was the director o f  out-patient 
units o f  the state located in Porto Alegre” (Respondent/27 1992).
A representative of this secretariat explained that it favoured user participation but was resistant 
to it in Porto Alegre particularly when the Workers* Party (PT) was in the municipal 
government. With few exceptions, the directors of the state health secretariat, particularly the 
secretary, "abhorred" the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre. They did not want to 
help the consolidation of this forum not because they were against user participation, but 
because the municipal sphere of government was in the hands of the Workers* Party (PT) and 
because an increasingly large number of the leaders of urban social movements in Porto Alegre 
were supporting this party.
The competition was not only for votes, but also for ideological dominance within the 
health sector, and within the "policy community” of the Brazilian health system reformers. 
Those running the municipal health secretariat during 1989 and 1990 participated in this 
"community", both regionally and nationally. The attitude of the state health authorities seems 
to be part of the dispute dividing the Brazilian health system reformers at the national level. It 
was mostly polarised between those more closely identified politically with the communist 
parties and with leftist sections of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB),
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and those who were more closely identified with other left wing parties, particularly with the 
Workers’ Party (PT) (Gallo and Nascimento 1989,105-7).
In 1991, the central-left Democratic Labour Party (PDT) took over the government of 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Militants and sympathisers of this party had strongly defended 
further decentralisation of the health system and its democratisation. So, it is possible to 
suppose that the state health authorities in this year would be supporting the participation of 
user representatives in the decision-making process of the municipal health commission of 
Porto Alegre and the empowerment of this commission.
During the first nine months of 1991 the state health authorities supported the 
empowerment of the forum, but from October of that year they went clearly against it. Official 
representatives of the state health secretariat participated irregularly in the forum during the 
first nine months of 1991 and after that just stopped coming (CIMS 1991, 17/01/1991 to 
19/12/1991). A user respondent suggested that the good relationship established at first between 
the state health authorities and the community had deteriorated, and that the representative of 
the state health secretariat at the commission gave up working in, what this respondent called, 
an authoritarian administration (Respondent/7 1992). She observed that, from October 1991, 
state health authorities refused to participate in local and municipal health commissions because 
they thought they had been treated disrespectfully by user representatives there (Respondent/7 
1992). Apparently the refusal to participate was the main impression that the state health 
authorities had left on regular participants in the commission, since many respondents (eight out 
of fifteen) regarded them as resistant to the participation of user representatives in the decision­
making process of the commission. As can be seen in Graph 7.4, user respondents in particular 
considered that the state health authorities were resistant to participation.
Political competition between the Workers’ Party (PT) and the Democratic Labour 
Party (PDT) partially explains why the state health authorities withdrew from this forum. The 
two parties had support in urban social movements in Porto Alegre. Nevertheless, the 
Democratic Labour Party (PDT) was losing ground. The Workers’ Party (PT) was intensifying 
its influence over these movements (Baierle 1992, 123-5). Leaders of urban social movement 
organisations were active participants in municipal and local health commissions, whose role in 
the movement had been reinforced, since 1989, by the support offered to them by the 
administration of the Workers’ Party (PT) in the municipal health secretariat. At first, the state 
health authority had tried to counterbalance this alliance between urban social movement 
activists and municipal health authorities. When they realised that it was not possible they had 
refused to legitimate the forum with their presence.
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Graph 7.4 - Opinion of Participants in the Municipal Health Commission about the 
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SOURCE: Interviews with Participants in Porto Alegre's CIMS. Interviewed by Soraya M. V. 
Cortes, September to December of 1992, transcript, Interviewer Files, London.
Another reason for the failure of the state health authorities to consistently support the 
empowerment of the forum could be the dominance within the state health secretariat of the 
more traditional factions of the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) (Respondent/4 1992). 
Nevertheless, a major reason is probably the style of policy-making of this party, which usually 
relies on relations of patronage between politicians or bureaucrats and activists of social 
movements. The difficulty in dealing with organised interest groups in overt public spaces can 
probably help to explain their resistance in supporting the empowerment of the municipal health 
commission of Porto Alegre. When invited to attend a particular meeting of the commission, a 
director of the state health secretariat affirmed that he would not go because he did not want 
trouble. If user representatives had any demands they should seek direct contact with him at his 
office (Respondent/28 1992). A user respondent pointed out that they were very much resistant 
to user participation:
"moreover if  the community participated in an organised manner. They had real fear 
of this. I f it was non-organised, alienated participation, they welcomed and stimulated 
it, but in an organised manner they did not" (Respondent/7 1992).
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7.5. Position of Municipal Health Authorities on the Involvement of 
Users in the Municipal Health Commission
Municipal health authorities are probably one of the most influential actors in the 
participatory process taking place in the Brazilian municipal health fora. In the case of Porto 
Alegre, the commission was physically located inside the municipal health secretariat 
headquarters. The meetings took place there. The administrative and secretarial services were 
mostly provided by the staff of this secretariat. The municipal secretary of health has always 
been the co-ordinator of the forum.
During 1985, politicians identified with the authoritarian regime were in the municipal 
government of Porto Alegre. The secretary of health was the medical doctor Pedro Ruschel, 
who had worked for many years in the municipal emergency hospital (Hospital de Pronto 
Socorro de Porto Alegre) (Respondent/1 1992). According to a health professional who worked 
closely with him (Respondent/1 1992), his main interest was to promote this hospital. For him, 
public health matters as well as the municipal health commission were secondary issues. The 
commission was created during his administration because it was a means of obtaining financial 
resources from the social security system for this hospital (Respondent/27 1992). As a 
consequence, it is possible to suppose that, during this year, the municipal health authorities 
would not favour the participation of user representatives in the decision-making process of the 
municipal health commission.
Graph 7.5 demonstrates that the opinion of the majority of respondents confirmed this 
supposition. Most regular participants in the commission in 1985 considered that the municipal 
health authorities had little or no interest in promoting participation. Two respondents had 
highlighted the fact that the municipal secretary of health, given his hospital career, was not 
particularly interested in this participation (Respondent/1 1992; Respondent/27 1992). Other 
respondents had pointed out that, beyond the lack of interest of this general director, there was a 
generalised ignorance about how it would actually function, since the forum was a total novelty 
and had not yet established rules or a work routine (Respondent/23 1992; Respondent/24 1992).
In 1986, the first directly elected government took office in the city hall of Porto Alegre 
since the beginning of the military dictatorship. The winning party was the Democratic Labour 
Party (PDT). As mentioned above, this party supported the further decentralisation of the health 
system and user involvement in its decision-making process. The new municipal secretary of 
health, the medical doctor Claudio Silveira, was a public health specialist, who had worked for 
many years in public health institutions. His thoughts on public health were not influenced by
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the Latin-American literature on social medicine, in contrast to the reformers of the Brazilian 
health system who took part in the production of this literature. His conception of public health 
and of health planning and administration came from English and American literature on 
inequality and equity. His other source of inspiration were the Latin-American classics on 
public health, such as planning methods recommended by PAHO and budgeting and 
programming techniques (Respondent/2 1992).
Graph 7.5 - Opinion of Participants in the Municipal Health Commission about the 
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SOURCE: Interviews with Participants in Porto Alegre's CIMS. Interviewed by Soraya M. V. 
Cortes, September to December of 1992, transcript, Interviewer Files, London.
As regards user participation, the municipal health authorities seemed to be interested 
in promoting the involvement of user representatives in the commission but not in its decision­
making process. The municipal health authorities’ "great dream" was the consolidation of the 
municipal government’s proposal to create popular councils distributed throughout the city. In 
these councils, representatives of urban social organisations would look at the problems without 
the bias of a particular sector, they would be concerned with the "whole" city (Respondent/2 
1992). The municipal health commission, in this context, would be the "technical arm" of these 
councils. According to a representative of the municipal health secretariat this dream has never 
become reality. He also acknowledged that their views on the participation of user
L_ no/some interest 
I  reasonable interest 
i  □  strong/very strong interest
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representatives were rather technocratic. Participation should allow the exchange of information 
and not an involvement in the process of taking decisions (Respondent/2 1992).
Graphs 7.5 and 7.6 demonstrate that, among both user and non-user respondents, there 
was no clear predominance of one type of answer about the interest of municipal heath 
authorities in user participation. A non-user respondent explained this ambivalence among 
respondents, affirming that this municipal secretary of health had much more respect for user 
representatives than the former. Nevertheless, he also observed that he did not seem to be 
comfortable with the idea of user participation. The municipal secretary of health had
"a much better attitude, he was more respectful in plenary meetings, but he had, as 
well, the behaviour o f a technician who was not used to working with the community" 
(Respondent/27 1992).
Graph 7.6 - Opinion of Participants in the Municipal Health Commission about 
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The only two users to participate regularly in the commission during 1986, however, 
believed that the municipal health authorities were interested in user participation in the 
commission. One affirmed that the secretary’s co-ordination of the forum was more open and 
democratic than the former (Respondent/8 1992). The other, a very aggressive user 
representative, affirmed that the secretary had a strong interest in user participation. She
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remembered an argument she had had with him once, when he had argued that she had shown 
disrespect towards a representative of the medical profession. She added that, even 
remembering this argument, she acknowledged that he had tried to involve the community in 
the activities of the commission (Respondent/7 1992).
During 1987 and 1988, the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) was still in the municipal 
government of Porto Alegre. Nevertheless, the municipal secretary of health had changed. The 
new secretary, the medical doctor Ollmpio Albrecht, was a professional politician, rather than a 
health professional. As a politician from a party with a strong populist tradition, he would not 
be expected to favour user representatives taking part in decisions. Nevertheless, the deputy 
secretary, the medical doctor M&rio Dantas, who would became secretary in the last eight 
months of 1988, could be regarded as a Brazilian health system reformer. His ideas about public 
health, and the planning and administration of health services were deeply influenced by the 
works of leading reformers (Respondent/4 1992). In contrast to Olimpio Albrecht, the deputy 
director would be expected to favour users participating in the decision-making process of the 
commission.
A representative of Olimpio Albrecht’s administration highlighted the incentives given, 
during this administration, to the organisation of the local health commissions, to the promotion 
of regular plenary meetings with intensive civil society participation and to the 
institutionalisation of the inspection commission. He pointed out, however, that user 
representatives wanted to control everything, which according to him, was not “right”. 
Although it was a positive appraisal of the incentives given for the participation of user 
representatives, it also demonstrated that there was some tension between the municipal health 
authorities and the user representatives (Respondent/3 1993). A participant of Mario Dantas’ 
administration had a more critical view on the issue. Municipal health authorities in this period, 
he observed, thought that user representatives should help in the inspection of the quality of 
health services, should make suggestions, and should obtain information about health services. 
They did not think that user representatives should take part in the decision-making process, 
since they regarded it as a prerogative of the municipal health secretariat. According to him, the 
dominant position within the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) was that they should stimulate 
user participation, since users agreed with what the executive had already planned. He also 
observed, however, that it was a traditional populist politician, Olimpio Albrecht, who had 
transformed the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre into a real participatory forum. 
Municipal health authorities in this period invited user organisations to participate and
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eventually, he added, municipal health authorities lost control over user representatives 
(Respondent/4 1992).
Graph 7.5 shows that the majority of respondents thought that, during these two years, 
the municipal health authorities had no interest or some interest in the participation of user 
representatives in the decision-making process of the commission. Graph 7.6 demonstrates that 
the pattern of the answers was similar among user and non-user respondents.
Eleven respondents had described the attitude of the municipal health authorities as 
autocratic or manipulative, or affirmed that they tried to impose their views, only accepting the 
decisions they agreed with. A non-user respondent observed that the municipal health 
authorities did not place decisive issues on the agenda of the forum. He added that they did not 
want to share political power (Respondent/27 1992). This respondent argued that Olimpio 
Albrecht had an authoritarian style of co-ordinating the forum. According to him, this director
"was extremely domineering, he would never share power, he would never allow it" 
(Respondent/27 1992).
Two user respondents pointed out that the municipal health authorities had to "swallow" the 
increasing influence of user representatives within the forum (Respondent/7 1992;
Respondent/15 1992). Two others, in contrast, had praised their precise and objective style in
conducting the meetings (Respondent/11 1992; Respondent/13 1992).
Seven respondents have compared the style of co-ordination of Olimpio Albrecht and 
Mario Dantas. They regarded the latter as more open to the involvement of user representatives 
in the commission (Respondent/4 1992; Respondent/7 1992; Respondent/8 1992;
Respondent/13 1992; Respondent/18 1992, Respondent/22 1992; Respondent/27 1992).
Nevertheless, five observed that he was a weak substitute, without the political strength to 
impose his own style over the work of the commission (Respondent/9 1992; Respondent/12 
1992; Respondent/13 1992; Respondent/16 1992; Respondent/27 1992). Although respondents 
acknowledged that their co-ordination styles were different, the strong political bonds between 
these two directors and the permanence of the same team of professionals in both periods 
allows these administrations to be considered jointly.
During 1988, 1989 and 1990, the Workers’ Party (PT) was in the municipal 
government in Porto Alegre. The sociologist Maria Luiza Jaeger was the first woman and the 
first non-medical doctor to be municipal secretary of health. Her ideas about health policies, 
and the planning and administration of health services were influenced mainly by the reformers 
of the Brazilian health system (Respondent/5 1992). She was an active member of this "policy
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community" of reformers. Between August 1986 and May 1987, she had participated in the 
national commission set up to produce a reform plan for the health system (ComissSo Nacional 
da Reforma Sanitaria). In this commission, she was the official representative of the trade union 
confederation CUT (Central Unica dos Trabalhadores), which had strong connections with the 
Workers’ Party (PT). This party, to which she was affiliated, supported a reform of the 
Brazilian health system based on state ownership of all health services or, at least, strict public 
control over them. They also defended immediate decentralisation of the health system, through 
municipalisation as well as the participation of user representatives in the decision-making 
process of municipal health commissions.
Graph 7.5 shows that nearly all the respondents thought that the municipal health 
authorities, during this period, had a strong or very strong interest in the participation of user 
representatives in the decision-making process of the municipal health commission. Graph 7.6 
demonstrates that there was no important difference between the distribution of answers of 
users and non-users. Nevertheless, many respondents criticised their initial style of co­
ordination. Some respondents maintained that municipal health authorities placed on the agenda 
of the forum too many small financial and administrative issues (Respondent/11 1992; 
Respondent/26 1992). A respondent observed that, as former members of the plenary, they did 
not know, at first, how to conduct the commission. At the same time, he pointed out that they 
suffered strong pressure from users to find solutions, since they were seen as former 
"companheiros" by user representatives (Respondent/12 1992). As a result, they brought up for 
discussion many issues whose solution did not depend on the forum or on the municipal health 
secretariat, generating frustration among participants (Respondent/7 1992; Respondent/25 
1992). A participant in the administration of the municipal secretariat at that period admitted 
that they had had a difficult start. She observed that many of the directors of the secretariat were 
professionals who had participated in the commission as representatives of trade unions or trade 
union confederations. They had to learn the new role as municipal health authorities. After the 
first year, it became easier, especially when the local commissions were consolidated and the 
public health professionals of the municipal health secretariat’s out-patient units became 
involved in promoting the participation of user representatives in local and in municipal health 
commissions (Respondent/5 1992).
Many respondents referred to the efforts of the municipal health authorities at 
decentralising the decision-making process through the support they gave to the organisation of 
local health commissions. They stimulated the participation of civil servants in local and 
municipal health commissions and helped to decentralise the process of decision-making,
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pressurising local commissions to discuss and to solve their problems locally (Respondent/27 
1992). Apparently, after the first half of 1990, the municipal health authorities managed to put 
together a strong interest in promoting the participation of user representatives in the decision­
making process of the commission and a proper strategy to implement it. As a representative of 
the state health secretariat affirmed, their interest had always been strong, but the strategy had 
changed (Respondent/26 1992).
7.6. Relationship between Public Health Professionals, Working at the 
Local Health Units, and Urban Social Movement Activists
As was seen in the last chapter, the public health professionals who worked in the 
municipal, state and federal out-patient units, spread over the territorial area of the city, could 
have influenced the involvement of users in the municipal health commission. They had, in 
particular, helped to organise local health commissions and to promote user participation in 
these decentralised participatory fora. Based on the descriptions presented in chapters five and 
six, it was possible to distinguish three distinct periods with regard to the relationship between 
public health professionals and activists of urban social movements in Porto Alegre.
In the first period, 1985 and 1986, only in district four was there a strong relationship 
between public health professionals working in local units and urban social movement activists. 
In 1980, in this region, the pre-existing interest of urban social movements in health issues 
(Respondent/8 1992, Respondent/15 1992) had benefited from the activism of some public 
health professionals, mainly those working in the out-patient health units of the state health 
secretariat. After that, this relationship was permanent and intense. In district two, from 1985, 
there was the mobilisation of some health professionals and of urban social movement leaders, 
when they created the local health commission of the district (Respondent/CLIS2 1993). Most 
of the health professionals, in this case, worked in the out-patient units of the programme of 
family medicine of the hospital Nossa Senhora da Concei^o. Nevertheless, the involvement of 
urban social movement leaders was not very intense.
The second period was between January 1987 and April 1990, when, in many areas 
of the city, there was a close relationship between public health professionals and activists of 
urban social movements. In this period, besides districts four and two, in districts three, five, 
six, nine and ten there was a close relationship. These public health professionals could work in 
the out-patient units of a programme of family medicine, as in districts two and five, or they
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could be federal, state or municipal civil servants, as in districts three, four, five, six, nine and 
ten.
In the third period, between May 1990 and December 1991, there was a close 
relationship between public health professionals and activists of urban social movements in all 
areas of the city except districts one and eleven. During this period, in contrast to the previous 
ones, there was a consistent municipal policy of stimulating the health professionals of the 
municipal health secretariat to enhance their relationship with the leaders of urban social 
movements. The main objective was to consolidate the local health commissions in regions of 
the city where these professionals worked. In 1987 and in 1989, the municipal health authorities 
had encouraged the public health professionals to approach urban social organisations in the 
area where they worked. These initiatives, however, lacked consistency and were not as 
systematic as they were after April of 1990.
7.7. Large and Local Organisations: the Trend towards 
Decentralisation of Urban Social Movements
Most users attending plenary meetings and most user representatives involved in the 
decision-making process of the commission came from local urban organisations. Nevertheless, 
between September 1985 and July 1988, many users came from large organisations 
representing urban organisations or trade unions.
Representatives of trade union confederations, particularly those representing the CUT 
(Central Unica dos Trabalhadores), were among the leading user representatives on the 
commission. According to many respondents, representatives of this confederation actively 
participated in the commission (Respondent/4 1992; Respondent/27 1992; Respondent/28 
1992). They had been present at nearly all the plenary meetings held between 12 May 1987 and 
15 December 1988 (CIMS 1987/1988, 12/5/87 to 15/12/88). During this period, they took part 
in the inspection commission and occasionally attended meetings of the co-ordinating 
committee and technical secretariat.
Even if the documentation and other participants in the commission maintained that 
they were intensely involved in the commission, there were eleven out of the 23 respondents 
who considered that this confederation did not participate or that it had a very low profile 
within the commission. Intriguingly, six out of these eleven respondents had spontaneously 
highlighted the fact that Ricardo Collar and Miriam Rosa, the two most frequent representatives 
of this confederation, had played a remarkable role in the consolidation of the commission,
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particularly due to their participation in the discussions about, and writing of, the internal 
regulations. These respondents thought that they represented a trade union of health 
professionals or the trade union of civil servants of the state health secretariat.
By 1988, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the department of health of the CUT was 
made up of health professionals representing trade unions of health workers and health 
professionals. Many respondents did not realise that these two health professionals were 
representatives of the trade union movement, because they had a "triple identity" as 
representatives. They were left wing reformers of the Brazilian health system, in terms of their 
opposition to the gradualist reforms of the federal government and their defence of State 
ownership of health services (Comiss2o Nacional da Reforma Sanit&ria/Emendas CUT, ABEN, 
CONAM, FNM 1989, 59-60). They were representatives of trade unions of health workers and 
health professionals. They represented the group of health professionals discussing health 
policies within the CUT in Rio Grande do Sul.
A participant in the municipal health commission was critical of this multiple identity, 
questioning whether they actually represented the interests of members of the trade union 
confederation.
"We identified people like them, we feel they were health professionals. Wherever you 
went you met the same person, with the same discourse, his discourse. He was the 
legal representative, there is no question about this, but there is a question about 
whether he was expressing his own thoughts or presenting the thoughts of those he 
represented" (Respondent/23 1992).
The legitimacy of any representative could be questioned because there was always 
uncertainty about the boundary between an individual’s personal views and the views of those 
s/he is supposed to represent. Substantive representation does not imply resemblance to average 
users or workers. It requires representatives whose better skills, if compared to those they 
represent, combined with their compatible political views, can be more effective in pursuing the 
interests of users or workers (Marmor 1983, 82). Nevertheless, due to the lack of widespread 
discussion of health issues within the confederation, these representatives were seen as 
defenders of their own ideas about reform rather than defenders of the confederation's plan. A 
health professional who took part in the department of health of the CUT, at that moment, 
acknowledged this and even questioned the lack of internal discussion in the confederation.
"For example, Miriam was CUT representative at CIMS. She was a health 
professional, she participated in the discussions of the department of health of CUT. 
There was a group of people trying to stimulate this discussion inside the CUT, but it 
was very difficult to promote this discussion inside the confederation as a whole. In 
some moments, during CUT congresses, the propositions of the department of health
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are presented. Nevertheless, I have never seen the directorate of the confederation 
treating health issues as a priority" (Respondent/17 1992).
Apparently, the main issue for the trade union movement was health and safety at work 
(Respondent/5 1992) and not the reform of the Brazilian health system or the increased 
participation of user representatives in municipal health commissions. As mentioned in chapters 
four and five, the most highly mobilised categories of workers usually have special insurance 
schemes or access to out-patient care provided by health maintenance organisations or by the 
firms where they work. Therefore, improvement in the quality of the health care provided or 
financed by governmental institutions, which was one of the main goals of the municipal health 
commissions, was not among the political priorities of the trade union movement leaders 
representing them.
This lack of interest on the part of the confederation in these issues might explain the 
complete withdrawal of the CUT representatives from the municipal health commission after 
1988. When the Workers’ Party (PT) took office in the city hall of Porto Alegre, most members 
of the department of health of the confederation became directors of the municipal health 
secretariat. As a consequence, the department of health of the CUT in Rio Grande do Sul was 
weakened by so many defections. Only in 1992, when the commission began to discuss issues 
related to health and safety at work, did representatives of trade union confederations return to 
the forum. Then they would represent trade unions of workers not involved in the health sector 
(Respondent/5 1992).
During 1988, other large organisations withdrew their representatives from the 
municipal commission. Such was the case of the Rio Grande do Sul Federation of Community 
and Neighbourhood Associations (FRACAB) and of the Federation of Rural Workers of Rio 
Grande do Sul (FETAG). These two federations left the municipal commission, during this 
year, to participate in the state health commission which had been opened to civil society 
participation by the SUDS programme. More important, however, was the defection of 
representatives of the Porto Alegre Union of Residential Associations (UAMPA).
Representatives of this organisation played a leading role among the users in the 
commission (Respondent/15 1992). Most of the users from large organisations (81 out of 183) 
attending the plenary meetings came from UAMPA. Many urban associations joined this 
organisation after its creation in 1983 (Baierle 1992, 163). It gradually became the authorised 
voice of urban social movements in the city. During this period, representatives of UAMPA 
were among the user leaders in the commission. Nevertheless, from 1988, its representatives 
gradually withdrew from the forum, signalling a change in the organisation of urban social
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movements in Porto Alegre. This change was characterised by a sharp reduction in the 
influence of UAMPA over urban social movements in Porto Alegre (Respondent/5 1992; 
Respondent/6 1992; Respondent/8 1992). In 1988, political cleavages culminated in the election 
of a new directorate through a divisive electoral process. This directorate did not seem to 
represent the interests of popular associations. On the one hand, partisan cleavages had 
hampered the ability of directors to promote joint action. On the other hand, the directors of 
UAMPA prioritised broader political issues, while grassroots associations demanded concrete 
solutions for local and specific problems (Baierle 1992, 172-5). Moreover, the general political 
climate had changed. Since the political liberalisation of the second half of the eighties, 
political parties would be concerned with broad political matters. In this new context, 
organisations, like UAMPA, lost their former broader political role and, sometimes, it was 
difficult to find a new one.
The crisis of UAMPA weakened its political role as the official "voice" of urban social 
movements (Baierle 1992, 170-97 ). The weakened UAMPA has affected the organisation of 
these movements, which from then on tended to become more decentralised and organised at 
the local or regional levels. Nevertheless, the decentralisation of the organisation of these 
movements seems to have already been under way, which could have undermined the basis of 
support of UAMPA (Respondent/5 1992; Respondent/8 1992). In any case, it is undeniable that, 
between August 1988 and August 1990, urban social movements in Porto Alegre tended to be 
organised on a decentralised basis. This change influenced the types of involvement users had 
in the municipal health commission, since the largest group of participants in the commission 
were users from urban social movements.
The consolidation of the decentralised basis of the urban social movement in Porto 
Alegre, however, took place after August 1990. The main means of this consolidation was the 
policy of the Participatory Budget promoted by the Workers’ Party’s government, which had 
been in office since 1989. As was seen in chapter six, this policy had its basis in the regional 
assemblies organised in nine areas of the city. The first time the policy was implemented, in 
1989, leaders of urban social organisations did not regard it as a permanent instrument of 
participatory administration. The second Participatory Budget, whose process was initiated in 
September 1990, indicated that the policy would be consistent. The Participatory Budget had 
helped to consolidate the regionalised organisation of the urban movement.
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7.8. Issues Discussed in Plenary Meetings
The types of issues placed on the agenda of the plenary meetings can be regarded both 
as an output of the work of the forum and as an element that could stimulate or inhibit the 
involvement of users in the commission. It is an output because it is the result of decisions 
previously made for placing such issues on the agenda of the plenary. It is an element that could 
promote or hamper the involvement of users because issues might or might not be of interest to 
users.
The issues on the agenda of plenary meetings were classified into seven groups: (1) 
Minor. This type of issue encompasses mainly the presentation of reports or of notes about 
events, programmes or conferences, related or not related to health issues. (2) National Health 
Policies. This classification includes discussions about national health policies and their 
relationship with the organisation of the state and municipal health services. (3) Labour. This 
comprises discussions, and sometimes the mediation, of issues related to employment relations 
in the health sector. (4) Local. This involves the discussion of issues related to local or 
individual problems, such as the transfer of, or need for, a professional, the lack of some 
specific medicine in a particular health unit or complaints about the ill or unlawful treatment of 
an individual user. (5) CIMS1 Regulations. This type includes all issues related to creating or 
changing the working rules of municipal or local health commissions. (6) Financial. This 
comprises all issues related to financial matters, such as routine appraisals of the destination 
and accounts of financial resources transferred from the social security system to the municipal 
health secretariat, and new modalities of transfer of these resources or the municipal budget. (7) 
Organisation of Health Services in Porto Alegre. This includes all issues related to the 
organisation of public health and health care services located in the city of Porto Alegre. These 
could be discussions about plans, programmes or projects that would affect the organisation of 
health care or public health and sanitation in the city or in large areas of the city. They could be 
issues related to licensing, closing or opening health services, as well as to issuing or cancelling 
contracts between the social security system and providers. They were primarily issues related 
to evaluating, controlling and changing health care or public health and sanitation in the city.
Graph 7.7 demonstrates that, during 1985, the most frequently discussed issues in 
plenary meetings were the regulations of the commission. Since the forum was initiating its 
activities, the participants in that year were trying to agree on basic rules to guide the work of 
the forum. The organisation of health services in Porto Alegre, which would dominate the 
agenda after then, was discussed in only 25 per cent (four out of sixteen) of meetings. In 1986,
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the organisation of health services in Porto Alegre was discussed in the majority of plenary 
meetings. It indicates that the forum started out to be mostly concerned with the provision of 
health care and sanitation in the city. During the second half of 1987, the issue most frequently 
discussed in plenary meetings was the commission’s regulations. It corresponds to the period 
when the internal regulations had been discussed and passed by the plenary. Excluding this 
atypical period, the organisation of health services in the city had been the issue most frequently 
on the agenda until the first half of 1989. In the second half of 1989, for the first time since the 
commission was created, financial matters were the most frequently discussed issues in plenary 
meetings. The high proportion of meetings discussing financial issues confirms the appraisal 
made by some respondents of interviews that, during this period, the forum’s agenda was 
overloaded with financial issues (Respondent/11 1992; Respondent/26 1992). Indicating a 
change in the way plenary meetings were run, the organisation of health services in Porto 
Alegre was the issue most frequently discussed in plenary meetings during the second half of 
1990. Financial matters were again the issue most frequently discussed in plenary meetings 
during the first half of 1991. However, as the commission had changed its method of discussion 
of financial matters, making them more concise (Respondent/26 1992), it is possible to suppose 
that, even when this issue was present on the majority of the agendas, the discussions would not 
take up much time. The organisation of health services in Porto Alegre was most frequently 
discussed in plenary meetings in the second half of 1991.
Hence, there were some types of issues that were frequently on the agenda of plenary 
meetings. These were issues related to: (1) the organisation of health services in Porto Alegre, 
discussed in 70 per cent (144) of the 207 plenary meetings in the period; (2) financial matters, 
discussed in 46 per cent (96) of meetings; and (3) the regulations of the workings of the 
commission, discussed in 40 per cent (82) of meetings. The third issue was frequently on the 
agenda in specific periods, when the commission was created, when the internal regulations 
were discussed and passed by the plenary, or when the plenary was discussing more intensely 
its working procedures, due to a decrease in the involvement of users in the commission. The 
predominance on the agenda of one or other groups of issues could have had an influence over 
the number of users attending plenary meetings as well as over the type of involvement of user 
representatives in the decision-making process of the commission. Further analysis of this point 
will be undertaken in the next chapter.
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Graph 7.7 - Issues Discussed in Plenary Meetings: Per cent of Meetings, During Each Six 
Month Period, by Different Types of Issues - Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
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SOURCE: Comissao Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre, "Atas de Reunides 
Plenarias" (Porto Alegre, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Serviso Social, CIMS, 1985/1991), 
typewritten.
7.9. Summing Up
The factors and actors that could have influenced user involvement in the municipal 
health commission of Porto Alegre were deeply interdependent. Looking at each actor and 
factor separately, however, enables the verification of the complexity of the relationships they 
established among them.
One factor was the cluster of policies and laws, during the period, that recommended 
or imposed the progressive institutionalisation of municipal participatory fora in the health 
sector, and extended the role of users within them. Nevertheless, the existence of strong urban 
social movements in Porto Alegre made feasible the consistent involvement of users in the 
commission. The dynamic of these movements, which by 1988 changed from a more centralised 
into a decentralised pattern of organisation, determined the growth in involvement of users from 
local organisations. Moreover, Brazilian health system reformers, particularly those working at 
the local level, together with the activists of the urban movements, had constructed a space for 
the mobilisation of users in local health commissions. This space was also strengthened by 
municipal policies that, from 1990 onwards, stimulated the local organisation of urban social
187
movements. From that time, local health commissions became the basis of the consistent 
involvement of users in the municipal health commission.
The position of health authorities on user participation or the forum’s work dynamic 
could have determined changes in user involvement. The actions of Brazilian health system 
reformers - as federal, state and municipal health authorities and as health professionals 
working at local levels - were constantly behind the political-institutional changes that would 
affect the involvement of users in policy formulation and in the politics of the health sector. 
Urban social movements could offer reformers political support to confront the resistance of 
social sectors to the reform. Simultaneously, urban social movement activists, seeking to extend 
their influence over the policy-making of health institutions, could have direct access to health 
authorities in the commission or could influence the decisions taken there.
With regard to the whole period, it was possible to distinguish variations in the major 
factors influencing user involvement that allowed them to be classified into three ordinal 
categories (displayed in Table 7.1, Introduction), each corresponding to a specific period of 
time. The institutional framework of the Brazilian health system has progressed towards 
policies or laws which have deepened the process of integration and decentralisation of the 
system. In the case of the federal, state and municipal health authorities, although there were 
peculiarities, the evolution is towards the increasing interest of these authorities in the 
involvement of users in the forum. However, the progression of the category does not mean 
evolution in time. For example, federal health authorities between 1985 and March 1988 
favoured user involvement in the commission, and in 1991 they did not. The relationship 
between public health professionals and activists of urban social movements progresses towards 
a close relationship in more areas of the city, which culminates in policies stimulating this. The 
organisation of urban social movements takes into account the evolution towards a more 
decentralised pattern of organisation, which also culminates in the Participatory Budget, which 
promoted an additional incentive for decentralisation. Many regular participants in the 
commission had highlighted the fact that the decrease in the involvement of users, especially 
during 1989 and 1990, was related to the overload of financial issues on the agenda. Because of 
this, in the case of issues discussed more frequently in plenary meetings, the progression is 
towards less frequency of discussion of financial issues and more frequent discussion of the 
organisation of health services in Porto Alegre.
In the next chapter, the major influences on the involvement of users will be correlated 
with the two indicator-variables described in chapter six: the number o f users attending plenary 
meetings and the types o f involvement o f user representatives in the decision-making process o f
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the commission. It will then be possible to verify whether the analysis of these factors could 
help to explain the types of involvement users have had in the municipal health commission of 
Porto Alegre between 1985 and 1991.
Chapter 8
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Explaining the Involvement of Users in the Municipal 
Health Commission of Porto Alegre
8.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the possible existence of linkages between user involvement, 
and the institutional-political factors that could have influenced this involvement, in the 
municipal health commission of Porto Alegre. The variations in the two main indicators of 
involvement - the number o f users attending plenary meetings and the types o f involvement o f 
user representatives in the decision-making process o f the commission - and variations in the 
behaviour of major factors that could influence user involvement are briefly summarised.
The most objective indicator of involvement is the attendance of users at plenary 
meetings, each meeting being regarded as a basic "case”. Hence, for each of the 207 plenary 
meetings, there is a particular register (category) which provides evidence for each indicator of 
the involvement of users and the behaviour of each factor or actor at that moment.
8.2. The Relationship Between User Involvement and the Factors that 
Influenced this Involvement
Taking into account the description of the dependent and independent variables, 
discussed in chapters six and seven, it is possible now to establish whether they are correlated. 
Before doing so, however, the behaviour of these variables, throughout the period, will be 
summarised into a number of categories to facilitate the verification of possible correlation 
among them.
The dependent variable, in this research, has two indicators, which could be treated as 
two variables themselves.
The first one, the number of users attending plenary meetings does not express, on 
its own, whether users had any political influence over the forum. Nevertheless, it is a very
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objective means of indicating whether users were involved at all in the activities of the forum, 
since it is used in combination with other types of evidence. The attendance of users at the 207 
plenary meetings of the period, had a significant (Sigf = .00) growth (r2 = .44) during the 
period. Nevertheless, this growth was not very regular, and there was one sub-period - between 
January 1989 and December 1990 - when the attendance did not increase.
The number of users attending meetings varied between none (zero) and 27. Aiming at 
verifying whether there is an association between this variable (attendance) and other variables, 
the observed count of users in each plenary meeting were distributed in bivariate Chi2 tables. 
All tables displayed many cells (varying between 81 and 90 per cent of cells) with an expected 
frequency of less than five, making the use of this test questionable. To overcome this 
difficulty, this continuous variable was transformed into a categorical ordinal one. The criterion 
used in this transformation was related to the number of existing health districts, since the 
majority of user participants came from local organisations in these districts. Three categories 
were created. (1) The first encompasses plenary meetings that had none (zero) to two users 
present, corresponding to a maximum potential presence of users from two out of the ten health 
districts. (2) The second category encompasses plenary meetings that had between three and 
seven users in attendance, corresponding to a maximum potential presence of users from seven 
out of the ten health districts. (3) The third category encompasses plenary meetings that had 
more than seven user participants, corresponding to a potential presence of users from at least 
eight out of the ten health districts. Once these three categories were constructed, it was 
possible to verify the relation of this indicator-variable to the other variables.
The second indicator of the dependent variable, the types of involvement of user 
representatives in the decision-making process of the commission, is not as objective as the 
first, but it can offer a substantive account of how user representatives were actually involved in 
the activities of the forum. As was explained in chapter six, there were four different phases of 
the involvement of user representatives in the decision-making process of the commission. 
These phases were defined taking into account the predominant type of involvement that user 
representatives had in the forum. Taking into account the literature on participation and a 
preliminary survey, this research originally assumed that these types could be: non­
participation, manipulation, delegation, negotiation and participation, as defined in chapter two. 
The types of involvement found were: (1) non-participation, between September 1985 and 12 
May 1987; (2) negotiation, between 12 May 1987 and December 1988; (3) 
delegation/participation, between January 1989 and November 1990; (4) participation 
between December 1990 and December 1991. Negotiation and participation are qualitatively
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distinct modalities of involvement of the user representatives. While the former implies that 
there was reasonably overt tension between the user representatives and the municipal health 
authorities, who were the co-ordinators of the forum, the latter indicates that they acted together 
harmoniously. Although this difference is highly relevant, it did not affect the intensity of 
involvement of user representatives. For instance, in both cases, they participated in agenda 
formation. Thus these two types of user representative involvement were collapsed into one 
single category to make it easier to verify whether it was related to other variables. Hence, the 
three categories of the variable user representative involvement in the decision-making process 
of the forum, when verifying its possible association with other variables, were: (1) non­
participation, (2) delegation/participation and (3) negotiation or participation. These 
categories are qualitatively distinct, but there was an order between them, regarding the 
intensification of the involvement of the user representatives in the decision-making process.
These two "indicator-variables” of the dependent variable user involvement in the 
decision-making process should have a relationship between them. Most user representatives 
were activists of trade union or of urban social movements. They could represent large 
organisations of these movements or, more frequently, local organisations of the urban social 
movements. In any case, if they were more intensely involved in the decision-making process of 
the forum, they would influence the membership of their organisations to participate in the open 
decision-making division of the commission: the plenary. The opposite would be also true: if 
they were less involved in the decision-making process, they would not stimulate members of 
their organisations to come to plenary meetings. As can be seen in Table 8.1, this assumption 
was confirmed, since there is a strong positive association between the two variables (Somers' 
D with Attendance dependent = .726).
Table 8.1 - Attendance of Users at Plenary Meetings by Types of User Representatives’ 
Involvement in the Decision-Making Process - Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
Users’ Attendance at Plenary Meetings
(1) (2) (3)
Meetings with Meetings with Meetings with
0-2 users 3-7 users 8-more users
N N N
(%) (%) (%)
User Representatives’ 
Participation in the Decision- 
Making Process
(1) Non Participation 67 12 2
Chi1 Pearsons = 153.746 
4DF Sig -  .000
(82.7) (14.8) (2.5) Cramer's V * .612
2) Delegation-Participation S 27 17
Approx Sig * .000
( 10 .2 ) (55.1) (34.7) Gamma ■ .895
(3) Negotiation or 2 18 55 Somer's d  with ATTENDANCE
Participation (2.7) (24) (73.3) dependent -  .726
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The independent variables in this research are those described in chapter seven. These 
variables are related to each other, particularly those that are strongly associated with the 
indicator-variables of users’ involvement in the commission. They are treated as independent 
variables, however, to highlight the strength of the association of each of them with this 
involvement.
The first independent variable is the institutional framework of the Brazilian health 
system. This represents the complex of programmes, policies and laws that created and 
consolidated the municipal health commissions in Brazil. The existence of these commissions, 
their role within the health system, and who would be their members were defined by this 
cluster of policy and legal provisions, which would strongly influence the possibilities of long 
run involvement of users in these commissions. As was analysed in chapter four, since the 
beginning of the eighties, the Brazilian health system has been restructured. There were three 
institutional landmarks of the changes. (1) The first was the programme AcOes Integradas de 
Saude of 1984, which created the municipal health forum and stimulated the integration of the 
governmental agencies responsible for public health and health care provision. This programme 
transferred financial resources from the social security system to the state and municipal health 
secretariats. (2) The second was the programme Sistemas Unificados Descentralisados de 
Saude of 1987, which transferred to states the structure, financial resources and functions of the 
INAMPS. The programme universalised access to health care and established that there should 
be further transfer of state and federal services and administrative bodies to municipalities. It 
also encouraged municipal health commissions to participate in the planning and management 
of the new system. (3) The third landmark of this reform was the health laws - Leis do Sistema 
Unico de Saude - passed by the Brazilian Congress by the end of 1990, which would regulate 
the health system created by the new Brazilian Constitution set up in 1988. The new laws 
reinforced the principles of integration, decentralisation and universal right to health care, 
empowering the municipal fora which would have planning and supervisory powers over the 
municipal health services. The municipal commission would become institutionalised municipal 
councils regulated by federal, state and municipal laws. They would become an institutionalised 
part of the structure of municipal government as well as of the organisation of the national 
health care system. Each new landmark or category represents progress towards the level of 
integration and of decentralisation of the Brazilian health system. It also implies further 
possibilities of the involvement of users in the municipal health commissions.
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The changes to the institutional framework were responsible for the very existence of 
the forum, as well as for its general "shape” and role within the system. The next two variables 
determined whether there was "someone" to participate and how this political actor would 
participate in the commission and not somewhere else.
The first variable is the organisation of urban social movements. To maintain the 
involvement of user representatives on a sustained basis there should be organisations behind 
them providing expertise and resources to make their participation consistent. Large Brazilian 
cities, such as Porto Alegre, did have civil society organisations, mainly from trade union and 
urban social movements, whose structure could sustain such participation. The trade union 
movement was better structured than urban social movements. Members of the most active 
trade unions, however, had access to health care provided through special arrangements, 
reducing, therefore, the interest of the membership and of the leaders in getting involved in 
municipal health commissions. Their traditional areas of concern had been wages and, since the 
seventies, issues related to health and safety at work and not to the provision of health care 
(Respondent/5 1992). On the contrary, members of organisations of urban social movements - 
residential, community or neighbourhood associations and the confederations representing them 
- had no access to services other than those provided by the public sector. Since 1987, when the 
SUDS programme was set up, all citizens had access to health care provided by the INAMPS. 
The extension of health care coverage by social security to populations traditionally excluded 
could have stimulated the organisations that represented their interest, which were the 
organisations of urban social movements, to become involved in the participatory fora of the 
health sector. In fact, user representatives from organisations of urban social movements had 
been involved in the decision-making process of the commission and 86 per cent (1,077 out of 
1,251) of the users attending plenary meetings, between 1985 and 1991, came from this type of 
organisation. Because of this, urban social movements in Porto Alegre did influence the way in 
which users would be involved in the commission.
During the first half of the eighties, there was a tendency towards centralisation of the 
organisation of these movements. An expression of this tendency was the creation, in 1983, of 
the Porto Alegre Union of Residential Associations (UAMPA) (Baierle 1992, 54). In 1988, the 
organisation of urban social movements was becoming more decentralised (Respondent/5 1992, 
Respondent/8 1992). In addition, or reflecting that, in July 1988 the UAMPA went through 
successive political crises related to partisan disputes, which culminated in a divisive electoral 
battle for the directorate of this organisation. After this election, this central organisation lost 
influence among the urban social movements. The weakened UAMPA illustrates, and possibly
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influenced, the inversion of the tendency reflected in the types of users attending plenary 
meetings. As was seen in chapter six, the tendency of urban social movements to rely less on 
central organisations was further stimulated by the Participatory Budget implemented by the 
municipal government, after 1989, when the Workers’ Party (PT) took office.
Hence, regarding this tendency towards the decentralisation of the organisation of the 
urban social movements in Porto Alegre, three categories were created. (1) The first one 
corresponds to the period when this organisation was tending towards centralisation, between 
1985 and July 1988. The last date refers to the election of the directorate of the UAMPA, which 
is usually regarded as an important causal factor in the decrease of the centralised organisation 
of the urban social movements of Porto Alegre. (2) The second, between August 1988 and 
September 1990, corresponded to a period when the organisation of the urban social 
movements was tending towards decentralisation, but there were no consistent governmental 
policies stimulating or hindering this trend. (3) The third category is applied to the period when 
the organisation of the urban social movements was tending towards decentralisation, with 
the additional influence of a consistent municipal policy stimulating it. Although the 
Participatory Budget had been in force since 1989, urban social movement activists became 
convinced that it was a permanent policy during its second period, which began in September 
1990.
The institutional framework created the forum and defined its working rules. The 
organisation of the urban social movements could have been responsible for "creating" a social 
actor able to become involved in the activities of the forum. Nevertheless, this potential ability 
could have been channelled to areas other than health. If issues related to health care had 
become a major concern for the activists of these movements, they could have chosen other 
forms of political action in which to be involved than in the activities of the municipal and local 
health commissions. They could have promoted direct action to pressure governments into 
agreeing with their demands, as they did many times. Nevertheless, the question to be asked is 
not only how health became one of the most mobilised areas for urban social movements in 
Porto Alegre, but also how the municipal and local health commissions became the major 
channels for this mobilisation. The forum was open to civil society participation. The strength 
of the urban social movements in Porto Alegre made it feasible for users to participate in this 
forum. There were, however, the direct actions of public health professionals. These 
professionals, especially at the local level, helped to promote the participation of the urban 
social movement activists in local and municipal health commissions.
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The third variable is, therefore, the relationship between public health professionals 
working at the local level, and urban social movement activists. This relationship can help 
to explain how the political actors "users", mainly through their representatives, would channel 
their demands in the health sector to the municipal and local health commissions. As was 
described in chapter six, this relationship had an important role in consolidating these 
commissions, particularly the local ones.
This variable expresses, at the local level, the influence which the "policy community" 
of the Brazilian health system reformers had over the involvement of users in the municipal 
health commission. It is an important but limited expression of the action of this social actor, 
who was constantly behind other actors or promoting political-institutional changes that would 
affect this involvement. This "policy community", however, cannot be identified as a formal 
actor in the municipal health forum. As was highlighted in chapter three, there were covert 
political alliances and confrontations that occurred within and around the formal spaces of 
policy making. The main actors involved in deciding policies can be other than leaders of 
interest groups or officials acting formally in the forum. This "policy community", in all its 
factions, sought informal alliances with the leaders of urban social movements, in order to 
enlarge the social basis of support for the reform. They defended user participation in the 
decision-making process in the health sector as a principle. Nevertheless, the participation of 
these leaders could offer them the necessary political support to confront social sectors resistant 
to the reform. They could have an advantage when competing for financial resources with other 
policy areas within the government.
In a type of corporatist arrangement there were advantages for both actors: Brazilian 
health system reformers and urban social movement leaders. Reformers were interested in 
obtaining support for the reform of the system, as well as in maximising the budget and sphere 
of influence of their agencies. Leaders of urban social movements were interested in improving 
the quality of health care and in making it really accessible to members of their organisations. 
They were also looking for the expansion of their influence over the members of their 
organisations. The regular participation in local and municipal health commissions opened, to 
these leaders, formal and informal channels to influence the policy-making of health 
institutions. It made accessible to them services that would otherwise be only formally 
available. The connections established through the commission with health authorities, could 
not only benefit them personally but also the members of their organisations.
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The construction of this variable allows an explanation of how the Brazilian health 
system reformers - in the case of public health professionals working at the local level - could 
establish in Porto Alegre a strong relationship with activists of urban social movements. The 
health professionals, working at the local level, together with the urban social movement 
activists made the local health commissions the basis of the consistent involvement of users in 
the municipal health commission.
Until 1986, some public health professionals, most of them working at the out-patient 
units of the state health secretariat located in health district four, had established a close 
relationship with the organisations of urban social movements of the region. Only in 1987 did 
public health professionals and urban social movement activists begin also to work together in 
other health districts. This was the case in health districts two, five, six, nine and ten. 
Nevertheless, between January 1987 and April 1990, districts four, two and five seemed to have 
had the best organised local health commissions, where the relationship between these two 
actors was strongest. From May 1990, the municipal health authorities had strongly stimulated 
the public health professionals who worked at the municipal health secretariat to become 
involved in local and municipal health commissions. From that time, in nearly all the health 
districts of Porto Alegre, there was a strong relationship between the public health 
professionals, working at local units, and the urban social movement activists. Hence, this 
relationship, regarding the increasing bonds between these two social actors, can be classified 
into the following three categories: (1) when there was a close relationship in a few regions of 
the city, (2) when there was a close relationship in many regions of the city, and (3) when 
there was a close relationship in many regions of the city and a municipal policy 
stimulating this.
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 demonstrate that there is a strong positive association between the 
three variables described above and the dependent indicator-variables. The institutional 
framework of the Brazilian health system had the strongest association, being the most 
influential variable among all the others (Somers' D with Attendance dependent = .750; Somers' 
D with URP dependent = .823). The other two, the relationship between public health 
professionals working at the local level, and urban social movement activists and the 
organisation of urban social movements, were respectively the second (Somers' D with 
Attendance dependent = .641; Somers' D with URP dependent = .691) and the third (Somers' D 
with Attendance dependent = .582; Somers' D with URP dependent = .561) strongest influence 
on the two dependent indicator-variables.
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Table 8.2 - Attendance of Users at Plenary Meetings by Variables that Could 
Affect Attendance - Porto Alegre - 1985/1991
Attendance of Users at Plenary Meetings
Institutional Framework of 
the Brazilian Health System
(1) (2) (3)
Meetings with Meetings with Meetings with
0-2 users 3-7 users 8-more users
N N N
(%) (%) (%)
(1) Af5es Integradas de 
Saude(AIS)
(2) Sistemas Unificados 
Descentralizados de Saude 
(SUDS)
(3) Leis do Sistema Unico 
de Saude
Relationship Between 
Public Health Professionals, 
Working at Local Level, 
and Urban Social 
Movement Activists
(1) Close in a few regions 
of the city
(2) Close in many regions 
of the city
(3) Close in many regions 
of the city combined with 
stimulus of municipal 
policy
Organisation of Urban 
Social Movements
(1) Tending towards 
centralisation
(2) Tending towards 
decentralisation
(3) Tending towards 
decentralisation with 
Participatory Budget
68 16 4 Chi2 Pearsons = 145.661
(77.3) (18.2) (4.5) 4DF Sig * .000 
Cramer's V * .596
6 40 44 Approx Sig = .000
(6.7) (44.4) (48.9)
Gamma * .936 
Somer's d with ATTENDANCE
0 1 26 dependent -  .750
(0 ) (3.7) (96.3)
Chi2 Pearsons = 111.145 
4 DF Sig = .000
55 9 1
(84.6) (13.8) (1-5) Cramer's V ».520 
Approx Sig “ .000
19 36 42 Gamma «.851
(19.9) (37.1) (43.3)
Somer's d with ATTENDANCE
0 12 31 dependent ■ .641
(0 ) (27.9) (72.1)
69 26 22 Chi2 Pearsons ■ 82.970
(59) (2 2 .2 ) (18.8) 4 DF Sig = .000 
Cramer's V ■ .449
5 25 24 Approx Sig * .000
(9.3) (46.3) (44.4)
Gamma ■ .780
0 6 28 Somer's d with ATTENDANCE
(0 ) (17.6) (82.4) dependent = .582
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Table 8.3 - Types of User Representative Involvement in the Decision-Making 
Process by Variables that Could Affect this Involvement - Porto Alegre - CIMS
1985/1991
Institutional Framework of 
the Brazilian Health System
User Representatives* Participation in the Decision-Making Process
(1) (2) (3)
Non Delegation- Negotiation
Participation Participation or
Participation
N N
(%) (%) N
 (%)_____________________________
(1) AfOes Integradas de 82 0 7 Chi* Pearsons * 224.479
Saude (AIS) (92.1) (0) (7.9) 4 DF Sig * .000
Cramer’s V -  .736
(2) Sistemas Unificados 0 50 41 Approx Sig 31.000
Descentralizados de Saude (0) (54.9) (45.1)
(SUDS) Gamma * .938
(3) Leis do Sistema Unico 0 0 27 Somer's d with URP
de Saude (0) (0) (100) dependent 3  .823
Relationship Between 
Public Health Professionals, 
Working at Local Level, 
and Urban Social 
Movement Activists
(1) Close in a few regions 
of the city
(2) Close in many regions 
of the city
(3) Close in many regions 
of the city combined with 
stimulus of municipal 
policy
Organisation of Urban 
Social Movements
66 0 0
(100) (0) (0) Chi* Pearsons - 192.197 
4 DF Sig ® .000
16 36 46 Cramer's V * .681
(16.3) (36.7) (46.9) Approx Sig 3 .000 
Gamma 3 .879
0 14 29
(0) (32.6) (67.4) Somer's d with URP
dependent 3  .691
(1) Tending towards 
centralisation
(2) Tending towards 
decentralisation
(3) Tending towards 
decentralisation with 
Participatory Budget
82 0 36 Chi1 Pearsons 3 153.398
(69.5) (0) (30.5) 4 DF Sig3 .000
Cramer's V 3 .608
0 45 10 Approx Sig 3 .000
(0) (81.8) (18.2)
Gamma 3 .666
0 5 29 Somer's d with URP
(0) (14.7) (85.3) dependent3 .561
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Beyond these variables, there are four others that have influenced the involvement of 
users in the commission, although in a less decisive way,. Among those, the most influential 
was the position of municipal health authorities on this involvement. The interest of these 
authorities could be classified into three ascending categories. (1) The first category is non­
interest in the involvement of users. The municipal health authorities in office during 1985 
could be classified as not interested in this involvement both because of the political position of 
these authorities, identified with the political party supporting the authoritarian regime, and 
because then the very idea of a participatory forum was a novelty for the majority of the 
managers of the Brazilian health services. (2) The second category is interest in consultative 
participation. Municipal health authorities, during 1986, 1987 and 1988, can be classified 
within this category. Although in this period there were three different municipal secretaries of 
health, they all had in common an identification with the central left Democratic Labour Party 
(PDT). They stimulated the involvement of users in the municipal health commission, but they 
considered that user representatives should only have a consultative role in the municipal health 
commission. (3) The third category is interest in participation of user representatives in the 
decision-making process. Between 1989 and 1991, municipal health authorities in office 
supported the Workers’ Party (PT). These authorities had shown an interest in stimulating the 
participation of user representatives in the decision-making process of the commission.
As can be observed in Tables 8.4 and 8.5, the position of the municipal health 
authorities on this participation had a moderate to strong positive association with both 
indicator-variables (Attendance: Somer’s d  = .516; URP: Somefs d  = .409).
The other variable is issues most frequently discussed in plenary meetings. As was 
seen in chapter six, the agendas of plenary meetings were decided by their main actors, 
particularly by the municipal health authorities, the co-ordinators of the forum. Nevertheless, in 
some periods, user representatives took part in the setting of the agenda. The agenda of a 
plenary meeting can be seen as an outcome of the work dynamic of the commission. It can also 
be seen as a factor influencing the involvement of users in the forum, since users can have a 
variable interest in issues discussed there. Some regular participants in the commission had 
pointed out in particular the overloading of financial issues on the agenda, which could lead to 
the reduction of the involvement of users in the commission (Respondent/11 1992; 
Respondent/26 1992).
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Graph 8.1 shows the three issues most frequently discussed in plenary meetings. They 
were issues related to the organisation of health services in Porto Alegre, to the financing of 
health services and to the regulations of the commission. The categories were constructed 
taking into account the combination of the two most commonly discussed items, which were the 
organisation o f health services in Porto Alegre and financial issues. (1) The first category is 
applied to periods of six months when there were more meetings discussing financial issues 
than meetings discussing the organisation o f health services. This was the case, for example, in 
1985 and the second half of 1989. (2) The second category is applied to periods of six months 
when there was a similar proportion of plenary meetings discussing both issues. This was the 
case, for instance, in the first half of 1986 and in the first half of 1990. (3) The third category 
corresponds to the periods of six months when there were more meetings discussing the 
organisation of health services in Porto Alegre than meetings discussing financial issues, as 
in 1988 and the second half of 1991.
Graph 8.1 - Types of Issues Most Frequently Discussed in Plenary Meetings - Porto
Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
Financial  CIMS Reflations PA Health Servs' Organ
Period
SOURCE: ComissSo Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre, "Atas de ReuniOes 
Plen&rias" (Porto Alegre, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi5o Social, CIMS, 1985/1991), 
typewritten.
201
The predominance of financial issues on the agenda would result in less attractive 
meetings, from the users’ point of view. A higher frequency of discussions about the 
organisation of health services would make the meetings more attractive. Tables 8.4 and 8.5 
demonstrate that the association between this variable and the two dependent indicators- 
variables is weak to moderate (Attendance: Somer's d  = .283, URP: Somer’s d  = .273), although 
very significant (Sig = .000).
This variable seems to have had a particular influence on the decrease, or slower 
growth, in the attendance of users at plenary meetings and the reduction of the involvement of 
users in the decision-making process of the commission, during 1989 and 1990. Nevertheless, 
during the first half of 1991, there were more meetings discussing financial issues than there 
were meetings discussing the organisation of health services in Porto Alegre, and a growing 
number of users was attending plenary meetings and user representatives were actively 
participating in the decision-making process of the commission. As a participant of the forum 
affirmed (Respondent/26 1992), during 1990, financial issues were still discussed in most 
plenary meetings, but the method of discussion had changed. Details would be discussed by the 
technical secretariat.
Another variable is the position of state health authorities on the involvement of 
users in the commission. The three categories presented below summarise their position on the 
issue.
(1) The first category is non interest on the involvement of user representatives in the 
commission. This corresponds to the three last months of 1991, when the state health authorities 
withdrew their representatives from the forum. This was due to partisan disputes between the 
state health authorities, identified with the Democratic Labour Party (PDT), and the municipal 
health authorities, who were supporters of the Workers’ Party (PT). It was also due to the 
political "style” of the state health authorities, whose populist tradition would lead them to 
avoid open political disputes in a public forum.
(2) The second category is interest in user involvement, but this involvement should 
not take place in overt public fora nor in Porto Alegre's commission. The first period that 
this category is applied to was between 1985 and 1986, when state health authorities, although 
not against user participation, neither promoted the consolidation of institutionalised 
participatory fora within the health sector, nor supported the idea of user representatives taking 
part in the decision-making process of the commission. They established good relationships
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with the leaders of urban social organisations. They seemed to be resistant to the consolidation 
of these fora, mainly because they were created and gradually institutionalised by policies they 
did not agree with. The second period was between 1987 and 1988. Then, the state health 
authorities, although strongly supporting the reform of the system, due to partisan disputes had 
an ambiguous position towards the consolidation of the forum. They were supporters of the 
central-left Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) and saw both the municipal 
health authorities and the leaders of the urban social movement as political rivals. 
Nevertheless, some of the directors of the state health secretariat, particularly those responsible 
for the management of health services in Porto Alegre, had a different understanding. They had 
actively supported the forum’s consolidation and the participation of user representatives in the 
decision-making process of the commission. Differences within the team of professionals 
controlling the state health secretariat have generated a dubious position regarding the issue.
(3) The third category was interest in participation of user representatives in the 
decision-making process. This corresponds to the first nine months of 1991, when the state 
health authorities, representing the newly elected Democratic Labour Party (PDT), had 
demonstrated a real interest in reinforcing the forum and in promoting the participation of user 
representatives in the decision-making process.
It was not possible to verify whether there is an association between this variable and 
the indicator-variables of the involvement of users in the commission. As can be seen in Tables 
8.4 and 8.5, the Chi2 tables (resultant of the attempt at association) had a high percentage of 
cells with an expected frequency of less than five (33 and 44 per cent). Nevertheless, the 
position of the state health authorities should have had a weak influence over the involvement 
of users in the commission, because most of the time, from 1985 to 1990, they had a neutral 
position. This long period of ambiguous support has probably neutralised the positive or 
negative impact which the position of these authorities would have had on the involvement of 
users in the commission.
The last variable to be associated with user involvement in the commission is the 
position of federal health authorities. The position of the federal health authorities on the 
issue can also be classified into three categories. (1) The first corresponds to the period 1990 
and 1991, when they were resistant to it. The government elected in 1989 was not committed 
to institutional democratisation. In practical terms, federal health authorities tried to hinder the 
process of decentralisation of the Brazilian health system and to avoid the institutionalisation of 
health participatory fora. Although these authorities did not seem to favour the reform of the
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system, the process was too advanced by then. Throughout the country, federal health services, 
especially units and hospitals of the former IN AMPS, were already under the management of 
state health secretariats. In places where health services had been municipalised, most of these 
services were under municipal administration. The decline of the direct influence of the federal 
health authorities on the commission is illustrated by the withdrawal, in 1989, of the direct 
representation of the federal health authorities on the commission. (2) The second category 
corresponds to the last eight months of 1988 and 1989, when the federal health authorities were 
indifferent to the issue. As described in chapter seven, the authorities directing the federal 
health services, during this period, were neither supporters of the reform of the Brazilian health 
system nor defenders of participatory mechanisms in the system. However, they did not seem to 
have the will or enough political strength to promote policies opposing it. (3) The third category 
corresponds to the period between September 1985 and April 1988, when federal health 
authorities had an interest in promoting user representatives' participation in the decision­
making process of the commission. During this period, reformers of the Brazilian health 
system were directing the INAMPS and the Ministry of Health. They initiated the process of 
reform that had stimulated the consolidation of participatory fora at the municipal, state and 
federal levels of government.
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 demonstrate that there was a strong negative relationship between 
the position of the federal health authorities on the involvement of users in the commission and 
the attendance of users at plenary meetings (Somer's d  with Attendance dependent = - .556) and 
types of user representatives' involvement in the decision-making process of the commission 
(Somer's d  with Attendance dependent = - .533). Nevertheless, it was not because greater 
interest by the federal health authorities in this involvement would provoke less involvement of 
users or vice versa. It was mainly because, when these authorities had a favourable position 
regarding the issue, the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre was initiating its 
activities. Then, the reform of the health system was beginning, and neither leaders of urban 
social movements nor public health professionals saw the forum as an important element of the 
health system. Furthermore, the municipal health authorities were not particularly interested in 
promoting the involvement of users in this forum. On the contrary, during 1990 and 1991, when 
the federal health authorities were not interested in promoting participatory policies, all the 
other influential factors and actors were favourable to the consolidation of the forum and to the 
involvement of users in the commission.
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Table 8.4 - Attendance of Users at Plenary Meetings by Variables that Could Affect
Attendance - Porto Alegre - CIMS -1985/1991
Attendance of Users at Plenary Meetings
(i) (2) (3)
Meetings Meetings Meetings
with with with
0-2 users 3-7 users 8-more
users
N N N
(%) (%) (%)
Position of Municipal Health 
Authorities on Users' Involvement
in Municipal Health Commission
Chi1 Pearsons 3 65.718
(1) Non interest in users’ 16 0 0 4 DF Sig 3 .000 
Cramer's V 3 .400
involvement (100) (0) (0)
(2) Interest in consultative 53 28 30 Approx Sig 3 .000
participation (47.7) (25.2) (27)
Gamma 3 .722
(3) Interest in user representatives’ 5 29 44
participation in decision-making (6.4) (37.2) (56.4) Somer's d with
process ATTENDANCE 
dependent3 .516
Issues Most Frequently Discussed
in Plenary Meetings
Chi1 Pearsons 3 18.883
(1) Financial 19 10 3 4 DF Sig3 .000 
Cramer's V 3 .215
(59.4) (31.3) (9.4)
(2) Similar proportion financial and 25 16 18 Approx Sig 3 .000
organisation health services (42.4) (27.1) (30.5)
Gamma 3 .416
(3) Organisation health services 30 31 53
(26.3) (27.2) (46.5) Somer's d with
ATTENDANCE 
dependent3 .283
Position of State Health Authorities 
on Users’ Involvement in 
Municipal Health Commission
(1) Non interest in users’ 
involvement
(2) Interest in user involvement, but 
not at CIMS or in Porto Alegre 
CIMS
(3) Interest in user representatives’ 
participation in decision-making 
process
Position of Federal Health 
Authorities on Users' Involvement 
in Municipal Health Commission
(1) Resistant to users’ involvement
(2) Indifferent to users’ 
involvement
(3) Interest in user representatives’ 
participation in decision-making 
process
0 0 8
(0) (0) (100)
74 56 48 33 % cells with Expected
(41.6) (31.5) (27.0) Frequency less than 5 
Gamma 3 .375
0 1 18
(0) (5.3) (94.7) Somer's d with 
ATTENDANCE dependent3 
.266
Chi1 Pearsons =79.160
2 15 32 4 DF Sig3 .000
(4.1) (30.6) (65.3)
Cramer's V 3 .439
3 18 25 Approx Sig 3 .000
(6.5) (39.1) (54.3)
Gamma 3 - .742
69 24 17
(62.7) (21.8) (15.5) Somer's d with
ATTENDANCE dependent1 
.556
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Table 8.5 - Types of User Representatives’ Involvement in the Decision-Making Process 
by Variables that Could Affect this Involvement - Porto Alegre - CIMS -1985/1991
Jser Representatives' Participation in the Decision-Making 
Process
(1) (2) (3)
Non
Participation
N
(%)
Delegation-
Participation
N
(%)
Negotiation or 
Participation
N
 29____
Position of Municipal Health 
Authorities on Users’ Involvement 
in Municipal Health Commission
(1) Non interest in users’ involvement
(2) Interest in consultative 
participation
(3) Interest in user representatives’ 
participation in decision-making 
process
Position of State Health Authorities 
on Users* Involvement in Municipal 
Health Commission
16 0 0 Chi1 Pearsons = 143.473
(100) (0) (0) 4 DF Sig = .000
65 0 46 Cramer's V * .590
(58.6) (0) (41.4) Approx Sig 3 .000
0 50 29 Gamma3 .512
(0) (63.3) (36.7)
Somer's d with URP 
dependent = .409
(1) Non interest in users’ 0 0 8
involvement (0) (0) (100)
44 % cells with Expected
(2) Interest in user involvement, but 81 50 48 Frequency less than 5
not at CIMS or in Porto Alegre 
CIMS
(45.3) (27.9) (26.8)
Gamma 3 .407
(3) Interest in user representatives’ 0 0 19
participation in decision- making 
process
(0) (0) (100) Somer's d with URP 
dependent3 .516
Issues Most Frequently Discussed in 
Plenary Meetings
(1) Financial
(2) Similar proportion financial and 
organisation health services
(3) Organisation health services
Position of Federal Health 
Authorities on Users’ Involvement 
in Municipal Health Commission
(1) Resistant to users’ involvement
(2) Indifferent to users’ involvement
(3) Interest in user representatives’ 
participation in decision-making 
process
16 16 0 Chi1 Pearsons 3 42.404
(50.0) (50.0) (0) 4 DF Sig3 .000
Cramer's V 3 .320
25 20 14 Approx Sig 3 .000
(42.4) (33.9) (23.7)
Gamma 3 .391
41 14 61
(35.3) (12.1) (52.6) Somer's d with URP
dependent ■ .273
Chi* Pearsons -  54.273
0 20 29 4DF Sig-.000
(0) (40.8) (59.2)
Cramer's V 3 .362
0 30 17 Approx Sig 3 .000
(0) (63.8) (36.2)
Gamma 3 - .657
81 0 29
(73.6) (0) (26.4) Somer's d with URP
dependent ■ - .533
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8.3. Summing Up
In summary, it is possible to state that the changes in the institutional framework of the 
Brazilian health system, over the past ten years, were strongly associated with variations in the 
attendance of users at plenary meetings and with variations in the types of user representatives’ 
involvement in the decision-making process of the forum. The perception that a reform was 
under way had probably encouraged political actors, users in particular, to participate in the 
municipal health forum and gradually increased their influence over the organisation of health 
services in Porto Alegre.
Changes in policies and in institutional organisation could not however guarantee that 
there were autonomous and independent user representatives able to become involved in the 
commission. These actors could be found in large Brazilian cities, where there were strong 
urban social movements and trade union movements. Trade unions, due to special arrangements 
between employers and employees, did not regard improvements in publicly financed health 
care as a priority. In Porto Alegre, the main representatives of the users were urban social 
movement leaders and activists. The organisation of these movements, from 1988 onwards, has 
tended towards decentralisation. Municipal policies, promoted by municipal health authorities 
and municipal officials, further stimulated the decentralised organisation of urban social 
movements in Porto Alegre. During 1990, the municipal health secretariat reinforced the 
consolidation of the local health commissions in the health districts, while the municipal 
government carried out the programme of the Participatory Budget. The latter was organised by 
regions of the city whose territorial limits were similar to the health districts, facilitating the 
integration and mutual reinforcement of both participatory local fora. The variation in the 
organisation of urban social movements was also strongly associated with variations in the 
involvement of users in the local health commissions and, through them, in the municipal health 
commission.
At the same time the, at first rare close, relationship between the public health 
professionals, working at the local level, and the urban social movement activists became a 
widespread feature of the health districts in Porto Alegre. By 1986, only in district four did 
these social actors enjoy a close relationship. In 1988, it could be found in other regions, such 
as district two and district five. From May 1990, however, there was a municipal health policy 
stimulating the articulation between municipal health secretariat civil servants and urban social 
movement activists. As the relationship between public health professionals working at the 
local level, and activists of urban social movements, grew closer, the involvement of users in 
the municipal health commission increased as well.
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The position of the municipal health authorities regarding the involvement of users in 
the commission was strongly to moderately associated with the level of users' involvement in 
the commission. Nevertheless, when these authorities had a strong interest in participation they 
also promoted policies stimulating the civil servants of the municipal health secretariat to 
promote the consolidation of the local health commissions. They had also supported the 
municipal programme of the Participatory Budget, which has helped to reinforce the 
organisation of urban social movements on a decentralised basis. Hence, beyond the influence 
of their own interest in the involvement of users, there was their indirect influence over the 
configuration of these other two variables.
Other factors and actors apparently did not have a strong influence over the 
involvement of users in the commission. The influence, which variations in types of interest 
that federal health authorities had in the participation of user representatives in the forum 
seemed to have, decreased as the process of decentralisation of the health system deepened. 
Nevertheless, it was due to mainly the initiative of the federal health authorities that the SUDS 
programme was launched. As has been seen, this programme was the major turning point 
towards a deep decentralisation of the system. Hence, especially between 1985 and the 
beginning of 1988, the political actions of the federal health authorities led to changes in the 
system that decisively affected the organisation of the municipal health forum. Since then, as 
the system has become more decentralised, the role of the state and municipal spheres of 
government have increased, at the same time as the political role of federal health authorities 
has decreased.
Especially since the SUDS programme was set up, in 1987, the state health authorities 
should have increased their influence over the municipal commission due to the decentralisation 
of the system. Nevertheless, between 1985 and 1990, the position that the state health 
authorities adopted towards this participatory forum was ambiguous. From 1987, the state 
health authorities had supported the Brazilian health system reform under way and, in 
particular, defended the participation of users in the decision-making process of the system. 
Partisan disputes, however, made the main directors of the state health secretariat resistant to 
the empowerment of the commission of Porto Alegre, even if some of these directors actively 
supported the commission. A regular participant in the commission has affirmed that the state 
health authorities, in this period, did not hinder but did not stimulate the involvement of users in 
the commission (Respondent/22 1992). Their ambiguity apparently had neutralised their 
influence over the involvement of users in the forum.
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The types of issues most frequently on the agenda, whether they were financial issues 
or the organisation of health services, had a significant but moderate influence over the 
involvement of users in the commission. Probably, the impact the types of issues had on this 
involvement was restricted to 1989 and 1990. The style of direction of the meetings, as well as 
the time spent discussing different types of issues, probably had more influence on the 
involvement of users than the mere presence of such issues on the agenda.
As was highlighted in chapter two, underneath the formal process of policy-making 
there were actors, alliances and confrontations that there were not easily identified. There was 
the case, for instance, of the relationship between public health professionals, working at local 
level, and activists of the urban social movement. It was just a dimension of the broader, if 
more diffuse, alliance between the Brazilian health system reformers and these activists. 
Looking at the case of the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre it is possible to identify 
these reformers who were behind many changes in the institutional framework of the health 
system, as well as assuming the role of several different actors. Alliances with user 
representatives established in the municipal health commissions could help to pressure central 
governments, at municipal, state and federal administrative levels to allocate more financial 
resources to the health sector. User representatives could also offer political support for the 
reform, counterbalancing the powerful resistance from private providers, the federal 
bureaucracy and medical professionals. At the same time, user representatives, when 
participating in the forum, could influence the definition of policies. They could also increase 
their prestige within their organisations through the connections established in the commission 
with health authorities. In particular the actions of the inspection commission empower them to 
demand for members of their organisations access to the otherwise inaccessible health services. 
A user representative has explained
"I said to Ricardo [deputy co-ordinator of CIMS during 1989-1992]: 'Even when I am 
not around participating in CIMS work, if there is any problem in my "vila", I take my 
identification card, as a member of the inspection commission of CIMS, go to the 
hospital and in seconds there is a bed available. (...) I  think I am not perpetrating any 
crime. Because unfortunately in our country, in our state it is like this. Through this 
identification I  can, I do... I f  you go and simply ask, you can fall asleep waiting" 
(Respondent/12 1992).
Users’ representatives, empowered as participants of the commission, could help users to obtain 
real access to health care. However, users who did not know these representatives or the work 
of the municipal commission still found it difficult to obtain access to services that in theory 
would be available to them. The reform of the health system did not make health care actually 
accessible to all Brazilians, but it has at least guaranteed them the right to it. It has empowered
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user leaders to represent the interests of social sectors traditionally excluded from the benefits 
of development, before health authorities and health care providers. Whether it could lead to a 
system were all people will in fact have access to health care of good quality, remains to be 
seen.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Recommendations
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the nature of user participation in the 
municipal health commission of Porto Alegre, Brazil. The main questions on which it focused 
are (1) how were users involved in the municipal health forum? and (2) what major factors have 
conditioned their involvement? The starting point for answering them was sought in the origins 
of the idea of participation as a policy issue. During the last two decades in developed 
countries, the institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms has been seen as a complement or 
as an alternative to traditional forms of political representation in liberal democracies. In 
developing countries, since the seventies, International Agencies have emphasised self reliance 
and popular or community participation as a means of achieving development. In the health 
field, since 1978, primary health care has been seen as the main strategy for improving health 
conditions both in developed and developing countries. One of the principles that this strategy 
promoted was community participation in the health sector.
Different participants can become involved in a participatory process and the “quality” 
of this process can have sharp variations. As can be seen in chapter two, the literature may refer 
to popular participation, community participation, consumer participation, citizen's 
participation and user participation. This research adopted the concept of user participation 
because it seemed to be the most relevant when the focus was on the involvement of substantive 
representatives of a particular group of health service users in a specific territorial area. Studies 
of participation have used different criteria to build up classifications that have helped in the 
analysis of participatory processes, identifying diverse degrees of participation. The 
classification this research utilises was a result of a compound of other typologies offered by 
the literature, which was built up considering the empirical case upon which it focused. Chapter 
two shows the typology adopted by this study, which uses the notions of non-participation, 
manipulation, negotiation, delegation and participation.
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Using two indicator-variables of users' involvement within the municipal health 
commission of Porto Alegre - the number and types o f users attending plenary meetings and the 
types o f involvement o f user representatives in the decision-making process - it is possible to 
affirm that, between 1985 and 1991, user involvement increased significantly. More users 
attended plenary meetings and user representatives intensified their involvement in the 
decision-making process. The majority of user representatives participating in the decision­
making divisions of the commission and attending plenary meetings came from local 
organisations. It was also possible to verify that these two indicator-variables were associated, 
showing that the number of users attending plenary meetings reflected the intensity of the 
involvement of user representatives in the decision-making process.
Regarding the types of involvement of user representatives in the decision-making 
process of the commission it was possible to distinguish four sub-periods. In the first, between 
September 1985 and December 1991, user representatives’ involvement in the commission can 
be classified as non-participation. Then, very few users attended plenary meetings, there were 
no internal regulations, co-ordinating committee or inspection commission.
In the second sub-period, between May 1987 and December 1989, user representatives 
were most of the time involved in a process of negotiation with the health authorities. They 
imposed their participation on reluctant health authorities. They obtained a formal majority on 
the working party that wrote the internal regulations and on the co-ordinating committee. The 
internal regulations came into force at the same time as the user representatives controlled who 
would be nominated to take part in the technical secretariat. They became exclusive members of 
the inspection commission although, at their discretion, health professionals could take part. In 
this sub-period, users regularly attended plenary meetings, in the majority of which there were 
eight or more users present.
In the third sub-period, users’ involvement in the commission decreased. This could be 
classified as something in between participation and delegation. Although the internal 
regulations were in force, user representatives seemed to have partially lost their impetus to 
participate. Representatives of local health commission four, which was the most active among 
the local commissions, had apparently delegated to municipal health authorities the right to 
decide on the issues discussed by the municipal commission. The co-ordinating committee did 
not meet during the first eleven months of 1990, and there were fewer users present at plenary 
meetings when compared with the previous sub-period. In most meetings, there were between 
three and seven users present.
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In the last sub-period, between December 1990 and December 1991, the involvement of 
users in the commission reached its climax, permitting it to be classified as participation. The 
internal regulations were followed and the co-ordinating committee worked regularly with the 
participation of user representatives. More users regularly attended plenary meetings than in 
any former sub-period. In 27 out of 29 meetings there were eight or more users present.
There are many factors that could have affected the participatory process. Given the 
case this research examined and its focus, the factors considered most influential in the 
participatory process of the Porto Alegre municipal health commission were: (1) recent changes 
in the institutional framework o f the Brazilian health system; (2,3,4) the position o f federal, 
state and municipal health authorities on user participation; (5) the relationship between public 
health professionals who worked at local health units, and urban social movement activists:; (6) 
the organisation o f urban social movements in the city; (7) the types o f agenda o f the 
commission.
Recent changes in the institutional framework of the Brazilian health system could be 
regarded as the most influential factor determining the nature of the participatory process taking 
place in Porto Alegre’s municipal health commission. It also had a decisive influence over all 
the other factors related to this process. These changes in the Brazilian health system, during 
the last decade, were amalgamated into a cluster of programmes, policies and legal provisions. 
The main turning point in these changes came between 1984 and 1990, when the programmes 
AIS and SUDS were set up and the health laws created and regulated the United Health 
System (SUS). These programmes and legal provisions were the cornerstone of an articulated 
policy that has made the Brazilian health system (1) better integrated, through the unification 
of the public health sub-sector (Ministry of Health, state and municipal health secretariats) and 
the social security sub-sector of health care (INAMPS’ own and contracted services); (2) more 
decentralised, devolving functions and transferring federal financial resources to state health 
secretariats, aiming at further devolution to municipal health secretariats; and (3) universalised, 
formally covering the entire Brazilian population.
In this context, during the second half of the eighties, the municipal sphere of 
government gradually became more important within the health system at the same time as 
municipal health commissions became a widespread feature of the system. These fora had 
planning and supervisory powers over the financial resources transferred from the federal to the 
municipal sphere of government. The municipalisation of health services would virtually place 
under their control those state and social security financial resources transferred to
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municipalities to run ex-state and ex-social social security health services, and to pay for social 
security contracted out private services. Municipal health commissions have been key elements 
in the reform of the Brazilian health system as municipal governments have gradually increased 
their planning and supervisory roles over health services located within their territorial 
jurisdiction. In large cities, due to the support of strong social and trade union movements, 
participatory schemes could achieve better results. This was the case in Porto Alegre.
Another very influential factor determining users’ involvement in the commission was 
the dynamic of urban social movements in Porto Alegre. During the second half of the eighties, 
this movement changed from a more centralised to a decentralised pattern of organisation, 
influencing the increased involvement in the commission of users from local organisations. 
These local organisations were local health commissions, mothers’ clubs, residential or 
community associations, among others. Another factor was the combined action of the Brazilian 
health system reformers working at the local level, and the urban social movement activists. 
The "policy community" of reformers - made up mainly of public health professionals and 
academics - was constantly behind other actors or promoting political-institutional changes that 
would affect the involvement of users in the policy formulation and politics of the health sector. 
These reformers defended user participation not only because they believed in democratising 
state organisations, but also because social movements could offer them the political support to 
challenge the resistance by those with vested interests to the reform and competing policy areas 
inside government.
Alongside this type of corporatist arrangement were urban social movement activists 
seeking to extend their influence over policy-making by health institutions. Direct access to 
health authorities in the commission could help these activists to exert pressure for 
improvements in the quality and accessibility of the health care provided for the poor 
populations they represented. As the Brazilian health system reformers acknowledged the 
legitimacy of their claims, these activists could reinforce their leading positions within their 
organisations. The process of the exclusion of the medical profession and private sector 
representatives from the decision-making divisions of the commission illustrates the results of 
this alliance. In this case, health authorities and other professionals defending the reform, in 
alliance with urban social movement activists, systematically excluded the medical profession 
and private sector representatives from the decision-making process of the commission. In 
protest against this strategy of exclusion, and against the reform with which they did not agree, 
in 1991 medical profession and private sector organisations formally withdrew their 
representatives from the commission. Nevertheless, as was mentioned before, their lack of
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influence over the participatory forum did not mean that they exercised little power over the 
decision-making processes in the health sector. It could mean, on the contrary, that they exerted 
their influence over policy formulation and implementation through concealed, privileged 
channels. In this case, even if they did not directly affect the degree of user participation in 
these fora, they could influence the formation of their agenda and contribute to determining the 
role of these fora within the health sector.
There were other factors that influenced the involvement of users in the commission, 
such as the position of the municipal, state and federal health authorities on user participation, 
and the forum’s work dynamic. The position of the municipal health authorities on user 
participation was a very influential factor because they were the co-ordinators of the forum and 
of the co-ordinating committee, exercising direct influence on the formation of the agenda and 
the overall functioning of the forum. The other factors, however, had apparently determined 
only short term changes in user involvement. The forum’s work dynamic could help to explain 
in particular why, in 1989 and 1990, there were fewer users attending plenary meetings and 
why, in 1990, the co-ordinating committee did not function.
Although this research has been concerned with the participatory process itself, it seems 
relevant to ask about the role of this participatory forum in the decision-making process of the 
health sector. If user representatives increased their involvement in the health commission, did 
this actually influence the decision-making process in the health sector? The delay in the 
municipalisation of health services in this city limited the power that the municipal health 
authorities had to extend the agenda of the commission. While the management of health 
services in the city was not under municipal control, the decision-making power of the 
commission itself would be limited; that is, increasing control over the forum did not 
necessarily signify greater control over health services in the city. Even taking into account the 
delays in the case of Porto Alegre and in other state capitals, a growing number of 
municipalities are taking control of health services in their territory. The growing number of 
municipalisations favoured the idea that, sooner or later, all cities would have most of their 
health services under municipal management. User organisations and other interest groups, 
aware of the inevitability of the devolution process, tended to renew their efforts to increase 
their influence over municipal councils.
However, the way municipalisation was carried out has lead to a fragmentation of 
public health services instead of an organised decentralisation. Policy recommendations state 
that federal financial resources should be distributed according to demographic,
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epidemiological or efficiency criteria. Instead, political affinities or rivalries among politicians 
at federal and municipal levels have sometimes determined the allocation of these resources. 
Often, the SUS has paid private providers and has transferred scarce financial resources for 
public health services and for public providers of health care. As a consequence, the 
municipalities had to finance the latter. Decentralisation can therefore have the perverse effect 
of accentuating regional inequalities in income distribution in Brazil, since richer cities would 
be more able to finance the health services, out-patient and hospital care provided by public 
services, while the poorer cities would be less able to do so.
The formal extension of universal health care coverage to all Brazilians, which started 
during the seventies and culminated with the SUDS decree in 1987, did not result in 
substantially improved access to health care. There was an expansion in primary health care 
units during the early eighties. Their capacity to resolve health problems, however, was very 
low, due mostly to the lack of financial and human resources. Hospital and out-patient services 
contracted by the social security system, which should have been providing free care for all, 
often compelled patients to pay illegal charges. In small and poor municipalities, the process of 
municipalisation, during the second half of the eighties, restricted instead of expanded the 
capacity of these services to resolve health problems. It has become popular among mayors to 
use SUS financial resources to buy ambulances to transport as many cases as possible to the 
already overloaded health services of large cities. Very complex services are constantly 
burdened with relatively simple cases restricting the access of those who really need to use 
them.
The sectors of the population which did not have access to special insurance 
arrangements, or which could not pay directly for health care, had no option but to rely on 
public services. Their potential interest in improving these services did not mean automatic 
participation in local and municipal health commissions. The role of the Brazilian health system 
reformers can help to explain the involvement of urban social movement activists in these fora. 
They stimulated user involvement when working as public health professionals in out-patient 
health units near Porto Alegre’s shantytowns or when, as federal, state or municipal health 
authorities, they favoured user involvement in participatory fora. In some areas in Porto Alegre, 
as in the case of district four, the already existing mobilisation around health issues was 
channelled to these fora. In other areas, such as district ten, where health issues were not 
regarded as a priority by urban social organisations, without the encouragement of public health 
professionals the involvement of urban social movement activists with health issues would
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probably have been less intense, and their political action would not necessarily have converged 
on these fora.
From 1989, when the Workers’ Party (PT) took office in the municipal government, 
local and municipal health commissions were further strengthened by the Participatory Budget 
implemented by the city hall of Porto Alegre. The regular activities of these participatory fora 
mutually reinforced each other. They consolidated spaces for the involvement of the 
representatives of civil society organisations in the decision-making process of the municipal 
government, as well as opening up this government to public scrutiny and increasing its 
accountability. These fora were run by municipal officials who had close political relations with 
urban social movement organisations. The policy of strengthening these participatory fora 
resulted in support for the municipal government. In the case of health commissions, the 
involvement of urban social movements in these fora resulted in political support for the 
Brazilian health system reformers, who were running the municipal health secretariat, against 
interest groups opposing the reform of the health system and against other governmental areas 
competing for financial resources. In the case of the Participatory Budget, urban social 
movements involved in the budgetary process offered precious political support to a 
government without a majority in the municipal legislative chamber.
Hence, on the one hand, the municipal health commission had limited influence over 
the health sector, due to delays in the municipalisation process and to the actual division of the 
health system into two tiers, which made only poorer population groups interested in 
influencing the decision-making of publicly financed health services. On the other hand, the 
urban poor living in large cities in Brazil, who since the seventies had had their interests 
represented through urban social movements, were stimulated by public health professionals to 
channel their health demands through the user representatives participating in the municipal and 
local health commissions. Taking this into account, is it accurate to question the very existence 
of a participatory experience in Latin America? Has it resulted in the mere manipulation of the 
poor by a national or local elite? The case being studied does not seem to confirm Ugalde’s 
claim that, in Latin America, experiences of participation in the health field inspired by primary 
health care principles have only contributed to the additional exploitation of the poor by 
extracting free labour, and contributing to their cultural deprivation and to political violence by 
the outing and suppression of leaders and the destruction of grassroots organisations (Ugalde 
1985,43). However, it is possible to question whether the municipal health fora in Brazil could 
be classified as participatory experiences inspired by primary health care principles. Although 
the primary health care approach formed part of the reform of the Brazilian health system, and
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thus was behind the creation of the first commissions, since their institutionalisation through the 
SUDS programme they bear more resemblance to statutory fora in liberal democracies than to 
“participatory experiences” inspired by these principles. It is interesting to observe that Stiefel 
and Pearse (1982, 156), at the beginning of the eighties, perceived, in contrast to Ugalde, that, 
despite widespread authoritarianism, there were in Latin America favourable conditions for the 
promotion of social movements and participation.
Grindle and Thomas (1991, 63) affirmed that, in developing countries, large 
proportions of the population - including urban shantytown residents - are not organised for 
sustained political activity. They also maintained that, in these countries, societal interests are 
often likely to be represented through informal processes rather than through more public forms 
of lobbying (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 63). In the case being studied, it is possible to affirm 
that organisations representing shantytown populations sustained enduring involvement of their 
representatives in the overt political spaces of the local and municipal health commissions. 
Clientelism and patronage still pervade relations between the government and interest groups in 
Brazil, especially in small cities, in rural areas and in less industrialised regions of the country. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, even if a participatory forum became central in the decision­
making process of a government, the sector in which it takes place cannot be central in 
government political strategy, as the health sector is usually not (Walt 1994, 86-8). The 
openness of participatory mechanisms within the government is often restricted to areas 
regarded as non strategic, such as those dealing with social policies. Even considering this, the 
case examined here indicates the gradual formation of an alternative type of political 
relationship in the health sector of a Brazilian urban centre, where the interests of the urban 
shantytowns residents are represented formally and publicly.
Grindle and Thomas (1991,32-4) linked the weakness of mechanisms for interest group 
representation in developing countries to the strong role policy communities would have in 
policy formulation and in reform implementation. In the case examined here, the policy 
community of the Brazilian health system reformers had a central role in attracting urban social 
movement activists to become involved in these formalised fora. They can be regarded as policy 
formulators as well as an active part of an alliance established between them and urban social 
movement activists. Nevertheless, instead of taking decisions through informal processes of 
consultation within a weakly organised civil society, they promote the normalisation of 
mechanisms of interest group representation in the health sector in Porto Alegre.
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Hence, we can question whether it is possible to affirm that user involvement in the 
municipal health commission of Porto Alegre could represent an auspicious sign for the 
consolidation of democracy in Brazil through the construction of channels for effective 
participation, which could articulate the political institutions and social demands of those 
previously excluded (Moists 1990,33). Democracy in this sense would imply the opening up of 
decision-making processes to political and social sectors traditionally excluded from the 
political process (O’Donnel 1988,43) and, moreover, in sharing in the benefits of development 
(Paul 1987, 3). With reference to this particular case, when user representatives increased their 
involvement in the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre, we must ask whether this 
would result in these representatives taking part in decisions about policies that could determine 
whether users would have access to better health care or would improve their health.
Firstly, the provision of health care is only a minor factor contributing to the social 
inequalities in Brazil and alone it would not improve the quality of life, or the health, of 
Brazilians living in poverty. Secondly, the participatory process in Porto Alegre’s health 
commission does not guarantee any reduction in inequalities in the health care provision for the 
different social sectors in Brazil as a whole. However, the consolidation of participatory fora 
can assist in the democratisation of Brazilian institutions, giving voice to social sectors 
traditionally excluded from the political system. The representatives of those having no option 
but to use publicly financed health care can, through these fora, obtain information and, at least 
partially, influence policy formulation and supervision of the quality of health care provision.
As was seen in chapters six, seven and eight, user representatives clearly aimed at 
exerting pressure for better care for those they represented. They imposed their participation 
upon the decision-making divisions of the commission and they insisted on participating in 
agenda formation because they wanted to influence the policies decided in this forum. Even if 
the major health service policies in Porto Alegre were not decided there, there were many other 
important issues being decided, and they had unprecedented power to influence them. This was 
the case, for instance, when they asked for, and obtained, the suspension of hospital contracts 
with the INAMPS, through the inspection commission, or when they pressured for, and 
obtained, the opening of emergency services in some areas of the city. As was explained above, 
increased participation does not necessarily mean the better health for the people, as it would 
depend on other factors. Neither does it imply, without other policy measures, the end of the 
division between the provision of better services for those who can afford to pay for them 
directly or through insurance arrangements, and the provision of poor quality care for those 
depending on publicly financed services. Nevertheless, as Hall (1994, 1805) pointed out, policy
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results are determined not only by structural and institutional factors, but also by involved 
groups developing their own socio-political strategies and organisational practices which may 
exert strong influence upon the course of events. Through their involvement in the commission, 
these representatives were increasing the responsiveness of publicly financed health services to 
the needs of users who, individually, lacked the political power to sustain their demands.
The focus of this research was on the participatory process itself and not on the effects 
of participation upon the quality of health provision. However, it would be interesting to 
examine whether increased user participation leads to improved access, improved health care or 
better health. The method used in this research to assess user involvement can be utilised in 
municipal or local health commissions, combined with the analysis of the impact of a successful 
participatory process on the quality of health care or on health indicators. One difficulty would 
be to identify and isolate other factors that could affect the quality of health care and health 
status. Another problem would be to assess the quality of health care, especially in Brazil where 
the data on health service provision are not reliable, and health indicators are calculated only 
for large regions and cities. Even considering these constraints, such a study could be carried 
out if adaptations were made taking into account the types of empirical data available and, for 
instance, improvements that were a direct result of the participatory process.
The “methodology” developed in this research for the assessment of user participation 
in statutory fora was based on the systematic analysis of meeting attendance lists, meeting 
minutes, interviews with regular participants in the forum, and other sources of information. 
The analysis combined these data to build up indicators of participation and of factors 
influencing the participatory process. The method, described in detail in Appendix I, uses two 
main sets of variables: (1) The first is concerned with the ways in which users participated in 
the commission. Two indicators were created to assess this participation: the attendance of 
users at weekly plenary meetings of the commission (the decision-making division of the 
forum) and the types of involvement of user representatives in the decision-making process. (2) 
The second set of variables refers to the factors that could have most influenced the 
participation of users. The method can be used in the analysis of other participatory processes 
taking place in statutory fora. In order to apply it, the main requisites are: the forum should 
have regular meetings, there should be minutes of meetings and lists of those attending 
meetings stating the institutions or organisations they came from. These sources of information 
help to construct the sets of dependent and independent variables, as well as to select who were 
the most frequent participants in the meetings to be interviewed about the participatory process.
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The results of this research, as it is a case study, cannot be generalised to other 
municipal health commissions in Brazil. Nevertheless, as was seen in chapter five, there are 
studies indicating that participatory patterns in municipal health commissions will vary 
according to the regions of the country and, mainly, according to the size of the cities (IBAM 
and others, 1991; IBAM and others, 1993; Carvalheiro and others 1992, 41-52, 95-133). An 
interesting line of investigation would be the application of the methodology developed in this 
research - or part of it, given possible restrictions in time or financial resources - to municipal 
health commissions in state capitals in other regions of the country. Another study using this 
method would be to analyse participatory processes within commissions in medium and small 
cities, or in small cities where levels of social activism vary.
Considering that policy makers in the Brazilian health sector intend to evaluate this 
central aspect of sectoral reform, that is, user involvement in the municipal health commission, 
the lines of research mentioned above could be developed in the future. Taking into account the 
particular case of the municipal health commission of Porto Alegre, and considering that health 
authorities have an interest in promoting user participation in the decision-making process of 
municipal health commissions, the analysis undertaken by this study suggests some 
recommendations.
Firstly, the commission’s work dynamic should be organised in order to leave to the 
decision-making divisions of commissions - the plenary and the co-ordinating committee - most 
policy decisions. Administrative matters should be dealt with by the health institutions and by 
the technical secretariat. The overload of administrative and financial details, instead of 
creating administrative openness to public scrutiny, could create interminable meetings where 
decisions related to the organisation of health services are hastily discussed during the 
remaining time.
Secondly, local health commissions should be consolidated in all areas of a city. A 
decentralised approach to participation encouraged enduring user participation and more 
homogeneous representation of user organisations from several areas of the city. Once local 
health commissions become the local planning and supervisory body in the region, the issues 
related to the organisation of health services in the whole city could occupy a central place on 
the agenda of the municipal health commission. The articulation between municipal and local 
health commissions could form the basis for implementing the health system reform ideal of 
organising a comprehensive network of health services in the city.
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Thirdly, the health authorities and user representatives in Porto Alegre should rethink 
their strategy of excluding the medical profession and private providers from the decision­
making divisions of the commission. As was seen, the absence of these social actors does not 
mean that they have less influence over health sector decision-making. On the contrary, it could 
mean the reinforcement of concealed channels of policy-making and the undermining of the 
health commission’s influence over the health sector. These important actors will seek other 
channels through which to make their demands upon policy makers, weakening the political 
strength of the commission within the sector.
The main policy recommendation is for the municipalisation of health services, that is 
for health care provision to be placed under the control of municipalities. While these services 
are under the management of several institutions, the real power of the municipal health 
commission, and thus of user representatives, over them will be restricted. However, the 
municipalisation of health services in this city, and increased user control over them alone will 
not guarantee better health care for users. It would be necessary first to reduce the 
fragmentation of the system, creating federal and state mechanisms for monitoring the system, 
along with other measures which are related to the overall organisation of the health system in 
Brazil.
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Appendix I
Methodology
1.1. Research Problem
1.1.1. Main Questions and Propositions
The main questions of this research are: (1) how were users involved in the municipal 
health forum ofPorto Alegre? and (2) what major factors have conditioned their involvement?
The research regarded as main indicators of involvement: the number and types o f users 
present at plenary meetings and the types o f user representatives' involvement in the 
commission's decision-making process. Chapter six shows that, given the statutory nature of the 
commission, it was possible to know the number and types of users attending plenary meetings, 
which offers a very precise but limited account of user involvement in the forum. Analysis of 
documents and interviews allows us to examine the way in which user representatives were 
involved in the commission. This second indicator is not as objective as the first, but it offers a 
substantive account of how user representatives were actually involved in the activities of the 
forum. As was explained in chapter two, this research uses the following typology for defining 
types o f user involvement: (1) Non-participation, (2) Manipulation, (3) Delegation, (4) 
Negotiation, (5) Participation.
The main research propositions were based on the assumption that some factors could 
have more influence on the involvement of users than others. The selection of major influences 
takes into account the suggestions of the literature on the subject, discussed in chapter three. It 
also considers the reality of the Brazilian health system and Porto Alegre’s political and social 
particularities, which are analysed in chapters four and five. As a result, this research considers
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as major factors influencing user involvement in the municipal health commission of Porto 
Alegre: (1) recent changes in the institutional framework o f the Brazilian health system; (2,3,4) 
the position o f federal, state and municipal health authorities on user participation; (5) the 
relationship between public health professionals, who worked at local health units, and 
activists o f urban social movements.; (6) the organisation o f urban social movements in the city\
(7) the types o f agenda o f the commission. The analysis of these factors throughout the period 
are discussed in chapter seven.
1.1.2. Population and Period
Municipal health commissions have been key elements of the reform of the Brazilian 
health system over the past thirteen years. Through this reform municipal health commissions 
have become a widespread institutional feature of the health system. They have gradually 
increased their planning and supervisory roles over health services located within their 
territorial jurisdiction. Participatory schemes of municipal health commissions can achieve 
better results in areas where they have the support of strong social and trade union movements. 
As was seen in chapter five, this is the case in the southern region of Brazil and, in particular, in 
Porto Alegre.
The study examines the workings o f the municipal health commission o f  Porto 
Alegpe, between 1985 and 1991. The commission was created in September 1985 (CIMS 
1985, 2/9). As the field work for this research was carried out during 1992, the period of study 
begins with the creation of the commission and ends in the year immediately before the field 
work.
1.2. Research Methods
1.2.1. Sources of Information
Literature, Statistical Reports and Documents
Information on the Brazilian economy, society and health sector were obtained from 
published and unpublished studies, statistical reports and documents. Unpublished documents 
were mainly obtained through a systematic search for studies on related subjects carried out 
from the last decade until 1992, which were listed by the main Brazilian research agencies. 
Lists of PhD and MS dissertations presented in the main Brazilian universities were also 
searched, aiming at selecting those related to the subject of study. These systematic searches 
resulted in a list of works, most of which could be obtained in the libraries of USP (University
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of S3o Paulo) and UNICAMP (University of Campinas). Other studies were obtained in the 
library of the Public Health School of Porto Alegre (Escola de Saude Publica da Secretaria de 
Saude e Meio Ambiente). This was especially so in the case of studies related to the 
involvement of urban social movements with health issues in Porto Alegre and to the public 
out-patient network in the city.
The census and the annual statistical reports (Anuirio Estatistico) of the FundafSo 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE 1941, 1951; FIBGE 1982, 1983, 1987, 
1989,1991,1993) also offered information related to the economy, society and health sector in 
Brazil. Research reports, particularly those carried out in collaboration with the Instituto 
Brasileiro de Administra^o Municipal (IBAM and others 1991, 1993), offered valuable 
information on the evolution and distribution throughout the country of municipal health fora. 
Documents such as laws, decrees, bills and plans were used together with the literature to 
obtain information on the economy, society and health sector in the country, as well as to define 
the main variables of the research.
Nevertheless, the minutes and attendance lists of (a) the plenary meetings (mainly), 
(b) the technical secretariat, (c) the co-ordinating committee and (d) the inspection commission 
were treated as central for: (1) the reconstruction of the way the forum worked throughout the 
period, (2) the reconstruction of the forum's agenda, (3) the verification of whether user 
representatives participated in agenda formation, and (4) the definition of dependent and 
independent variables. The documents related to local health commissions, which were found 
among the files of the municipal health commission, were used to reconstruct their history.
Interviews
Selecting Interviewees among Participants in the Municipal Health Commission
In trying to encompass most institutions and interest groups that were regularly 
involved in the activities of the municipal health commission, different types of respondents 
were interviewed. They were: (1) main directors of the municipal health secretariat, who had 
co-ordinated the commission; regular participants in the commission who represented: (2) users 
from local organisations; (3) users from trade unions excluding health sector workers; (4) users 
from trade union confederations; (5) health professionals or health workers; (6) private 
providers; (7) federal health authorities; (8) state health authorities; (9) other regular 
participants in the commission whose knowledge was referred to by other respondents; (10) 
participants in the commission who were well informed about local health commissions. As 
most of the respondents were prominent public figures in the Brazilian, Rio Grande do Sul or
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Porto Alegre political life, due to ethical reasons, their identity was not revealed. However, the 
list with the interviewees’ names, and the institutions they represented is available for those 
privately interested in obtaining further information about them.
(1) The main directors o f the municipal health secretariat, who had co-ordinated the 
commission from its creation until the end of 1991, were easily selected, because they led the 
municipal health secretariat in each period.
(1) Respondent/1: representing the municipal health secretariat in 1985;
(2) Respondent/2: representing the municipal health secretariat in 1986 and January 1987;
(3) Respondent/3: representing the municipal health secretariat in 1987 and in the first four 
months of 1988;
(4) Respondent/4: representing the municipal health secretariat in most of 1988; and
(5) Respondent/5: representing the municipal health secretariat in 1989 and 1992.
The selection of the other respondents was based on the assumption that those who 
most frequently participated in the plenary meetings were the most able to represent the views 
of their institutions or of their organisations about user participation taking place in the 
municipal health commission. A longer period of participation could enable them to compare 
the attitude of different social actors towards user involvement in the commission and the 
quality of this involvement itself. When the interviews were carried out in the second half of 
1992, the provisional assumption was that, as regards the types of user involvement in the 
forum, there were four sub-periods: 1985/1986, 1987/1988, 1989 and 1990/1991. The 
interviewees should be those present at plenary meetings in as many sub-periods as possible. 
Considering these two criteria together - frequency at as many meetings as possible during as 
many sub-periods as possible - the attendance lists of plenary meetings were systematically 
examined. This examination have permitted the identification of respondents to be interviewed.
(2) Considering the subject of this research, it seemed important to know the opinion of 
user representatives about their own involvement in the forum. As was seen in chapters six and 
eight, there were more users from urban social organisations in plenary meetings than there 
were other types of users. At the same time, these organisations’ representatives were more 
actively and consistently involved in the activities of the commission than were other types of 
user representatives. The idea was to interview more user representatives than any other type of 
representatives, and those users from urban social organisations should make up the majority of 
the user respondents. There were, however, so many users from urban social organisations who
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had been present at several plenary meetings that it was necessary to use an additional criterion 
for selection. That is, user representatives from local organisations to be interviewed were those 
present in three or four sub-periods, attending at least two meetings in each of these three or 
four sub-periods (1985/1986, 1987/1988, 1989 and 1990/1991). Among 31 reasonably regular 
user participants, 8 (25 per cent) were selected using this criterion. User respondents from 
urban social organisations were:
(1) Respondent/6: representative of Porto Alegre Union of Residential Associations (UAMPA);
(2) Respondent/7: user representative of health district four;
(3) Respondent/8: user representative of health district four;
(4) Respondent/9: user representative of health district four;
(5) Respondent/10: user representative of health district six;
(6) Respondent/11: user representative of health district ten;
(7) Respondent/12: user representative of health district two; and
(8) Respondent/13: user representative of health district five.
(3) The user from trade unions excluding health sector workers most frequent at 
plenary meetings throughout most periods was very easily selected. She was the only regular 
participant of this type attending plenary meetings. She participated regularly in plenary 
meetings between 1987 and 1991.
(1) Respondent/14: representative of the trade union of rural workers of Porto Alegre.
(4) Users from trade union confederations participated in plenary meetings only during 
1987 and 1988. From the only two regular participants the most frequent was selected.
(1) Respondent/15: representative of CUT (Central Unica dos Trabalhadores).
(5) As there were many participants representing health professionals or health 
workers, in this case also an additional criterion was used. Those to be interviewed should be 
present at meetings in three or four sub-periods (1985/1986, 1987/1988, 1989 and 1990/1991). 
Using this criterion, of 47 reasonably regular participants, five (ten per cent) were selected.
(1) Respondent/16: representative of the union of medical doctors of Rio Grande do Sul;
(2) Respondent/17: representative of the union of civil servants of the state health secretariat;
(3) Respondent/18: representative of the union of nurses of Rio Grande do Sul;
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(4) Respondent/19: representative of the union of veterinarians of Rio Grande do Sul; and
(5) Respondent/20: representative of the union of civil servants of the municipal health 
secretariat.
(6) It was easy to select the respondent representing private providers. There were only 
two regular participants of this type during the whole period. One was present at nine meetings 
in 1985, another participated in 87 meetings, between 1985 and 1991. Because of his more 
frequent presence at meetings over a longer period, the latter was selected to be interviewed.
(1) Respondent/21: representative of the association of private hospitals of Rio Grande do Sul.
(7) Federal health authorities came to meetings representing the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Education and the INAMPS. Those representing the Ministry of Health were only 
present at few meetings during 1985 and 1986. Participants representing the Ministry of 
Education and the INAMPS, however, regularly attended plenary meetings, during the whole 
period. Two participants representing the Ministry of Education regularly attended plenary 
meetings. One was present at 26 meetings, during 1990 and 1991, and the other attended 74 
meetings, between 1985 and 1990. Due to his more consistent participation the latter was 
selected to be interviewed. Representing the INAMPS there were three reasonably regular 
participants. One was present at 17 meetings, during 1986 and 1987, another attended 23 
meetings in 1985 and 1986, and the other participated in 28 meetings between 1986 and 1988. 
Due to her more frequent presence at meetings for a longer period, the latter was selected to be 
interviewed.
(1) Respondent/22: representing the INAMPS, and
(2) Respondent/23: representing the Ministry of Education.
(8) Official representatives of the state health secretariat at the commission were 
selected as state health authorities to be interviewed. They were also the most consistent 
participants, coming from this secretariat, during the period when they were official 
representatives.
(1) Respondent/24: representing the state health secretariat during 1985 and 1986;
(2) Respondent/25: representing the state health secretariat in 1987, 1988 and during part of 
1989; and
(3) Respondent/26: representing the state health secretariat during part of 1989, in 1990 and 
1991.
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(9) Several respondents spontaneously named two health professionals to be 
interviewed. According to these respondents, these health professionals had constant 
involvement in the commission’s activities and could offer valuable information about user 
involvement.
(1) Respondent/27: who had been a regular participant in the technical secretariat since 1985; 
and
(2) Respondent/28: a health professional closely related to urban social movement activists in 
health district four.
(10) Respondents were asked about participants in the commission who could produce 
information specifically related to the local health commissions. Two participants were selected 
following the indications of interviewees:
(1) Respondent/27: who had been regular participant in the commission since 1985; and
(2) Respondent/15: who took part in the co-ordination of the commission between 1989 and 
1991.
Selecting Interviewees among Representatives of the Brazilian Health System Reformers and 
the Medical Profession
Trying to assess the Brazilian health system reformers’ and the medical profession’s 
political role in the commission as well as their views on user participation, well-known 
representatives of both groups were interviewed. Some "key” respondents were asked about the 
most legitimate representative of both groups in Porto Alegre, regarding the different factions 
of reformers and the different organisations representing the medical profession. They 
suggested people, who were contacted and interviewed.
Respondents representing Brazilian health system reformers were:
(1) Respondent/5: representing the Workers’ Party (PT) (also interviewed as municipal health 
authority);
(2) Respondent/4: representing the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) (also interviewed as 
municipal health authority);
(3) Respondent/30: representing the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B);
(4) Respondent/31: representing the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB); and
(5) Respondent/32: representing the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB).
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Respondents representing the medical profession were:
(1) Respondent/33: representing the union of medical doctors of Rio Grande do Sul;
(2) Respondent/34: representing the medical association of Rio Grande do Sul; and
(3) Respondent/35: representing the council of medical doctors of Rio Grande do Sul.
Selecting an Interviewee among the Informers at National Level
Trying to obtain additional information about the municipal health fora throughout the 
country the president of the National Council of Municipal Secretaries of Health 
(CONASEMS) was interviewed.
(1) Respondent/36: representing the CONASEMS.
Designing Questionnaires for Interviews
There were six types of questionnaires, each of them applied to the following types of 
respondents:
(1) main directors of the municipal health secretariat,
(2) users,
(3) other participants in the commission,
(4) respondents representing Brazilian health system reformers and the medical profession,
(5) participants in the commission able to inform about local health commissions,
(6) respondent representing CONASEMS.
For respondents of types (1), (2) and (3) of respondents, the questionnaires asked only 
about the period that each respondent actually participated in the activities of the commission. 
When asking about the position of different actors towards user involvement in the commission, 
the questions took into account the political changes. For instance, when inquiring about the 
stance of federal health authorities on user participation, the question referred to three periods:
(1) 1985,1986,1987 and the beginning of 1988; (2) between May and December of 1989; and
(3) 1990 and 1991. As there was not yet a precise definition of the periods corresponding to 
different types of users' involvement, when asking about the strength of their involvement and 
about the "quality” of their participation, each single year was referred to. For the remaining 
types of respondents the questions were not directly related to the commission's works. 
Appendix II presents models of the six types of questionnaire.
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Interviews aimed at obtaining different types of information, according to the type of 
interviewee. Users, health professionals and health workers, private providers, respondents 
representing municipal, state and federal health authorities and the two health professionals 
(nominated to be interviewed by other respondents) were asked (a,b,c) about the position on 
user participation of municipal, state and federal health authorities, (d) about how users 
participated, (e) about the quality of the relationship between user representatives and 
municipal health authorities and (f) on how the forum’s agenda was established. Respondents 
representing municipal health authorities were also asked about (g) the role of user 
participation in their policies.
Users and respondents representing Brazilian health system reformers and the medical 
profession were asked (a) about the quality of the relationships between user leaders and the 
medical profession and between user leaders and the Brazilian health system reformers. 
Respondents representing the Brazilian health system reformers and the medical profession 
were also asked (b) about the role of user participation in their plans for the health sector.
The interview with the respondent representing the CONASEMS aimed at obtaining 
information (a) about the historical evolution of municipal health commissions and of user 
involvement in these commissions, and (b) about possible differences in the type of user 
involvement when considering different regions and city size in Brazil. Informants on local 
health commissions were asked about the history of, and how users were involved in, each 
commission.
Carrying out Interviews
Questionnaires guided the structured interviews which were carried out during the 
second half of 1992 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. However, it was impossible to interview 
Respondent/3 at that time, due to his intense political activity. This specific interview was 
carried out by a research assistant in July 1993. For each interview, an individualised had been 
previously prepared, because: (1) distinct respondents could produce different types of 
information and (2) the period during which respondents had participated in the commission 
varied. Two pilot interviews were carried out, in August 1992. They helped in the rephrasing of 
some questions and expressions, before the actual interviews took place. During the interviews, 
the questionnaire was systematically followed. Sometimes, however, after repeating a question, 
if the respondent could not understand the meaning - which happened especially when 
interviewing users - the question was rephrased. All interviews were tape recorded. In addition 
to tape recordings, notes were taken during the interviews. The interviews lasted approximately
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between half an hour and one hour and 40 minutes. As can be observed in the list of 
respondents presented above, the same person would have been interviewed twice. In these 
cases, the two interviews could be carried out during the same meeting or in two meetings, 
depending on the preference of the respondent.
Preparing Interviews for Analysis
All the tapes from the interviews were transcribed. Each interview's transcription was 
systematically read to highlight the points which could help to answer the main questions of this 
research. The relevant parts of each interview were selected and summarised on a form. Apart 
from the identification of the respondent, these forms have fields for two main sets of 
information. The first was on how users were involved in the forum, in each year between 1985 
and 1991, summarising the respondent’s views on:
(1) how users were involved in the commission's activities;
(2) how was the relationship between health authorities and users, especially user 
representatives;
(3) how the agenda was established.
The second set of information summarised in these forms refers to the determinants of 
user involvement. Respondents were directly asked about some possible factors influencing this 
involvement or were asked to suggest which influences they regarded as determinant. They 
were directly asked about:
(1, 2, 3) the position of municipal, state and federal health authorities on user involvement;
(4) the position of trade union confederations on user participation;
(5) relationships between medical professionals (especially the leaders of medical 
organisations) and users (especially user representatives);
(6) relationships between Brazilian health system reformers and users (especially user 
representatives);
(7, 8, 9) importance of user participation in the plans for the health sector of municipal health 
authorities, Brazilian health system reformers and the medical profession;
(10,11,12) why user attendance at plenary meetings grew in 1987/1988, dropped in 1989/1990, 
and grew again in 1991.
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The summary of each of these points was stored in a database of interviews, which was 
organised by interviewee and by year. The personal computer programme Access 1.0 for 
Windows was used for storage of the information. These summaries were used as a general 
guide, the original transcriptions being constantly used when dealing with the data obtained 
through the interviews.
Questionnaires on Local Health Commissions
Complementing the information obtained from the two interviews about the history of 
the involvement of users in local health commissions, a questionnaire (Appendix II) was sent to 
each local commission co-ordinator to be filled in by its the most long-standing participants. 
Among the eleven active commissions, numbers two, three, four, six, nine, ten and eleven 
returned the questionnaire. Additional information about commissions five, one, seven and eight 
came from other interviews and documents.
1.2.2. The Analysis
As was seen before, the literature, statistical reports and documents were the main 
sources of information used to build up the discussion on (1) participation, (2) major factors 
that could influence user participation in an institutionalised participatory forum, (3) the 
Brazilian health system, (4) the spread of municipal participatory fora in the Brazilian health 
sector over the past ten years, and (5) health services and urban social movements in Porto 
Alegre.
Nevertheless, the main focus of the research was on the participatory process taking 
place in the municipal health forum of Porto Alegre. The main challenge was to find ways of 
assessing this process, given the main research questions and the types of data available. 
Aiming at answering the two main research questions, it was necessary: (1) to reconstruct the 
work pattern of the municipal forum, (2) to analyse how the users were involved in the 
commission, (3) to analyse the factors that could have most influenced user involvement, and
(4) to verify which factors had most influenced user involvement in die commission. Table 1.1 
summarises the main questions, analytical strategies and sources of information described in 
this section.
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Table 1.1 - Summary of the Main Research Questions, Analytical Strategies and Sources
of Information
Main Questions Analytical Strategies Sources of information
How were users 
involved in the
To reconstruct the work pattern of the municipal forum 
throughout the period, documents and interviews were analysed 
focusing on:
.legal provisions and internal regulations that guided the work of 
the commission,
.divisions of the commission and what were their 
functions/powers
.legal role of user representatives in the main divisions of the 
commission,
.social actors entitled to vote/decide about agenda formation and 
controversial issues,
.legal functions/power of the commission within the health 
system.
-main policy documents and 
legislation concerning 
municipal commissions in 
the period
-minutes and attendance 
lists of meetings of the 
plenary, of the co-ordinating 
committee, of the technical 
secretariat and of the 
inspection commission 
-documents in the 
commission’s files 
-interviews with the 
participants in the 
commission
municipal health 
commission?
To verify the number and types o f users attending plenary 
meetings throughout the period, attendance lists o f plenary 
meetings were analysed considering:
.who attended meetings: providers, health professionals and 
health workers, users or others,
.types of organisations users came from: large, local urban, 
trade anions, others,
.regions of the city users from local organisations came from: 
health districts.
To analyse haw user representatives were involved in the 
decision-making process throughout the period, 
documents (mainly attendance lists and minutes of the decision­
making and technical divisions) and interviews were analysed 
considering:
.types of involvement: non-participation, manipulation, 
delegation, negotiation, participation.
-minutes and attendance 
lists of meetings of the 
plenary, of the co-ordinating 
committee, of the technical 
secretariat and of the 
inspection commission 
-interviews with the 
participants in municipal 
and local commissions 
-documents in the 
commission’s files
What major 
factors have
To identify the factors that could have most influenced user 
involvement, the literature, documents (particularly the minutes 
of the decision-making and technical divisions of the 
commission) and interviews were analysed, considering: 
.suggestions of the literature on the subject, the reality of the 
Brazilian health system and Porto Alegre’s political and social 
particularities.
Since major influences were identified, to examine variations in 
their behaviour throughout the period, the literature, documents 
and interviews were analysed, considering:
.major turning points in their behaviour.
-policy documents, 
legislation and literature 
concerning the commission, 
health authorities, the 
Brazilian health system, and 
urban social movements in 
Porto Alegre
-minutes of meetings of the 
plenary, of the co-ordinating 
committee, of the technical 
secretariat and of the 
inspection commission 
-interviews with the 
participants in the 
commission
conditioned
their
involvement?
To verify which factors had most influenced user involvement, 
relationships were established between these factors and the 
number o f users attending plenary meetings and the types o f user 
representatives ’ involvement in the decision-making process.
- data above mentioned
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The Forum's Work Pattern
The reconstruction of the forum's work pattern throughout the period focused on the 
following aspects: (a) the legal provisions and internal regulations that guided the work of the 
commission, (b) the divisions of the commission and their functions/powers within the 
commission’s general organisation, (c) the legal role of user representatives in the main 
divisions of the commission, (d) social actors entitled to vote/decide on agenda formation and 
controversial issues, (e) legal functions/powers of the commission itself within the health 
system.
The systematic examination of these aspects allowed the reconstruction of the work 
pattern of the commission carried out in chapter six. The sources investigated were the main 
policy documents and legislation concerning municipal health commissions, minutes and 
attendance lists of meetings of the plenary, of the co-ordinating committee, of the technical 
secretariat and of the inspection commission, other documents in the commission’s files and the 
interviews with the participants in the commission during the period.
The Analysis of How Users Were Involved in the Commission
As mentioned before, the analysis of how users were involved in the commission took 
into account the forum's ways of working and two main indicators: the number and types o f  
users attending plenary meetings and the types o f user representatives' involvement in the 
commission's decision-making process.
The number and types o f users attending the plenary meetings seemed to be a 
significant indicator because the plenary was the decision-making division of the commission. 
The number and types of users were identified through the analysis of the attendance list of 
each plenary meeting. Together with each meeting’s minute there was a list of the participants. 
The list displays the name, the signature and the institution/organisation from where each 
participant came. Examination of the attendance lists of 207 meetings, taking place between 
September 1985 and December 1991, resulted in a proportion of only 4.7 per cent of names 
whose institution or organisation of origin was not identified. The remaining 95.3 per cent of 
the participants were classified and stored in a personal computer spread sheet programme 
(Excel 4.0 for Windows) and in the database of a statistical programme (Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences - SPSS 6.0 for Windows). These data are displayed in Tables III.3 and III.4 
of Appendix III. The statistical and graphical processing of these data utilised these two
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software resources and for some particular graphs the resources of the personal computer 
graphical programme Freelance (Freelance Graphics 2.0 for Windows).
The participants were classified into four large categories: (1) providers: those coming 
from health institutions, regardless of whether they were health professionals, health workers or 
senior managers; (2) health professionals or health workers: those coming from associations 
or trade unions of health professionals or of health workers; (3) users: those coming from 
organisations such as residential, community or neighbourhood associations, trade unions 
representing non-health sector workers, confederations of trade unions or confederations of 
urban social organisations; (4) others: those who could not be classified into the last three 
categories. This classification allowed the identification of: (a) which categories of participants 
made up the majority in the meetings of a given period, (b) what were the "oscillations" in the 
proportion of each category's participation in meetings throughout the period, (c) what was the 
mean (the median was very similar to the mean) and mode of each category of participants 
throughout the period, highlighting the user category, and (d) whether there was a trend towards 
the increase, stabilisation or decrease of the presence of users in these meetings. To verify the 
last point, a liner regression was applied considering the number of users present at each 
meeting by the succession in time of meetings. The scarcity of meetings and the high 
fluctuation in the number of users present at meetings invalidated the power of prediction of the 
regression. Nevertheless, it did not invalidate the possibility of the verification of a past trend.
To identify whether user participants came from centralised or decentralised 
organisations they were further classified into four categories according to the type of 
organisation: (1) large organisations, such as confederations of trade unions or of urban social 
movement organisations; (2) local urban organisations, such as residential, community and 
neighbourhood associations; (3) trade unions, excluding those representing health sector 
professionals and workers; (4) others, such as associations of sufferers of particular diseases - 
AIDS, diabetics or haemophiliacs - or associations concerned with environmental issues. This 
classification permitted the verification of: (a) the proportion of users coming from each of 
these types of organisation throughout the period, (b) whether there was a change in these 
proportions.
Local organisations were situated in particular areas of the city. In 1991 Porto Alegre 
was divided into eleven health districts, each one corresponding to one local health 
commission. Users attending plenary meetings were usually participants in local health 
commissions or in some urban organisation in the area. Since the location of grassroots 
organisations was identified, it was possible to distribute users from them according to each
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district. This further classification helped to verify: (1) whether this distribution was uniform, 
indicating whether these users came from many or few areas of the city, (2) from which regions 
most of these users came and (2) whether patterns of distribution changed throughout the 
period. Graphs helped to describe the distribution of the results, as can be seen in chapter six. 
Another way of verifying the degree of homogeneity was the appliance of an index o f 
qualitative variation (IQV) to the distribution of users by regions during the successive years. 
This index is
"essentially the ratio o f  the amount o f variation actually observed in a distribution o f 
scores to the maximum variation that could exist in that distribution. The index varies 
from 0.00 (no variation) to 1.00 (maximum variation)" (Healey 1993, 93).
The computational formula for the IQV is
l
1QV y ’t e - i )
where £  = the number o f categories 
N  = the number of cases 
V 2 = the sum of the squared frequencies (Healey 1993, 95).
The types o f user representatives' involvement in the commission's decision-making 
process was the other indicator of user involvement in the commission. As explained in chapter 
two, this research works with the following concepts of types of user involvement: (1) non­
participation, (2) manipulation, (3) delegation, (4) negotiation, (5) participation. The analysis 
stressed the participation of users in the processes of agenda formation and of decision-making. 
Strong indications of their participation in both processes can be drawn through the verification 
of whether users participated in or had control over the decision-making and technical divisions 
of the forum. The main sources of information in the analysis of the involvement of user 
representatives were the commission's internal regulations and other legal or policy provisions, 
minutes and attendance lists of meetings of the plenary, of the co-ordinating committee, of the 
technical secretariat and of the inspection commission and interviews with the participants in 
the commission.
The interviews were the main source of information for describing how users were 
involved. However, internal regulations and other legal or policy provisions, as well as minutes 
of the commission's varied divisions, were also systematically analysed, highlighting mainly the 
information related to the processes of agenda formation and of decision-making. Attendance 
lists of the meetings of the co-ordinating committee, of the technical secretariat and of the 
inspection commission helped to check whether the formal composition of these divisions
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corresponded to their "rear' composition. The focus was on the actual participation of user 
representatives in these meetings.
The Analysis of Factors that Could Have Most Influenced Users* Involvement
As mentioned above, this research regarded as factors that could have most influenced 
the quality of users' involvement: (1) recent changes in the institutional framework o f the 
Brazilian health system; (2,3,4) the position o f federal, state and municipal health authorities 
on user participation (5) the relationship between public health professionals, who worked at 
local health units, and activists o f urban social movements,; (6) the organisation o f urban social 
movements in the city; (7) the type o f agenda o f the commission.
(1) Turning points in the recent changes in the institutional framework o f the Brazilian 
health system were identified through the examination of the literature and documents.
(2,3,4) The "expected” position o f federal, state and municipal health authorities on 
user participation, during a particular administration, was compared to the respondents’ 
opinions about the position of these authorities. The "expected” position was obtained from the 
literature or by taking into account the political affiliations of the authorities. The respondents’ 
opinions were established through the analysis of the interviews. Two types of opinions were 
taken into account.
The first type refers to respondents’ answers to the closed questions about whether they 
classified the municipal health authorities' in interest in the participation of user representatives 
in the decision-making process as: “non interest”, “some interest”, “reasonable interest”, 
“strong interest” or “very strong interest”. When asking about state and federal health 
authorities' interest, the question was whether they had “supported”, had “been indifferent to”, 
or had “resisted” the participation of user representatives in the decision-making process. To 
facilitate comparisons it would have been better if there had been a single type of question for 
all the authorities. However, the realisation of this unevenness among the questions came only 
when all the interviews had already been carried out. Aiming to make them comparable, the 
answers referring to the municipal health authorities were collapsed into three categories: “non­
interest/some interest”, “reasonable interest” and “strong/very strong interest”. The small 
quantity of interviewees, as shown in Tables III.5, III.6 and III.7 of Appendix III, did not allow 
the verification of the significance of the answers using chi square or other non parametrical 
tests. Even taking this into account the absolute number of answers was examined, highlighting 
the comparison between the answers of user and non-user interviewees.
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The second type of respondents’ opinion taken into account was their explanations 
given for the answers. It was the analysis of these explanations that offered a qualified chart for 
the comparison between health authorities’ expected and actual positions on the participation of 
user representatives in the commission's decision-making process.
(5) The relationship between public health professionals, who worked at local health 
units, and activists o f urban social movements was analysed considering whether: (a) there was 
a close relationship between them, (b) this close relationship, where there was one, was 
confined to a particular region of the city or was spread throughout many health districts and (3) 
there was a policy stimulating their approach. Although the literature was also utilised, the main 
sources of information for answering these questions were the interviews and the questionnaires 
about local health commissions.
(6) The organisation o f the urban social movements in Porto Alegre was examined, 
highlighting the existence of trends towards centralisation or decentralisation. Whether there 
were policies stimulating the centralisation or decentralisation of the organisation these 
movements was also investigated. The main sources of information were: the literature, the 
minutes and attendance lists of plenary meetings, and the interviews and questionnaires about 
local health commissions.
(7) The agenda o f the commission was reconstructed through the analysis of the 
minutes of the plenary meetings. Although it was not possible to know how much time was 
spent on the discussion of each issue, it was possible to discern whether an issue was discussed 
or not. After the reconstruction of each meeting’s agenda, the issues were classified into seven 
groups: (1) Minor. This type encompasses mainly the presentation of reports or notes about 
events, programmes or conferences, whether or not related to health issues. (2) National Health 
Policies. This classification encompasses discussions about national health policies and their 
relationship to the organisation of state and municipal health services. (3) Labour. This 
classification includes discussions, and sometimes the mediation, of issues related to 
employment relations in the health sector. (4) Local. This group involves the discussion of 
issues related to local or individual problems, such as the need of a health professional or the 
lack of some specific medicine in a particular health unit, or the denunciation of ill or unlawful 
treatment of an individual user. (5) Commission's Regulations. This type includes all issues 
related to creating or changing the working rules of municipal or local health commissions. (6) 
Financial. This group comprises all issues related to financial matters, such as routine 
appraisals of plans for expenditure and accounts of financial resources transferred from the
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social security system to the municipal health secretariat, new modalities of transfer of these 
resources or the municipal budget. (7) Organisation o f Health Services in Porto Alegre. This 
group comprises all issues related to the organisation of public health and health care services 
located in the city of Porto Alegre. These issues could be discussions about plans, programmes 
or projects that would affect the organisation of health care and public health services in the 
city or in large areas of the city, issues related to licensing, closing or opening health services, 
as well as to contracting or cancelling contracts between the social security system and 
providers.
The issues, classified in this way, by each meeting, are displayed in Table III.8 of 
Appendix III. The calculation of the percentage of meetings in which each type of issue had 
been discussed each half year, led to the conclusion that two types of issues were most 
frequently discussed in plenary meetings. They were those related to the organisation of health 
services in Porto Alegre and to the financing of health services. Categories were constructed 
taking into account whether, during each period of six months, the majority of plenary meetings 
discussed financial issues, discussed the organisation of health services or a similar proportion 
of both issues.
The large variety of items required their classification into thematic groups in order to 
make it possible to distinguish the nature of the issues and to compare the frequency of each 
type of issue to the others. Although it was found to be the best way found to deal with this type 
of data, there was a constraint. The literature did not offer examples of the classification of the 
themes discussed in participatory meetings. Hence, it was necessary to create one. The 
establishment of the basic agenda was rather objective, since most minutes had a sub-title 
before any subject that was discussed. The construction of the groups had the initial intention of 
stressing (1) the complexity of issues (minor/local versus organisation of health 
services/national health policies) and (2) whether they referred to very local or to larger 
areas/problems (local versus organisation of health services). There were, however, many issues 
related to the commission's self regulation (commission's regulations), to disputes between 
employers and employees in the health sector (labour) and to financial concerns. The 
establishment of this classification can be regarded as arbitrary. Nevertheless, it was successful 
in encompassing all the matters discussed in plenary meetings in a summarised way.
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Which Factors Had Most Influenced the Ways Users Were Involved in the 
Commission?
In order to answer this question, the dependent and independent variables were 
analysed and organised into categories. The dependent variable was analysed through the two 
indicators mentioned above: the number o f users attending plenary meetings and the types o f 
user representatives' involvement in the decision-making process. The number o f users 
attending plenary meetings varied between none (zero) and 27. To verify whether there was an 
association between this indicator-variable and other variables, the observed count of users in 
each plenary meeting was distributed in chi square tables. The tables displayed many cells 
(varying between 81 to 90 per cent of cells) with an expected frequency of less than five, 
making the use of this test questionable. To overcome the difficulty, this continuous variable 
was transformed into a collapsed ordinal-level variable. As was explained in chapter eight, the 
criterion used in this transformation was related to the number of districts of health in existence, 
since the majority of user participants came from local organisations located in these districts. 
The categories for user attendance at plenary meetings were defined as follows:
(1) meetings with 0 -2  users
(2) meetings with 3 - 7  users
(3) meetings with 8 - more users
The types o f user representatives' involvement in the decision-making process were also 
classified into three categories that considered the increase in the intensity of the involvement 
of the user representatives. They are:
(1) Non Participation
(2) Delegation/Participation
(3) Negotiation or Participation
As was explained in chapter eight, negotiation and participation are qualitatively distinct 
modalities of involvement of user representatives. While the former implies that there was 
reasonably overt tension between the user representatives and the municipal health authorities, 
who were the co-ordinators of the forum, the latter indicates that they acted together 
harmoniously. Although this difference is highly relevant, it did not affect the intensity of 
involvement of user representatives. Thus these two types of user representative involvement 
were collapsed into one single category to make it easier to verify whether it was related to 
other variables.
241
As was explained in chapters seven and eight, the independent variables - factors that 
could have affected user involvement - also had an ordinal level of measurement and their 
variation was classified into three categories.
Recent changes in the institutional framework o f the Brazilian health system were 
classified into the following categories:
(1) Agdes Integradas de Saude (AIS)
(2) Sistemas Unificados Descentralizados de Satide (SUDS)
(3) Leis do Sistema tJnico de Satide
The position o f the federal health authorities on user participation was classified into 
the following categories:
(1) Resistant to users’ involvement
(2) Indifferent to users’ involvement
(3) Interest in the participation of user representatives in the decision-making process
The position o f the state health authorities on user participation was classified into the 
following categories:
(1) Non interest in users’ involvement
(2) Interest in user involvement but not in institutionalised fora (commissions) or in the 
commission of Porto Alegre
(3) Interest in the participation of user representatives in the decision-making process
The position o f the municipal health authorities on user participation was classified 
into the following categories:
(1) Non interest in users’ involvement
(2) Interest in consultative participation
(3) Interest in the participation of user representatives in the decision-making process
The relationship between public health professionals, who worked at local health units, 
and activists o f urban social movements were classified into the following categories:
(1) Close in a few regions of the city
(2) Close in many regions of the city
(3) Close in many regions of the city combined with the stimulus of municipal policy
The organisation o f urban social movements in the city was classified into the
following categories:
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(1) Tending towards centralisation
(2) Tending towards decentralisation
(3) Tending towards decentralisation with the Participatory Budget
The types o f agenda o f the commission were classified into the following categories:
(1) Financial
(2) Similar proportion of financial and organisation of health services
(3) Organisation of health services
There were some points to be highlighted about this “categorisation”. First, the 
construction of categories implies ’’reducing” the complexity of the information, resulting in the 
loss of detailed and valuable data. Nevertheless, it facilitates the investigation of possible 
relationships between the variables, and helps the understanding of the essential characteristics 
of the variables. Second, the "independent” variables were actually related to each other. They 
are treated as independent variables to stress a possible hierarchy of the strength of the 
association between each of them and the dependent indicator-variables. Third, the variables 
were collapsed or organised into three categories. Although it was perhaps not ideal, it 
facilitated the realisation of valid statistical tests among them. As they were ''categorical” 
variables, the category could be thoroughly defined, reconstructing the most complete figure as 
possible of the phenomena to which it referred. The exception was in the case of the number of 
users present at plenary meetings which, on the other hand was a very objective, if limited, 
measure of users' involvement in the commission.
In order to study the possible association between the variables, bivariate tables were 
constructed (Tables 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, chapter eight) and the variables were tested for 
independence as well as for the existence, strength, and direction of their possible relationships. 
Each plenary meeting was regarded as a "record" because: (1) the "date" of each meeting gave 
precise information about the position of all other actors at that time, (2) the most objective 
information, which was the number of users attending the meeting, was organised by the date of 
the meeting, and (3) the meetings regularly covered all the period of the study. The following 
tests were applied:
(a) Chi Square Pearsons
"As is the case with all tests of hypothesis, the test with chi square consists of 
computing a test statistic, X2 (obtained), from the sample data and placing that value 
on the sampling distribution of all possible sample of outcomes. Specifically, X* 
(obtained) will be compared with the value of X2 (critical) that will be determined by 
consulting a chi square table for a particular alpha level and degrees of freedom" 
(Healey 1993,256).
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The computational formula for the chi square is:
X2 (obtained) = ——
f t
where f 0 = the cell frequencies observed in the bivariate table
f e -  the cell frequencies that would be expected if the variables were 
independent (Healey 1993,256).
(b) Cramer's V
Using the chi-squared-based measure of association was the first step in assessing the 
strength of the relationship between the variables. In tables with three or more columns and 
three or more rows the form of statistic generally used to assess this strength is the Cramer's V 
(Healey 1993, 334, 341).
'To calculate V, find the square root of chi square divided by the quantity N 
multiplied by the number of rows minus 1 or the number of columns minus I, 
whichever is the lower (or 'minimum) value. Cramer's Vhas an upper limit of 1.00 for 
any table and, like phi, can be interpreted as an index that measures the strength of the 
association between two variables" (Healey 1993, 334).
The variables had an ordinal level of measurement. Gamma is a measure of association 
appropriate for ordinally measured variables organised into table format, particularly for 
measuring the association between two collapsed ordinal variables (Healey 1993, 350, 368). 
Gamma measures the proportional reduction in error (PRE) gained by predicting one variable 
while taking the other into account (Healey 1993,350).
"In the case of gamma, we predict the order of pairs of cases. That is, we predict 
whether one case will have a higher or lower score than the other on the variable in 
question. The first prediction rule is to predict the order of a pair of cases on one 
variable while ignoring their order on the other. The second rule is to predict the 
order of a pair of cases on one variable while taking their order on the other variable
The formula for Cramer's V is:
minimum
where (minimum o fr- l,c-1) = the minimum value of r - 1 (number of rows -1) or
c - 1 (number of columns - 1)
N  = the number of cases (Healey 1993, 334).
(c) Gamma
into account" (Healey 1993, 350).
244
By computing gamma, we get in a single number a summary measure of the existence, strength, 
and direction of the relationship.
The formula for computing gamma is:
c _ N,-Nt  
N . + N t + T y
where N s = the number of pairs of cases ranked the same as both variables
Nd = the number of pairs of cases ranked differently on the two 
variables (Healey 1993,355).
(d) Somer's d
Somer's d  is a measure of association appropriate for collapsed ordinal-level variables 
that have been arrayed in a bivariate table. It is interpretable by the logic of PRE and, 
computationally, it is based on a comparison of the number of pairs of cases ranked in the same 
order on both variables (Na ) with the number of pairs ranked differently (A^) (Healey 1993, 
356).
"The difference between these statistics and gamma lies in their treatment o f pairs o f 
cases that are tied Gamma represents the proportional reduction in error in 
prediction for pairs o f cases that are not tied (...) Somer's d includes pairs that are 
tied on the dependent variable but not the independent" (Healey 1993, 356).
The formula for Somer's d  is:
d _  Ns -  Nd 
N s + N d +Ty
where N s = the number of pairs of cases ranked the same as both variables
Nd = the number of pairs of cases ranked differently on the two 
variables
Ty = the number of pairs of cases tied on the dependent variable 
(Healey 1993, 356).
The influence of Brazilian health system reformers over user involvement in the 
commission was demonstrated through the influence of the variables: the recent changes in the 
institutional framework o f the Brazilian health system, which were mainly promoted by 
reformers, the position o f federal, state and municipal health authorities on user participation, 
who in some periods were reformers, and the relationship between public health professionals, 
who worked at local health units, and activists o f urban social movements, since these
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professionals were often reformers. Sometimes, these professionals could be also representing 
unions of health professionals or health workers and trade union confederations. Focusing on 
the role of these reformers in the participatory process, the issue of whether there was a political 
alliance between them and social movement leaders was investigated also. Taking into account 
the well-known influence of the medical profession within the health sector, their role in the 
participatory process was investigated also. This investigation allowed us to verify:
(1) whether the Brazilian health system reformers took part in the forum activities;
(2) if they did, which interest groups, organisations or institutions they formally represented;
(3) what was the importance of user participation in the plans for the health sector of both the 
Brazilian health system reformers and the medical profession;
(4) what was the nature of the relationship between the user representatives and both the 
Brazilian health system reformers and the medical profession.
1.3. Final Comments
According to Yin (1991, 95-8), a major strength of case study data collection is the 
opportunity to use many different sources of information. In a process of “triangulation” - that 
is, of the constant cross-checking of the evidence - problems related to “constructing validity” 
are addressed, because multiple sources of information provide multiple measures of the same 
phenomenon (Yin 1991, 97).
As shown above, this research dealt with a variety of sources of information and each 
of them alone was regarded as unreliable. The interviewees could only offer their personal 
views, which could be biased by their political positions, partial access to information or their 
relations of friendship or personal animosity with health authorities or user representatives. 
Moreover, as many questions referred to events that took place in the past, they could simply 
not have remembered precisely what had happened. The official documents - such as plans, 
bills, projects or programmes - present “official” views, usually promoting the policies and 
political positions of the authorities responsible for issuing them. The minutes of meetings 
present the views of the person that wrote them, since they were a summary of the meeting. 
Some aspects might or might not be regarded as important, depending on the writer.
Considering these types of constraints, information obtained from one source was 
cross-checked with others in order to confirm or deny its veracity. For instance some 
respondents affirmed that, during 1989, there was an overload of financial issues on the plenary
246
meetings’ agenda. This initial information was confirmed by the agenda of the plenary meetings 
reconstructed through the analysis of the minutes of plenary meetings. It was also confirmed by 
a letter found in the commission’s files, in which a local health commission co-ordinator 
complained about the exhaustive discussion of financial issues and administrative details in 
plenary meetings. When different sources presented conflicting information, an explanation for 
the .difference was sought. This was the case for instance when user respondents affirmed that 
the state health authorities, during 1985 and 1986, favoured user participation while the 
literature, a non-user respondent and some documents indicated that they did not. Looking at 
the concept of participation that these users were using, looking at the idea of participation that 
these state authorities expressed in interviews and documents and comparing this to the notion 
of participation of that non-user respondent, who was a Brazilian health system reformer, it was 
possible to understand the difference. User respondents and state health authorities regarded as 
participation users being listened to directly and informally by health authorities. The non-user 
respondent regarded as participation user representatives having formal and actual power over 
overt decision-making processes in the health sector.
The use of multiple sources of evidence imposes a great burden on a case study 
investigator. The researcher has to carry out a variety of data collection techniques and these 
data need to be properly examined, categorised, tabulated, and recombined in order to address 
the initial questions and propositions of the study (Yin 1991, 97, 105). These difficult tasks can 
be summarised in the most intricate challenge of this research which is using varied data to set 
up a method for the assessment of participation.
The use of the two indicators of user involvement - the number o f users attending the 
plenary meetings and the types o f user representatives' involvement in the decision-making 
process - helped to solve the problem. On the one hand, the number of users attending plenary 
meetings is a very objective indicator, while the types of user representatives’ involvement in 
the decision-making process is not. On the other hand, the attendance of users is a very limited 
indicator of involvement, while the types of involvement in the decision-making process can 
give a substantive indication of the intensity of user involvement. The classification of types of 
user representatives’ involvement in the decision-making process could give room for different 
inteipretations, even bearing in mind that the construction of these “types” involved the use of 
as many sources of information as possible.
Varied sources of information were also used to construct the categories which indicate 
variations in the factors used to explain the intensity of user involvement. The easiest
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classification was the one concerned with changes in the institutional framework of the 
Brazilian health system, that took into account two major policies and a set of laws. The others 
were based on the literature, documents and interviews, as can be seen in chapter seven. Here 
again there is room for disagreement about the way the categories were set up.
Even taking into account the constant cross-checking of the information, another 
researcher might reach different conclusions. Nonetheless, only positivist conceptions of the 
research process would attempt to pose the researcher as a “neutral” agent in this process. As 
Bulmer (1984, 3-4) argues, sociological research involves the strategies and techniques of 
empirical investigation as well as theory. The researcher examining a particular social process 
is seeking both to understand and explain social phenomena, and is always interpreting the 
world through a frame of reference, not merely describing it.
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Appendix II
Questionnaires
II.l. Questionnaires of Interviews
Model 1 - Main Directors of the Municipal Health Secretariat
Respondent Identification: full name 
Place, date and time of interview
1. Durante o perfodo que dirigiste a Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social quais eram 
os principais objetivos, o programa ou o projeto dessa Secretaria para a area de saude?
(During the period when you directed the Municipal Health Secretariat which were this 
Secretariat’s main goals, programmes or plans in the health field?)
2. Qual o significado que tu atribuirias ao termo participa^o comunitaria/popular/do 
consumidor/do cidad&o/do usuArio [dependendo do termo que ela/e usar anteriormente, se 
nSo mencionou participa^o, perguntar sobre participa^^o do usuArio]?
(What is the meaning, for you, of the term community/popular/consumer/citizen/user 
participation [depending on the expression that s/he used before, if s/he does mention 
participation, ask about user participation]?
3. Durante o periodo de tua gestao na Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social, tu 
classificarias a participa9&) dos representantes dos usuArios nas decisdes que eram tomadas pela 
CIMS como:
(During the period of your administration in the Municipal Health Secretariat, how would you 
classify user representatives’ participation in the decision-making process taking place in the 
CIMS:)
□ Inexistente (Non-existent)
□ Fraca (Weak)
□ RazoAvel (Reasonable)
□ Intensa (Intense)
□ Muito Intensa (Very Intense)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
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4. Durante [ano/s ela/e dirigiu a Secretaria]*, qual o entendimento que a dire9 So da Secretaria 
Municipal de Saude e Servi5o Social tinha sobre o papel que deveria ser desempenhado pelos 
representantes dos usudrios nas atividades da CIMS?
(During [year/s s/he directed the Secretariat]*, what did the directors of the Municipal Health 
Secretariat think should be the role of user representatives in the activities of the CIMS?)
5. Descreva o papel que de fato desempenhavam os representantes dos usuarios nas atividades 
da CIMS, neste periodo.
(Describe the actual role of user representatives in the activities of the CIMS, during this 
period.)
6. Durante [ano/s ela/e dirigiu a Secretaria]*, tu dirias que a direfdo da Secretaria tinha:
(During [year/s s/he directed the Secretariat]*, would you say that the directors of the 
Secretariat had:)
□ Nenhum interesse (No interest)
□ Algum interesse (Some interest)
□ Razodvel interesse (Reasonable interest)
□ Forte interesse (Strong interest)
□ Muito forte interesse (Very strong interest)
Em promover a participa^o dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes que eram tomadas 
pela CIMS
(In promoting the participation of user representatives participation in decisions taken by the 
CIMS)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
7. Neste mesmo periodo quais foram as medidas ou as a9 0es concretas que a administra9do da 
Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social tomou para viabilizar esta participa9&>?
(In this same period, which measures or concrete actions were taken by the Municipal Health 
Secretariat to make feasible this participation?)
8. No periodo em que dirigiste a Secretaria, tu dirias que as entidades que representavam os 
usudrios - associa9des de moradores, centrais sindicais, etc - demonstravam:
(During the period in which you directed the Secretariat, would you say that the organisations 
representing users - residential associations, trade union confederations, etc. - showed:
□ Nenhum interesse (No interest)
□ Algum interesse (Some interest)
□ Razodvel interesse (Reasonable interest)
□ Forte interesse (Strong interest)
□ Muito forte interesse (Very strong interest)
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Em participar nas decision tomadas pela CIMS?
(In participating in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
9. Neste mesmo periodo, como era o relacionamento entre os representantes dos usuarios e a 
dire^do da Secreataria? Os representantes dos usuarios encaravam de que forma a dire^o da 
Secretaria?
(In this same period, how was the relationship between user representatives and Secretariat 
directors? How did user representatives view these directors?)
10. Quais eram as pessoas, os profissionais ou grupo de pessoas ou professionals, com os quais 
tu discutias as questdes referentes d politica de saude? Quais eram os autores ou grupo de 
autores, ou publicasdes ou entidades profissionais, politicas ou academicas que mais 
influenciaram na defmi5do da politica de saude que tua administrate implementou no 
municipio?
(With whom - people, professionals or group of people or professionals - did you discuss health 
policies? Which were the authors or author groups, publications or professional, political or 
academic organisations, which most influenced the definition of the health policies promoted by 
your administration?)
11. Durante [ano/s ela/e dirigiu a Secretaria]*, os funcionarios da Secretaria eram: 
(During [year/s s/he directed the Secretariat]*, the Secretariat civil servants had:)
□ Favordveis (Favoured)
□ Indiferentes (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitentes (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________ ._______________________________
A participagdo dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS? 
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
12. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participagdo dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
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13. Durante [ano/s ela/e dirigiu a Secretaria]*, a area de saude do govemo federal era: 
(During [year/s s/he directed the Secretariat]*, the federal health authorities had:)
□ Favordvel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa^o dos representantes dos usuarios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
14. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usuarios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
15. Durante [ano/s ela/e dirigiu a Secretaria]*, a area de saude do govemo estadual era: 
(During years [year/s s/he directed the Secretariat]*, the state health authorities had:)
□ Favordvel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa^o dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
16. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
17 . Durante [ano/s ela/e dirigiu a Secretaria]*, alguma central sindical participou das 
atividades da CIMS? [Se sim] Qual/s?
(During [year/s s/he directed the Secretariat]*, was there any trade union confederation 
participating in the CIMS? [If yes] Which one/s?)
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18. Durante [ano/s ela/e dirigiu a Secretaria]* , a/s central/s sindical/s era/m:
(During [year/s s/he directed the Secretariat]*, trade union confederation/s had:)
□ Favordvel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa^o dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
19. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
20. Que tu saibas, houve ao longo do periodo de existencia da CIMS, algum momento em que 
as entidades que representavam os usudrios decidiram priorizar a participa^o na CIMS?
(Do you know, whether, since the CIMS was created, there was a period when user 
organisations decided to prioritise their participation in the CIMS?)
Prdximas questdes aplicdveis para os que participaram entre 1987 e 1991
(The following questions are applicable to those participating between 1987 and 1991)
Observando o grdfico (Graph II. 1), como tu explicarias:
(Observing the graph (Graph II. 1), how would you explain:)
2 1 .0  aumento da presen9a dos usudrios nas reunides plendrias em 1987 e 1988?
(The increased user attendance at plenary meetings in 1987 and 1988?)
22. A queda na presen9a dos usudrios nas reunides plendrias em 1989 e 1990?
(The drop in user attendance at plenary meetings during 1989 and 1990?)
23 .0  aumento da presen9a dos usudrios nas reunides plendrias em 1991?
(The increased user attendance at plenary meetings in 1991?)
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Graph II. 1 - Average of Users Present at Plenary Meetings at Three Monthly Intervals -
Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
18 T
■
16 - -
Trimestre (Trimester)
SOURCE: Comiss3o Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre, "Atas de Reunides 
Plenarias - Listas de Preseni^a" (Porto Alegre, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servii^o Social, 
CIMS, 1985/1991), typewritten.
*When respondent had participated in more than a year or more than an administrative 
period of that type of health authority, the whole question was asked again
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Model 2 - Users
Respondent Identification: full name 
Place, date and time of interview
1. Durante [ano/s ela/e participou na CIMS]* a participa^o dos representantes dos usudrios 
nas decisdes que eram tomadas pela CIMS poderia ser classificada como:
(During [year/s s/he participated in the CIMS]* the participation of user representatives in 
decisions taken by CIMS could be classified as:)
□ Inexistente (Non-existent)
□ Fraca (Weak)
□ Razodvel (Reasonable)
□ Intensa (Intense)
□ Muito Intensa (Very Intense)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
2. Como tu descreverias o papel que de fato desempenhavam os representantes dos usuarios nas 
atividades da CIMS em [ano/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*?
(How would you describe the actual role of user representatives in the CIMS activities, in 
[year/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*?)
3. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, tu dirias que a dire^o da Secretaria 
Municipal de Saude e Servi9o Social tinha:
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, would you say that the directors of the 
Municipal Secretariat Health Secretariat had:)
□ Nenhum interesse (No interest)
□ Algum interesse (Some interest)
□ Razodvel interesse (Reasonable interest)
□ Forte interesse (Strong interest)
□ Muito forte interesse (Very strong interest)
Em promover a participa^o dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes que eram tomadas 
pela CIMS
(In promoting the participation of user representatives participation in decisions taken by the 
CIMS)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
4. Que tu saibas, houve ao longo do periodo de existencia da CIMS, algum momento em que as 
entidades que representavam os usudrios decidiram priorizar a participa^o na CIMS?
(Do you know, whether, since the CIMS was created, there was a period when user 
organisations decided to prioritise their participation in the CIMS?)
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5. Durante [ano/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, tu dirias que as entidades que representavam os 
usudrios - associa9des de moradores, centrais sindicais, etc - demonstravam:
(During [year/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, would you say that the organisations 
representing users - residential associations, trade union confederations, etc. - showed:
□ Nenhum interesse (No interest)
□ Algum interesse (Some interest)
□ Razodvel interesse (Reasonable interest)
□ Forte interesse (Strong interest)
□ Muito forte interesse (Very strong interest)
Em participar nas decision tomadas pela CIMS?
(In participating in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
6. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, como era o relacionamento entre os 
representantes dos usudrios e a direfdo da Secreataria? Os representantes dos usuarios 
encaravam de que forma a dire?ao da Secretaria?
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, how was the relationship between user 
representatives and Secretariat directors? How did user representatives view these directors?)
7. Quais sdo as pessoas - profissionais, Hderes sindicais ou lideres dos movimentos populares, 
etc - que tu mais confias?
(Whom, among professionals, trade union or popular movements’ leaders, etc., do you most 
regard as reliable?)
8. Quais sdo as pessoas, professionais ou grupo de pessoas e professionais, com quern tu 
discutes questdes relacionadas d politica de saude?
(With whom - people, professionals or group of people and professionals - do you discuss 
issues concerning health policies?)
9. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, os funciondrios da Secretaria Municipal de 
Saude e Servi9 0  Social eram:
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, the Municipal Health Secretariat civil 
servants had:)
□ Favordveis (Favoured)
□ Indiferentes (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitentes (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa9do dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
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Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
10. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usuarios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
11. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, a area de saude do govemo federal era: 
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, the federal health authorities had:)
□ Favoravel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa^o dos representantes dos usuarios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
12. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
13. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, a area de saude do govemo estadual era: 
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, the state health authorities had:)
□ Favordvel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa?do dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
14. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
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15. Durante [periodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, alguma central sindical participou das 
atividades da CIMS? [Se sim] Qual/s?
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, was there any trade union confederation 
participating in the CIMS? [If yes] Which one/s?)
16. Durante [year/s ela/e participou na CIMS]* , a/s centrais sindical/s era/m:
(During [year/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, trade union confederation/s had:)
□ Favordvel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa$&o dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
17. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^Ao dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
Prdximas questdes aplicdveis para os que participaram entre 1987 e 1991
(The following questions are applicable to those participating between 1987 and 1991)
Observando o grdfico (Graph II. 1), como tu explicarias:
(Observing the graph (Graph II. 1), how would you explain:)
18. O aumento da presenfa dos usudrios nas reunides plendrias em 1987 e 1988?
(The increased user attendance at plenary meetings in 1987 and 1988?)
19. A queda na presenfa dos usudrios nas reunides plendrias em 1989 e 1990?
(The drop in user attendance at plenary meetings during 1989 and 1990?)
20. O aumento da presen9a dos usudrios nas reunides plendrias em 1991?
(The increased user attendance at plenary meetings in 1991?)
*When respondent had participated in more than a year or more than an administrative
period of that type of health authority, the whole question was asked again
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Model 3 - Other Participants in the Commission
Respondent Identification: full name 
Place, date and time of interview
1. Durante [ano/s ela/e participou na CIMS]* a participa^o dos representantes dos usuarios 
nas decisdes que eram tomadas pela CIMS poderia ser classificada como:
(During [year/s s/he participated in the CIMS]* the participation of user representatives in 
decisions taken by the CIMS could be classified as:)
□ Inexistente (Non-existent)
□ Fraca (Weak)
□ Razodvel (Reasonable)
□ Intensa (Intense)
□ Muito Intensa (Very Intense)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta? 
(Could you explain your answer?)
2. Como tu descreverias o papel que de fato desempenhavam os representantes dos usudrios nas 
atividades da CIMS em [ano/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*?
(How would you describe the actual role of user representatives in the CIMS activities, in 
[year/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*?)
3. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, tu dirias que a dire^o da Secretaria 
Municipal de Saude e Servifo Social tinha:
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, would you say that the directors of the 
Municipal Secretariat Health Secretariat had:)
□ Nenhum interesse (No interest)
□ Algum interesse (Some interest)
□ Razodvel interesse (Reasonable interest)
□ Forte interesse (Strong interest)
□ Muito forte interesse (Very strong interest)
Em promover a participa^o dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes que eram tomadas 
pela CIMS
(In promoting the participation of user representatives participation in decisions taken by the 
CIMS)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
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4. Que tu saibas, houve ao longo do periodo de existencia da CIMS, algum momento em que as 
entidades que representavam os usuarios decidiram priorizar a participate) na CIMS?
(Do you know, whether, since the CIMS was created, there was a period when user
organisations decided to prioritise their participation in the CIMS?)
5. Durante [ano/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, tu dirias que as entidades que representavam os 
usuarios - associafdes de moradores, centrais sindicais, etc - demonstravam:
(During [year/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, would you say that the organisations
representing users - residential associations, trade union confederations, etc. > showed:
□ Nenhum interesse (No interest)
□ Algum interesse (Some interest)
□ Razodvel interesse (Reasonable interest)
□ Forte interesse (Strong interest)
□ Muito forte interesse (Very strong interest)
Em participar nas decision tomadas pela CIMS?
(In participating in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
6. Durante [periodo-s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, como era o relacionamento entre os 
representantes dos usudrios e a direfdo da Secreataria? Os representantes dos usudrios 
encaravam de que forma a d ire to  da Secretaria?
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, how was the relationship between user 
representatives and Secretariat directors? How did user representatives view these directors?)
7. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, os fimciondrios da Secretaria Municipal de 
Saude e Servico Social eram:
(During [period/s s/he participated in CIMS]*, the Municipal Health Secretariat civil servants 
had:)
□ Favordveis (Favoured)
□ Indiferentes (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitentes (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participato dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
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8. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usuarios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
9. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, a Area de saude do govemo federal era: 
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, the federal health authorities had:)
□ Favordvel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa^o dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
10. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
11. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, a drea de saude do govemo estadual era: 
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, the state health authorities had:)
□ Favordvel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________ _______________________________
A participa^do dos representantes dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
12. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido infludncia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
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13. Durante [perfodo/s ela/e participou na CIMS]*, alguma central sindical participou das 
atividades da CIMS? [Se sim] Qual/s?
(During [period/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, was there any trade union confederation 
participating in the CIMS? [If yes] Which one/s?)
14. Durante [year/s ela/e participou na CIMS]* , a/s centrais sindical/s era/m:
(During [year/s s/he participated in the CIMS]*, trade union confederation/s had:)
□ Favoravel (Favoured)
□ Indiferente (Been indifferent to)
□ Resitente (Resisted)
□ Outro (Other)______________________________________________________
A participa^o dos representantes dos usuarios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(The participation of user representatives in decisions taken by the CIMS?)
Tu poderias explicar tua resposta?
(Could you explain your answer?)
15. Tu achas que tal atitude teria tido influencia sobre o grau de participa^o dos representantes 
dos usudrios nas decisdes tomadas pela CIMS?
(Do you believe that such attitudes, influenced the degree of participation of user 
representatives in decision taken by the CIMS?)
Prdximas questdes aplicdveis para os que participaram entre 1987 e 1991
(The following questions are applicable to those participating between 1987 and 1991)
Observando o grafico (Graph II. 1), como tu explicarias:
(Observing the graph (Graph II. 1), how would you explain:)
16. O aumento da presen9a dos usuarios nas reunides plendrias em 1987 e 1988?
(The increased user attendance at plenaiy meetings in 1987 and 1988?)
17. A queda na presenya dos usuarios nas reunides plendrias em 1989 e 1990?
(The drop in user attendance at plenary meetings during 1989 and 1990?)
18.0  aumento da presen9a dos usudrios nas reunides plendrias em 1991?
(The increased user attendance at plenary meetings in 1991?)
*When respondent had participated in more than an year or more than a administrative
period of that type of health authority, the whole question was asked again
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Model 4 - Respondents Representing Brazilian Health System Reformers and the 
Medical Profession
Respondent Identification: full name 
Place, date and time of interview
1. Tu tens tido uma atua^o muito intensa na irea de saude, discutindo principalmente questSes 
relacionadas i  politica de saude. Qual € o projeto que tu e o grupo politico que tu integras 
defendem para o setor saude no pais?
(You have been intensely involved in the health area, mainly discussing issues related to health 
policies. What are the plans that you and the political group in which you take part support for 
the health sector in the country?)
2. Qual o papel que tu atribuirias aos usuarios dos servifos de saude neste projeto?
(What would be the role of health service users in these plans?)
Se importante, se teriam papel deliberative, perguntar a prdxima quest&o
(If important, if they would participate in the decision-making process, ask the following 
question)
3. Porque os usuirios teriam importincia t£o decisiva?
(Why would users be so important?)
4. Tu achas que existem diferen9as de entendimento quanto a questio saude entre o executivo 
central de govemo (Presidencia, Govemadores, Prefeitos) e os setores de saude destes govemos 
(Menist£rio da Saude, INAMPS, secretarias de Saude)? [Se existem] Que diferen9as s3o estas?
(Do you think there are differences in the understanding of health issues between the 
government’s central executive (Presidency, Governors, Mayors) and the government’s health 
areas (Ministry of Health, INAMPS, health secretariats)? [If there is] What are the differences?
5. Tendo em conta os seguintes atores politicos:
(1) Prefeitos,
(2) Secretirios Municipals de Saude,
(3) Representantes dos usuirios de servi9 0 s de saude,
(4) Representantes dos prestadores privados de servi9os de saude e
(5) Organisa9des que representam profissionais e trabalhadores dos servi9 0 s de saude 
Como est£o se articulando estes atores nos ultimos anos na irea de saude em Porto Alegre?
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(Taking into account the following political actors:
(1) Mayors,
(2) Municipal Secretaries of Health,
(3) User representatives,
(4) Private providers’ representatives and
(5) Health professionals and health workers representatives 
How have their relationships been in recent years in Porto Alegre?
6. Qual seria a forma desejdvel de articula^o entre estes atores, tendo em vista a proposta de 
politica de saude que tu defendes?
(What would be the ideal relationship between these actors, taking into account the plans for 
the health sector that you support?)
7. Como que tu caracterizarias as re la tes  entre o grupo de pessoas que como tu defendem este 
projeto e os representantes dos usuarios de servi9 0 s de saude?
(How would you characterise the relationship between people who like you support these plans 
for the health sector and the representatives of health service users?)
8. Quais eram as pessoas, os profissionais ou grupo de pessoas ou professionais, com os quais 
tu discutias as questftes referentes a politica de saude? Quais eram os autores ou grupo de 
autores, ou publica95es ou entidades profissionais, politicas ou academicas que mais 
influenciaram na defini9&o da politica de saude que tua administra9&o implementou no 
municipio?
(With whom - people, professionals or groups of people or professionals - did you discuss 
health policies? Which were the authors or author groups, publications or professional, political 
or academic organisations, which most influenced the definition of the health policies promoted 
by your administration?)
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Model 5 - Participants in the Commission Informing about Local Health 
Commissions
Respondent Identification: full name 
Place, date and time of interview
1. Durante [anos 1985 a 1991]*, havia comissOes locais de saude atuantes?
(During [years 1985 to 1991]*, were there active local health commissions?)
2. Durante [anos 1985 a 1991]*, a participate) dos usudrios nas comissdes locais de saude 
diminuiu, se manteve estavel ou aumentou?
(During [years 1985 to 1991]*, did user participation in local health commissions decreased, 
remain stable or increased?)
Se houve aumento
3. Em quais delas houve aumento? Porque? 
(If increased
In which of them did it increase? Why?)
Se diminuiu
4. Em quais delas diminuiu? Porque?
(If decreased
In which of them did it decrease? Why?)
5. Isto influiu no nivel de participato dos usudrios na comissdo municipal de saude? Porque? 
(Did this influence the degree of user participation in the municipal health commissions? Why?)
6. Tu poderias fazer um breve historico e caracterizato de cada uma das comissdes locais de 
saude?
(Could you briefly tell me about the evolution and main characteristics of each local health 
commission?)
CLIS 1 
CLIS2
[CLIS 3 to CLIS 10]
CLIS 11
*For each year the whole question was asked again
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Model 6- Respondent Representing CONASEMS
Respondent Identification: full name 
Place, date and time of interview
1. Qual tern sido o papel do CONASEMS no contexto das mudan9as que vem ocorrendo no 
sistema de saude Brasileiro?
(What has been the role of CONASEMS in the changes taking place in the Brazilian health 
system?)
2. Desde a cria^o das primeiras comissdes locais de saude houve mudan9as nestes f6runs? 
Gostaria que tu salientasses o cardter e a intensidade da participa9^o dos usuarios nestes foruns?
(Since the first commissions were created, were there changes in these fora? I would like you to 
highlight the nature and intensity of user participation in these fora?)
3. Qual 6 a propor9&> de municipios no pais que tern comiss£o ou conselho municipal de saude?
(What is the proportion of municipalities in the country with municipal health commissions or 
councils?)
4. Tu achas que esta proporpo9do varia de regido para regido? Tentando uma compara9ao qual 
seria a proporfdo de cidades com f6rum municipal de saude em cada regido do pais?
(Do you think that this proportion varies among the regions? Trying to compare, what would be 
the proportion of cities with municipal health fora in each region of the country?)
5. Existem diferen9as inter-regionais em termos da intensidade, autenticidade ou autonomia da 
participa9 i^o dos usuarios nestes foruns?
(Were there inter-regional differences in terms of intensity, authenticity or autonomy of user 
participation in these fora?)
6. As capitais dos estados se diferenciam em termos da intensidade e do efetivo poder de 
decisdo dos representantes dos usudrios nestes f6runs, se comparadas as demais cidades do 
pals? [Se se diferenciam] Em que termos?
(Are state capitals different in terms of the intensity of involvement and effective decision­
making power of user representatives in these fora when compared to other cities in the 
Country? [If so] In what ways are they different?)
7. Os f6runs das cidades maiores tambdm se differenciam dos das cidades menores?
(Are the fora of large cities different from those of small cities?)
8. Como tu situarias o Conselho Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre neste contexto? 
(How would you place Porto Alegre’s Municipal Health Council in this context?)
267
II.2. Questionnaires Sent to Local Health Commissions
Model 7- Questionnaire Sent to Co-ordinators of Local Health Commissions
Respondent Identification: full name 
Place, date
1. Sublinhe as respostas corretas 
(Underline the right answers)
A ComissSo Local de Saude se reunia periodicamente em: 
(Did the Local Health Commission meet regularly in:) 
[anos 1985 a 1991]* Sim N3o
[years 1985 to 1991]* (Yes) (No)
Se sim 
(If yes)
periodicidade: mensal quinzenal semanal
(frequency) (monthly) (fortnightly) (weekly)
outra_
(other)
2. Tu poderias caracterizar as atividades da Commiss3o Local de Saude durante: 
(Could you characterise the activities of the Local Health Commission during:)
1985
1986
[years 1987 to 1990]
1991
3. Como era a participa^o dos usuarios do distrito nas atividades da CommissSo Local e 
Municipal durante:
(How did users of the district participate in the activities of the Local and Municipal 
Commissions' during:)
1985
CLIS:
CIMS:
[years 1986 to 1990]
1991
CLIS:
CIMS:
*For each year the whole question was asked again
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Appendix III
Data of Graphs, Tables and Statistics
Table III.1 - Base for Graph 5.1 • Percentage of Deliberative Municipal Health Councils 
with Parity of User Representation, by Brazilian Region - 1991
Regions
Municipal
Councils
1*
Deliberative
Councils
2
Deliberative Councils with Half 
Representatives Being Users 
3
%
2/1
%
3/2
Brazil 348 287 144 82 50
South 130 114 67 88 59
Southeast 154 126 62 82 49
Northeast 38 30 11 79 37
Central-west 22 15 4 68 27
North 4 2 0 50 0
* Research surveyed 1 lper cent of the Brazilian cities (Instituto Brasileiro de Administrate* Municipal and others 
1991, 1).
SOURCE: Instituto Brasileiro de Administrate) Municipal and others, "Perfil dos Municipios 
na Area de Saude - Sintese" (Ministdrio da Saude, Fundato Nacional de Saude, IBAM, 1991), 
25, photocopied.
Table UL2 - Base for Graph 5.2 • Percentage of Porto Alegre Population Living in 
Illegally Occupied Areas - 1981/1991
Years Total Population Population in %
Irregular Areas
1981 1114867 182480 16
1991 1263239 391501 31
SOURCES: Giacomoni, James, A Comunidade como Instancia Executora do Planejamento: o 
Caso do "Orqamento Participativo" de Porto Alegre (PPGA - Departamento de Ciencias 
Administrativas da Faculdade de Ciencias Economicas - UFRGS, Porto Alegre, 1993), 107, 
photocopied.
Fundato Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, Anuario Estatistico do Brasil (Rio de 
Janeiro, IBGE, 1993), 208.
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Table UI.3 - Base for Graphs 6.1,6.2,6.3 and Table 6.2 - Attendance at Plenary Meetings 
by Type of Participant - Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
1st
M eeting D ate P roviders
H ealth
W orkers/
Professionals
U sers O thers
Non
Identified Total
1 02/09/85 7 0 0 0 0 7
2 09/09/85 13 0 0 1 0 14
3 16/09/85 10 0 0 2 2 14
4 24/09/85 10 0 0 3 0 13
•5 30/09/85 46 0 0 2 0 48
6 08/10/85 15 0 0 8 0 23
7 15/10/85 6 0 0 5 0 11
8 22/10/85 11 0 0 2 0 13
9 29/10/85 9 0 0 3 0 12
10 06/11/85 4 0 0 4 0 8
11 13/11/85 7 0 0 1 0 8
12 20/11/85 5 0 0 1 0 6
13 27/11/85 5 0 0 1 0 6
14 11/12/85 7 0 0 1 0 8
15 17/12/85 4 0 0 3 0 7
16 23/12/85 9 0 0 5 0 14
17 07/01/86 5 0 0 1 0 6
18 14/01/86 2 0 0 1 0 3
19 21/01/86 5 0 0 4 0 9
20 28/01/86 6 0 0 2 0 8
21 04/02/86 6 0 0 1 0 7
22 06/02/86 7 0 0 1 0 8
23 18/02/86 7 0 0 1 0 8
24 25/02/86 6 0 0 1 0 7
25 04/03/86 6 0 0 2 0 8
26 11/03/86 4 0 0 2 0 6
27 18/03/86 6 0 0 1 0 7
28 25/03/86 4 0 0 1 0 5
29 01/04/86 8 0 0 3 0 11
30 08/04/86 5 0 0 2 0 7
31 15/04/86 5 0 0 1 0 6
32 22/04/86 5 0 0 2 0 7
33 29/04/86 6 0 0 2 0 8
34 06/05/86 9 0 0 1 0 10
35 13/05/86 37 0 8 2 0 47
36 20/05/86 3 0 4 4 0 11
37 27/05/86 13 0 1 2 0 16
38 03/06/86 24 0 0 1 0 25
39 10/06/86 9 0 0 2 0 11
40 17/06/86 8 0 0 2 0 10
41 24/06/86 16 0 0 2 0 18
42 01/07/86 13 0 0 2 0 15
43 10/07/86 4 0 0 1 0 5
44 29/07/86 13 0 0 2 0 15
45 05/07/86 22 0 1 1 0 24
46 19/08/86 10 0 0 0 0 10
47 26/08/86 21 0 1 1 0 23
48
49
02/09/86
04/09/86
22 1 3 13 0 39
0
50 09/09/86 14 0 4 2 0 20
51 09/09/86 6 0 0 9 0 15
52 16/09/86 8 0 5 3 0 16
53 23/09/86 22 0 4 3 0 29
54 30/09/86 13 1 4 3 0 21
55 07/10/86 12 0 1 2 0 15
56 14/10/86 10 0 3 2 0 15
57 21/10/86 13 0 1 1 0 15
58 28/10/86 12 0 0 1 0 13
59 11/11/86 10 0 3 4 0 17
60 18/11/86 17 0 3 2 2 24
61 25/11/86 23 0 0 3 0 26
62 02/12/86 15 1 0 1 0 17
63 09/12/86 13 0 0 1 1 15
64 16/12/86 16 0 0 0 0 16
65 23/12/86 3 0 0 0 0 3
2nd^
M e
66“
67
68
69
70
71
72
-73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
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D ate Providers
H ealth
W orkers/
Professionals
Users O thers
Non
Identified T ota
30/12/86 5 0 0 1 0 6
06/01/87 7 0 0 1 0 8
13/01/87 18 0 0 1 0 19
20/01/87 6 0 0 1 0 7
27/01/87 7 0 0 1 0 8
03/02/87 5 0 0 1 0 6
10/02/87 5 0 0 2 0 7
17/02/87 7 0 0 3 0 10
24/02/87 8 0 0 2 0 10
10/03/87 28 3 0 0 0 31
17/03/87 26 2 2 2 0 32
24/03/87 21 2 7 0 0 30
31/03/87 13 2 4 0 0 19
07/04/87 14 2 2 0 0 18
14/04/87 24 1 2 1 0 28
28/04/87 16 2 7 3 0 28
05/05/87 27 0 10 5 0 42
12/05/87 19 2 11 8 0 40
19/05/87 13 1 5 0 0 19
26/05/87 21 1 5 0 0 27
02/06/87 18 2 12 0 0 32
09/06/87 17 2 4 0 0 23
16/06/87 17 2 2 0 0 21
07/07/87 20 2 6 2 0 30
14/07/87 16 2 3 0 0 21
21/07/87 16 2 4 0 0 22
28/07/87 19 2 5 3 2 31
04/08/87 18 0 8 0 0 26
11/08/87 17 3 5 5 1 31
18/08/87 21 2 9 1 0 33
25/08/87 17 2 6 0 2 27
01/09/87 18 1 5 1 1 26
03/09/87 12 11 5 1 1 30
22/09/87 9 8 7 0 0 24
01/10/87 24 12 22 1 3 62
27/10/87 24 0 0 8 0 32
05/11/87 25 9 22 1 1 58
12/11/87 11 5 13 0 2 31
19/11/87 15 0 9 1 1 26
03/12/87 27 9 15 0 0 51
10/12/87 13 6 10 1 4 34
07/01/88 12 5 12 1 1 31
04/02/88 23 6 8 3 0 40
11/02/88 9 6 8 0 1 24
10/03/88 17 7 11 4 4 43
17/03/88 11 6 15 4 1 37
05/05/88 21 10 11 1 4 47
19/05/88 21 9 8 3 4 45
09/06/88 23 8 8 3 1 43
07/07/88 18 8 6 2 0 34
21/07/88 16 2 7 1 0 26
04/08/88 25 10 9 1 1 46
18/08/88 27 7 13 1 1 49
01/09/88 22 10 11 6 5 54
15/09/88 19 10 12 2 12 55
13/10/88 19 5 24 182 8 238
20/10/88 19 6 15 4 3 47
27/10/88 13 9 10 0 0 32
03/11/88 18 3 23 0 35 79
17/11/88 14 5 9 1 3 32
01/12/88 13 6 7 2 0 28
08/12/88 16 6 7 1 2 32
15/12/88 13 9 15 2 1 40
05/01/89 28 10 9 3 2 52
19/01/89 28 6 8 0 0 42
26/01/89 58 8 14 0 1 81
16/02/89 14 7 6 3 0 30
02/03/89 14 2 3 1 0 20
16/03/89 12 4 8 2 1 27
29/03/89 6 4 8 2 0 20
06/04/89 23 6 11 2 2 44
13/04/89
27/04/89
9 4 5 0 0
O 
00
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3rd
M eeting D ate P roviders
H ealth
W orkers/
Professionals
Users O thers
Non
Identified T otal
139 04/05/89 22 3 7 5 0 37
140 18/05/89 36 8 10 6 3 63
141 01/06/89 18 6 9 1 0 34
142 15/06/89 19 2 10 1 3 35
143 06/07/89 12 3 4 1 4 24
144 13/07/89 16 6 10 4 4 40
145 20/07/89 13 1 7 1 4 26
•146 03/08/89 43 6 5 5 2 61
147 17/08/89 13 3 5 2 1 24
148 24/08/89 8 4 5 2 0 19
149 31/08/89 14 7 5 1 0 27
150 21/09/89 17 2 2 4 1 26
151 28/09/89 12 5 9 1 3 30
152 05/10/89 17 3 2 0 1 23
153 19/10/89 18 7 13 2 7 47
154 09/11/89 9 3 5 0 2 19
155 23/11/89 15 7 6 6 1 35
156 30/11/89 18 2 5 5 5 35
157 07/12/89 16 2 4 2 0 24
158 21/12/89 18 2 2 0 0 22
159 18/01/90 16 3 5 5 2 31
160 08/02/90 14 3 3 2 0 22
161 08/03/90 18 8 8 4 2 40
162 15/03/90 7 2 2 0 0 11
163 05/04/90 11 4 3 12 0 30
164 19/04/90 18 3 0 4 1 26
165 03/05/90 16 3 9 3 2 33
166 17/05/90 18 4 7 6 1 36
167 07/06/90 23 10 12 2 4 51
168 21/06/90 43 10 7 2 1 63
169 05/07/90 18 8 6 3 3 38
170 19/07/90 30 5 5 8 1 49
171 02/08/90 16 9 4 3 3 35
172 16/08/90 22 10 20 2 4 58
173 13/09/90 29 10 3 2 5 49
174 27/09/90 17 4 5 5 1 32
175 04/10/90 13 5 3 1 3 25
176 25/10/90 21 10 3 3 0 37
177 08/11/90 21 10 4 6 0 41
178 22/11/90 24 10 24 5 8 71
179 06/12/90 20 10 9 0 2 41
180 20/12/90 16 7 6 2 0 31
181 17/01/91 21 7 13 2 1 44
182 24/01/91 21 6 15 0 2 44
183 21/02/91 9 3 10 0 2 24
184 07/03/91 29 5 9 2 3 48
185 21/03/91 25 7 5 2 6 45
186 04/04/91 24 7 16 4 5 56
187 18/04/91 35 5 9 3 4 56
188 02/05/91 30 7 ■ 14 4 4 59
189 16/05/91 16 7 11 7 0 41
190 06/06/91 27 6 8 4 5 50
191 13/06/91 23 3 9 8 1 44
192 20/06/91 37 8 14 2 4 65
193 04/07/91 45 11 27 7 13 103
194 18/07/91 19 3 9 1 2 34
195 01/08/91 42 12 27 6 3 90
196 08/08/91 21 5 13 5 3 47
197 15/08/91 42 10 9 6 1 68
198 29/08/91 24 8 13 3 4 52
199 05/09/91 30 5 15 7 1 58
200 10/10/91 27 10 14 2 2 55
201 17/10/91 27 6 17 3 16 69
202 31/10/91 15 14 25 16 4 74
203 07/11/91 44 1 9 2 4 60
204 21/11/91 30 7 22 1 6 66
205 05/12/91 83 8 19 1 5 116
206 12/12/91 22 0 10 3 3 38
207 19/12/91 52 4 22 3 4 85
SOURCE: ComissSo Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre, "Atas de Reunides 
Plendrias” (Porto Alegre, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Serviso Social, CIMS, 12 May 1987 
to December 1988), attendance lists, typewritten.
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Table III.4 - Base for Graphs 6.4 and 6.5 - Attendance of Users at Plenary Meetings by Type of Organisation or Region They Came from - Porto
Alegre-CIMS-1985/1991
1st
Meeting Date UAMPA CUT C C T FRACAB FETAG Dist 1 Dist 2 Dist 3 Dist 4 Dist 5 Dist 6 Dist 7 Dist 8 Dist 9 Dist 10 Dist 11 T rade
Unions
Others Total
1 02/09/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 09/09/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 16/09/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 24/09/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 30/09/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 08/10/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 15/10/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 22/10/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 29/10/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 06/11/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 13/11/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 20/11/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 27/11/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 11/12/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 17/12/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 23/12/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 07/01/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 14/01/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 21/01/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 28/01/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 04/02/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 06/02/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 18/02/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 25/02/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 04/03/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 11/03/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 18/03/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 25/03/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 01/04/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 08/04/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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2nd
Meeting Date UAMPA CUT CGT FRACAB FETAG Dist 1 Dist 2 Dist 3 Dist 4 Dist 5 Dist 6 Dist 7 Dist 8 Dist 9 Dist 10 D is t i l T rade
Unions
O thers Total
31 15/04/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 22/04/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 29/04/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34 06/05/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 13/05/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 8
36 20/05/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4
37 27/05/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
38 03/06/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 10/06/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 17/06/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
41 24/06/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 01/07/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
43 10/07/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
44 29/07/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
45 05/07/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
46 19/08/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
47 26/08/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
48 02/09/86 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
49 04/09/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 09/09/86 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
51 09/09/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
52 16/09/86 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
53 23/09/86 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
54 30/09/86 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ■ 0 0 0 4
55 07/10/86 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
56 14/10/86 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
57 21/10/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
58 28/10/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
59 11/11/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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3rd
Meeting Date UAMPA CUT CGT FRACAB FETAG Dist 1 Dist 2 Dist 3 Dist 4 Dist 5 Dist 6 Dist 7 Dist 8 Dist 9 Dist 10 D is t i l T rade
Unions
Others Total
60 18/11/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
61 25/11/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
62 02/12/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
63 09/12/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
64 16/12/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
65 23/12/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
66 30/12/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
67 06/01/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
68 13/01/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 20/01/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 27/01/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 03/02/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72 10/02/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
73 17/02/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
74 24/02/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 10/03/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
76 17/03/87 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
77 24/03/87 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 I 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 7
78 31/03/87 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
79 07/04/87 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
80 14/04/87 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
81 28/04/87 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 7
82 05/05/87 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 10
83 12/05/87 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 - 0 2 0 11
84 19/05/87 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
85 26/05/87 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
86 02/06/87 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 12
87 09/06/87 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
88 16/06/87 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
89 07/07/87 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 6
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4th
Meeting Date UAMPA CUT CGT FRACAB FETAG Dist 1 Dist 2 Dist 3 Dist 4 Dist 5 Dist 6 Dist 7 Dist 8 Dist 9 Dist 10 D istil Trade
Unions
Others Total
90 14/07/87 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
91 21/07/87 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
92 28/07/87 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
93 04/08/87 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 8
94 11/08/87 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
95 18/08/87 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
% 25/08/87 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
97 01/09/87 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
98 03/09/87 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
99 22/09/87 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
100 01/10/87 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 2 7 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 22
101 27/10/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
102 05/11/87 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 6 1 1 0 0 4 0 1 2 22
103 12/11/87 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 13
104 19/11/87 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 9
105 03/ 12/87 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 15
106 10/12/87 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 10
107 07/01/88 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 12
108 04/02/88 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 8
109 11/02/88 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8
110 10/03/88 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 11
111 17/03/88 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 15
112 05/05/88 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 11
113 19/05/88 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 ■ 0 0 0 8
114 09/06/88 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8
115 07/07/88 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 6
116 21/07/88 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
117 04/08/88 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 9
118 18/08/88 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 13
119 01/09/88 2 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 11
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5th
Meeting Date UAMPA CUT CGT FRACAB FETAC Dist 1 Dist 2 Dist 3 Dist 4 Dist 5 Dist 6 Dist 7 Dist 8 Dist 9 Dist 10 Distil Trade
Unions
Others Tota
120 15/09/88 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 12
121 13/ 10/88 1 1 0 0 1 2 9 0 4 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 24
122 20/10/88 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 15
123 27/ 10/88 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 10
124 03/11/88 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 23
125 17/11/88 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 9
126 01/12/88 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 7
127 08/12/88 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 7
128 15/12/88 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
129 05/01/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 9
130 19/01/89 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 8
131 26/01/89 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 14
132 16/02/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6
133 02/03/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
134 16/03/89 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 8
135 29/03/89 1 1 0 1 I 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 8
136 06/04/89 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 11
137
138
13/04/89
27/04/89
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 5
139 04/05/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 7
140 18/05/89 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 10
141 01/06/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 9
142 15/06/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 10
143 06/07/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 > 0 0 0 4
144 13/07/89 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
145 20/07/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 7
146 03/08/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
147 17/08/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 I 0 0 0 0 5
148 24/08/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5
149 31/08/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 5
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6th
Meeting Date UAMPA CUT CGT FRACAB FETAG Dist 1 Dist 2 Dist 3 Dist 4 Dist 5 Dist 6 Dist 7 Dist 8 Dist 9 Dist 10 Distil Trade
Unions
Others Total
ISO 21/09/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
151 28/09/89 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 9
152 05/10/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
153 19/10/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 3 I 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 13
154 09/11/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
155 23/11/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6
156 30/11/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5
157 07/12/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
158 21/12/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
159 18/01/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
160 08/02/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
161 08/03/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
162 15/03/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
163 05/04/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
164 19/04/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
165 03/05/90 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 9
166 17/05/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
167 07/06/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 12
168 21/06/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7
169 05/07/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6
170 19/07/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5
171 02/08/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
172 16/08/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 16 0 0 1 0 20
173 13/09/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3
174 27/09/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
175 04/10/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 ■ 0 0 0 3
176 25/10/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3
177 08/ 11/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
178 22/11/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 11 0 0 6 24
179 06/12/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 9
180 20/12/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6
181 17/01/91 0 ■ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 13
182 24/01/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 0 3 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 15
183 21/02/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 10
184 07/03/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 9
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7th
Meeting Date UAMPA CUT CGT FRACAB FETAG Dist 1 Dist 2 Dist 3 Dist 4 Dist 5 Dist 6 Dist 7 Dist 8 Dist 9 Dist 10 Distil Trade
Unions
Others 1 Total
185 21/03/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5
186 04/04/91 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 1 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 16
187 18/04/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 9
188 02/05/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 1 14
189 16/05/91 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 11
190 06/06/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 8
191 13/06/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 9
192 20/06/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 1 1 2 4 0 0 0 14
193 04/07/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 2 3 3 1 2 9 0 0 1 27
194 18/07/91 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 9
195 01/08/91 1 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 3 3 5 2 1 2 6 1 2 0 27
1% 08/08/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 13
197 15/08/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 9
198 29/08/91 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 13
199 05/09/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 2 4 0 0 0 2 15
200 10/10/91 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 14
201 17/ 10/91 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 17
202 31/10/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 6 25
203 07/11/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 9
204 21/11/91 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 4 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 4 22
205 05/12/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 19
206 12/12/91 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 10
207 19/12/91 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 3 6 2 0 2 1 2 0 1 22
Total 81 39 11 36 16 19 150 64 188 136 68 59 27 136 106 7 56 52 1251
SOURCE: ComissSo Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre, "Atas de Reunifies Plen6rias" (Porto Alegre, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e 
Servi9 0  Social, CIMS, 12 May 1987 to December 1988), attendance lists, typewritten.
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Table III.5 - Base for Graphs 7.1 and 7.2 - Opinion of Participants in the Municipal 
Health Commission about the Position of Federal Health Authorities on User 
Participation: Number of Answers by Period - Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
Type of 1985/1988 1988/1989 1990/1991
Answer Non-User User Non-User User Non- User User
Resistant 6 2 4 1 3 1
Indifferent 4 1 5 3 5 4
In Favour 4 5 0 1 0 0
Missing 1 2 2 4 2 3
SOURCE: Interviews with Participants of Porto Alegre's CIMS. Interviewed by Soraya M. V. 
Cortes, September to December 1992, transcript, Interviewer Files, London.
Table HI.6 - Base for Graphs 7.3 and 7.4 - Opinion of Participants in the Municipal 
Health Commission about the Position of State Health Authorities on User Participation: 
Number of Answers by Period - Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
Type of 1985/1986 1987/1990 1991
Answer Non- Users Users Non- Users Users Non- Users Users
Resistant 1 0 6 2 3 5
Indifferent 4 0 4 4 1 1
In Favour 2 2 5 4 3 2
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOURCE: Interviews with Participants of Porto Alegre's CIMS. Interviewed by Soraya M. V. 
Cortes, September to December 1992, transcript, Interviewer Files, London.
Table HL7 - Base for Graphs 7.5 and 7.6 - Opinion of Participants in the Municipal 
Health Commission about the Position of Municipal Health Authorities on User 
Participation: Number of Answers by Period - Porto Alegre - CIMS - 1985/1991
Type of 1985 1986 1987/1988 1989/11991
Answer Non-
Users
| Users Non-
Users
Users Non-
Users
Users Non-
Users
Users
No/Some Interest 4 0 3 0 6 5 0 0
Reasonable Interest 1 0 1 1 3 2 1 0
Strong/Very Strong Interest 0 0 2 1 4 3 11 9
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOURCE: Interviews with Participants of Porto Alegre's CIMS. Interviewed by Soraya M. V. 
Cortes, September to December 1992, transcript, Interviewer Files, London.
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Table IIL8 - Base for Graph 7.7 - Issues Discussed in Plenary Meetings: Per cent of 
Meetings, During Each Six Month Period, by Different Types of Issues - Porto Alegre
CIMS -1985 and 1991
1st
M eetings D ate
Them es
M inor Financial L abou r Local C IM S’
Regulations
N at H ealth  
Policies
O rg  o f H ealth  Serv 
in P  A legre
1 02/09/85 O' 0 0 0 1* 0 1
2 09/09/85 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
3 16/09/85 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
4 24/09/85 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
5 30/09/85 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
6 08/10/85 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
7 15/10/85 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
8 22/10/85 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
9 29/10/85 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
10 06/11/85 0 1 I 0 0 0 0
11 13/11/85 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
12 20/11/85 1 1 0 0 I 0 0
13 27/11/85 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
14 11/12/85 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
15 17/12/85 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
16 23/12/85 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
17 07/01/86 1 0 0 0 I 0 1
18 14/01/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 21/01/86 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
20 28/01/86 0 1 0 0 I 0 0
21 04/02/86 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
22 06/02/86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
23 18/02/86 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
24 25/02/86 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
25 04/03/86 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
26 11/03/86 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
27 18/03/86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
28 25/03/86 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
29 01/04/86 0 1 0 0 I 0 1
30 08/04/86 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
31 15/04/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
32 22/04/86 1 0 0. 0 0 0 1
33 29/04/86 1 0 0 0 0 0
34 06/05/86 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
35 13/05/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
36 20/05/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
37 27/05/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
38 03/06/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
39 10/06/86 1 1 0 0 1 0
40 17/06/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
41 24/06/86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
42 01/07/86 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
43 10/07/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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2nd
Meetings Date
Themes
Minor Financial Labour Local CIMS’
Regulations
Nat Health 
Policies
Org of Health Serv 
in P Alegre
44 29/07/86 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
45 05/07/86 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
46 19/08/86 1 I 0 0 0 0 1
47 26/08/86 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
48 02/09/86 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
49 04/09/86 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
50 09/09/86 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
51 09/09/86 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
52 16/09/86 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
53 23/09/86 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
54 30/09/86 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
55 07/10/86 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
56 14/10/86 0 0 1 0 0 1
57 21/10/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
58 28/10/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
59 11/11/86 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
60 18/11/86 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
61 25/11/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
62 02/12/86 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
63 09/12/86 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
64 16/12/86 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
65 23/12/86 0 0 0 0 0 0
66 30/12/86 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
67 06/01/87 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
68 13/01/87 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
69 20/01/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 27/01/87 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
71 03/02/87 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
72 10/02/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
73 17/02/87 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
74 24/02/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
75 10/03/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
76 17/03/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
77 24/03/87 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
78 31/03/87 0 0 0 . 1 1 0 1
79 07/04/87 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
80 14/04/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
81 28/04/87 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
82 05/05/87 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
83 12/05/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
84 19/05/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
85 26/05/87 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
86 02/06/87 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
87 09/06/87 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
88 16/06/87 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
89 07/07/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
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3rd
Meetings Date
Themes
Minor Financial Labour Local CIMS’
Regulations
Nat Health 
Policies
Org of Health Serv 
in P Alegre
90 14/07/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
91 21/07/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
92 28/07/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
93 04/08/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
94 11/08/87 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
95 18/08/87 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
96 25/08/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
97 01/09/87 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
98 03/09/87 0 0 0 0 I 0 0
99 22/09/87 0 0 1 0 0 0 I
100 01/10/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
101 27/10/87 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
102 05/11/87 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
103 12/11/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
104 19/11/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
105 03/12/87 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
106 10/12/87 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
107 07/01/88 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
108 04/02/88 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
109 11/02/88 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
110 10/03/88 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
111 17/03/88 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
112 05/05/88 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
113 19/05/88 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
114 09/06/88 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
115 07/07/88 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
116 21/07/88 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
117 04/08/88 0 1 0 0 0 1
118 18/08/88 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
119 01/09/88 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
120 15/09/88 0 1 1 1 I 1 1
121 13/10/88 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
122 20/10/88 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
123 27/10/88 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
124 03/11/88 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
125 17/11/88 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
126 01/12/88 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
127 08/12/88 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
128 15/12/88 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
129 05/01/89 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
130 19/01/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
131 26/01/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
132 16/02/89 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
133 02/03/89 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
134 16/03/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
135 29/03/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
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4th
Meetings Date
Themes
Minor Financial Labour Local CIMS’
Regulations
Nat Health 
Policies
Org of Health Serv 
in P Alegre
136 06/04/89 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
137 13/04/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
138 27/04/89 0 1 0 1 0 0 t
139 04/05/89 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
140 18/05/89 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
141 01/06/89 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
142 15/06/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
143 06/07/89 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
144 13/07/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
145 20/07/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
146 03/08/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
147 17/08/89 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
148 24/08/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
149 31/08/89 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
150 21/09/89 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
151 28/09/89 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
152 05/10/89 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
153 19/10/89 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
154 09/11/89 0 1 0 1 0 0
155 23/11/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
156 30/11/89 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
157 07/12/89 0 1 0 0 1 0
158 21/12/89 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
159 18/01/90 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
160 08/02/90 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
161 08/03/90 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
162 15/03/90 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
163 05/04/90 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
164 19/04/90 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
165 03/05/90 0 0 0 1 1 0
166 17/05/90 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
167 07/06/90 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
168 21/06/90 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
169 05/07/90 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
170 19/07/90 0 1 0 . 1 0 0 1
171 02/08/90 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
172 16/08/90 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
173 13/09/90 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
174 27/09/90 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
175 04/10/90 1 0 0 0 0 0
176 25/10/90 1 1 0 0 1 0
177 08/11/90 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
178 22/11/90 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
179 06/12/90 0 1 0 0 1 0
180 20/12/90 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
181 17/01/91 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
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5th
Meetings Date
Themes
Minor Financial Labour Local CIMS'
Regulations
Nat Health 
Policies
Org of Health Serv 
in P Alegre
182 24/01/91 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
183 21/02/91 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
184 07/03/91 0 1 0 0 0 1
185 21/03/91 1 1 0 1 0 0
186 04/04/91 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
187 18/04/91 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
188 02/05/91 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
189 16/05/91 1 1 0 0 1 0
190 06/06/91 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
191 13/06/91 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
192 20/06/91 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
193 04/07/91 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
194 18/07/91 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
195 01/08/91 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
196 08/08/91 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
197 15/08/91 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
198 29/08/91 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
199 05/09/91 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
200 10/10/91 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
201 17/10/91 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
202 31/10/91 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
203 07/11/91 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
204 21/11/91 0 0 0 1 1 0 I
205 05/12/91 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
206 12/12/91 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
207 19/12/91 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
O' - The issue was not present on the agenda of the meeting 
l3 - The issue was present cm the agenda of the meeting
SOURCE: Comissao Interinstitucional Municipal de Saude de Porto Alegre, "Atas de ReuniOes 
Plen&rias" (Porto Alegre, Secretaria Municipal de Saude e Servi9 0  Social, CIMS, 1985/1991), 
typewritten.
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